Animal welfare science and ecology are both generally concerned with the lives of animals, however they differ in their objectives and scope; the former studies the welfare of animals considered ‘domestic’ and under the domain of humans, while the latter studies wild animals with respect to ecological processes. Each of these approaches addresses certain aspects of the lives of animals living in the world though neither, we argue, tells us important information about the welfare of wild animals. This paper argues (...) for the development of a new scientific discipline ‘welfare biology’ to address these issues and more, given the deficiencies of pre-existing life science disciplines to research the subject. Welfare biology is the study of the welfare of all living beings who have a welfare, with a value orientation toward promoting that welfare, regardless of the beings’ situation or relationship to humans and our activities. (shrink)

There being no object without a subject, we can neither understand nor govern ourselves as if we were objects. If “human” refers to our objectivity and “transcendental” to our subjectivity, philosophy, since it is a subjective act, is transcendental.

Psychology does not seek to correlate independent happenings, but to discern in the manifold of a unique life, or of a unique culture, the pervasive sense or meaning which the life or culture expresses. The method is appropriate to the subject: a human being is not a string of lawfully connected events but an embodied meaning, an incarnated value. Psychology is therefore less like physics than it is like the critical interpretation of a work of art. It is psychoanalytical. Some (...) of the traditional objections to psychoanalytic theory disappear in the light of this conception. Others vanish when it is realized that the analytic situation, being personal encounter as well as interpretative analysis, to some extent creates the being it analyzes. (shrink)

Like everyone else, I dislike pinning doctrinal nameplates on myself. For some fifteen years, however, from 1941 until 1955, a sufficiently importunate questioner could push me to admit that I guessed I was some sort or other of a pragmatist. The invitation to reconsider pragmatism was thus for me a chance to reoccupy once familiar ground, to recover positions which once seemed compelling and then no longer did, and to make sure I had not given up the true with the (...) false. I bought out my baker’s stock of madeleines and set off. (shrink)

This study is primarily a call to philosophers to attend the concerns raised by the increasing possibility of indefinitely extended human life. While these concerns are largely moral and socio-political, questions arising from this possibility are seen to involve other philosophical areas, including epistemology.Starting with the age-old desire for extended, enjoyable life, possible strategies for realizing such life are considered. Such realization is shown to conflict with the desire for children. Various reasons for choice between the alternatives of indefinitely extended (...) life and what is currently understood to be a normal life, including the possibility of offspring, are examined. Competing social visions are sketched for the purpose of resolving this dilemma. It is argued that humanity’s likely choice from among the competing social sketches favors the decision for extended life against that for limited lifespan with the possibility of children. Assuming that the extended life will be a life of learning leads to epistemological considerations regarding what is to be learned. (shrink)

RésuméJohn Searlea récemment soutenu que le cerveau ne peut pas être un ordinateur (non connexionniste). Son argument est que les vrais systèmes physiques comme les cerveaux fonctionnent à la causalité, tandis que les opérations computationnelles ne sont pas causales, mais sont plutôt des séquences formelles qui requièrent un interprète extérieur pour lew existence en tant que systèmes formels. Les vrais systèmes physiques, par contre, ne requièrent aucune interprétation pour lew existence comme systèmes physiques opérationnels.Contrairement à Searle, je soutiens qu'iln'y a (...) pas de démarcation nette entre notre application des formalismes mathématiques standard à des phénomènes physiques comme les oscillations, et notre application des formalismes computationnels aux divers phénomènes physiques qui sont, effectivement ou potentiellement, bien décrits et expliqués pas ces formalismes. (shrink)

In print for the first time in over ten years, Act and Crime provides a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both Anglo-American criminal law and the morality that underlies it. The book defends the view that human actions are always volitionally caused bodily movements and nothing else. The theory is used to illuminate three major problems in the drafting and the interpretation of criminal codes: 1) what the voluntary act requirement both does and should require; 2) (...) what complex descriptions of actions prohibited by criminal codes both do and should require ; and 3) when two actions are 'the same' for purposes of assessing whether multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are warranted. The book both contributes to the development of a coherent theory of action in philosophy, and it provides both legislators and judges a grounding in three of the most basic elements of criminal liability. (shrink)

