Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.

In these three Tanner lectures, distinguished ethical theorist Allan Gibbard explores the nature of normative thought and the bases of ethics. In the first lecture he explores the role of intuitions in moral thinking and offers a way of thinking about the intuitive method of moral inquiry that both places this activity within the natural world and makes sense of it as an indispensable part of our lives as planners. In the second and third lectures he takes up the (...) kind of substantive ethical inquiry he has described in the first lecture, asking how we might live together on terms that none of us could reasonably reject. Since working at cross purposes loses fruits that might stem from cooperation, he argues, any consistent ethos that meets this test would be, in a crucial way, utilitarian. It would reconcile our individual aims to establish, in Kant's phrase, a "kingdom of ends." The volume also contains an introduction by Barry Stroud, the volume editor, critiques by Michael Bratman (Stanford University), John Broome (Oxford University), and F. M. Kamm (Harvard University), and Gibbard's responses. (shrink)

Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a prespecified list of alternatives and (...) if there are at least three additional alternatives not on this list, replacing nondictatorship by anonymity results in an impossibility theorem. (shrink)

This book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational?

Choices can be wise or foolish, and feelings can be apt or off the mark. So we judge, and it would be good to know what content these normative judgements carry. Gibbard offers an answer, and elaborates it. His theory explores what is at issue in narrowly moral questions, and in questions of rational thought and conduct in general.

An original and elegant work of metaethics, this book brings a new clarity and rigor to the discussion of these tangled issues, and will significantly alter the ...

Identities formed with proper names may be contingent. this claim is made first through an example. the paper then develops a theory of the semantics of concrete things, with contingent identity as a consequence. this general theory lets concrete things be made up canonically from fundamental physical entities. it includes theories of proper names, variables, cross-world identity with respect to a sortal, and modal and dispositional properties. the theory, it is argued, is coherent and superior to its rivals, in that (...) it stems naturally from a systematic picture of the physical world. (shrink)

Philosophers have long suspected that thought and discourse about what we ought to do differ in some fundamental way from statements about what is. But the difference has proved elusive, in part because the two kinds of statement look alike. Focusing on judgments that express decisions--judgments about what is to be done, all things considered--Allan Gibbard offers a compelling argument for reconsidering, and reconfiguring, the distinctions between normative and descriptive discourse--between questions of "ought" and "is." Gibbard considers how (...) our actions, and our realities, emerge from the thousands of questions and decisions we form for ourselves. The result is a book that investigates the very nature of the questions we ask ourselves when we ask how we should live, and that clarifies the concept of "ought" by understanding the patterns of normative concepts involved in beliefs and decisions. An original and elegant work of metaethics, this book brings a new clarity and rigor to the discussion of these tangled issues, and will significantly alter the long-standing debate over "objectivity" and "factuality" in ethics. Table of Contents: I. Preliminaries 1. Introduction: A Possibility Proof 2. Intuitionism as Template: Emending Moore II. The Thing to Do 3. Planning and Ruling Out: The "Frege-Geach" Problem 4. Judgment, Disagreement, Negation 5. Supervenience and Constitution 6. Character and Import III. Normative Concepts 7. Ordinary Oughts: Meaning and Motivation 8. Normative Kinds: Patterns of Engagement 9. What to Say about the Thing to Do: The Expressivistic Turn and What it Gains Us IV. Knowing What to Do 10. Explaining with Plans 11. Knowing What to Do 12. Ideal Response Concepts 13. Deep Vindication and Practical Confidence 14. Impasse and Dissent References Index This is a remarkable book. It takes up a central and much-discussed problem - the difference between normative thought and "descriptive" thought. It develops a compelling response to that problem with ramifications for much else in philosophy. But perhaps most importantly, it brings new clarity and rigor to the discussion of these tangled issues. It will take some time to come to terms with the details of Gibbard's discussion. It is absolutely clear, however, that the book will reconfigure the debate over objectivity and "factuality" in ethics. --Gideon Rosen, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University Gibbard,/author> writes elegantly, and the theory he develops is innovative, philosophically sophisticated, and challenging. Gibbard defends his theory vigorously and with admirable intellectual honesty. --David Copp, Professor of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University. (shrink)

