Speech variability facilitates non-tonal language speakers’ lexical tone learning. However, it remains unknown whether tonal language speakers can also benefit from speech variability while learning second language (L2) lexical tones. Researchers also reported that the effectiveness of speech variability was only shown on learning new items. Considering that the first language (L1) and L2 probably share similar tonal categories, the present study hypothesizes that speech variability only promotes the tonal language speakers’ acquisition of L2 tones that are different from the (...) tones in their L1. To test this hypothesis, the present study trained native Mandarin (a tonal language) speakers to learn Cantonese tones with either high variability (HV) or low variability (LV) speech materials, and then compared their learning performance. The results partially supported this hypothesis: only Mandarin subjects’ productions of Cantonese low level and mid level tones benefited from the speech variability. They probably relied on the mental representations in L1 to learn the Cantonese tones that had similar Mandarin counterparts. This learning strategy limited the impact of speech variability. Furthermore, the results also revealed a discrepancy between L2 perception and production. The perception improvement may not necessarily lead to an improvement in production. (shrink)

This paper discusses the metaphor of projection in relation to Hume’s treatment of causal necessity. I argue that the best understanding of projection shows it to be compatible with taking Hume to be a ‘sceptical realist’ about causal necessity, albeit an agnostic one.

Traditionally Hume is seen as offering an ‘empiricist’ critique of ‘rationalism’. This view is often illustrated – or rejected – by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes'. However the textual evidence shows that Hume's most sustained engagement with a canonical ‘rationalist’ is with Nicolas Malebranche. The author shows that the fundamental differences (among the many similarities) between the two on the self and causal power do indeed rest on a principled distinction between ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’, and that there is (...) some truth in the traditional story. This, however, is very far from saying that Hume's general orientation is an attack on something called ‘rationalism’. (shrink)

Christian Emden’s informative book has a number of explicit aims: the first aim is to “reconstruct Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism”; the second aim is to show “that there are specific historical reasons why Nietzsche came to adopt a position best understood in terms of philosophical naturalism”; and the third aim is to show “how Nietzsche’s naturalism and his understanding of the life sciences tie in with genealogy.”1 In pursuit of these aims, Emden divides the book into three parts, one titled “Varieties (...) of Philosophical Naturalism,” the second “Evolution and the Limits of Teleology,” and the third “Genealogy, Nature and Normativity.” In this article I shall concentrate mainly on Emden’s discussion of... (shrink)

He is the darling of naturalism or the bogeyman of scepticism, a friend to virtue or an unwitting party to incipient nihilism. He is politically conservative, or a liberator from old views. He is a fideist, an advocate of faith over reason, or a precursor of Richard Dawkins.

The original occasion for most of the chapters contained in this book was the result of a wish to establish a forum where Hume scholars of various provenances and convictions could meet and discuss all matters Humean, profiting from the very differences that commonly would make it difficult for them to cross paths with each other. This wish materialised in an interdisciplinary workshop, ‘Hume Studies in Britain’, held in Cambridge in September 2000. The title of the book is intended to (...) reflect that original interdisciplinary approach: Hume has made different impressions on the different areas of investigation here represented. Thus his writings can be taken as transparent vehicles for philosophical intuitions, problems, and arguments that are still at the centre of philosophical reflection today. On the other hand, there are readings that try to locate Hume's views against the background of concerns, debates and discussions of his own time. Hume's texts may be read as highly sophisticated literary-cum-philosophical creations: in such cases, the reader's attention tends to be directed at issues of genre and persuasive strategies rather than philosophical questions and arguments. Or they may be regarded as moments in the construction of the ideology of modernity, and as contributions to the legitimation of a given social order. As the true classics that they are, Hume's works are typical ‘open texts’, in which readers keep finding an ever new and varied bounty of inspirations. The borders between these approaches are far from neat; and this book intends to promote as much trespassing as possible between them. (shrink)

In mathematics, various representations of real numbers have been investigated. All these representations are mathematically equivalent because they lead to the same real structure - Dedekind-complete ordered field. Even the effective versions of these representations are equivalent in the sense that they define the same notion of computable real numbers. Although the computable real numbers can be defined in various equivalent ways, if computable is replaced by primitive recursive (p. r., for short), these definitions lead to a number of different (...) concepts, which we compare in this article. We summarize the known results and add new ones. In particular we show that there is a proper hierarchy among p. r. real numbers by nested interval representation, Cauchy representation, b -adic expansion representation, Dedekind cut representation, and continued fraction expansion representation. Our goal is to clarify systematically how the primitive recursiveness depends on the representations of the real numbers. (shrink)

