According to the Asymmetry, it is wrong to bring a miserable child into existence but permissible not to bring a happy child into existence. When it comes to procreation, we don’t have complete procreative liberty. But we do have some discretion. The Asymmetry seems highly intuitive. But a plausible account of the Asymmetry has been surprisingly difficult to provide, and it may well be that most moral philosophers – or at least most consequentialists – think that all reasonable efforts to (...) provide such an account have by now been exhausted. In this paper, I argue that, despite the difficulties, the Asymmetry is too important to be set aside. I also note a handful of accounts of the Asymmetry that have been proposed and why they fail. It seems, for example, that it will not do to say that some people matter morally and others don’t, or that a person matters morally in some worlds but not others. My own conclusion is that, while we are bound to say all people matter morally – you, me and the merely possible – we are not bound to say that all their losses– or all ours– matter morally. We can instead distinguish between morally significant and insignificant losses, with the distinction between the two being a matter of where the loss is incurred in relation to the person who incurs it. This way of looking at things – which I call Variabilism– provides the basis for a plausible account of the Asymmetry. The availability of such an account suggests, I think, that our prospects for rescuing the Asymmetry are bright. (shrink)

This book aims to give an account, called Variabilism, of the moral significance of merely possible persons and to use Variabilism to illuminate abortion. In doing so it lays the groundwork for a more productive discussion on abortion.

Child Versus Childmaker investigates a "person-affecting" approach to ethical choice. A form of consequentialism, this approach is intended to capture the idea that agents ought both do the most good that they can and respect each person as distinct from each other. Focusing on cases in which a conflict of interest arises between "childmakers"—parents, infertility specialists, embryologists, and others engaged in the task of bringing new people into existence—and the children they aim to create, the author considers what we today (...) owe those who will come into existence tomorrow. (shrink)

The Asymmetry consists of two claims. (A) That a possible person's life would be abjectly miserable –less than worth living – counts against bringing that person into existence. But (B) that a distinct possible person's life would be worth living or even well worth living does not count in favour of bringing that person into existence. In recent years, the view that the two halves of the Asymmetry are jointly untenable has become increasingly entrenched. If we say all persons matter (...) morally whether they exist or not and on that basis try to explain the first half of the Asymmetry, we lose the second half of the Asymmetry. If we say that some persons do not matter morally and some do and on that basis try to explain the second half of the Asymmetry, we lose the first half of the Asymmetry – or else find ourselves with a principle that is either inconsistent or otherwise deeply troubled in some way that has nothing to do with the content of the Asymmetry itself. In this article, I propose an alternative approach to the Asymmetry which I will call Variabilism. By understanding each and every person, whether existing or not, to matter morally but variably– such that the moral significance of any loss incurred by any person is considered to depend, not on who incurs that loss and whether that person matters morally, but rather on where that loss is incurred in relation to the person who incurs it – we can both nicely ground the two halves of the Asymmetry and avoid the conceptual difficulties that have plagued competing approaches. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Broome and others have argued that it makes no sense, or at least that it cannot be true, to say that it is better for a given person that he or she exist than not. That argument can be understood to suggest that, likewise, it makes no sense, or at least that it cannot be true, to say that it is worse for a given person that he or she exist than that he or she never have existed at (...) all. This argument is of critical importance to the question of whether consequentialist theory should take a traditional, aggregative form or a less conventional, person‐affecting, or person‐based, form. I believe that, potentially, the argument represents a far more serious threat to the person‐based approach than does, for example, Parfit's two medical programmes example. Parfit's example nicely illustrates the distinction between aggregative and person‐based approaches and raises important questions. But the example — though not, I think, by Parfit — is sometimes pressed into service as a full‐fledged counterexample against the person‐based approach. As such, I argue, the example is not persuasive. In contrast, the Broomeian argument, if correct, is definitive. For that argument relies on certain metaphysical assumptions and various uncontroversial normative claims — and hence nicely avoids putting into play the controversial normative claims that lie at the very heart of the debate. The purpose of the present paper, then, is to evaluate the Broomeian argument. I argue that this potentially definitive challenge to a person‐based approach does not in fact succeed. (shrink)