What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, on core metaethical issues. Naturalist (...) moral realism, once devastated by the charge of "naturalistic fallacy," has been reinvigorated, as have versions of moral realism that insist on the discontinuity between ethics and science. Irrealist, expressivist programs have also developed with great subtlety, encouraging the thought that a noncognivist account may actually be able to explain ethical judgments' aspirations to objectivity. Neo-Kantian constructivist theories have flourished as well, offering hope that morality can be grounded in a plausible conception of reasonable conduct. Together, the positions advanced in the essays collected here address these recent developments, constituting a rich array of approaches to contemporary moral philosophy's most fundamental debates. An extensive introduction by Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton is also included, making this volume the most comprehensive and up-to-date work of its kind. Moral Discourse is ideally suited for use in courses in contemporary ethics, ethical theory, and metaethics. (shrink)

Arrow’s impossibility result stems chiefly from a combination of two requirements: independence and fixity. Independence says that the social choice is independent of individual preferences involving unavailable alternatives. Fixity says that the social choice is fixed by a social preference relation that is independent of what is available. Arrow found that requiring, further, that this relation be transitive yields impossibility. Here it is shown that allowing intransitive social indifference still permits only a vastly unsatisfactory system, a liberum veto oligarchy. Arrow’s (...) argument for independence, though, undermines any rationale for fixity. (shrink)

Rawls' Difference Principle asserts that a basic economic structure is just if it makes the worst off people as well off as is feasible. How well off someone is is to be measured by an ‘index’ of ‘primary social goods’. It is this index that gives content to the principle, and Rawls gives no adequate directions for constructing it. In this essay a version of the difference principle is proposed that fits much of what Rawls says, but that makes use (...) of no index. Instead of invoking an index of primary social goods, the principle formulated here invokes a partial ordering of prospects for opportunities. (shrink)

I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I ought to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenuity. I have in mind here an “all things (...) considered” ought that I can use in my thinking, an ought that is not specifically moral, in that it doesn’t settle by sheer rules of language that I ought always to abide by morality. For this ought, the question of what I ought to do seems just to be the question of what to do. (shrink)

I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I ought to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenuity. I have in mind here an “all things (...) considered” ought that I can use in my thinking, an ought that is not specifically moral, in that it doesn’t settle by sheer rules of language that I ought always to abide by morality. For this ought, the question of what I ought to do seems just to be the question of what to do. (shrink)

Goodness, rational permissibility, and the like might be gruesome properties. That is to say, they might not well suit causal-explanatory purposes. Or at least, these properties are gruesome for all their normative concepts tell us by themselves. Perhaps hedonists are right and such properties are anything but gruesome, but perhaps instead, the most gruesome-minded ethical pluralists are right—normative concepts by themselves don’t settle the issue. At the end of his marvelous commentary, John Hawthorne depicts the morass of dank possibilities that (...) a “moral realist” must enter when he tries explaining how normative words and thoughts could lock on to some particular causally gruesome property that constitutes being good. Right, I say, and expressivists can direct us around the morass. Then he asks why I avoid the questions that lead moral realists into this morass. But I don’t avoid them; I offer an answer. (shrink)

