My aim in this article is twofold. First, I will illuminate the triangular conceptual connections between responsibility, authority, and power as they are exposed in the organizational realm; second, I will show how the three concepts are distinct. Relying on the work of Peter Strawson and his followers on responsibility for my point of departure, I will show that the connection between the inner corporational authority and its inner matching responsibility is different from the connection between the outer corporational forces (...) and influences and the CSR that they develop in reaction to these. This will expose another important distinction between two kinds of responsibility: the organizational kind, as instantiated in organizations, and the social kind, which constitutes the outer aspect of the CSR. Though many thinkers address different kinds of responsibility, a comparative perspective of these different concepts is missing. I attempt to bring three of these separate discourses together to examine them alongside one another, evaluating them in the light of their differences and similarities. This will expose a new typology of ‘responsibility’ that penetrates and illuminates the relations between corporations and society and as such enhance our understanding of organizational responsibility. (shrink)

My aim in this article is twofold. First, I will illuminate the triangular conceptual connections between responsibility, authority, and power as they are exposed in the organizational realm; second, I will show how the three concepts are distinct. Relying on the work of Peter Strawson and his followers on responsibility for my point of departure, I will show that the connection between the inner corporational authority and its inner matching responsibility is different from the connection between the outer corporational forces (...) and influences and the CSR that they develop in reaction to these. This will expose another important distinction between two kinds of responsibility: the organizational kind, as instantiated in organizations, and the social kind, which constitutes the outer aspect of the CSR. Though many thinkers address different kinds of responsibility, a comparative perspective of these different concepts is missing. I attempt to bring three of these separate discourses together to examine them alongside one another, evaluating them in the light of their differences and similarities. This will expose a new typology of ‘responsibility’ that penetrates and illuminates the relations between corporations and society and as such enhance our understanding of organizational responsibility. (shrink)

The development of machine learning and deep learning (DL) in the field of AI (artificial intelligence) is the direct result of the advancement of nano-electronics. Machine learning is a function that provides the system with the capacity to learn from data without being programmed explicitly. It is basically a mathematical and probabilistic model. DL is part of machine learning methods based on artificial neural networks, simply called neural networks (NNs), as they are inspired by the biological NNs that constitute organic (...) brains. Despite its similarity to biological organs such as human brains, major problems arise in trying to attribute moral responsibility to autonomic systems based on hardware including nano-electronic devices, which are sought to replace humans (moral agents) in the context of AI. It is suggested that the required emotional environment which enables actions according to reasons in humans is not witnessed at AI devices. Though AI technology raises an enticing resemblance to human actions, this resemblance is to be considered with a skeptical eye. It is because actions are associated with reasons while causes are connected to operations. Human agents are capable of acting upon their reasons, while AI devices are limited only to operations as they are conditioned by their programming, which is considered as an embodiment of some causes. As moral responsibility goes hand in hand with the capacity to act (according to reasons), attributing moral responsibility to AI devices is revealed to be but a misleading metaphor. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Frege, and others who followed him, stressed the role of fallibility as a means to defining ‘objectivity.’ By defining objective judgments as fallible, these philosophers contributed to the consolidation of a theory of objectivity which suggested interpreting epistemological, as well as other judgements, as being objective. An important philosophical implication of this theory lies in its disclosure of the interrelations between truth and objectivity. In light of this insight, and based on an analysis of instances of false (epistemological and (...) other) judgments, I show that truth and objectivity go hand-in-hand, while falsity and objectivity do not. This finding alone indicates the necessity to revise the theory of objectivity. (shrink)

The book examines the ethical aspect of journalistic activity in an attempt to understand and render explicit the values which guide journalists in their work, but it emphasizes the point that while such values reflect society's existing professional mores, this particular profession is also placed in such a way as to shape the consciousness and values of those who consume its working product. The central question of this work has to do with the ethical implications of journalistic activity, and more (...) exactly, the ethical responsibility of the media in framing public discourse. This question touches on how the journalistic profession conceives its own responsibilities, as reflected in its various professional codes, but it also relates to an account of its formative influence on human sensibilities in a culture in which journalism plays a major role in the interpretation and dissemination of knowledge. (shrink)