In mathematics, various representations of real numbers have been investigated. All these representations are mathematically equivalent because they lead to the same real structure – Dedekind-complete ordered field. Even the effective versions of these representations are equivalent in the sense that they define the same notion of computable real numbers. Although the computable real numbers can be defined in various equivalent ways, if “computable” is replaced by “primitive recursive” , these definitions lead to a number of different concepts, which we (...) compare in this article. We summarize the known results and add new ones. In particular we show that there is a proper hierarchy among p. r. real numbers by nested interval representation, Cauchy representation, b -adic expansion representation, Dedekind cut representation, and continued fraction expansion representation. Our goal is to clarify systematically how the primitive recursiveness depends on the representations of the real numbers. (shrink)

Esports is a rapidly growing industry worldwide, and it is making significant inroads in Hong Kong as well. However, owing to debates regarding the distinction between Esports and video gaming and the potential negative effects of engaging in Esports, its development in Hong Kong is still in its infancy. Therefore, this qualitative study investigated the perceptions and attitudes of teenagers and young adults toward Esports development and engagement, using the theory of planned behavior. Twenty-five teenagers and young adults participated in (...) this study, with their ages ranging from 15 to 29 years. Our results revealed the views of Hong Kong teenagers and young adults on the beneficial and deleterious outcomes, subjective norms, and barriers and facilitators of participating in Esports. Additionally, the results of this qualitative study may contribute toward a deeper understanding of Hong Kong Esports players to develop a theory of planned behavior construct for capturing the beliefs and perceptions of Hong Kong teenagers toward Esports. (shrink)

Quite an appealing book, Peter Kail’s Simply Nietzsche introduces Nietzsche’s thought by reviewing his published work from BT to EH. Simply Nietzsche is neither a long nor a laborious read. Nor does it invest much time in minutely carved debates about understanding this or that passage or alleged inconsistencies between Nietzsche’s various claims. Rather, Simply Nietzsche displays the virtues of a good introduction. In direct and transparent prose, it guides the reader new to Nietzsche through many of his most (...) important arguments, displays how seemingly disparate claims are elements of a whole, and reveals what is most notable, novel, and peculiar about those claims and that whole. Some will complain that topics... (shrink)

Brian Leiter and Peter Kail have delivered thoughtful critiques of my book, Nietzsche’s Naturalism: Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century.1 It is a great pleasure to respond to these critiques, since they raise some crucial issues with regard to Nietzsche’s understanding of naturalism and normativity. On the one hand, there are many areas of agreement: Nietzsche’s philosophical project is best understood along the lines of naturalism; developments in the nineteenth-century life sciences, broadly speaking, play a crucial (...) role in the formation of Nietzsche’s naturalism; and Nietzsche’s relationship to both Darwin and Darwin’s neo-Kantian interpreters is more complex than generally assumed. On the... (shrink)

Peter Kail’s comprehensive, thoughtful, and challenging book focuses on Hume’s use of projectionFthe appeal to mental phenomena to explain manifest features of the worldFin his treatments of external objects, causation, and morality. Almost all interpreters of Hume acknowledge a role for projection, but Kail is the first to unpack the metaphor, and to show the different ways in which projection works in different domains.

My critical comments on Part I of P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy are divided into two parts. First, I challenge the exegetical details of Kail's take on Hume's important distinction between natural and philosophical relations. I show that Kail misreads Hume in a subtle fashion. If I am right, then much of the machinery that Kail puts into place for his main argument does different work in Hume than Kail thinks. (...) Second, I offer a brief criticism of Kail's argument for reading Hume "as a realist about the external world". The two parts are tied together because it turns out that Kail and I disagree about how Hume thinks of philosophers' activity generally.One caveat:. (shrink)

P. J. E. Kail's Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy is an excellent book, consisting—like Hume's Treatise itself—of three excellent parts. I will comment on one central aspect of its second part: its explanation of the source of the second thoughts that Hume famously expressed, with a frustrating lack of specificity, about his own initial discussion of personal identity in the Treatise.As is well known, Hume holds in the section "Of personal identity" (T 1.4.6) that a self, mind, or (...) person is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions" (T 1.4.6.4; SBN 252) and, more specifically, a "system of different perceptions or different existences link'd together by the relation of cause and .. (shrink)

The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The ‘usefulness and agreeableness reading’ (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified via (...) their usefulness and agreeableness to the self and others; proponents include Ardal (in Livingston & King (eds.) Hume: a re-evaluation, 1976), Kail (in: Frasca-Spada & Kail (eds.) Impressions of Hume, 2005), McCormick (Hume Stud 31:1, 2005), Owen (Hume’s reason, 1999), and Ridge (Hume Stud 29:2, 2003), while Schafer (Philosophers, forthcoming) also defends an interpretation along these lines. In this paper, I will argue that although U&A has textual merit, it struggles to maintain a substantive distinction between epistemic and moral justification—a distinction that Hume insists on. I then attempt to carve out the logical space for there being a distinctly epistemic notion of justification founded on usefulness and agreeableness. However, I find that such an account is problematic for two reasons: first, it cannot take advantage of the textual support for U&A; secondly, it is incompatible with other features of the text. (shrink)