Is there anything morally special about free exchange? In asking this, I am asking not only about extreme, so-called “libertarian” views, on which free exchange is sacrosanct, but about more widespread, moderate views, on which there is at least something morally special about free exchange. On these more compromising views, other moral considerations may override the moral importance of free exchange, but even when rights of free exchange are restricted for good reason, something morally important is lost. For some, free (...) exchange may preserve liberty, in some morally significant sense, or realize some such moral value as “to each his own.” Alternatively, a system of free exchange may have a special moral status by virtue of the kinds of pragmatic arguments that economists give, arguments that free exchange produces good social results. Whether free exchange has any such virtues as these is the broad question I address in this paper. I offer what I have to say somewhat in the spirit of an overview. Philosophical scrutiny and economic analysis combine, it seems to me, to delineate fairly clearly what is, and what is not, morally special about free exchange. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION We look to rights for protection. The hope of advocates of “human rights” has been that certain protections might be accorded to allof humanity. Even in a world only a minority of whose inhabitants live under liberal democratic regimes, the hope is, certain standards accepted in the liberal democracies will gain universal recognition and respect. These include liberty of persons as opposed to enslavement, freedom from cruelty, freedom from arbitrary execution, from arbitrary imprisonment, and from arbitrary deprivation of property (...) or livelihood, freedom of religion, and freedom of inquiry and expression. Philosophers, of course, concern themselves with the theory of rights, and that is partly because of the ways questions of rights bear on fundamental normative theory. By far the most highly developed general normative theory has been utilitarianism. Now many opponents of utilitarianism argue that considerations of rights discredit utilitarianism, that utilitarianism yields conclusions about rights that we would normally regard as faulty, and that moreover, the reasons for regarding those conclusions as faulty turn out, upon examination, to be stronger than the reasons forregarding utilitarianism as valid. A valid theory cannot have faulty conclusions, and so thinkingabout rights shows utilitarianism not to be a valid normative theory. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the utilitarian movement in nineteenth century England, accepted the incompatibility of utilitarianism and “the rights of man, ” and rejected talkof the latter as “anarchical fallacies”. His great successor John Stuart Mill, however, argued that a perceptive and far–sighted utilitarianism supports strong rights both of democratic participation and of individual freedom of action. (shrink)

This volume offers new perspectives on some better known authors such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Catharine Macaulay, and Anna Laetitia Barbauld, as well as neglected figures from the British Isles and continental Europe. The collection advances discussion of how best to understand women’s political contributions during the period, the place of salon sociability in the political development of Europe, and the interaction between discourses on slavery and those on women’s rights. It will interest scholars and researchers working in women’s intellectual history (...) and Enlightenment thought and serve as a useful adjunct to courses in political theory, women’s studies, the history of feminism, and European history. (shrink)

Walk across a campus on a beautiful fall day and observe what a conversing species we are. Chimpanzees can be taught to talk a little, in sign language. Put educated chimpanzees together, though, and they turn out to have nothing to say to each other. We humans are different; we can even find silence awkward. Language does many things for us; conveying straight information is the most obvious. I want to stress, though, some of the ways that talk adjusts our (...) terms for living together. What I say will be speculative and some of it will no doubt be wrong, but I suspect it is not completely off-base. Much of talk we can see as securing and adjusting terms of association – terms, among other things, of cooperation and mutual restraint. In part, this is a matter of governing our feelings toward each other. Feelings tend toward action; they can make for social glue or social bombshells. Nature, in the form of Darwinian evolution, has given us various ways to mesh feelings, and some of these. I think, are a matter of language. (shrink)

Given all the consequences of an act and the value of each of them, how can we find their value on the whole? In Utilitarianisms: Simple and General, Inquiry 13, 394–449, J. Howard Sobel offers two alternative suggestions. Here one of Sobel's suggestions is attacked and the other given new support. Where the number of consequences is finite, it is argued, their value is the sum of their basic intrinsic values: the basic intrinsic value of a state of affairs is (...) the value it has on its own account, and not in virtue of other states of affairs it entails. (shrink)

On my own view likewise, if we look for a straight analysis of the concept of a reason, we will find none that works. I mean the concept of a reason to do something, as when I say that the health effects and addictiveness of smoking are reasons not to take it up. I don't mean the psychological concept of an “operative reason”, as Scanlon calls it, a person's reason for doing what she does, as in “Her reason for taking (...) up smoking was that it would freak out her parents;” saying this doesn't commit us to thinking that that's any reason at all to take up smoking. Now for this normative concept of a reason to do something, I agree with Scanlon: we can't do better than he does by way of straight analysis; we can only say, somewhat uninformatively, that to be a reason to do something is to count in favor of doing it. On much the grounds he lays out, for instance, we can't translate talk of reasons into psychological claims about preferences or desires. (shrink)