The question of who exactly is responsible for an organization’s actions cannot be too carefully considered, as a clear understanding of this point is crucial from ethical, moral, managerial, and public perspectives. This article discusses how to justify a non-participant member’s responsibility for the actions of other group members, establishing collective responsibility. The article develops a novel context-depended framework that solves this problem by supplying good grounds for perceiving organizations as organic entities, which is adequate for establishing collective responsibility. I (...) suggest that to be responsible for the actions of an organization, one has to belong to that organization, even if one has not taken any part at any level in group actions. The more regular concept of causal responsibility is not applicable here since it cannot account for the responsibility of non-participant members. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which journalism—print and electronic—shapes our cultural fabric and modes of discourse. Journalists report facts and comment on them in a provocative style. They stimulate us with captivating images and colorful language, shifting our minds from a more intellectual contemplation of reality. Finally, journalists bring death into our lives through grim pictures of wars and natural disasters. I suggest that these relatively recent trends in journalism are responsible for a gradual (...) transformation in public discourse. Emotions, rather than rational thinking, are becoming our basis for understanding current events. As a result, journalists are minimizing the distance between us, as rational creatures of culture, and nature. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which journalism—print and electronic—shapes our cultural fabric and modes of discourse. Journalists report facts and comment on them in a provocative style. They stimulate us with captivating images and colorful language, shifting our minds from a more intellectual contemplation of reality. Finally, journalists bring death into our lives through grim pictures of wars and natural disasters. I suggest that these relatively recent trends in journalism are responsible for a gradual (...) transformation in public discourse. Emotions, rather than rational thinking, are becoming our basis for understanding current events. As a result, journalists are minimizing the distance between us, as rational creatures of culture, and nature. (shrink)

Modern technological discourse and practices are the outcome of numerous changes in our cultural makeup. The most intriguing question regards the kind of human sensibilities and character traits manifested by technological practices. What, in other words, is the phenomenology of a given practice? In this paper, I argue that technological interventions not only usurp the natural for the sake of the cultural, thereby leaving no room for an independent natural realm; by conquering and taking control of the natural through technology, (...) humans introduce major conceptual change. They break down the conceptual boundaries between nature and culture, causing them to collapse. (shrink)

This article aims to argue in favour of two different kinds of responsibility: moral and organizational. I present the notion of moral responsibility and, specifically, moral accountability, which stands at the centre of the later discussion. I address Coleen Macnamara’s view of accountability, a model of enforcement involved in setting demands and sanctions. Then I account for some cases of morally impaired persons’ failure to respond adequately to moral demands, in contrast to their capacity to respond effectively to organizational demands. (...) I take the latter findings to show that there are two distinct kinds of accountability, moral and organizational. While moral accountability is connected to the arousal of emotions, I claim that organizational accountability is related to inner-organizational reactive procedures associated with employment benefits or sanctions. However, this can be distant from emotions. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to flesh out a new distinction between moral responsibility, as it is understood in light of Strawson’s “reactive attitudes,” and an institutional form of responsibility—a responsibility that employees bear for their work to their superiors. I show that Strawson’s view of responsibility is separate from organizational responsibility, and hence the responsibility of employees to their managers cannot be understood in terms of indignation or resentment, both of which are key Strawsonian concepts. The latter type (...) of responsibility can be understood in terms of objective attitudes, managerial demands, organizational standards, and related expectations. Based on a Cartesian and a Wittgensteinian notions of asymmetry between first- and third-person uses of psychological concepts, Strawson developed a view of responsibility that dissolves the above asymmetry. In contrast with the latter asymmetry, which focuses on those who ascribe psychological concepts to themselves and to others, Strawson’s view is centered on the recipients of reactive attitudes. According to his view, resentment and indignation differ because they are aimed at different recipients, something that cannot be applied in cases of organizational responsibility. (shrink)

