Central to Spinozism is the thesis that the immanence of the Divine Substance in the cosmos (in natural objects) is – like the immanence of the dancer in the dance –maximal or total. Just as the dance consists entirely of the dancer in aesthetically‐stylized motion, so the domain of nature is nothing in addition to God in cosmic guise. Accordingly, natural objects constitute modes of God. Hence, Spinozism and (traditional) theism are obviously irreconcilable. For it is indispensable to theism that (...) the immanence of God in the cosmos is not maximal; rather, that natural objects are distinct from the Divine Substance. Now it has standardly been presupposed by theists (and many others) that natural objects could not be distinct from God without being ontologically exterior to God; thus, that theism would readily collapse into Spinozism if the cosmos was interior to the Divine Substance. It seems to me that this is a long‐standing mistake. After demonstrating that there is probative warrant for maintaining that theism requires the interiority of natural objects to God, there is shown to be more than adequate justification for denying that this necessitates the collapse of theism into Spinozism. (shrink)

Many philosophers have contended that (traditional) theism or supernaturalism suffers from what can properly be called the Problem of Divine Hiddenness (the PDH ). [See Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002]. Moreover, it is the contention of many proponents of the PDH that this “problem,” if, indeed, not just a component of the “problem of evil,” bears a striking similarity to the latter. Specifically, at the heart of this ostensible difficulty for theism is that Divine “Hiddenness,” like pain and suffering—or at least (...) pain and suffering in the amount that the world contains—is precisely the opposite of what one would expect if there existed a (maximally great) supernatural Person. Accordingly, it is maintained by proponents of the PDH that supernaturalism is disconfirmed by the relevant “problem.” The aim of this essay is to establish that there is more than ample metaphysical warrant (of a sort overlooked thus far) for maintaining that the “hiddenness” of God is exactly what should be expected if theism is true. Thus, the conclusion we hope to secure is that the PDH has considerably less to recommend it than its proponents have thought, and, accordingly, that it fails to constitute an effective threat to supernaturalism. (shrink)

The doctrine of Tzimzum (or divine “withdrawal”) occupies pride of place in the Jewish mystical tradition as a response to what is arguably the chief theological or metaphysical concern of that tradition: namely, how God’s Infinity or Absolute Unlimitedness does not preclude the existence of a distinct domain of finite being. Alternatively, how can it be that God, by virtue of His Maximal Plenteousness, does not exhaust the whole of Reality? I attempt to show that, while a plausible argument - (...) one that does not involve the idea of Tzimzum --- can be mounted against this “pantheism” problem, the doctrine of Tzimzum has considerable force as the nucleus of a theodicy. (shrink)

While proponents of traditional theism obviously reject the “pantheistic” metaphysic that there is nothingwhich is ultimately distinct from God—i.e., that the Divine Substance exhausts the whole of Reality—it seems tome that the following question is yet properly to be addressed: given that the doctrine of God’s infinity or absolute unlimitedness is no less axiomatic or nonnegotiably foundational to traditional theism than it is to the pantheistic interpretation of reality, how can traditional theists justifiably deny that the Divine Substance exhausts the (...) whole of Reality? What acceptable basis do traditional theists have—given their presupposition that God is absolutely unlimited—for denying the long-standing contention of Spinoza and Spinozists that the Divine Being of canonical Judeo-Christian belief could not ultimately fail to be all-inclusive? (shrink)

While proponents of traditional theism obviously reject the “pantheistic” metaphysic that there is nothingwhich is ultimately distinct from God—i.e., that the Divine Substance exhausts the whole of Reality—it seems tome that the following question is yet properly to be addressed: given that the doctrine of God’s infinity or absolute unlimitedness is no less axiomatic or nonnegotiably foundational to traditional theism than it is to the pantheistic interpretation of reality, how can traditional theists justifiably deny that the Divine Substance exhausts the (...) whole of Reality? What acceptable basis do traditional theists have—given their presupposition that God is absolutely unlimited—for denying the long-standing contention of Spinoza and Spinozists that the Divine Being of canonical Judeo-Christian belief could not ultimately fail to be all-inclusive? (shrink)

The doctrine of Tzimzum (or divine “withdrawal”) occupies pride of place in the Jewish mystical tradition as a response to what is arguably the chief theological or metaphysical concern of that tradition: namely, how God’s Infinity or Absolute Unlimitedness does not preclude the existence of a distinct domain of finite being. Alternatively, how can it be that God, by virtue of His Maximal Plenteousness, does not exhaust the whole of Reality? I attempt to show that, while a plausible argument - (...) one that does not involve the idea of Tzimzum --- can be mounted against this “pantheism” problem, the doctrine of Tzimzum has considerable force as the nucleus of a theodicy. (shrink)

This anthology deserves a big scholarly cheer from those philosophers—on the increase, I believe—who regard the Bishop of Cloyne as a theistic metaphysician and epistemologist of perception of the first importance. Also, these essays should prove beneficial to those benighted ‘educated laymen’ whose understanding of Immaterialism is exhausted by Samuel Johnson’s kicking of the stone.