With the knowledge that team work is not always associated with high(er) performance, we draw from the Multi-Level Theory of Psychological Contracts, Person-Environment Fit Theory, and Optimal Distinctiveness Theory to study shared perceptions of psychological contract (PC) breach in relation to shared perceptions of complementary and supplementary fit to explain why some teams perform better than other teams. We collected three repeated survey measures in a sample of 128 respondents across 46 teams. After having made sure that we met all (...) statistical criteria, we aggregated our focal variables to the team-level and analysed our data by means of a longitudinal three-wave autoregressive moderated-mediation model in which each relationship was one-time lag apart. We found that shared perceptions of PC breach were directly negatively related to team output and negatively related to perceived team member effectiveness through a decrease in shared perceptions of supplementary fit. However, we also demonstrated a beneficial process in that shared perceptions of PC breach were positively related to shared perceptions of complementary fit, which in turn were positively related to team output. Moreover, best team output appeared in teams that could combine high shared perceptions of complementary fit with modest to high shared perceptions of supplementary fit. Overall, our findings seem to indicate that in terms of team output there may be a bright side to perceptions of PC breach and that perceived person-team fit may play an important role in this process. (shrink)

Politics is a part of human life, and biology is the study of life. All political beings are biological organisms. These are truisms, but they might suggest lines of investigation. Sociobiology, the name suggests, means social theory taken as a branch of the life sciences. Human sociobiology, then, would apply biological theory to human society. How might this be done?

This paper argues that morality is objective in a specific sense that accords with a broadly expressivist stance in metaethics. The paper also explains that although there is a kind of subjectivity in moral inquiry, the same holds for other kinds of normative inquiry, including epistemic and even scientific inquiry, and moreover that this kind of subjectivity is no threat to morality’s objectivity. The argument for the objectivity of morality draws strong parallels between ethics, epistemology, and science, but does not (...) depend on equally strong parallels between ethics and mathematics. I argue that there is more to learn from a comparison between ethics and mathematics than I used to think, but the difference between the issues that come up in thinking about objectivity in ethics and those that come up in thinking about objectivity in mathematics is substantial, and we cannot carry over results from the philosophy of mathematics to the case of morality. (shrink)

At issue with Narveson is not the independence of persons, but an extreme form of ownership. Many people could be more independent with ownership of a moderate kind. All Narveson’s arguments depend on presupposing that extreme ownership has a special moral status.

On my own view likewise, if we look for a straight analysis of the concept of a reason, we will find none that works. I mean the concept of a reason to do something, as when I say that the health effects and addictiveness of smoking are reasons not to take it up. I don't mean the psychological concept of an “operative reason”, as Scanlon calls it, a person's reason for doing what she does, as in “Her reason for taking (...) up smoking was that it would freak out her parents;” saying this doesn't commit us to thinking that that's any reason at all to take up smoking. Now for this normative concept of a reason to do something, I agree with Scanlon: we can't do better than he does by way of straight analysis; we can only say, somewhat uninformatively, that to be a reason to do something is to count in favor of doing it. On much the grounds he lays out, for instance, we can't translate talk of reasons into psychological claims about preferences or desires. (shrink)

It is very common these days to come across the claim that the notions of mental content and linguistic meaning are normative notions. In the work of many philosophers, it plays a pivotal role. Saul Kripke made it the centerpiece of his influential discussion of Wittgenstein’s treatment of rulefollowing and private language; he used it to argue that the notions of meaning and content cannot be understood in naturalistic terms. Kripke’s formulations tend to be in terms of the notion of (...) linguistic meaning, but his argumentative strategy makes it clear that he holds both versions of the claim.... (shrink)