The ‘New Hume’ interpretation, which sees Hume as a realist about ‘thick’ Causal powers, has been largely motivated by his evident commitment to causal language and causal science. In this, however, it is fundamentally misguided, failing to recognise how Hume exploits his anti-realist conclusions about (upper-case) Causation precisely to support (lower-case) causal science. When critically examined, none of the standard New Humean arguments — familiar from the work of Wright, Craig, Strawson, Buckle, Kail, and others — retains any significant (...) force against the plain evidence of Hume's; texts. But the most devastating objection comes from Hume's own applications of his analysis of causation, to the questions of ‘the immateriality of the soul’ and ‘liberty and necessity’. These show that the New Hume interpretation has misunderstood the entire purpose of his ‘Chief Argument’, and presented him as advocating some of the very positions he is arguing most strongly against. (shrink)

For decades scholars thought they knew Hume's position on the existence of causes and objects he was a sceptic. However, this received view has been thrown into question by the `new readings of Hume as a sceptical realist. For philosophers, students of philosophy and others interested in theories of causation and their history, The New Hume Debate is the first book to fully document the most influential contemporary readings of Hume's work. Throughout, the volume brings the debate beyond textual issues (...) in Hume to contemporary philosophical issues concerning causation and knowledge of the external world and issues in the history of philosophy, offering the reader a model for scholarly debate. This revised paperback edition includes three new chapters by Janet Broughton, Peter Kail and Peter Millican. Contributors: Kenneth A. Richman, Barry Stroud, Galen Strawson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John P. Wright, Simon Blackburn, Edward Craig, Martin Bell, Daniel Flage, Anne Jaap Jacobson, Rupert Read, Janet Broughton, Peter Millican, Peter Kail. (shrink)

For Bernard Williams, philosophy and history are importantly connected. His work exploits this connection in a number of directions: he believes that philosophy cannot ignore its own history the way science can; that even when engaging with philosophy’s history primarily to produce history, one needs to draw on philosophy; and that when doing the history of philosophy primarily to produce philosophy, one still needs a sense of how historically distant past philosophers are, because the point of reading them is to (...) confront something different from the present. But Williams also holds that systematic philosophy itself needs to be done historically, engaging not just with its own history, but with that of the concepts it seeks to understand. To explore these different ways in which philosophy and history intertwine, this volume assembles specially commissioned contributions by A. W. Moore, Terence Irwin, Sophie-Grace Chappell, Catherine Rowett, Marcel van Ackeren, John Cottingham, Gerald Lang, Lorenzo Greco, Paul Russell, Carla Bagnoli, Peter Kail, David Owen, Giuseppina D’Oro, James Connelly, Matthieu Queloz, Nikhil Krishnan, John Marenbon, Ralph Wedgwood, Garrett Cullity, Hans-Johann Glock, Geraldine Ng, Ilaria Cozzaglio, Amanda R. Greene, and Miranda Fricker. They critically appraise Williams’s work in and on the history of philosophy as well as his historicist turn and his use of genealogy. The resulting collection uniquely combines substantive discussions of historical figures from Homer to Wittgenstein with methodological discussions of how and why the history of philosophy should be done, and how and why philosophy should draw on history. (shrink)

In Part 3 of Projection and Realism, P. J. E. Kail offers an original and thought-provoking analysis of Hume's views on morality. Kail seeks to make sense of Hume's talk of projection and realism. Kail's stated aim is to help us understand Hume's own views, rather than some new Humean view. Part 3 is thus a contribution to the literature on Hume's meta-ethics. Kail's particular approach presents two challenges to the student of Hume's works. First, (...) class='Hi'>Kail gives us a set of terms that are not Hume's; this includes a distinction between explanatory projection and feature projection; a distinction between two forms of realism, metaphysical hedonism and the identification of moral value with natural properties of. (shrink)

The Physiological Library’s catalogue shows that Hume had access to Malebranche’s sixth edition of De la recherche de la vérité while a student in Edinburgh.1 The Recherche is also included in the David Hume’s Library.2 While Hume did not agree with Malebranche on all things, a number of commentators have argued that Hume borrowed many points from Malebranche, not only concerning causality and the famous example of the billiard balls3 but also on other subjects. Charles McCracken’s Malebranche and British Philosophy (...) compares Hume and Malebranche on causation, self-knowledge, kinds of truth, the relation between imagination and belief, and ethics.4 Peter Kail has more recently devoted three articles to the .. (shrink)

This article has its origin in a symposium on Christopher Janaway's 2007 book, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy. It comprises responses by the author to articles by the commentators Daniel Came, Ken Gemes, P.J.E. Kail, and Stephen Mulhall.