Martin Buber’s political thought has enjoyed renewed attention lately, particularly his concept of “theopolitics,” a type of political practice that recognizes God as the ultimate political authority. In Buber’s biblical exegesis, theopolitics is a condition of everyday life in premonarchical Israel, but following the installation of the monarchy, it becomes a specialized activity of prophets, consisting chiefly in divinely commanded intercession against state actions. Buber suggests that a version of this prophetic activity is manifest in present-day socialist cooperatives, especially the (...) kibbutzim. Indeed, for Buber, these cooperatives can be seen as laying the groundwork for messianic redemption. This essay probes some potentially troubling implications of Buber’s theopolitical framework, taking objections raised in Walter Benjamin’s correspondence as an entry point. A central concern for Benjamin is Buber’s nationalist articulation of Jewish identity, which appears all the more problematic when considered in tandem with the teleological view of history evident in Buber’s framework. (shrink)

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an (...) External World In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once (...) such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action. (shrink)

Dieses Buch untersucht Humes revolutionäre Theorie des begrifflichen Denkens.Das begriffliche Denken ist eine wichtige Tätigkeit des Geistes. Was genau geschieht im Geist, wenn wir diese Tätigkeit ausüben? Im Vergleich zu anderen Philosophen der Frühen Neuzeit hat Hume bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage eine grössere Schwierigkeit: Humesche Ideen sind (anders als bei Descartes und Locke) rein phänomenaler Natur. Sie sind geistige "Bildchen" ohne begriffliche Struktur. Wie soll das begriffliche Denken mit Hilfe derartiger Ideen möglich sein? Hume reagierte auf diese Herausforderung mit (...) einem völlig neuartigen Ansatz und wurde zum Bahnbrecher einer moderneren Theorie des Denkens. Eine klare Einsicht in diesen Teil der Humeschen Philosophie ist zudem unentbehrlich für ein adäquates Verständnis seines Agnostizismus bezüglich der kausalen Kraft und seiner Metaphysik der Existenz. (shrink)

My reply to the comments of Parkinson (2010) and Kuppens (2010) is organized in three parts. The first part deals with Parkinson’s claim that the scope of our research is limited because no real emotions were elicited. I suggest that the outcomes in our studies are structurally similar to real emotions but that they lack intensity. In the second part, I try to correct three potential misunderstandings regarding the nature of the comparison process that I proposed. In the third part, (...) I respond to Kuppens’ suggestion that we also need to consider the transition of appraisal values into the other components of emotion (actions tendencies, responses, and subjective experience). (shrink)

Résumé La localisation des implantations des grands éléments d’infrastructure collective pose des problèmes de légitimation juridique spécifique. Ils délimitent en effet plusieurs territoires distincts en fonction de la nature des impacts qu’ils provoquent, lesquels, chacun, sont soumis à leurs propres législations et rentrent dans les compétences d’autorités différentes, y compris celle dont dépend la décision sur l’infrastructure envisagée. De telles situations normatives complexes empêchent la sémantisation légitimante que le droit est censé assurer dans les décisions de l’appareil étatique: elle sera (...) toujours partielle, voire lacunaire. Les compensations ne peuvent être que procédurales, et celles-ci sont insuffisantes à atteindre l’idéal postulé par le principe de légalité des activités publiques. Mais il ne peut en aller autrement pour ces infrastructures. (shrink)

Literary and philosophical reflections combine with true-life farm anecdotes to offer commentary on seeking the good life in the modern age.

This book focuses on six key practices for engaged learning: acknowledging and building on students' prior knowledge and experiences; facilitating relationships; offering feedback; framing connections to broader contexts; fostering reflection and metacognition; and promoting integration and transfer of knowledge and skills.