I am grateful to Mr Levine for his careful and accurate rendering of the thesis which I presented and defended in my first paper on the topic of ‘self-authenticating religious experience’. As should be reasonably clear from his remarks, I defended therein the negative and somewhat modest epistemological thesis that even if it is inconceivable for there to occur self-authenticating experience of God, it is far from obvious that such is the case. Hence, it seems to me that the claim (...) of more than a few theistic mystics to have had such experience is entitled to something more than the rather cavalier rejection it has received at the hands of many ‘tough-minded’ epistemologists of religion. (shrink)

I am grateful to Philip Quinn for his thorough and penetrating critique of my paper on classical theism and pantheism. He has given me much to think about, and it would be philosophically remiss of me not to acknowledge that – in the light of his remarks – the argument which I employed in defence of the thesis that classical theism implies a version of pantheism might well benefit from some amendment. However, the purpose of this brief counter-rejoinder is to (...) establish that the nexus of my argument has emerged from his commentary in reasonably robust health, i.e., to demonstrate that if the argument of my former paper is to be rejected, it will take something more than Professor Quinn's critique to make that clear. Very concisely, then, my response is as follows: At a preliminary point, Professor Quinn claims that my argument ‘merits careful scrutiny’ because, if it succeeds, ‘something shockingly at variance with received views’ will have been established . I find this to be somewhat odd. For it seems clear that St Paul was a ‘classical theist’, indeed a very special one in so far as the shaping of Christian theism is concerned. And while his famous and oftcited dictum that God is the One in Whom ‘we live, move, and have our being’ may be such that it is permissible to construe it in ways which do not imply any version of pantheism, it clearly seems unjustified to maintain that pantheistic doctrines are ‘shockingly at variance’ with that most intriguing statement of St Paul's. (shrink)

In "anselm's discovery", professor hartshorne argues that there is 'no issue' between theism and pantheism. classical or orthodox theists, it seems eminently fair to say, can be expected to recoil from such a claim with more than a little indignation. what i attempt to establish, however, is that hartshorne is correct. in short, i argue that the doctrine of 'god's-constant-conservation-of-all-things' (clearly an essential or integral doctrine of classical theism) entails that the 'spatiotemporal' matrix has the property of being included within (...) the being of god "essentially". if this is so, however, classical theism shows itself to be incoherent insofar as god would not then be immutable (an essential property of god, according to classical theism). (shrink)

In Anselm's Discovery , Professor Hartshorne makes the rather startling and counterintuitive claim that ‘…there is indeed no issue between theism and pantheism. We all exist in the divine being, as St Paul said.’ 1 Classical or orthodox theists, it seems eminently fair to say, can be expected to recoil from any such suggestion with more than a little indignation. First of all, it might well be objected that Hartshorne - as a ‘process theist’ - is not a classical theist, (...) and, consequently, while there may be no issue between pantheism and his brand of theism, such is simply not the case in so far as classical theism is concerned. According to the latter - in contradistinction, of course, to Hartshorne's ‘neoclassical theism’ - immutability is an ‘essential’ property of God; as such, it would be a conceptual error to ascribe any contingent states to God at all. Now as is well known by philosophers of religion, Hartshorne regards this immutability doctrine of classical theism as a serious ‘logical blunder’ , one which - in so far as it reflects the ‘Greek bias’ which has always identified perfection with the absolutely unchangeable - is profoundly distortive of the biblical concept of Deity. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clear up the long-standing veritable mountain of misinterpretation, perpetuated from critic to critic, concerning the admittedly problematic concept of self-authenticating religious experience. While it may well be the case, as many have argued, that a sort of ‘experience’ about which one could not be mistaken is simply a logically impossible state of affairs, this cannot be known to be the case so long as what is under attack is a bogus concept, obviously absurd, (...) having nothing whatsoever to do with the correct interpretation of ‘self-authentication’. Hence, my mission herein is essentially that of philosophical analysis or clarification of meaning. Only upon suitable clarification of this concept will we be in a position to consider the question of its possible application, i.e. whether or not there could be an instantiation of such experience. I might point out that my central concern is somewhat more explicatory than historical, though I believe that the account developed in this paper is essentially congenial with the intent of those who have been proponents of the view that there can be self-authenticating religious experience. Let us begin, then, by turning to some representative criticism of the concept in question. (shrink)