According to the traditional conception of morality one's feeling of guilt is appropriate if and only if one has culpably done wrong. The feeling must involve this propositional content. In recent literature, however, two opposite developments can be discerned. First there is a tendency to expand the range of things one can appropriately feel guilty about. So, for example, it is argued that there is nothing wrong in feeling guilt about actions done involuntarily, or done by others, or about thoughts (...) which just happen to the subject of the feeling . This position is criticized on the ground that guilt is a painful emotion and should therefore be suffered only if it is deserved. On the other hand, there are also arguments in the literature to the effect that agent regret should be substituted for guilt , and that the range of appropriate guilt feelings should be limited . The main objection to Williams's proposal is that it would mean an impoverishment of the moral world: guilt feeling implies, as agent regret does not, the recognition that one could and should have acted otherwise. As to Gibbard's position, it is demonstrated that it is based on a disputable metaethics. In addition to that, it is argued that Gibbard's view of guilt feeling as an adaptive syndrome is untenable. (shrink)

A proof by Allan Gibbard (Ifs: Conditionals, beliefs, decision, chance, time. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981) seems to demonstrate that if indicative conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot be stronger than material implication. Angelika Kratzer's theory that conditionals do not denote two-place operators purports to escape this result [see Kratzer (Chic Linguist Soc 22(2):1–15, 1986, 2012)]. In this note, I raise some trouble for Kratzer’s proposed method of escape and then show that her semantics avoids this consequence of Gibbard’s proof (...) by denying modus ponens. I also show that the same holds for Anthony Gillies’ semantics (Philos Rev 118(3):325–349, 2009) and argue that this consequence of these theories is not obviously prohibitive—hence, both remain viable theories of indicative conditionals. (shrink)

In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication.

The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard’s and Sen’s paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product (...) structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard’s paradox and to Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems. (shrink)

A difficulty is exposed in Allan Gibbard's solution to the embedding/Frege-Geach problem, namely that the difference between refusing to accept a normative judgement and accepting its negation is ignored. This is shown to undermine the whole solution.

O presente artigo busca apresentar os traços principais da explicação expressivista de normas morais de Allan Gibbard, ressaltando as possíveis semelhanças e diferenças entre a posição dele e de outros expoentes da metaética, buscando avaliar se a concepção de moralidade desenvolvida por ele, com base na biologia evolutiva, seria suscetível à crítica suscitada por George W. Moore no Principia Ethica, denominada “falácia naturalista”, e àquela apresentada por Cohen e Nagel, em seu livro An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, (...) denominada “falácia genética”. This paper aims to outline the main features of norm-expressivist explanation of moral rules of Allan Gibbard highlighting the possible similarities and differences between his position and other exponents of metaethics and seeking to assess whether the conception of morality developed by him, based on evolutionary biology, would be susceptible to criticism raised by George W. Moore in Principia Ethica called 'naturalistic fallacy' and the one presented by Cohen and Nagel on their book An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method called 'genetic fallacy'. (shrink)

Um pedaço de barro solta-se de um grande barranco, formando por coincidência, e ao mesmo tempo, uma estátua de Machado de Assis. Três dias depois a estátua é completamente destruída; ao ser atingida por um machado ela se parte em vários pedaços. Chega ao fim, então, a existência tanto da estátua como do pedaço de barro da qual ela é feita. Notemos que ambos vieram a existir ao mesmo tempo e também ao mesmo tempo deixaram de existir. No período de (...) tempo que existiram tudo o que aconteceu a uma aconteceu a outra. Allan Gibbard acredita que com um exemplo deste tipo pode nos dar um caso de identidade contingente. No artigo “Contingent Identity” ele tenta mostrar a plausibilidade de um caso onde uma estátua s é igual ao pedaço de barro c e, no entanto, é possível que ambos existam e s seja diferente de c. Com isto ele pretende atacar algumas noções de Kripke sobre coisas concretas e nomes próprios. (shrink)

