At the close of his account of causality in the Treatise, Hume acknowledges that he had to adopt the “seemingly preposterous method” of examining the causal inference prior to analyzing the causal relation since the relation “depends so much on the inference”. This dependence emerges in his two definitions of ‘cause’ which, he concedes, seem “extraneous” to the causal relation. In this paper, I try to do what Hume did not do but could have done: fully describe the causal relation (...) so as to reach its core. That core is what I call “existential dependence,” the fact that one “object” exists because another exists. It turns out that Hume’s “preposterous method” is correct since existential dependence is what I call a “distributive” relation, a kind of conjunction that can be represented only by means of certain inferences. This makes existential dependence seem mysterious, but the mystery disappears if we interpret this dependence as probability, something that is comprehensible only through inferences. The key consequence of all of this is that we need to distinguish between the kind of causality that conforms to Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ and the kind of causality our causal inferences designate. (shrink)

At the close of his account of causality in the Treatise, Hume acknowledges that he had to adopt the “seemingly preposterous method” of examining the causal inference prior to analyzing the causal relation since the relation “depends so much on the inference” (T 169). This dependence emerges in his two definitions of ‘cause’ (T 169–170) which, he concedes, seem “extraneous” to the causal relation. In this paper, I try to do what Hume did not do but could have done: fully (...) describe the causal relation so as to reach its core. That core is what I call “existential dependence,” the fact that one “object” exists because another exists. It turns out that Hume’s “preposterous method” is correct since existential dependence is what I call a “distributive” relation, a kind of conjunction that can be represented only by means of certain inferences. This makes existential dependence seem mysterious, but the mystery disappears if we interpret this dependence as probability, something that is comprehensible only through inferences. The key consequence of all of this is that we need to distinguish between the kind of causality that conforms to Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ and the kind of causality our causal inferences designate. (shrink)

It is widely believed that Hume recognizes only two types of causality-one equivalent to a constant conjunction between two "objects," the other involving somesort of necessary connection between them. I will refer to these types, respectively, as "conjunction" and "necessity." I believe that Hume relies on a third type of causality-a process by which a constant conjunction of perceptions causes someone to acquire a mental habit. To remain close to Hume's terminology, I will refer to the process as "repetition." The (...) main thesis of this paper is that this process, though causal, cannot be equated with either conjunction or necessity. Repetition is no small matter. It is the key to the correctness of Hume's overall account of causality and causal belief since it explains why humans have causal beliefs,why the causes they believe in need only be revealed in conjoined perceptions, and yet also why humans believe that a cause involves a necessary connection with its effect even though this belief is unverifiable. (shrink)

It is widely believed that Hume recognizes only two types of causality-one equivalent to a constant conjunction between two "objects," the other involving somesort of necessary connection between them. I will refer to these types, respectively, as "conjunction" and "necessity." I believe that Hume relies on a third type of causality-a process by which a constant conjunction of perceptions causes someone to acquire a mental habit. To remain close to Hume's terminology, I will refer to the process as "repetition." The (...) main thesis of this paper is that this process, though causal, cannot be equated with either conjunction or necessity. Repetition is no small matter. It is the key to the correctness of Hume's overall account of causality and causal belief since it explains why humans have causal beliefs,why the causes they believe in need only be revealed in conjoined perceptions, and yet also why humans believe that a cause involves a necessary connection with its effect even though this belief is unverifiable. (shrink)

The curious thing about some of the standard objections to Kantian freedom is that Kant was acutely aware of them, so much so that some of their most forceful formulations can be lifted directly from his writings. Consider the three most famous objections to his theory.

In “Economy,” Henry Thoreau argues against the common view that it is highly worthwhile for a human being to work hard in order to obtain material possessions. Thoreau’s objections are forceful, wide-ranging, and extraordinarily well written. Yet his readers, like almost everyone else, continue to desire, pursue, or acquire more and more material things as well as more and more money, the primary means to such things. Thoreau knew that this was true of the people of his own time, but (...) he didn’t know why. I think I know what Thoreau didn’t know. What Thoreau didn’t know is why material possessions are effective and alluring embodiments of a human being’s worth as a person. This is a particular kind of worth, which I call reputed worth. In the paper I show why reputed worth is so important to people, how material goods embody it, and, unfortunately, why reputed worth is deeply flawed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Basic Representationalist Model Model‐based Theorizing and Homuncular Functionalism Other Pieces of the Picture “Look, Mr Dalton …” References.

This book explains the skill of perseverance and why it is important.