The non-identity problem is really a collection of problems having distinct logical features. For that reason, non-identity problems can be typed. This article focuses on just one type of non-identity problem, the problem, which includes Derek Parfit's depletion example and many others. The can't-expect-better problem uses an assessment about the low probability of any particular person's coming into existence to reason that an earlier wrong act does not harm that person. This article argues that that line of reasoning is unusually (...) treacherous in that it makes not just one hard-to-detect error in what is done with the relevant probability assessments but rather alternates between two. We sort out one fallacy only to fall, against all odds (as it were), into a second. By avoiding both errors, we become able to discern harm in cases in which the can't-expect-better problem argues there is none. We will then be in a position to set aside the can't-expect-better problem as an objection against the person-based intuition that acts that are must be at least some existing or future person. (shrink)

When her baby was born last June, Rossana Dalla Corte, age sixty-two, was thought to be the oldest woman ever to have given birth. Her pregnancy was achieved at a private fertility clinic in Italy, the same clinic that treated “Jennifer F.,” a London woman who, on Christmas day, 1993, at the age of fifty-nine, gave birth to twins. The reproductive procedure, likely to become more common during the next few years, has received intense scrutiny from health officials in Great (...) Britain, France, and Italy. Moral questions concerning that procedure already have been taken up by the popular press in the United States. Such questions can be expected to take on a new urgency as the United States considers reshaping its health care system and, specifically, the circumstances under which coverage for infertility treatment will be provided. (shrink)

This article critically examines some of the inconsistency objections that have been put forward by John Broome, Larry Temkin and others against the so-called "person-affecting," or "person-based," restriction in normative ethics, including "extra people" problems and a version of the nonidentity problem from Kavka and Parfit. Certain Pareto principles and a version of the "mere addition paradox" are discussed along the way. The inconsistencies at issue can be avoided, it is argued, by situating the person-affecting intuition within a non-additive form (...) of maximizing consequentialism – a theory which then competes with such additive, or aggregative, forms of maximizing consequentialism as "totalism" and "averagism.". (shrink)

This paper considers two objections based in axiological considerations against the position that whether a given outcome, or possible future or world, is morally worse than a second world may depend in part on what is going on at a third world. Such a wide-angled approach to determining worseness is critical to the solution I have previously proposed in connection with the nonidentity problem. I argue that both objections fail.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 8, Page 38-39, August 2012.

Thus, there is a compelling policy argument as well as a suggestive constitutional argument that the practice of selling parental rights in general, and in particular the practice of commercial surrogacy, should not be permitted. These arguments favor the approach adopted in New York State as opposed to any more latitudinarian approach that would permit commercial surrogacy. Clearly, if the payment of money in exchange for parental rights should be prohibited, then we have a strong basis on which to reject (...) the intentionalist theory, along with any other theory tht would link the parentage of a child with the payment of money. This conclusion is in no way undermined by the various arguments recited in part V above that favor the intentionalist theory since, as we have seen, these arguments are flawed. (shrink)

David lewis has argued that--Despite the 'fission' cases--One may consistently hold both that what matters in survival is "mental continuity and connectedness" and that what matters in survival is identity. To prove his point, He produces a certain theory of persons. Derek parfit and penelope maddy have objected that the theory lewis produces does not actually have the advantages he claims for it. In this paper, The author questions their objections, And then argues that, Even though lewis's theory has many (...) virtues, No sufficiently knowledgeable person can be justified in accepting it (here and now) as an adequate theory of persons. (shrink)

Lawyers and philosophers have found it challenging to construct an account of when an act causes harm that is broad enough to address multiple agent problems but not so broad that it fails to distinguish between genuinely harming a person and imposing a condition on a person that we deem undesirable. Thus, we may think an act causes harm only if it makes a difference to a person and, more specifically, makes things worse for that person. If the effect is (...) the same whatever the one agent does in virtue of what a second agent does or is prepared to do, it may seem that what the one agent does makes no difference. Multiple agent problems are endemic. Legal hypotheticals include the example of two fires, each ‘tortiously’ set, converging on a single barn. The physician faces a multiple agent problem when he or she understands that refusing to provide the fertility treatment a patient demands will just lead to another physician providing the treatment instead. And corporations face the problem when they project that conscientiously refraining from drilling for oil at a particular site will not safeguard that site but rather open the door to equally deleterious activities of still other corporations. This paper argues that a useful first step in developing an account of harm in the multiple agent context is to recognize that often, even if the individual agent cannot make things better for a person, the group can. It seems, however, that a fully adequate account will also show how and when the harm that the group imposes on a person devolves to the agent. This paper proposes such an account. Requirements include: that the agent is a member of a group implicated in the harm; that the agent participate in the bringing about of that harm; and that the agent’s non-participation would not have made things worse for the person. To avoid the charge of harm, then, and still participate in the harm that is done by the group, the agent’s participation must make things better for the person; simply not making things worse, once the other conditions are satisfied, is not enough to avoid the charge of harm. Advantages of the proposed account include its ability to discern as an exception cases in which the agent’s non-participation would have made things worse for the person and to distinguish cases involving a mix of natural and man-made causes. (shrink)

