The present essay is organized into five main sections. We begin with a few preliminary remarks about "cloud computing," which are developed more fully in a later section. This is followed by a brief overview of the evolution of Helen Nissenbaum's framework of "privacy as contextual integrity." In particular, we examine Nissenbaum's "Decision Heuristic" model, described in her most recent work on privacy, to see how it enables the contextual-integrity framework to respond to privacy challenges posed by new and emerging (...) technologies. We then apply that heuristic device to questions surrounding one aspect of cloud computing -- viz., "cloud storage" technology. In particular, we focus on current practices affecting Google Docs as an instance of a cloud-storage system. (shrink)

In this essay we argue that the current social and ethical structure in the Open Source Software Community stem from its roots in academia. The individual developers experience a level of autonomy similar to that of a faculty member. Furthermore, we assert that the Open Source Software Community’s social structure demands benevolent leadership. We argue that it is difficult to pass off low quality open source software as high quality software and that the Open Source development model offers strong accountability. (...) Finally, we argue that Open Source Software introduces ethical challenges for universities and the software development community. (shrink)

It has been a decade since Computer Ethics came into prominence within the field of computer science and engineering, changing not only the profession but the classroom as well. The commercialization and globalization of the World Wide Web has impacted us all, both producers and consumers alike. What was once the province of the few has become the virtual society of the multitudes. Ethical issues concerning security, privacy, information, identity, community and equity of access once contained and localized, have assumed (...) additional complexity in the global environment. Every day, the front pages of our newspapers and magazines report violations of one sort or another.This paper will address two questions: As we move into the 21 st century, how can we shape 'ethical' information communication technology professionals? And, is our vision of an 'ethical' global on-line society a realistic one? (shrink)

"The Rules" are found in a collaborative document that states principles for responsibility when a computer artifact is designed, developed and deployed into a sociotechnical system. At this writing, over 50 people from nine countries have signed onto The Rules. Unlike codes of ethics, The Rules are not tied to any organization, and computer users as well as computing professionals are invited to sign onto The Rules. The emphasis in The Rules is that both users and professionals have responsibilities in (...) the production and use of computing artifacts. In this paper, we use The Rules to examine issues of trust. (shrink)

We contend that software developers have an ethical responsibility to strive for reliable software. We base that obligation on long standing engineering traditions that place the public good as a central tenant and on the professional relationship between a software developer and the users of the software developed.

The age of digital technology has introduced new complications into the issues of fair and private use of copyrighted material. In fact, the question of private use of another's work has been transformed from a side issue in intellectual property jurisprudence into the very center of intellectual property discussions about rights and privileges in a networked world. This paper will explore the nuanced difference between fair and private use as articulated in the US and the European Copyright Laws. Part One (...) will explain the legal use and meaning of fair use and its justifications. We maintain that it is almost impossible to resolve the issue of the fair/private use's legal nature, if one has not previously resolved copyright's legal nature. Legal resolution of such conflicts, as we shall demonstrate, follows different rules, and the messages sent to users and authors vary greatly depending on the jurisdiction. Part Two will examine the issue of Private Use as Fair Use by Design. We will look at the impact of Digital Rights Management on fair use and explore if the nature of private use as fair use has changed because we are dealing with the protection of digital content. We will show that protecting digital works by code, via various digital rights management schemes is shrinking the public domain of information and restricting private use as fair use. (shrink)

There is a growing literature on the concept of e-trust and on the feasibility and advisability of “trusting” artificial agents. In this paper we present an object-oriented model for thinking about trust in both face-to-face and digitally mediated environments. We review important recent contributions to this literature regarding e-trust in conjunction with presenting our model. We identify three important types of trust interactions and examine trust from the perspective of a software developer. Too often, the primary focus of research in (...) this area has been on the artificial agents and the humans they may encounter after they are deployed. We contend that the humans who design, implement, and deploy the artificial agents are crucial to any discussion of e-trust and to understanding the distinctions among the concepts of trust, e-trust and face-to-face trust. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the case of Tay, the Microsoft AI chatbot that was launched in March, 2016. After less than 24 hours, Microsoft shut down the experiment because the chatbot was generating tweets that were judged to be inappropriate since they included racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic language. We contend that the case of Tay illustrates a problem with the very nature of learning software that interacts directly with the public, and the developer's role and responsibility associated with it. (...) We make the case that when LS interacts directly with people or indirectly via social media, the developer has additional ethical responsibilities beyond those of standard software. There is an additional burden of care. (shrink)

To many who develop and use free software, the GNU General Public License represents an embodiment of the meaning of free software. In this paper we examine the definition and meaning of free software in the context of three events surrounding the GNU General Public License. We use a case involving the GPU software project to establish the importance of Freedom 0 in the meaning of free software. We analyze version 3 of the GNU General Public License and conclude that (...) although a credible case can be made that the added restrictions are consistent with the definition of free software, the case requires subtle arguments. Strong arguments against the added restrictions are less subtle, and may therefore be more convincing to many users and developers. We also analyze the Affero General Public License and conclude that it is inconsistent with the definition of free software. (shrink)

In their important paper “Autonomous Agents”, Floridi and Sanders use “levels of abstraction” to argue that computers are or may soon be moral agents. In this paper we use the same levels of abstraction to illuminate differences between human moral agents and computers. In their paper, Floridi and Sanders contributed definitions of autonomy, moral accountability and responsibility, but they have not explored deeply some essential questions that need to be answered by computer scientists who design artificial agents. One such question (...) is, “Can an artificial agent that changes its own programming become so autonomous that the original designer is no longer responsible for the behavior of the artificial agent?” To explore this question, we distinguish between LoA1 (the user view) and LoA2 (the designer view) by exploring the concepts of unmodifiable, modifiable and fully modifiable tables that control artificial agents. We demonstrate that an agent with an unmodifiable table, when viewed at LoA2, distinguishes an artificial agent from a human one. This distinction supports our first counter-claim to Floridi and Sanders, namely, that such an agent is not a moral agent, and the designer bears full responsibility for its behavior. We also demonstrate that even if there is an artificial agent with a fully modifiable table capable of learning* and intentionality* that meets the conditions set by Floridi and Sanders for ascribing moral agency to an artificial agent, the designer retains strong moral responsibility. (shrink)

Grodzinsky's characterization of the syntactic function of Broca's area is convincing, but his argument that this transformation processing capability is specific to language is less so. Based on predictions from simulation studies of sequence learning, we report a correlation between agrammatic patients' impairments in (a) syntactic comprehension, and (b) nonlinguistic sequence transformation processing, indicating the existence of a nonlinguistic correlate of agrammatic aphasia.

An updated and extended second edition supporting the findings of its well-known predecessor which claimed that courts employ common-sense notions of causation in determining legal responsibility.

F. S. McNeilly; XIII—Immorality and the Law, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 167–182, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.

First published in 1931 and originally delivered as the Deems Lectures at New York University in 1929, this book examines what scientific discoveries in many different branches of science reveal, and the implications of such discoveries for philosophy. Esteemed philosopher F. S. C. Northrop surveys a variety of advances, including relativity and quantum mechanics, and how they correlate to his epistemological theory of concepts. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of science and (...) the connection between science and philosophy. (shrink)