This book is an attempt to write about Kierkegaard's philosophy in the style of Kierkegaard's philosophy: energetic, playful, free spirited, surprising, and joyous. It is a deliberately crumby book in the sense that it seeks out the fragments, scraps, and crumbs of philosophical arguments that are generally ignored or swept away, like so much rubbish, but that are actually the most interesting parts of the meal. The Anti-Assistant-Professor Method that this book follows adopts Kierkegaard's many excellent jokes about assistant professors (...) as a guide to how not to write about Kierkegaard's philosophy; specifically: - Don't cease to be human. - Don't be a parasite, merely feeding off other people's creations and never creating anything new. - Don't reduce or simplify or systematize Kierkegaard's ideas in order to make life easier for everyone (because that was never the point). - Don't kill Kierkegaard's philosophy by lecturing on it, thereby turning it into a collection of dead ideas for nonhumans rather than subjective truths that need to be lived. Following these guidelines, the book attempts to extend and amplify some of Kierkegaard's most important ideas in a way that combats the persistent problem of nihilism--a disease that even Kierkegaard succumbed to at the end of his life. (shrink)

Like the Copernican revolution which initiated the Modern project, there has been a thermodynamic revolution in the empirical sciences in the last two centuries. The aim of this paper is to show how we might draw from this revolution to make new and startling metaphysical and ethical claims concerning the nature and value of reality. To this end, this paper employs Aristotle’s account of the relation of the various philosophies and sciences to one another to show how we might assert (...) a new theory of being, moral value, and practical action from the primacy of entropic decay asserted in the contemporary mathematical sciences. This paper proceeds to show how, from what the contemporary sciences have concluded concerning the primacy of entropic decay within reality, unbecoming might be forwarded as a new account of the essence of existence: i.e., the first cause and motivating principle of reality’s formal, material, efficient, and final nature. The paper concludes by arguing that a new and surprising account of universal ethical value and normative duty can be deduced from such a metaphysics of decay. (shrink)

The first handbook on the topic of religious epistemology introduces and discusses topics fundamental to the epistemology of religious belief.

A provocative and entirely new account of ethical reasoning that reconceives the traditional understanding of ethical action negatively -/- In this radical reconsideration of ethical reasoning in contemporary European philosophy, Drew M. Dalton makes the case for an absolutely grounded account of ethical normativity developed from a scientifically informed and purely materialistic metaphysics. Expanding on speculative realist arguments, Dalton argues that the limits placed on the nature of ethical judgments by Kant’s critique can be overcome through a moral (...) evaluation of the laws of nature—specifically, the entropic principle that undergirds the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. In order to extract a moral meaning from this simple material fact, Dalton scrutinizes the presumptions of classical accounts and traditional understandings of good and evil within the history of Western philosophy and ultimately asserts that ethical normativity can be reestablished absolutely without reverting to dogmatism. -/- By overturning our assumptions about the nature and value of reality, The Matter of Evil: From Speculative Realism to Ethical Pessimism presents a provocative new model of ethical responsibility that is both logically justifiable and scientifically sound. Dalton argues for “ethical pessimism,” a position previously marginalized in the West, as a means to cultivate an account of ethical responsibility and political activism that takes seriously the unbecoming of being and the moral horror of existence. (shrink)

In The Teaching Self: Contemplative Practices, Pedagogy, and Research in Education, a rich collection of voices from diverse settings illustrates the ways in which first-person experiences with contemplative practices lay a foundation for contemplative pedagogy and research in teacher education.

Este livro foi elaborado na confluência de dois diálogos possíveis e necessários, um entre bioética e realidade latino-americana e outro entre doutrina católica e pensamento laico. A partir do Documento de Aparecida, o mais importante entre os documentos recentes da Igreja latino-americana, discute a relação entre ética, sociedade, desigualdades sociais e experiência religiosa. Apresenta reflexões sobre a dignidade e os direitos da pessoa humana; a defesa da vida e a autonomia do indivíduo; as relações entre justiça, exclusão social, solidariedade e (...) saúde; entre ética, beleza e esperança; a família no contexto pós-moderno e latino-americano, etc. Reúne textos de docentes universitários e especialistas do Brasil, Chile, Argentina, Colômbia, Cuba e Costa Rica. (shrink)

As I write this, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical caxc. The suffering and death that are occurring there now axe not inevitable, 1101; unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond Lhe capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to (...) very small proportions. The decisions arid actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions. At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situation in any signihczmt way. Generally speaking, people have not given large sums to relief funds; they have not written t0 their parliamentaxy representatives demanding increased government assistance; they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else directed toward providing thc refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs. At thc government level, no govcrmmcnt has given the sort of massive aid that would enable the refugees to survive fm: more than a few days. Britain, for instance, has given rather more than most countries. It has, to date, given £14,750,000. For comparative purposes, B1~itain’s share of thc nonreccverabla development costs of the Anglo-French Concorde project is already in excess of £275,000,000, and on present estimates will reach £440,000,¤00. The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as.. (shrink)

Adverse developmental exposures and pathologies of the social environment make vastly greater contributions to the leading health burdens in society than currently known genotypic information. Yet, while patients now commonly bring information on single alleles to the attention of their healthcare team, the former conditions are only rarely considered with respect to future health outcomes. This manuscript aims to integrate social environmental influences in genetic predictive models of disease risk. Healthcare providers must be educated to better understand genetic risks for (...) complex diseases and the specific health consequences of societal adversities, to facilitate patient education, disease prevention, and the optimal care in order to achieve positive health outcomes for those with early trauma or other social disadvantage. (shrink)