Since 1991, the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) has required all health care institutions that receive Federal funds to inform patients upon admission of their rights to make decisions about medical care and to execute advance directives. Implementation of the PSDA presents a special challenge for state mental hospitals. The relevance and possible negative therapeutic impact of discussing end of life decisions at the time of an acute psychiatric admission has recently been raised in the literature. Other ethical dilemmas arising from (...) the interplay between mental illness and informed consent for medical treatment, particularly for older patients committed to state mental hospitals, have been highlighted by the PSDA. In this article we discuss some of the issues raised by implementation of the PSDA in this setting. (shrink)

(1995). Responsibility Versus Defensiveness: Inclusion of Ethnicity in the Conceptualization of Theory. Ethics & Behavior: Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 373-375.

Social robots are increasingly used in different areas of society such as public health, elderly care, education, and commerce. They have also been successfully employed in autism spectrum disorders therapy with children. Humans strive to find in them not only assistants but also friends. Although forms and functionalities of such robots vary, there is a strong tendency to anthropomorphize artificial agents, making them look and behave as human as possible and imputing human attributes to them. The more human a robot (...) looks, the more appealing it will be considered by humans. However, this linear link between likeness and liking only holds to the point where a feeling of strangeness and eeriness emerges. We discuss possible explanations of this so-called uncanny valley phenomenon that emerges in human–robot interaction. We also touch upon important ethical questions surrounding human–robot interaction in different social settings, such as elderly care or autism spectrum disorders therapy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Enviornment 6.2 (2001) 114-118 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law. Melinda A. Roberts. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Pp. 235. ISBN 0-8476-8901-8 (Paperback) This book will provide the reader with a systematic examination of some of the (...) most difficult philosophical issues involved in procreation, and most notably those raised by wrongful life claims and the non-identity problem. Can an action without which a given child would not even exist be simultaneously said to harm this very child? This is the key question addressed in this book. It is relevant not only to bioethicists, but also to those concerned with the possibility of harming members of future generations in general. The author proceeds with remarkable clarity in three steps. First, she unveils the core intuition and unfolds the key implications of what is standardly referred to as the person-affecting view. Second, she focuses on the now famous non-identity problem that is supposed to raise a serious challenge to the plausibility of the person-affecting view. Third, wrongful life and human cloning are taken as illustrations of the problem.The starting point is thus the person-affecting or personalist view. The author argues that what is at stake in such a view is not only a concern for [End Page 114] persons (as opposed to plants or stones), but also for definite persons. The core intuition that "what is bad must be bad for someone" (Derek Parfit) implies a comparison between two states of the same person. As she puts it, "the pairwise comparisons of worlds appealed to within personalism are always in respect of particular people" (6). This does not necessarily imply consequentialism, contrary to what Roberts claims (e.g., 1), at least if we understand the latter, for example, as Philip Pettit does. 1 Moreover, one may very well argue that what is at the heart of the person-affecting intuition is a sense that an action needs to be assessed on the basis of its effect on persons, which would not necessarily imply that such effects require a comparison between two states of the same person. Nevertheless, the extent to which a person-affecting conception--as defined by Roberts--will be in trouble depends on the extent to which comparisons between the same person's states cannot operate. This is precisely where to introduce the idea of a non-identity context, that is, a situation in which not committing an allegedly harmful act would or could also have meant the nonexistence of the allegedly harmed person. For example, had a medical doctor not committed this preconceptional diagnostic mistake (or a father taken a slower or faster means of transportation to come back home), this child would or could not have existed. Can we thus say that the practitioner harmed the child who turned out to