Karl Hahn, Jahrgang 1937, war bis zu seiner Emeritierung im Jahr 2003 Professor für Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster. Hierbei hat er die Klassiker der abendländischen Geistesgeschichte nicht in einem kanonisch-schematischen Profil gelehrt, sondern die jeweiligen Themen und Theoreme mit lebensfüllender Leidenschaft vermittelt. Seine Vorlesungen und Seminare an der Universität zeugen, wie auch seine Vorträge und Tagungsbeiträge, von einem streitbaren Geist, der stets auch um die aktualisierende Bezugnahme bemüht war. Stets hat er pointiert Stellung (...) bezogen, auch gegen den Mainstream des Faches, das er kritisch hinterfragt hat. Ob Platon, Fichte oder auch Simone Weil: Bei Karl Hahn stehen philosophische Überlegungen für eine Suche nach der Vollendung des Daseins in seinen unendlich vielen und offenen Aussagemöglichkeiten. Hahns großes Lebensthema war und ist hierbei das tragische Element des menschlichen Wesens, dessen Kleinheit und Begrenztheit angesichts der großen Fragen der menschlichen Existenz. Das hat er seinen Studierenden mit auf den Weg gegeben. Und auch den Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die bereit waren, zuzuhören. Mit dem vorliegenden Band wird der Wissenschaftler zum Anlass seines 80. Geburtstages geehrt, der seine Verdienste nicht in der flüchtigen Wertschätzung des Feuilletons, sondern grundsätzlich im Diskurs der Seminarräume und Kongressveranstaltungen erworben hat. (shrink)

In Fichtes Eigentumstheorie, entfaltet in der Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, erweist sich das Recht auf Arbeit als das Urrecht des Menschen schlechthin und damit auch als Kernbestand des Eigentumsrechts.

In Fichtes Eigentumstheorie, entfaltet in der Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, erweist sich das Recht auf Arbeit als das Urrecht des Menschen schlechthin und damit auch als Kernbestand des Eigentumsrechts.

Hegel is a towering figure in modern philosophy, and he is interestingly a thinker for whom philosophical modernity and traditional religion are necessary partners in the pursuit of shared truth. In this paper, I use Hegel’s unique rendition on natural theology as a test-case for examining the intersection of traditional Christian religion and Idealist reason in Hegel’s philosophical modernity. Specifically, I raise the question of whether Hegel’s philosophy of religion is faithful to what philosopher William Desmond has called the “religious (...) between,” within which God exists as superior, transcendent other to the finite human being existing in created dependence on Him. I argue that Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion contain a German idealist conception of natural theology that counterfeits this “between” by subordinating it to a pseudo-mystical quest for noetic union with God that obliterates what should be the irreducible difference between the human and the divine essence. (shrink)

Hegel is a towering figure in modern philosophy, and he is interestingly a thinker for whom philosophical modernity and traditional religion are necessary partners in the pursuit of shared truth. In this paper, I use Hegel’s unique rendition on natural theology as a test-case for examining the intersection of traditional Christian religion and Idealist reason in Hegel’s philosophical modernity. Specifically, I raise the question of whether Hegel’s philosophy of religion is faithful to what philosopher William Desmond has called the “religious (...) between,” within which God exists as superior, transcendent other to the finite human being existing in created dependence on Him. I argue that Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion contain a German idealist conception of natural theology that counterfeits this “between” by subordinating it to a pseudo-mystical quest for noetic union with God that obliterates what should be the irreducible difference between the human and the divine essence. (shrink)

Suppose that two competing norms, N1 and N2, can be identified such that a given person’s response can be interpreted as correct according to N1 but incorrect according to N2. Which of these two norms, if any, should one use to interpret such a response? In this paper we seek to address this fundamental problem by studying individual variation in the interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual profiles of the participants based on their case judgments and reflective attitudes. To investigate (...) the participants’ reflective attitudes we introduce a new experimental paradigm called the Scorekeeping Task. As a case study, we identify the participants who follow the Suppositional Theory of conditionals (N1) versus Inferentialism (N2) and investigate to what extent internally consistent competence models can be reconstructed for the participants on this basis. After extensive empirical investigations, an apparent reasoning error with and-to-if inferences was found in one of these two groups. The implications of this case study for debates on the proper role of normative considerations in psychology are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, new evidence is presented for the assumption that the reason-relation reading of indicative conditionals ('if A, then C') reflects a conventional implicature. In four experiments, it is investigated whether relevance effects found for the probability assessment of indicative conditionals (Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer, 2016a) can be classified as being produced by a) a conversational implicature, b) a (probabilistic) presupposition failure, or c) a conventional implicature. After considering several alternative hypotheses and the accumulating evidence from other studies as (...) well, we conclude that the evidence is most consistent with the Relevance Effect being the outcome of a conventional implicature. This finding indicates that the reason-relation reading is part of the semantic content of indicative conditionals, albeit not part of their primary truth-conditional content. (shrink)