Os Ensaios de Michel de Montaigne requisitam justiça num contrato social. O seu trabalho não está no primeiro grupo das correntes contratuais, como deveria estar, nem é bem lembrado no bojo das teorias políticas modernas. Quanto mais o lemos, mais entendemos a preguiça com a sua obra. Na primeira seção discutimos um caminho contratual. Em segundo lugar, argumentamos a clareza de uma sociedade pré-estatal no seu trabalho. Na terceira parte do artigo, apontamos uma razão cética de Estado, baseada numa figura (...) institucional imperfeita, nascida do imperfeito. O conjunto de contradições fratricidas de seu tempo fazem-no convocar uma grande discussão sobre a necessidade da moderação e de instituições. Palvras-chave: Ensaios; Ceticismo; Descompostura; Contrato social. (shrink)

O artigo discute o método de esquiva de John Rawls em A ideia de um consenso por justaposição, de 1987. O centro da leitura que oferecemos sobre o argumento do consenso informa a recusa injustificada do ceticismo, a segunda objeção. Sugere-se que ele pode integrar o consenso por sobreposição. Deseja-se apontar para um fato conhecido entre os céticos: o método de oposições para a discussão configura uma ética do público para o público. Descreve-se como a linguagem fenomênica pode atravessar toda (...) tese e produção de consenso público para regimes democráticos. Conclui-se pela convergência dos métodos estudados. (shrink)

This paper argues that a set of questioning attitudes are among the foundations of human and animal minds. While both verbal questioning and states of curiosity are generally explained in terms of metacognitive desires for knowledge or true belief, I argue that each is better explained by a prelinguistic sui generis type of mental attitude of questioning. I review a range of considerations in support of such a proposal and improve on previous characterizations of the nature of these attitudes. I (...) then broaden their explanatory scope to include a number of forms of exploratory search. The paper has three main goals: to characterize the nature of the questioning attitudes, outlining their causal role and type of content; to argue that they are fundamental components of the mind, being widespread among animals and not constructed during ontogeny out of other attitudes; and to suggest that they explain a great deal more behavior than one might think. (shrink)

We propose a solution to the problem of logical omniscience in what we take to be its fundamental version: as concerning arbitrary agents and the knowledge attitude per se. Our logic of knowledge is a spin-off from a general theory of thick content, whereby the content of a sentence has two components: an intension, taking care of truth conditions; and a topic, taking care of subject matter. We present a list of plausible logical validities and invalidities for the logic of (...) knowledge per se for arbitrary agents, and isolate three explanatory factors for them: the topic-sensitivity of content; the fragmentation of knowledge states; the defeasibility of knowledge acquisition. We then present a novel dynamic epistemic logic that yields precisely the desired validities and invalidities, for which we provide expressivity and completeness results. We contrast this with related systems and address possible objections. (shrink)

Inspired by Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), we develop an argument—the “Scriptural Argument Against Dogmatic Protestantism” (SAADP)—that Protestants who accept the doctrine of sola scriptura cannot reasonably hold that Catholic and Eastern churches are in doctrinal error. If sola scriptura is true and Catholic and Eastern Churches have fallen into error, it is improbable that any Protestant can reliably form true beliefs about controversial points of Christian doctrine, including sola scriptura or suggestions that Catholic and Eastern Christians are in (...) error. We evaluate potential responses to SADDP, considering how SAADP should affect ecumenical doctrinal debates. (shrink)

What is ethics? Where do moral standards come from? Are they based on emotions, reason, or some innate sense of right and wrong? For many scientists, the key lies entirely in biology---especially in Darwinian theories of evolution and self-preservation. But if evolution is a struggle for survival, why are we still capable of altruism? In his classic study The Expanding Circle, Peter Singer argues that altruism began as a genetically based drive to protect one's kin and community members but (...) has developed into a consciously chosen ethic with an expanding circle of moral concern. Drawing on philosophy and evolutionary psychology, he demonstrates that human ethics cannot be explained by biology alone. Rather, it is our capacity for reasoning that makes moral progress possible. In a new afterword, Singer takes stock of his argument in light or recent research on the evolution of morality.--Publisher's description. (shrink)

Narrative thinking -- Narrative thinking about one's past -- Grief : a case study -- Narrative thinking about one's future -- Self-forgiveness : a case study -- The narrative sense of self -- Narrative, truth, life, and fiction.

Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...) on two brands of epistemic theory that naturally incorporate closure restrictions. The first type holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant question. The second holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant topic. For each approach, I offer a formalization of a leading theory from the literature and use this formalization to evaluate the theory’s adequacy in terms of a precise set of desiderata. I conclude that neither theory succeeds in meeting these desiderata, casting doubt on the viability of the underlying approaches. Finally, I offer a novel variant of the topic-sensitive approach that fares better. (shrink)