Works by Fink, S. Benjamin (exact spelling)

7 found
Order:
  1. Independence and Connections of Pain and Suffering.S. Benjamin Fink - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):46-66.
    Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain experiences necessarily or only contingently unpleasant? Here, I sketch how to answer such questions concerning intra-phenomenal metaphysics using the example of pain and unpleasantness. Arguments for a symmetrical metaphysical independence of phenomenal pain and unpleasant affect are presented, rejecting a composite view like the IASP definition and dimensional views. The motivating intuition of these views is explained by common binding mechanisms in consciousness and characterized (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  68
    The Ambiguity of "Pain".S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - In Jane Fernandez-Goldborough (ed.), Making Sense Of: Pain. Inter-Disciplinary Net.
    I argue that the understanding of "pain" as presented in the official medical definition by the IASP is ambiguous and likely a cluster concept.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  76
    Pain: A Natural State Without a Nature? Dealing with the Ambiguity of „Pain“ in Science and Ethics.S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - In Heather McKenzie, John Quintner & Gillian Bendelow (eds.), At the Edge of Being: The Aporia of Pain. Inter-Disciplinary Press.
    Can we find necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental state to be a pain state? That is, does pain have a nature? Or is the term ‘pain’ ambiguous? I argue here that our expression ‘pain’ lacks necessary use conditions if one considers a range of contexts. As use conditions constrain the reference class, I argue that ‘pain’ does not refer to a natural category, but binds together a bunch of loosely resembling phenomena. This leads to problems for scientific and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  58
    Review of Victoria Braithwaite's „Do Fish Feel Pain?“. [REVIEW]S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - Metapsychology 14 (34).
  5.  46
    Knowing Pain.S. Benjamin Fink - 2012 - In Esther Cohen (ed.), Knowledge and Pain. Rodopi. pp. 84--1.
    In this article, I focus on what is we know when we know pain or that someone is in pain. I argue that claims of knowledge about pains are problematic because of the complex nature of the phenomenon and because of "pain" is a cluster concept.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  27
    Review of Arne Vetlesen's „The Philosophy of Pain“. [REVIEW]S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - Metapsychology 14 (25).
  7.  14
    Review of Jan Westerhoff's „12 Examples of Illusion“. [REVIEW]S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - Metapsychology 14 (50).