According to the Principle of Conditional Non-Contradiction (CNC), conditionals of the form “If p, q” and “If p, not q” cannot both be true, unless p is inconsistent. This principle is widely regarded as an adequacy constraint on any semantics that attributes truth conditions to conditionals. Gibbard has presented an example of a pair of conditionals that, in the context he describes, appear to violate CNC. He concluded from this that conditionals lack truth conditions. We argue that this conclusion (...) is rash by proposing a new diagnosis of what is going on in Gibbard’s argument. We also provide empirical evidence in support of our proposal. (shrink)

In recent work Allan Gibbard claims to be both a local quasi-realist, in Blackburn’s sense, and a global expressivist. His local quasi-realism rests on an argument that for naturalistic discourse but not ethical discourse, the semantic relation of denotation and the causal relation of tracking can and should be identified; that denoting simply is tracking, for naturalistic vocabulary. I argue that Gibbard’s case for this conclusion is unconvincing, and poorly motivated by his own expressivist standards. I also argue (...) that even if it were successful, it is doubtful whether the resulting position would count as global expressivism, as Gibbard and I both use that term. (shrink)

This paper examines key aspects of Allan Gibbard's psychological account of moral activity. Inspired by evolutionary theory, Gibbard paints a naturalistic picture of morality mainly based on two specific types of emotion: guilt and anger. His sentimentalist and expressivist analysis is also based on a particular conception of rationality. I begin by introducing Gibbard's theory before testing some key assumptions underlying his system against recent empirical data and theories. The results cast doubt on some crucial aspects of (...) Gibbard's philosophical theory, namely his reduction of morality to anger and guilt, and his theory of “normative governance.” Gibbard's particular version of expressivism may be undermined by these doubts. (shrink)

A criticism of Dorothy Edgington's attempt to make Gibbard's problem for indicative conditionals apply to counterfactuals.

The paper is a critique of Allan Gibbard’s impressively crafted monograph Meaning and Normativity. The book relies on a subtle form of logical empiricism, developing a normative verificationist semantics within a subjective Bayesian framework. I argue that the resulting account of synonymy is too fine-grained, since it counts clearly synonymous words in different languages as non-synonymous. For similar reasons, Gibbard’s account of analytic implication relies on postulating untenable connections between semantics and epistemology. I conclude that one of the (...) main obstacles to robust realism about normativity and morality, the supposed conceptual connections between normative language and action, is a myth. (shrink)

According to the dispositional theory of meaning and content, what a speaker means by an expression is determined by her dispositions to use it. The literature contains two well-known objections against this theory: the problem of finitude and the problem of error. In his bookMeaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard propounds a novel defence against these objections. In this paper, I argue that Gibbard’s suggestions fail to save the dispositional theory. Moreover, I argue that Gibbard’s deflationary view about (...) facts prevents him from saying anything about the property of meaning that would hold any interest for a naturalist.Selon la théorie dispositionnelle du sens et du contenu, ce qu’un locuteur veut dire par une expression est déterminé par ses dispositions à l’utiliser. La littérature contient deux objections bien connues contre cette théorie: le problème de la finitude et le problème de l’erreur. Dans son livreMeaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard propose une nouvelle défense de la théorie dispositionnelle du sens et du contenu. Dans cet article, je soutiens que les suggestions de Gibbard ne parviennent pas à sauver la théorie dispositionnelle. De plus, je soutiens que le point de vue déflationniste de Gibbard sur les faits l’empêche de dire quoi que ce soit à propos de la propriété du sens qui aurait un intérêt quelconque pour un naturaliste. (shrink)

I tried to tease out what Gilbert means by "normative". It isn't obvious. I conclude that assumptions about ideal agents – not just ideal in the sense of error-free but also ideal in the sense of unlimited – and assumptions about ideal placement of oneself in another person's situation, are essential to what he means. I conclude that what he says is very plausible given these assumptions, though they themselves are very problematic. Especially problematic is the idea of an unlimited (...) simulation of a limited agent's perspective. (shrink)