In the “Critique of Pure Reason” and subsequent “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics...”, “Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science”, “Opus Postumum” Kant develops one of the modes of his transcendentalism, the metaphysics of possible experience, whose task is to study the transcendental conditions for the possibility of our (cognition), which, according to Kant, has a priori character. P. Strawson calls this mode of metaphysics ‘ descriptive metaphysics ’ and connects it with the analyzing the ‘conceptual structure’ of our thinking about the (...) world. The contemporary realistic trend (primarily within the framework of the analytical philosophical tradition) in the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is associated with the modern theory of “two aspects” (80s of the 20th century), which replaced the classical theory of “two objects/worlds” (compare also with the opposition “ theory of appearance vs. theory of appearances ”). Within the framework of this theory, the Kantian ‘appearance’ receives an objectified status, it is not our mental representation, but corresponds (as its signs) to really existing things, or Kantian ‘objects of experience’. The article traces the formation of the historical and conceptual background of the ‘ metaphysics of experience ’ (H. Paton's original expression). Historically, the metaphysics of experience inherits the neo-Kantian approach to interpreting Kant's transcendentalism as a ‘theory of experience’ (H. Cohen, E. Cassirer), then it develops in logical positivism/empiricism (H. Reichenbach, R. Carnap; further in post-posivivism: the theory of I. Lakatos and T. Kuhn), analytical philosophy of science (W. Sellars, G. Buchdal, H. Putnam), and at present the metaphysics of experience is developing in a number of contemporary works of an analytical orientation (P. Strawson, K. Ameriks, L. Allais and etc.). (shrink)

This is a report of the international workshop «Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy 2: Kant’s Appearance, Its Ontological and Epistemic Status» (April 27—29, 2017, Moscow), the tasks of which was (1) to discuss the specificity of transcendental idealism, (2) to study the nature of one of Kant’s important concepts — that of appearance — within the framework of the essential conceptual triad of transcendentalism: thing in itself (Ding an sich) — appearance (Erscheinung) — representation (Vorstellung), (3) to analyse the distinction (...) between Kant’s concepts of appearance and phenomenon, and (4) to examine the concepts of appearance and phenomenon in relation to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. (shrink)

The 13th International Kant Congress was held on August 6-9, 2019 in Oslo, Norway. The main tasks of this review are to analyse the central theme of the Congress, “The Court of Reason”, the related spheres of philosophical inquiry such as metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology, as well as to reveal the main approaches and development trends of transcendental philosophy in “theoretical” and “practical” fields and modern Kant studies, notably transcendental philosophy of language and consciousness. The solution of these tasks will (...) make it possible to raise the question of the prospects of Kantian transcendentalism in relation to the pressing problems of our time and to chart the paths of such development. (shrink)

The topic of this article is the problem of World and Infinity. The concepts “Weltanschauung,” (I. Kant) and “Umgreifende” (K. Jaspers) are introduced. A transcendental analysis of the concepts "World" and "Infinite" as ideas of reason is carried out. The theory of the world by L. Tengely is analyzed. Metaphysical and mathematical interpretations of the infinite are compared (actual and potential infinity, openness, horizon).

At the present time, there are several interpretations and modes of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (TP). Which of these interpretations and modes of transcendentalism most adequately express the spirit of TP, i.e. can claim the title of the transcendental ones? For the explication of the ‘idea of transcendental philosophy’ [KrV, A1], here I distinguish two transcendental shifts: methodological and metaphysical ones, which in their totality predetermine the essence and set the specificity of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The methodological transcendental shift that Kant (...) postulates in his definitions of TP in the Critique of Pure Reason [KrV, A11; B25] represents a shift from studying of objects to the analysis and justification of our mode of cognition of objects. This shift sets a fairly wide range of a la Kantian a priori doctrines and predetermines the transcendental turn (Re–Transcendentalising) of modern philosophy. The metaphysical transcendental shift that can be correlated with “the altered method of our way of thinking [in metaphysics]” [KrV, BXVIII], is associated with the splitting of the “thing” into the actual object (or Kantian thing-in-itself) and object of experience (or Kantian appearance), and involves a transition from the study of thing-in-itself to the analysis of the appearance. More precisely, this shift finds its expression in the transcendental triad “object (thing-in-itself; Ding an sich) – appearance (Erscheinung) – representation (Vorstellung)”, which determines the ‘idea’ (essence) of transcendental idealism/metaphysics. (shrink)

