There is little agreement among moral and political philosophers when it comes to determining what it is that makes adaptive preferences problematic. The large number of competing explanations offered by philosophers illustrates the absence of any consensus. The most prominent versions of these explanations have recently come under attack by Dale Dorsey, who argues that adaptive preferences are a red herring: the problematic nature of adaptive preferences is not explained by the fact of adaptation but by an appeal to some (...) other normative consideration. In this article I offer an account of adaptive preferences that both accommodates the thought that only some of our adaptive preferences are problematic and responds to the skeptical challenge pressed by Dorsey. I argue that some adaptive preferences are prima facie irrational as they exhibit a peculiar error in reasoning where individuals change the semantic content of the reasons underpinning the new preference. (shrink)

Aristotle notoriously excludes free women and both male and female artisans and slaves from citizenship in the polis on the basis of an identifiable difference in nature: all of these groups, unlike free males, possess and exhibit some delinquency in their capacity for reason. Commentators have typically interpreted Aristotle’s comments on the nature of free women by suggesting that free women by nature have heightened or increased propensities towards incontinent behavior. If this is indeed the only difference between the natures (...) of free men and free women, then it remains difficult to see why the appropriate modes of education in addition to the practice of habit would fail to ameliorate this deficiency in free women. My intention is to argue that Aristotle does think of the difference in the capacity for reason between free men and free women as a difference of kind—namely, women lack the capacity to develop practical reason—and as a result, justifiably, at least within the suppositions of his own position, excludes free women from citizenship. (shrink)

Violence risk assessment tools are increasingly used within criminal justice and forensic psychiatry, however there is little relevant, reliable and unbiased data regarding their predictive accuracy. We argue that such data are needed to (i) prevent excessive reliance on risk assessment scores, (ii) allow matching of different risk assessment tools to different contexts of application, (iii) protect against problematic forms of discrimination and stigmatisation, and (iv) ensure that contentious demographic variables are not prematurely removed from risk assessment tools.

BackgroundMedical errors, unsatisfactory outcomes, or treatment complications often prompt patient complaints about healthcare providers. In response, physicians may adopt defensive practices to mitigate objections, avoid complaints, and navigate lengthy trial processes or other potential threats. However, such defensive medicine (DM) practices can carry risks, including potential harm to patients and the imposition of unnecessary costs on both patients and the healthcare system. Moreover, these practices may run counter to accepted ethical standards in medicine.MethodsThis qualitative study involved conducting semi-structured interviews with (...) 43 physicians, among whom 38 were faculty members at medical universities, 42 had administrative experience at various levels of the health system, and 23 had previously served as health system policymakers. On average, the participants had approximately 23.5 years of clinical experience. The selection of participants was based on purposive sampling. Data collection through interviews continued until data saturation was achieved.ResultsBased on the findings, DM manifests in both positive and negative forms, illustrated by instances like ordering unnecessary lab tests, imaging, or consultations, reluctance to admit high-risk patients, and avoiding high-risk procedures. The study participants identified a range of underlying and contextual factors contributing to DM, encompassing organizational-managerial, social, personal, and factors inherent to the nature of defensive medical practices. The results also highlight proposed strategies to address and prevent DM, which can be grouped into organizational-managerial, social, and those focused on modifying the medical complaints management system.ConclusionDM is a multifaceted and significant phenomenon that necessitates a comprehensive understanding of its various aspects, including interconnected and complex structures and underlying and contextual factors. While the results of this study offer a solid foundation for informing policy decisions within the healthcare system and include some explanatory policy suggestions, we encourage policymakers to complement the findings of this study with other available evidence to address any potential limitations and to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the policymaking process related to DM. (shrink)

Critical thinking, considered as a version of informallogic, must consider emotions and personal attitudesin assessing assertions and conclusions in anyanalysis of discourse. It must therefore presupposesome notion of the self. Critical theory may be seenas providing a substantive and non-neutral positionfor the exercise of critical thinking. It thereforemust presuppose some notion of the self. This paperargues for a Foucauldean position on the self toextend critical theory and provide a particularposition on the self for critical thinking. Thisposition on the self is (...) developed from moretraditional accounts of the self from Descartes toSchopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

What is the 'good life'? Is it a life completely devoted to intellect, or should we take for granted the hedonistic position, which says that pleasure is the absolute good? The hedonist subordinates everything to pleasure, and tests anything in a rigorous calculus for the amount of pleasure it yields. It is against this hedonism that Plato turns himself in a unique manner in his dialogue Philebus. After having reached a deadlockin a sterile opposition between hedonism and intellectualism in his (...) former works, Platonow wants to dig deeper. He wants to criticize hedonism from within. In the first place, Plato investigates the proper nature of pleasure. It is to be situated within the continuous fluxus of our lives; a going back and forth between lack and replenishment. The limit that gives sense to this movement is the 'natural state', which we never attain in its purity. The role of intellect is hereby reduced to a strictminimum. It seems to be mainly a faculty which concerns the recognition and experience of pleasure as pleasure. In this way, Plato strives to establish a certain degree of consensus of opinion with hedonism, in order to be able to refute it afterwards. This refutation is supported by the formal structure of the dialogue: it consists in a gradual 'conversion' of a hedonist, who will eventually be brought into the intellectualist camp of Socrates. The critique to which Socrates' interlocutor yields is based on three main ideas. 1.Hedonism pretends to know what the good is. Plato counters this with a moderate intellectualism, taking the good to be undecided, and providing a place also for pleasure within the good life. 2. Moreover, Plato reveals an internal contradiction in hedonism: every hedonist will, if possible, prefer a 'pure' pleasure, in which the mixture with its contrary, pain, is as small as possible. However, this purity cannot be reduced to the hedonistic calculus. 3. Finally, the choice of the title of this dialogue is to be seenas a part of Plato's critique against hedonism. The main character Philebus refuses to engage in the debate. Plato suggests by this that he who proclaimspleasure to be the only intrinsic good is unable to partake in a discussion about pleasure. For he would, before any argument whatever, subordinate pleasure to truth and reason. If a hedonist is willing to argue he has already surrendered, and will be 'converted' whether he wants it or not. (shrink)

Erroneously attributing propositional attitudes (desires, beliefs...) to computational artefacts has become internationally commonplace in the public arena, especially amongst the new generation of non-initiated users. Technology for rendering machines “user-friendly” is often inspired by interpersonal human communication. This calls forth designers to conceptualise a major component of human intelligence: the sense ofcommunicability, and its logical consequences. The inherentincommunicability of machines subsequently causes a shift in design strategy. Though cataloguing components of bouts between person and machine with Speech Act Theory has (...) been popular, I will endeavour to present thesine qua non for their insertion into a larger unit of discourse — their societal embodiment. I shall argue that the so-called “intelligence” of the artificial should to be seenas a purposeful act that is socially generated, because it comes of Man,for Man. Designership will provide the forum for evolving user requirements and interface renewal. (shrink)