There have been many attempts during the history of applied ethics that have tried to develop a theory of moral reasoning. The goal of this paper is to explicate one aspect of the debate between various attempts of offering a specific method for resolving moral dilemmas. We contrast two kinds of deliberative methods: deliberative methods whose goal is decision-making and deliberative methods that are aimed at gaining edifying perspectives. The decision-making methods assessed include the traditional moral theories like utilitarianism and (...) Kantianism, as well as second order principles, such as principlism and specified principlism. In light of this assessment, we suggest taking a closer look at two perceptive models, casuistry and particularism. These models are used for dealing with moral dilemmas that provide for edifying perspectives rather than decision-making. These perceptive models, though less scientific and not as good at prescribing an action, are more human in the sense that they enrich our moral sensibilities and enhance our understanding of the meaning of the situation. (shrink)

Here are ten essays written by a happily balanced mixture of younger and of more senior Quine scholars commenting on the philosophy of Willard Van Orman Quine, and collected in honor of his seventieth birthday, June 1978.

This article presents a response to a recent article by Yotam Lurie and Robert Albin in which they discuss and present the merits of casuistry as a method for resolving moral dilemmas in business, principally by developing 'edifying' perspectives on the situation, and in doing so highlight the shortcomings of principles (such as the categorical imperative) in generating insights and thereby moral choices. The present article accepts the importance of cases and examples as a source of insight, but (...) argues that the process of conceptualisation involved in understanding these necessarily involves some reference to principles. However, principles and cases are best seen as complementary to the ethical decision-making process rather than in opposition. The complementary functions of these are highlighted in processes such as reflection upon experience, in applications of moral imagination and in the integration of emotive and cognitive elements in ethical choice. (shrink)

Sham surgery is a controversial and rarely used component of randomised clinical trials evaluating surgical interventions. The recent use of sham surgery in trials evaluating efficacy of intracerebral fetal tissue grafts in Parkinson’s disease has highlighted the ethical concerns associated with sham surgery controls. Macklin, and Dekkers and Boer argue vigorously against use of sham surgery controls. Macklin presents a broad argument against sham surgery controls while Dekkers and Boer present a narrower argument that sham surgery is unnecessary in the (...) specific setting of fetal tissue engraftment for Parkinson’s disease. I defend sham surgery controls against both these criticisms. Appropriate clinical trial design, sometimes including sham surgery, is needed to ensure that false positive trial results do not occur and endanger public safety. Results of a completed trial of fetal tissue grafting for Parkinson’s disease are used to illustrate the potential benefits of, and problems associated with, sham surgery controls. Sham surgery controls, however, should be employed only when absolutely necessary. I suggest criteria for appropriate use of sham surgery controls. (shrink)

This article examines how people with type 2 diabetes perceive autonomous decision making and which moral capacities they consider important in diabetes nurses' support of autonomous decision making. Fifteen older adults with type 2 diabetes were interviewed in a nurse-led unit. First, the data were analysed using the grounded theory method. The participants described a variety of decision-making processes in the nurse and family care-giver context. Later, descriptions of the decision-making processes were analysed using hermeneutic text interpretation. We suggest first- (...) and second-order moral capacities that nurses specializing in diabetes need to promote the autonomous decision making of their patients. We recommend nurses to engage in ongoing, interactive reflective practice to further develop these moral capacities. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to augment the ethical discussion among nurses with the findings from empirical research on autonomy of older adults with type 2 diabetes mellitus. There are many factors influencing autonomy. These include: health conditions, treatment, knowledge, experience and skills, personal approach as well as familial patterns, type of relationship, life history and social context. Fifteen older adults with type 2 diabetes mellitus were interviewed in a nurse-led diabetes clinic. These participants perceive three processes which support (...) autonomy in responsive relationships: preserving patterns of concern and interaction, nurturing collaborative responsibilities and being closely engaged in trustful and helpful family relations. People with diabetes realize autonomy in various responsive relationships in their unique life context. Next, we performed a literature review of care ethics and caring in nursing with regard to relational autonomy. We classified the literature in five strands of care: attitude-oriented, dialogue-oriented, activity-oriented, relationship-oriented and life-oriented. According to our respondents, autonomy in responsive relationships is fostered when patient, nurses, professionals of the health team and family members carry out care activities supported by a relational attitude of care. They can best realize autonomy in relationships with others when several essential aspects of care and caring are present in their lives. Therefore, we advocate a comprehensive approach to care and caring. (shrink)