Kant’s transcendental philosophy of Kant is the metaphysics of possible experience related to the solution of the [semantic] problem set in his famous letter to M. Hertz (02.21.1772): “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the object?” There are two possible ways to solve it: empiricism and apriorism, – and Kant chooses the second of them, thus making his “Copernican Revolution”. In the Preface to the 2nd ed. Critique Kant correlates his (...) Copernican turn/revolution with "altered method of our way of thinking [in metaphysics]" [BXVIII] and considers it as an analogue of the hypothetico-deductive scientific method of Copernicus – Galileo – Newton. The analysis of structure of the Copernican Revolution shows that it is possible to pick out two vectors: the empirical (from the thing-in-itself to representations) and the noumenal ones (from the transcendental unity of apperception [or transcendental object] to objects of experience). The introduction of an a priori vector (resp. a priori forms) means that Kant's conception is not empirical, but Kant’s keeping empirical vector says that it is compatible with empirical realism [A370–1]. Thus, Kantian transcendentalism is a synthesis of realism (basic level) and transcendental idealism (as a meta-level superstructure above it), whose task is to find out and analyze the transcendental conditions [possibility] of our knowledge of objects. (shrink)

In my paper I argue, relying on Kantian definitions and conceptual distinctions, the thesis that Kantian transcen-dental philosophy, which he characterizes as a second-order system of transcendental idealism, is not [empirical] idealism, but a form of realism (resp. compatible with empirical realism [A370-1]). As arguments in favor of this “realistic” thesis, I consistently develop a realistic interpretation of the Kant’s concept of appearance (the theory of “two aspects”), as well as of Kantian Copernican revolution, of his theory of intuition as (...) cognitive ability which 'giving' ‘us objects, of the concept of double affection and noumenal causality. (shrink)

Presented in the “Critique of Pure Reason” transcendental philosophy is the first theory of science,which seeks to identify and study the conditions of the possibility of cognition. Thus, Kant carries out a shift to the study of ‘mode of our cognition’ and TP is a method, where transcendental argumentation acts as its essential basis. The article is devoted to the analysis of the transcendental arguments. In § 2 the background of ТА — transcendental method of Antiquity and Leibniz’s Principle of (...) Sufficient Reason — are analyzed and their comparison with ТА is given. § 3 is devoted to the analysis of TA in the broad and narrow senses; a formal propositional and presupposition models are proposed. In § 4 I discuss the difference between TA and metaphysics’ modes of reasoning. It analyzes the Kant’s main limitations of the use TA shows its connection with the Modern Age and contemporary science. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the role (function) of reflection in cognition and its modes (types) as part of the cognitive ability. Along with logical and transcendental reflection, Kant's transcendental shift (turn) is discussed, as well as the role of reflection in Kant's schematism (the ability to judge) and the formation of schemas. Particular attention is paid to another mode of reflection – reflexive switching, which underlies not only the formation of pure rational concepts and schemes (Kant's concept of epigenesis; (...) metaphysical deduction of categories), but the epigenesis of a priori forms of sensibility of space and (especially) time, connected with the Kantian synthesis of apprehension in the intuition. The article proposes an original conception of time, the so-called onion model of time, which is based on a reflexive (iterative) apperceptive ladder. (shrink)

In my commentary, I write, firstly, of the dualistic (ambivalent) use of the concept ‘appearance’ by Kant and, secondly, of the need for a semantic (referential) interpretation of the Kantian concept ‘‘appearance’ as opposed to intentional interpretation of R.Aquilla. In his reply to my objections, R. Aquila precisies his initial position and gives additional arguments in it’s favor.