Am Wiener Kreis scheiden sich die Geister, trat er doch mit dem dezidierten Anspruch auf, mit den Mitteln der modernen Logik den metaphysischen Schutt von Jahrtausenden aus dem Weg zu räumen. Statt einer homogenen Bewegung, die sich empiristischen Dogmen verschrieb, erscheint der Wiener Kreis in der philosophischen Forschung jedoch heute als eine heterogene Gruppe von eigenständigen Denkern, die gemeinsam die Grundlagen der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie legten. In jeweils spezifischer Weise setzten sie sich von der philosophischen Tradition ab oder versuchten, einzelne Teile (...) davon in die wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung zu integrieren. Der Band enthält eine repräsentative Auswahl von Aufsätzen der Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises. Sie beschränkt sich mit Ausnahme dreier Frühschriften der Gründer bewußt auf die Jahre des historischen Kreises vom Beginn der Treffen 1924 bis zur Ermordung Schlicks 1936, obwohl einige der Hauptideen erst in den USA ihre volle Wirkung entfalteten und von dort Ende der sechziger Jahre wieder in die deutschsprachige Philosophie zurückwirkten. In ihrer Einleitung skizzieren die Herausgeber die historische Entwicklung des Kreises und erläutern die zentralen thematischen Fragestellungen. Die Anmerkungen identifizieren die internen wie externen Opponenten und erklären den Kontext der zeitgenössischen Wissenschaft. (shrink)

In this manuscript we study individual variation in the interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual profiles of the participants based on their behavioral responses and reflective attitudes. To investigate the participants’ reflective attitudes we introduce a new experimental paradigm called the Scorekeeping Task, and a Bayesian mixture model tailored to analyze the data. The goal is thereby to identify the participants who follow the Suppositional Theory of conditionals and Inferentialism and to investigate their performance on the uncertain and-to-if inference task.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions :REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE Every discipline worthy of a name deserves to be criticized periodically, asked to explain its objects and assess its march. The history of science is no exception. Indeed, criticism at this juncture should be all the more welcomed since the subjcct has now won its place in the curriculum of Anglo-Saxon educational institutions, particularly in the United States where Ph.D. (...) program offerings are multiplying almost faster than students. 1 The pioneering days of the 1930's and 1940's are past--if not totally forgotten--and men of the "second generation" like myself who received their training in the 1950's will gain much from having their methodological presuppositions questioned. Curiously enough, there has been little discussion of this kind in print for the last decade, with the exception of articles published in Poland and Russia, where the discipline is passing through its own pioneering crisis.2 In the West, the older debates stirred up largely by British Marxists are nowadays generally disregarded and have had surprisingly little productive effect upon the field. Within the last few years, the most effective methodological discussions have stemmed from Karl Popper and his generally brilliant lot of disciples. Dr. Joseph Ag~ssi, now Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois and a member of this group, recently wrote a deliberately provocative essay entitled "Towards an historiography of science." a Agassi begins it with the arresting statement that the study of the history of science is "in a lamentable state" and ends with the implicit suggestion that an examination of the historiography of science is one of the most revealing ways to discover the discipline's failings. For Agassi, it is clear that the root of the historian's problems has been a false set of philosophical premises about the nature of science, and of its history as well. He finds that the discipline has suffered from two diseases named "inductive philosophy " and "conventionalist philosophy," for which there is a major new panacea, Popper's "critical philosophy of science." This refreshingly straightforward argument provides the essay with a ready-made structure, at the same time as it infuses it throughout with a polemical tone. Because of this tone and because of the importance of Agassi's message, he deserves to be answered. On one subject, I cannot agree more with Agassi--the need for a critical examination of the hisComell, Harvard, and the University of Wisconsin have a long-standing tradition of graduate study in the history of science. In the last few years, they have been joined by: the Case IImtitute of Technology; Indiana; Johns Hopkins; M.I.T.; Princeton ; the Universities of California (Berkeley and U.C.L.A.), Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington; and Yale. Profeasor Duane Roller of Oklahoma has prepared a report on the present state of teaching of the history of science in the United States. 2Abstracts of the discussions can be found in the Bulletin signalgtique : Philosophie. Sciences humaines of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. See especially Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki u (1962), special issue; and Organon (1964), no. 1. 8History and Theory. Studies in the philosophy o] history, Beiheft 2 (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963),117pp. [235] 236 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY toriography of science. On the other hand, his interpretation of the way history of science has and is being written seems more like a misinformed caricature than a sincere effort to understand the past in all its complexity. But let us first examine his discussion of "inductivism," "conventionalism," and "Popperianism." Inductivists or Baconians---he uses the terms interchangeably--write history the way they insist science itself has developed. Just as they assume scientific theories to have emerged from the collection of evidence, they expect that the piling up of historical facts strung along a time-axis adds up to history. As Agassi sagely observes, historians of science, like other induetivists, delude themselves into the belief that such an approach guards them from subjectivity and prejudice. To be sure, philosophers since Kant have known that such naive empiricism is in fact fundamentally misleading, for even the most ardent Baconian has... (shrink)