be heavily handicapped due, for example, to a genetically transmissible disease (or that the father harmed his child by leaving him with a very polluted environment due to his use of big cars as a means of transportation)?One key feature of Roberts's approach is that she restricts the scope of the non-identity problem to cases where not committing the allegedly harmful action would have made it impossible for this child to have existed ("two-alternative" cases) (26, 319, 325). This entails that whenever this very child could still have come to existence in the allegedly harmful action's absence, whatever the likelihood of such a coming to existence, we would fall outside a non-identity context ("three-alternative" cases) (27; 94-95). What matters to Roberts is whether or not the same child could have been born better than he is, not whether he would, as a matter of fact, have been born at all. The consequence is that in cases where the same child could have been born, say, unhandicapped, the author remains... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Enviornment 6.2 (2001) 114-118 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law. Melinda A. Roberts. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Pp. 235. ISBN 0-8476-8901-8 (Paperback) This book will provide the reader with a systematic examination of some of the (...) most difficult philosophical issues involved in procreation, and most notably those raised by wrongful life claims and the non-identity problem. Can an action without which a given child would not even exist be simultaneously said to harm this very child? This is the key question addressed in this book. It is relevant not only to bioethicists, but also to those concerned with the possibility of harming members of future generations in general. The author proceeds with remarkable clarity in three steps. First, she unveils the core intuition and unfolds the key implications of what is standardly referred to as the person-affecting view. Second, she focuses on the now famous non-identity problem that is supposed to raise a serious challenge to the plausibility of the person-affecting view. Third, wrongful life and human cloning are taken as illustrations of the problem.The starting point is thus the person-affecting or personalist view. The author argues that what is at stake in such a view is not only a concern for [End Page 114] persons (as opposed to plants or stones), but also for definite persons. The core intuition that "what is bad must be bad for someone" (Derek Parfit) implies a comparison between two states of the same person. As she puts it, "the pairwise comparisons of worlds appealed to within personalism are always in respect of particular people" (6). This does not necessarily imply consequentialism, contrary to what Roberts claims (e.g., 1), at least if we understand the latter, for example, as Philip Pettit does. 1 Moreover, one may very well argue that what is at the heart of the person-affecting intuition is a sense that an action needs to be assessed on the basis of its effect on persons, which would not necessarily imply that such effects require a comparison between two states of the same person. Nevertheless, the extent to which a person-affecting conception--as defined by Roberts--will be in trouble depends on the extent to which comparisons between the same person's states cannot operate. This is precisely where to introduce the idea of a non-identity context, that is, a situation in which not committing an allegedly harmful act would or could also have meant the nonexistence of the allegedly harmed person. For example, had a medical doctor not committed this preconceptional diagnostic mistake (or a father taken a slower or faster means of transportation to come back home), this child would or could not have existed. Can we thus say that the practitioner harmed the child who turned out to be heavily handicapped due, for example, to a genetically transmissible disease (or that the father harmed his child by leaving him with a very polluted environment due to his use of big cars as a means of transportation)?One key feature of Roberts's approach is that she restricts the scope of the non-identity problem to cases where not committing the allegedly harmful action would have made it impossible for this child to have existed ("two-alternative" cases) (26, 319, 325). This entails that whenever this very child could still have come to existence in the allegedly harmful action's absence, whatever the likelihood of such a coming to existence, we would fall outside a non-identity context ("three-alternative" cases) (27; 94-95). What matters to Roberts is whether or not the same child could have been born better than he is, not whether he would, as a matter of fact, have been born at all. The consequence is that in cases where the same child could have been born, say, unhandicapped, the author remains... (shrink)