The paper discusses the Strawsonian concept of descriptive metaphysics and its various implementations in conceptions of I. Kant, R.G. Collingwood and P.F. Strawson, their similarities and differences. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of Kant's transcendental philosophy (resp. transcendental idealism), or its metaphysics of appearance as a pioneer version of descriptive metaphysics and its comparison with the version of descriptive metaphysics of P. Strawson himself.

Chromosomal rearrangements frequently occur at specific places (“hot spots”) in the genome. These recombination hot spots are usually separated by 50–100 kb regions of DNA that are rarely involved in rearrangements. It is quite likely that there is a correlation between the above‐mentioned distances and the average size of DNA loops fixed at the nuclear matrix. Recent studies have demonstrated that DNA loop anchorage regions can be fairly long and can harbor DNA recombination hot spots. We previously proposed that chromosomal (...) DNA loops may constitute the basic units of genome organization in higher eukaryotes. In this review, we consider recombination between DNA loop anchorage regions as a possible source of genome evolution. (shrink)

Les notions d'ordre, de raison, de conscience sont des concepts de la philosophie de Rousseau et, en même temps, les valeurs de sa vie. L'idéal de la société constitue un cadre de réflexions sur ces valeurs, exprimant son identité d'écrivain dans la vie sociale et intellectuelle de son temps. Ainsi, il s'écarte de l'utopie au sens propre du mot.

The review presents the International Workshop “Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy-3: Nature of Transcendental Philosophy” held in Moscow on 19-22 April, 2018. The workshop was co-sponsored by the State Academic University for the Humanities, the Russian State University for the Humanities and the Foundation for the Humanities. The review examines the main topics of the workshop, summarises the main presentations and explicates the problem area of modern interpretations of Kant and the development of transcendentalism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. (...) The presentations, questions and discussions centred around the main problems of transcendentalism: the differences between the phenomenon and the thing in itself, between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, the relationship between realist and constructivist aspects of Kantian transcendentalism, the transformation of Kantian transcendental philosophy in Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology and more. (shrink)

En partant du constat que les significations du terme « utopie » varient en fonction des différents niveaux de langue (politique, professionnel, commun, etc.) l’auteur s’interroge sur les modalités des « expérimentations utopiques » dans la société. Dans la lignée des analyses de Paul Ricœur et de Robert Nozick, ainsi qu’en s’appuyant sur les conclusions de ses propres recherches consacrées aux représentations utopiques au XVIIIe siècle, l’auteur montre que l’utopie permet à l’individu d’exprimer son idéal de la société basé sur (...) des choix axiologiques personnels, ainsi qu’à fonder l’identité d’un groupe dont les membres disputent à l’idéologie sa prétention à la domination. Enfin, l’utopie sous la forme de fiction constitue un élément important d’un discours théorique portant sur les modèles institutionnels alternatifs et questionnant l’idéologie. L’étude des modes de l’existence sociale de l’utopie permet d’interpréter la façon dont elle se manifeste et perdure dans la société. (shrink)

Alternative theories to quantum mechanics motivate important fundamental tests of our understanding and descriptions of the smallest physical systems. Here, using spontaneous parametric downconversion as a heralded single-photon source, we place experimental limits on a class of alternative theories, consisting of classical field theories which result in power-dependent normalized correlation functions. In addition, we compare our results with standard quantum mechanical interpretations of our spontaneous parametric downconversion source over an order of magnitude in intensity. Our data match the quantum mechanical (...) expectations, and do not show a statistically significant dependence on power, limiting quantum mechanics alternatives which require power-dependent autocorrelation functions. (shrink)

The presented article compares the points of view on time developed in analytical philosophy and in phenomenology actively developed by B. Russell and L. Tengelyi. The objective of the study coincides with the identifying a common horizon for understanding time in analytical philosophy and phenomenology. This help to clarify the possibilities of productive interaction between analytical philosophy and phenomenology. The author of the article believes that a positive answer to this question can be ensured by a special thought experiment. The (...) experiment involves assessing the perception of time in extreme circumstances in terms of phenomenology and analytical philosophy. (shrink)