This anthology on creativity represents a lifetime of reading and study by the late Charles Dewey Tenney, a philosopher who had been a student of Alfred North Whitehead at Harvard. In a series of fourteen essays Tenney considers the various factors that can be identified in creativity, followed by the recorded testimony of philosophers, artists, historians, explorers, scientists and others, both theorists and practitioners. The contributors extend in time from Aristotle and Sophocles to Buckminster Fuller and May Sarton. They include (...) such diverse thinkers as Martin Luther, Karl Marx, Lewis Carroll, Julian Huxley, Albert Einstein, Abraham Lincoln, Gertrude Stein, Henry Nelson Wieman and Alfred North Whitehead. In all, more than 300 of the world's most creative individuals are included. Contents: Discovery, Invention and Creation; Roots of Discovery; Environs of Discovery; Agents of Discovery; Hinderances to Discovery; Observation and Discovery; Reason in Discovery; Reverie Discovery; Imagination in Discovery; Sensibility and Discovery; Method in Discovery; Artistry in Discovery; Diffusion; and Foresight and Discovery. (shrink)

Hans Hahn's long-neglected philosophy of mathematics is reconstructed here with an eye to his anticipation of the doctrine of logical pluralism. After establishing that Hahn pioneered a post-Tractarian conception of tautologies and attempted to overcome the traditional foundational dispute in mathematics, Hahn's and Carnap's work is briefly compared with Karl Menger's, and several significant agreements or differences between Hahn's and Carnap's work are specified and discussed.

Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in 1945, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemiesis one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy', its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems. Popper's highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thought of great philosophers (...) and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of The Open Society and Its Enemies, and for why it demands to be read both today and in years to come. This is the second of two volumes of The Open Society and Its Enemies. (shrink)

Metaphysics, geometry, and the problems with diagrams -- The Pythagorean theorem: Euclid I.47 and VI.31 -- Thales and geometry: Egypt, Miletus, and beyond -- Pythagoras and the famous theorems -- From the Pythagorean theorem to the construction of the cosmos out of right triangles.

Yoga teacher, podcaster, and blogger Kori Hahn presents a new-age guide for harnessing the principles of yoga to manifest a better life. The book teaches readers how to develop simple, personalized rituals using techniques such as affirmations, breath work, meditation, journaling, and visualization.

This collection of essays discusses the work of Jurgen Habermas - the philosopher and exponent of the tradition known as Critical Theory. His works defend the Enlightenment ideas of rationality, humanism, and the possibilities of discourse.

Auf der Suche nach objektiver Wahrheit wurde in den Wissenschaften das Prinzip der Relationalitat popular: Gegenstandsbereiche gleich welcher Art werden als reine Beziehungsgeflechte beschrieben, nach dem Vorbild der Mathematik (diese Notwendigkeit entstand nicht zuletzt durch die Relativitatstheorie). Um Reales theoretisch zu erfassen, etwa um Dinge zahlen zu konnen, braucht man ein Identitatsprinzip fur Gegenstande. Das formal beste und einzig universelle ist die Identitat der Ununterscheidbaren. In Verbindung mit dem modernen Strukturalismus fuhrt dies aber zum geisterhaften Verschwinden realer Dinge in der (...) Beschreibung, wenn beziehungsmassig Symmetrie vorliegt. Objektive Beschreibungen erfassen also nur asymmetrische Strukturen korrekt. Manches Reale wird somit nicht objektiv erfasst.". (shrink)

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside _The Open Society and Its Enemies_ as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.