The abstract structure of inquiry - the process of acquiring and changing beliefs about the world - is the focus of this book which takes the position that the "pragmatic" rather than the "linguistic" approach better solves the philosophical problems about the nature of mental representation, and better accounts for the phenomena of thought and speech. It discusses propositions and propositional attitudes (the cluster of activities that constitute inquiry) in general and takes up the way beliefs change in response to (...) potential new information, suggesting that conditional propositions should be understood as projections of epistemic policies onto the world.Robert C. Stalnaker is a professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.

Debate continues about the ethics of sham surgery controls. The most powerful argument for sham surgery controls is that rigorous experiments are needed to demonstrate safety and efficacy of surgical procedures. Without such experiments, there is danger of adopting worthless procedures in clinical practice. Opponents of sham surgery controls argue that sham surgery constitutes unacceptable violation of the rights of research subjects. Recent philosophical discussion has used two thought experiments—the transplant case and the trolley problem—to explore the circumstances under which (...) individuals may be harmed to benefit a larger group. The transplant case is felt to exemplify circumstances that forbid harming some to benefit a larger group while the trolley problem exemplifies circumstances that permit harming some to benefit others. I argue that sham surgery controls satisfy criteria derived from the trolley problem and are morally permissible. (shrink)

Robert B. Brandom is one of the most original philosophers of our day, whose book Making It Explicit covered and extended a vast range of topics in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language--the very core of analytic philosophy. This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out. A tour of the earlier book's large ideas and relevant details, Articulating Reasons offers an easy entry into two of the main themes of Brandom's (...) work: the idea that the semantic content of a sentence is determined by the norms governing inferences to and from it, and the idea that the distinctive function of logical vocabulary is to let us make our tacit inferential commitments explicit. Brandom's work, making the move from representationalism to inferentialism, constitutes a near-Copernican shift in the philosophy of language--and the most important single development in the field in recent decades. Articulating Reasons puts this accomplishment within reach of nonphilosophers who want to understand the state of the foundations of semantics. Table of Contents: Introduction 1. Semantic Inferentialism and Logical Expressivism 2. Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning 3. Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism 4. What Are Singular Terms, and Why Are There Any? 5. A Social Route from Reasoning to Representing 6. Objectivity and the Normative Fine Structure of Rationality Notes Index Displaying a sovereign command of the intricate discussion in the analytic philosophy of language, Brandom manages successfully to carry out a program within the philosophy of language that has already been sketched by others, without losing sight of the vision inspiring the enterprise in the important details of his investigation ' Using the tools of a complex theory of language, Brandom succeeds in describing convincingly the practices in which the reason and autonomy of subjects capable of speech and action are expressed. --J'rgen Habermas. (shrink)

Working in ZFC, we show that for any infinite cardinal κ and ordinal $\gamma the polarized partition relation $\[\begin{pmatrix} (2^{ → $\[\begin{pmatrix}(2^{ holds. Our proof of this relation involves the use of elementary substructures of set models of large fragments of ZFC.

We provide a short proof that if κ is a regular cardinal with κ ≤ c, then $\left( \matrix \kappa \\ \omega\endmatrix \right)\rightarrow \left( \matrix\format\c\kern.8em&\c\\ \kappa & \alpha \\ \omega & \omega \endmatrix \right)^{1,1}$ for any ordinal α < min {p, κ}. In particular, $\left( \matrix \germ{p} \\ \omega \endmatrix \right)\rightarrow \left( \matrix\format\c\kern.8em&\c\\ \germ{p} & \alpha \\ \omega & \omega \endmatrix \right)^{1,1}$ for any ordinal α < p. This generalizes an unpublished results of E. Szemerédi that Martin's axiom implies that (...) $\left( \matrix \germ{c} \\ \omega \endmatrix \right)\rightarrow \left( \matrix\format\c\kern.8em&\c\\ \germ{c} & \kappa \\ \omega & \omega \endmatrix \right)^{1,1}$ for any cardinal κ with κ < c. (shrink)

In a new retelling of the romantic rationalist adventure of ideas that is Hegel's classic The Phenomenology of Spirit, Robert Brandom argues that when our self-conscious recognitive attitudes take Hegel's radical form of magnanimity and trust, we can overcome a troubled modernity and enter a new age of spirit.