The question of the Russian man – his past, present and future – is the central one in the philosophy of history. Unfortunately, at present this area of philosophy is not suffciently developed in Russia. Partly the reason for this situation is the lack of understanding by researchers of the role played by Russian classical literature and its philosophizing writers in historiosophy. The Hunting Sketches, a collection of short stories by I.S. Turgenev, is a work still undervalued, not fully considered (...) not only in details but also in general meanings. And this is understandable because it is the frst systematic encyclopedia of Russian worldview, which is not envisaged by the literary genre. To a certain extent, Turgenev’s line is continued by I. Goncharov, L. Tolstoy, F. Dostoevsky, A. Chekhov. This article examines the philosophical nature of The Hunting Sketches, its structure and content. According to author’s opinion, stories can be divided into ten groups according to their dominant meanings. Thus, in The Hunting Sketches the main Russian types are depicted: “natural man,” rational, submissive, cunning, honest, sensitive, passionate, poetic, homeless, suffering, calmly accepting death, imbued with the immensity of the world. In the image and the comments of the wandering protagonist, Ivan Turgenev reveals his own philosophical credo, which he defnes as a moderate liberalism – freedom of thought and action, without prejudice to others. (shrink)

En partant du constat que les significations du terme « utopie » varient en fonction des différents niveaux de langue (politique, professionnel, commun, etc.) l’auteur s’interroge sur les modalités des « expérimentations utopiques » dans la société. Dans la lignée des analyses de Paul Ricœur et de Robert Nozick, ainsi qu’en s’appuyant sur les conclusions de ses propres recherches consacrées aux représentations utopiques au XVIIIe siècle, l’auteur montre que l’utopie permet à l’individu d’exprimer son idéal de la société basé sur (...) des choix axiologiques personnels, ainsi qu’à fonder l’identité d’un groupe dont les membres disputent à l’idéologie sa prétention à la domination. Enfin, l’utopie sous la forme de fiction constitue un élément important d’un discours théorique portant sur les modèles institutionnels alternatifs et questionnant l’idéologie. L’étude des modes de l’existence sociale de l’utopie permet d’interpréter la façon dont elle se manifeste et perdure dans la société. (shrink)

Wide-ranging and astutely argued, Talmud /and/ Philosophy examines the intersections, partitions, and mutual illuminations and problematizations of western philosophy and the Talmud. Among its devoted students or "learners," the Talmud - both as text and mode of thought - is a constantly unfolding truth about humans in their relationship to God in the world. Among many philosophers, the Talmud has been at best an idealized and remote object, and at worse, if noticed at all, an object for curiosity. The contributors (...) to this volume collectively turn on and probe a new mode of inquiry by approaching the very question of partitions, conjunctions and disjunctions between the Talmud and philosophy as the guiding question of their inquiry. Rather than using the Talmud and its modes of argumentation to develop existing philosophical themes, the essays probe the question of how the Talmud as an intellectual discipline sheds new light on the unfolding of philosophy in the history of thought. (shrink)

The writings in which an author expresses his thought may actually be the product of certain cultural practices of his age. The article considers how such practices are manifested in the writings of Isidore of Seville, particularly with respect to the meaning of the metaphor of taste. Isidore borrows this metaphor from texts that explain the process of understanding Scripture and applies it to the achievement of wisdom. On the one hand, the metaphor stresses the transformative aspect of understanding (rather (...) than the informative, scientia). It focuses on the special experience of the reader who senses the sweetness of the text, and not on the application of the text to one’s life. On the other hand, reading and writing were imagined in terms related to food. The text was food that had to be prepared, to ‘read’ meant to ‘taste’, to ‘meditate’ on it meant to ‘ruminate’. Against this background, the writings of Isidore seem to appeal to the memory of the reader and his ability to meditate upon the text and, finally, to experience the taste of wisdom. Only the outermost level of texts was intended to inform the reader. (shrink)