This article describes a qualitative content analysis of 37 elementary examples of social studies Inquiry Design Models (C3 Teachers, 2023a), conducted with the purpose of identifying the core student skills necessary to successfully engage in these inquiries. Prior research identifies core inquiry teaching skills for teachers across content areas and grade bands, but there has been little research on the demands placed on elementary students in social studies inquiry. In this study, we identify 33 broad skills, each of which are (...) observable and teachable. Four of these skills occurred in high frequency: generation of new ideas ( n = 152), writing process ( n = 110), linking evidence with claims ( n = 65), and discussion ( n = 63). These most frequently occurring skills all required higher-level and/or critical thinking. Implications for preservice and in-service teacher education are discussed. (shrink)

The scope and importance of the present work is manifest even to a casual glance; the actual heights of scholarly penetration and disinterestedness to which it rises can only be appreciated by the detailed examination of its text. From this latter examination, it readily appears that we are confronted with no ad hoc construction, no work cut, so to say, to fit a present need, however valid and cogent; but a work reflecting a near lifetime of application and animated by (...) a relentless devotion to documentary truth. For this reason, any account of it must, in simple justice, begin with a brief historical notice of the work itself. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Status of the Person in the Humanism of Giovanni Gentile" A. ROBERT CAPONIGRI THE HUMANISMOf Giovanni Gentile has gradually come to be recognized as one of the major speculative achievements of our time. The great strength and appeal of this position lie chiefly in the manner in which it meets the exigencies of the modem analysis of man and human existence while retaining the basic classical insights of (...) western thought. It achieves a synthesis which possesses at once historical, speculative, and cultural value and which rectifies many of the unilateral analyses so much in evidence. At the same time, serious limitations have been alleged to mar the Gentilean view of man. The most important of these allegations concerns the notion most intimately associated with the humanism of the west: the person. Strangely, it has been charged that the humanism of Gentile not only fails to develop an adequate concept of the person but directly involves the diminution and constriction of this concept as it has developed historically and influenced the western view of man. His, it is asserted, is a humanism without the person, which is but a small remove from the paradoxical assertion that it is a humanism without man? In many ways this charge is most perplexing. Were it correct, it would certainly have the limiting and constrictive effects his critics have pointed out. The real perplexity resides, however, not in spelling out the probable consequences of the allegation, but in determining how it might ever have arisen and gained such credence and championship. The fact is that nothing could be further from Gentile's intention and (what is more important) more alien to the burden of his text than the least diminution of the person. On the contrary, the person constitutes the central and pivotal notion of the entire structure of Gentilean humanism. The constructive effort of his thought is directed principally to the elaboration and validation of this * This paper was read before the Thirteenth International Congress of Philosophy, Mexico City (September, 1963), but has not been included in the Proceedings of the Congress. 1 M. F. Sclacca, II XX Secolo (1947), Vol. I, pp. 400 ft.; R. Holmes, The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile (1957), passim; H. S. Harris, The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (1960), passim. [6q 62 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY concept of the person. Once established, this concept becomes the cardinal principle upon which all his subsequent explorations and assertions in the areas of art, ethics, social and political theory, and education hinge. Consequently, it seems of utmost importance, for the comprehension of his thought and of its place in the total prospect of contemporary philosophy, to place in clear relief the basic lineaments of the concept of the person as it emerges from the critical stages of Gentile's thought as well as the role it plays in all subsequent constructive efforts. Formation of the Concept of the Person in Gentile's Thought To understand the emergence of the concept of the person in actualism, it is necessary to determine clearly Gentile's basic point of departure. This is established firmly in the history of philosophy: a fact which corroborates Harris's perception that Gentile's thought is essentially an historical enterprise? One of Gentile's chief and most sustained fields of effort is the history of philosophy and his work in this area served a double purpose. The first was the properly historical and critical work of establishing an interpretation of the course of the history of western philosophy; s the second was to locate his own thought in the context of the history of philosophy as thus established and thus to endow it with a firm scientific and "public" character, to assign it a "public" basis. This public basis was the achievement of western philosophy which his analysis had recognized as solid and beyond cavil. This achievement, he reasoned, must constitute the point of departure of any further relevant speculation. Gentile took the philosophical position of Hegel as representing this indubitable achievement of western thought in its most salient features. This statement must be correctly understood to be of any help and importance in approaching his thought. Gentile did not... (shrink)

A re-newed interest in, and appreciation of, the problems of history, both as the theory of historical process and as historiography became one of the marked characteristics of twentieth century thought and this book discusses Benedetto Croce's historical writings in that context.

The theoretical problems of historiography derive chiefly from an ambiguity at the heart of the historian's task; historiography is uncertain as to its own theoretical character, that is, its character and status as a mode of knowing. On the one hand, historiography is oriented wholly toward the concrete, toward its rich and inexhaustible determination in quality; moreover, the concrete toward which it is oriented, is not statuesque, substantively plural and fixed, but fluid, dynamic, continuous. Such concretion can be fixed and (...) rendered for expression and communication only in narration, in images, therefore; as a consequence, written history appears in its own self-consciousness, that is to historiography, most immediately as art. The subsumption of history under the general concept of art as a form of knowing, however, is attended by insuperable difficulties. Chief among these is the fact that the concrete to which history, that is, written history, is addressed is the existent concrete; but the images of art, patently, are unsusceptible of the character of existence, save obliquely and typically. The forms of art, its images, are structures of pure quality, devoid of any determination of real and unreal, of any determination of existence, while the images of history are images of the real. But the character of existence cannot be intrinsic to any image, it cannot be simply a quality among qualities: it is rather the determination of quality to actuality which it does not possess simply as quality. The character of existence cannot consequently pertain to the images of history as images but must accede to them by a further theoretical act beyond that by which the image is evoked. This further act can only be logical. Existence must enjoy the status of logical predicate, not of esthetic quality. (shrink)

PROVIDENCE » 1 mm, doctrine of the modifications of the human mind con- 1 stitutes the first principle of the synthesis of time and idea A and, therefore, the first positive element of the Vichian theory of history. This synthesis is achieved in ...