This book attempts to advance Donald Griffin's vision of the "final, crowning chapter of the Darwinian revolution" by developing a philosophy for the science of animal consciousness. It advocates a Darwinian bottom-up approach that treats consciousness as a complex, evolved, and multidimensional phenomenon in nature rather than a mysterious all-or-nothing property immune to the tools of science and restricted to a single species. -/- The so-called emergence of a science of consciousness in the 1990s has at best been a science (...) of human consciousness. This book aims to advance a true Darwinian science of consciousness in which its evolutionary origin, function, and phylogenetic diversity are moved from the field’s periphery to its very centre, thus enabling us to integrate consciousness into an evolutionary view of life. Accordingly, this book has two objectives: (i) to argue for the need and possibility of an evolutionary bottom-up approach that addresses the problem of consciousness in terms of the evolutionary origins of a new ecological lifestyle that made consciousness worth having and (ii) to articulate a thesis and beginnings of a theory of the place of consciousness as a complex evolved phenomenon in nature that can help us to answer the question of what it is like to be a bat, an octopus, or a crow. -/- A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in advancing our understanding of animal minds as well as anyone with a keen interest in how we can develop a science of animal consciousness. (shrink)

Animal welfare has a long history of disregard. While in recent decades the study of animal welfare has become a scientific discipline of its own, the difficulty of measuring animal welfare can still be vastly underestimated. There are three primary theories, or perspectives, on animal welfare - biological functioning, natural living and affective state. These come with their own diverse methods of measurement, each providing a limited perspective on an aspect of welfare. This paper describes a perspectival pluralist account of (...) animal welfare, in which all three theoretical perspectives and their multiple measures are necessary to understand this complex phenomenon and provide a full picture of animal welfare. This in turn will offer us a better understanding of perspectivism and pluralism itself. (shrink)

In it he came fully to terms with the inadequacy of traditional democratic theory." This volume is part of a continuing series on the major works of Walter Lippmann.

A most sensible exposition of Nietzsche's philosophy.

In the model proposed by Findlay & Walker, the programming of saccadic eye movements is achieved by two parallel processes, one dedicated to the coding of saccade metrics (Where) and the other controlling saccade initiation (When). One outcome of the “winner-take-all” characteristics of the salience map, the main node of the model, is an independence between the metrics and the latency of saccades. We report on some observations, made in the head-unrestrained cat under pathological conditions, of a correlation between accuracy (...) and latency of saccadic gaze shifts. To account for such a correlation, the link between metrics specification (Where) and saccade triggering (When) should be amended in the model. (shrink)

An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...) the current popularity of extended cognition theory through critical analysis and by pointing out fallacies and shortcoming in the literature Stimulates discussions that will advance debate about the nature of cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

In his theory of time Aristotle does not often mention the present time and nowhere gives a detailed account of it. Nonetheless, present time plays an important role in his conception. I primarily argue for the following claims: (1) According to Aristotle there is a perception of motion and there is a perception of time. These combined perceptions can neither occur in the past nor in the future nor in an indivisible now. Thus, there must be a present time. (2) (...) Aristotle acknowledges the passage of time. This passage of time can only be understood as a passing present. And since an indivisible now cannot pass, the passage of time delivers a further argument for the basic assumption of a present time. – For the most part I simply follow Aristotle’s argument in Physics IV 10 and 11. In doing so, I distinguish present time and now in the introductory puzzles, investigate the passing present in the co-perception of change and time, discuss the relation between change and the passage of time as well as the relation between the passing present and the different nows. (shrink)

The organisation of mammalian mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is more complex than usually assumed. Despite often being depicted as a simple circle, the topology of mtDNA can vary from supercoiled monomeric circles over catenanes and oligomers to complex multimeric networks. Replication of mtDNA is also not clear cut. Two different mechanisms of replication have been found in cultured cells and in most tissues: a strand‐asynchronous mode involving temporary RNA coverage of one strand, and a strand‐coupled mode rather resembling conventional nuclear DNA (...) replication. In addition, a recombination‐initiated replication mechanism is likely to be associated with the multimeric mtDNA networks found in human heart. Although an insight into the general principles and key factors of mtDNA organisation and maintenance has been gained over the last few years, there are many open questions regarding replication initiation, termination and physiological factors determining mtDNA organisation and replication mode. However, common themes in mtDNA maintenance across eukaryotic kingdoms can provide valuable lessons for future work. (shrink)

The last several years have seen vibrant debates among policymakers and scholars on whether to craft new human rights (or novel interpretations of existing ones) around neurotechnologies. These con...