In Knowledge and its Limits (KAIL), Timothy Williamson argues for the view that “only knowledge warrants assertion” (2000, 243). Call this the knowledge norm of assertion. Several philosophers including DeRose, Hawthorne, and Stanley, agree that if the knowledge norm is true, then knowledge itself depends on stakes, since warranted assertability seems to change with what is at stake if the proposition in question is true (1992; 2003; 2005). This brings us to the question: stakes for whom? DeRose maintains that (...) knowledge depends on the stakes for the speaker of the knowledge attribution, arguing for Epistemic Contextualism (2002, 187). However, Hawthorne and Stanley disagree, contending that it is the stakes for the subject of the knowledge attribution which is relevant, arguing for Subject Sensitive Invariantism (2003, 157; 2005, 85). While the Contextualist and the Invariantist are armed with responses against each other’s view, I suspect that Russell’s and Doris’ indifference cases might break the impasse in favor of the Contextualist (2008, 432). This paper will thus attempt to show that the knowledge norm of assertion leads us to Contextualism rather than Subject Sensitive Invariantism, by comparing how Contextualism and Subject Sensitive Invariantism fare against Russell’s and Doris’ Indifference Cases. (shrink)

The article discusses issues raised by Daniel Came, Ken Gemes, Peter Kail, and Stephen Mulhall in commentaries on Janaway, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's "Genealogy" (2008). The main topics are disinterestedness, aesthetic experience, perspectivism, affects and drives, the self, genealogical method, naturalistic psychology, and Nietzsche's rhetoric. The article argues that Nietzsche's criticisms of the conception of aesthetic experience as disinterested are justified, in particular his criticisms of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche's rejection of disinterestedness is linked to his claim that there is "only (...) a perspectival knowing" and his conception of genealogical method. The article argues that perspectivism is the view that we understand best when we feel a multiplicity of affects, and that Nietzsche's own rhetorical method is a therapeutic provocation of affects which constitute the true basis of his readers' values. A particular example from Genealogy I. 14 is examined.--Correspondence to: cjanaway @soton.ac.uk. (shrink)

Alessandra Stradella - Impressions of Hume - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.1 164-165 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Alessandra Stradella Emory University Frasca-Spada, Marina, and P. J. E. Kail, editors. Impressions of Hume. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 308. Cloth, $74.00. Readers of Hume have a new collection of essays. Impressions of Hume adds to the literature twelve essays recounting the impressions (...) Hume has made on specialists from different disciplines: philosophy, literature, and history. The editors set their agenda adequately in the intention to foster an appreciation of Hume's work as "open texts" and "show the endless fascination of Hume's writing and thought" . I believe the.. (shrink)

The new editorial team, Ann Levey, Karl Schafer and Amy Schmitter, are very pleased to present this special double-issue of Hume Studies. It contains a wide variety of articles on subjects old and new, as well as an assortment of book reviews, commissioned by the new book review editor, David Landy of San Francisco State University. We are grateful to the many people who have helped us get this volume and our tenure as editors underway, including the preceding editors-in-chief, Angela (...) Coventry and Peter Kail, and preceding book review editor, Annemarie Butler, as well as the previous editors-in-chief Corliss Swain and Saul Traiger, who offered invaluable advice about procedures, practices, and technological issues.... (shrink)

An understanding of human nature has been central to the work of some of the greatest philosophical thinkers including Plato, Descartes, Hume, Hobbes, Rousseau, Freud and Marx. Questions such as 'what is human nature?', 'is there such a thing as an exclusively human nature?', 'through what methods might we best discover more about our nature?', and 'to what extent are our actions and beliefs constrained by it?' are of central importance not only to philosophy, but to our general understanding of (...) ourselves as part of the human species. This volume addresses such questions through the inclusion of special commissioned essays by specialists including John Cottingham, Hans-Johann Glock, P. M. S. Hacker, Wolfram Hinzen, Rosalind Hursthouse, Peter Kail, Sarah Patterson and Richard Samuels. (shrink)

An understanding of human nature has been central to the work of some of the greatest philosophical thinkers including Plato, Descartes, Hume, Hobbes, Rousseau, Freud and Marx. Questions such as 'what is human nature?', 'is there such a thing as an exclusively human nature?', 'through what methods might we best discover more about our nature?', and 'to what extent are our actions and beliefs constrained by it?' are of central importance not only to philosophy, but to our general understanding of (...) ourselves as part of the human species. This volume addresses such questions through the inclusion of special commissioned essays by specialists including John Cottingham, Hans-Johann Glock, P. M. S. Hacker, Wolfram Hinzen, Rosalind Hursthouse, Peter Kail, Sarah Patterson and Richard Samuels. (shrink)