Killing in war as a matter of course may be inferred from the fact that, as stated by Thomas Hobbes, “all laws are silent in the time of war”. Although this traditional law-suspending power of war has been restricted to a certain degree by modern humanitarian international law, it is still commonly assumed that killing in war, unless and as long as not explicitly forbidden, is per se permitted and thus does not require any further legitimisation. This is in fundamental (...) contrast to a “normal” homicide, which requires special justification to be considered lawful. This commonly unquestioned license to kill, by the mere reason of being at war, is all the more astonishing given that no legal norm can be found that positively and explicitly declares killing in war to be lawful. However, on what ground can such an unwritten privilege be based? How can it be morally justified and sufficiently legitimised? This question shall be pursued in four steps: by, first, asking whether and why killing in war, as long as it does not cross the threshold of a war crime, shall stay outside the rubric of criminal law. After not having found a satisfactory answer, it must, second, be asked whether and to what degree constitutional law could provide empowerments and restrictions of killing in war. As neither will give full answers, third, final refuge may be taken in international law, with particular attention to state sovereignty. Since even on this level, however, killing in war has not yet found convincing legitimisation, fourth, further challenges are to be met. (shrink)

Winner of the Los Angeles Times Book Prize With a new preface by the author In his most powerful and important book, renowned psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton presents a brilliant analysis of the crucial role that German doctors played in the Nazi genocide. Now updated with a new preface, The Nazi Doctors remains the definitive work on the Nazi medical atrocities, a chilling exposé of the banality of evil at its epitome, and a sobering reminder of the darkest side (...) of human nature. (shrink)

This paper revisits some foundational questions concerning the abstract representation of a discourse context. The context of a conversation is represented by a body of information that is presumed to be shared by the participants in the conversation – the information that the speaker presupposes a point at which a speech act is interpreted. This notion is designed to represent both the information on which context-dependent speech acts depend, and the situation that speech acts are designed to affect, and so (...) to be a representation of context that is appropriate for explaining the interaction of context and the contents expressed in them. After reviewing the motivating ideas and the outlines of the apparatus, the paper responds to a criticism of the framework, and considers the way it can help to clarify some phenomena concerning pronouns with indefinite antecedents. (shrink)

This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...) opposed to refuting skepticism. These contrasts are applied not only to rational belief, but to rational action and the rationality of desires and intentions. The overall position is a pluralist, moderately rationalistic, internalist theory of justification and a partly externalist conception of knowledge. However, by virtue of offering a theory of rationality as well as an account of knowledge and justified belief, it will interest philosophers of ethics, science, and the social sciences and teachers and students of epistemology. (shrink)

Classical American pragmatism: the pragmatist -- Enlightenment-and its problematic semantics -- Analyzing pragmatism: pragmatics and pragmatisms -- A Kantian rationalist pragmatism: pragmatism -- Inferentialism, and modality in Sellars's arguments against -- Empiricism -- Linguistic pragmatism and pragmatism about norms: an arc of -- Thought from Rorty's eliminative materialism to his pragmatism -- Vocabularies of pragmatism: synthesizing naturalism and -- Historicism -- Towards an analytic pragmatism: meaning-use analysis -- Pragmatism, expressivism, and anti-representationalism: -- Local and global possibilities.

This is a paradigmatic work of contemporary philosophy.

Robert John Ackermann deals decisively with the problem of relativism that has plagued post-empiricist philosophy of science. Recognizing that theory and data are mediated by data domains (bordered data sets produced by scientific instruments), he argues that the use of instruments breaks the dependency of observation on theory and thus creates a reasoned basis for scientific objectivity. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished (...) backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)