A pioneering study that illuminates the connection of music, poetry, mystical praxis and social history underlying the ceremony of the Mevlevi Dervishes. Mevlana Jalaluddin Rumi, whose life and mystical poetry provided the inspiration for the Mevlevi Sufi order, is one of the world's best-known poets, yet the centuries-long musical tradition cultivated by the Mevleviye remains much less known. In this deeply researched book, renowned scholar Walter Feldman traces the historical development of Mevlevi music and brings to light the remarkable (...) musical and mystical aesthetics of the Mevlevi ayin - the instrumental and vocal accompaniment to the sublime ceremony of the 'Whirling' Dervishes. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Materie, Bewegung, kosmische Entwicklung" verfügbar.

2. Was hei~t Freiheit?......................... 13 Definitionen von Werten 3. Werte im Gedankenspiel oder in der Anwendung? 18 4. Wie steht es heute urn soziale Sicherheit?....... 24 Kenntnis der Wertverwirklichungen bis zur Gegenwart 5. Kein Wert kann allein filr sich verwirklicht werden.................................. 28 Kombination von Werten 6. Wie reagieren die Anderen auf die Anwendung von Werten?................................. 35 Gegenseitigkeit der Wertumsetzungen 7. Absolute Oberzeugungen oder allHigliche Wert- spriiche?................................ 39 Stu/en der Werteinstellungen 8. Was steht obenan?......................... 42 Rangordnungen von Werten 9. Wie weit (...) gilt noch Leistungsorientierung und wie wird Leistung aufgefa~t?.................... 49 10. Was ist geblieben - was hat sich verandert?..... 57 Bestiindigkeit oder Wandel in den Werteinstellungen 11. Industrielle oder postindustrielle Werte......... 66 12. Die "schweigende Mehrheit"................. 73 l3. Wie bringt man Werte in eine Rangfolge?....... 82 14. Systematische Abgrenzung von Werten - Zielen - Normen................................. 85 15. Perfekte Methoden - verworrene Ziele?........ 96 Di//erenzen zwischen Mitteln und Zwecken, Wirkungen und Gegenwirkungen 5 16. Werte und Gegenwerte.................... 103 17. Zur Psycho1ogie und Sozio1ogie der Werte...... III 18. Langhin gilltige Werte................... " 11 5 19. Historische Regenerationen............. 124 20. Bio-psychische Konstanten und Normalitaten. " 131 21. Anthropo1ogische Aspekte................. l36 22. Sch1uf. \wort............................. 142 23. Literaturhinweise........................ 144 6 1. Einleitung Seit Jahrzehnten sprechen viele Autoren und Zeitge­ nossen von Werteschwund, Wertezerfall oder Substanzver­ lust. Sie meinen damit, da~ Werte wie z. B. Freiheit, Lei­ stung oder Bildung unwichtig oder unverbindlich oder gar unbekannt werden. Fast jeder wird damit angesprochen. (shrink)

Present biomedical progress is fascinating and without doubt promotes welfare and reduces suffering in many ways. Nevertheless it has to be asked how far the modern individual is more a captive of its practical imperatives than an enlightened, conscious and responsible consumer of its offerings: How free are we in the view of the present biomedical progress? Facing this problem this volume presents some specific fields of application and, then, considerations of medical experts, sociologists, philosophers and theologians on human freedom (...) and its empowerment in front of these challenges. The volume is addressed to scientists and professionals in ethics and theology as well in the field of biomedicine. (shrink)

This paper presents the outlines of a phenomenological theory of foundational or non-inferential knowledge according to which the facts or states of affairs towards which our beliefs are intentionally directed can sometimes serve as reasons or evidence for what we believe. This occurs in acts of fulfillment, in which an object or state of affairs is given as it is thought to be. Hopp further argues that the sorts of empirical facts that can serve as reasons for noninferentially justified beliefs (...) are not confined to facts about one’s own occurrent mental states, but include facts about the physical world as well. In the course of defending the view against objections, Hopp argues that we should be internalists about the reasons in virtue of which what we believe is justified but externalists about the factors in virtue of which our states of believing have the status of being justified. He also argues against the claim that mental states, such as perceptual experiences, constitute our evidence for empirical beliefs. (shrink)