105 found
Order:
  1. Disjunctivism and Skepticism.Alan Millar - unknown
    The paper explains what disjunctivism is and explores its implications for skepticism. Following an account of Paul Snowdon’s conception of a disjunctivist account of perceptual experience the the focus is on how disjunctivism has figured in the epistemological work of John McDowell. A conception of recognitional abilities is deployed to expand on McDowell’s position. Finally, there is consideration of whether McDowell offers a satisfactory response to skepticism, taking account of criticism’s made by Crispin Wright.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  2. Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework which we use to understand each other. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action, the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons, the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people, and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  3.  12
    The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes.Alan Millar & Mark Rowlands - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):621.
    Rowlands defends environmentalism, that is, the conjunction of the ontological claim that cognitive processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing organisms and the epistemological claim that it is not possible to understand the nature of cognitive processes by focusing exclusively on what is occurring inside the skin of cognizing organisms. Chapter 3 is devoted to explaining how environmentalism differs from other forms of externalism about the mental. The crucial points are that the arguments to be presented for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  4.  85
    Epistemic Value.Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  5. What the Disjunctivist is Right About.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-199.
    There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by someone merely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perception enable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  6.  12
    A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Alan Millar - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):367-372.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  7.  98
    Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.
    A conception of the relation between reasons for belief, justified belief, and knowledge is outlined on which a belief is justified, in the sense of being well‐founded, only if there is an adequate reason to believe it, reasons to believe something are constituted by truths, and a reason to believe something justifies one in believing it only if it is constituted by a truth or truths that one knows. It is argued that, contrary to initial appearances, perceptual justification does not (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  8.  49
    Reasons and Experience.Alan Millar - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
    Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the (...)
  9. Epistemic Value.Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  10. How Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351.
    It is argued that seeing that P is a mode of knowing that P that is to be explained in terms of the exercise of visual-perceptual recognitional abilities. The nature of those abilities is described. The justification for believing that P, when one sees that P, is provided by the fact that one sees that P. Access to this fact is explained in terms of an ability to recognize of seen objects that one is seeing them. Reasons for resistance to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  11. Knowing by Perceiving.Alan Millar - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    Alan Miller offers a focused account of perceptual knowledge, the knowledge that we gain by means of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting. He explains perceptual knowledge in terms of general recognitional abilities, then situates that account within a broader perspective on epistemology and philosophical method more generally.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 330--47.
    A conception of recognitional abilities and perceptual-discriminative abilities is deployed to make sense of how perceptual experiences enable us to make cognitive contact with objects and facts. It is argued that accepting the emerging view does not commit us to thinking that perceptual experiences are essentially relational, as they are conceived to be in disjunctivist theories. The discussion explores some implications for the theory of knowledge in general and, in particular, for the issue of how we can shed light on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  13.  11
    What the Disjunctivist is Right About.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-198.
    There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by sorneone rnerely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perceptionenable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this challenge (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  14. Social Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in the social dimension of the subject. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers on a wide range of topics in social epistemology, such as the nature of testimony, the epistemology of disagreement, and the social genealogy of the concept of knowledge.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  15. I—Alan Millar: Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
    An explanation is given of why it is in the nature of inquiry into whether or not p that its aim is fully achieved only if one comes to know that p or to know that not-p and, further, comes to know how one knows, either way. In the absence of the latter one is in no position to take the inquiry to be successfully completed or to vouch for the truth of the matter in hand. An upshot is that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  16. Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays.Alan Millar - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):389-392.
  17. The Scope of Perceptual Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (291):73-88.
    Plausibly perceptual knowledge satisfies the following: It is knowledge about things from the way they appear. It can embrace more than the way things appear. It is phenomenologically immediate and thus, in one sense, non-inferential. and place a significant constraint on adequate elucidations of . Knowledge about an object, from the way it looks, which embraces more than the way it looks, should not turn out to be inferential in the relevant sense. The paper shows how this constraint can be (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  18.  87
    Perceptual Knowledge and Well-Founded Belief.Alan Millar - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):43-59.
    Should a philosophical account of perceptual knowledge accord a justificatory role to sensory experiences? This discussion raises problems for an affirmative answer and sets out an alternative account on which justified belief is conceived as well-founded belief and well-foundedness is taken to depend on knowledge. A key part of the discussion draws on a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities to account for how perception gives rise both to perceptual knowledge and to well-founded belief.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  19. What is It That Cognitive Abilities Are Abilities to Do?Alan Millar - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (4):223-236.
    This article outlines a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities. These include abilities to recognize certain things from their appearance to some sensory modality, as being of some kind, or as possessing some property. An assumption of the article is that these abilities are crucial for an adequate understanding of perceptual knowledge. The specific aim here is to contrast those abilities with abilities or competences as conceived in the virtue-theoretic literature, with particular reference to views of Ernest Sosa and John Greco. In (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  20.  8
    I—Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
    An explanation is given of why it is in the nature of inquiry into whether or not p that its aim is fully achieved only if one comes to know that p or to know that not-p and, further, comes to know how one knows, either way. In the absence of the latter one is in no position to take the inquiry to be successfully completed or to vouch for the truth of the matter in hand. An upshot is that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  21.  76
    Berkeley’s Puzzle.Alan Millar - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):232-242.
    Millar, A. 2017. Berkeley's Puzzle. Analysis 77: 232–242.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. How Reasons for Action Differ From Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  23. Knowledge and Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  24.  18
    Metaphor and Religious Language. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):224-226.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  25.  10
    Berkeley’s Puzzle.Alan Millar - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):873-873.
    Berkeley's Puzzle, Analysis anw070, doi: _ 10.1093/analys/anw070 _.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. From Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press. pp. 140.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. Knowing From Being Told.Alan Millar - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  28.  19
    The Normativity of Meaning.Alan Millar - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:57-73.
    In a discussion of rule-following inspired by Wittgenstein, Kripke asks us to consider the relation which holds between meaning plus by ‘+’ and answering questions like, ‘What is the sum of 68 and 57?’. A dispositional theory has it that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then you will probably answer, ‘125’. That is because, according to such a theory, to mean plus by ‘+’ is, roughly speaking, to be disposed, by and large, and among other things, to answer such (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  29. Can Perceptual Experiences Be Rational?Alan Millar - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):251-263.
    © Millar 2018This bold, provocative, and highly original book is in three Parts. Part I outlines a problem, sketches a solution, and defends a claim that is crucial to the solution—that ‘perceptual experiences and the processes by which they arise can be rational or irrational’. This claim is The Rationality of Perception. In Part II Siegel argues that the power of experiences to justify beliefs can be downgraded or upgraded by psychological precursors. Part III applies, and further develops, the theoretical (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  1
    Introduction.Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock & Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
    The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  31. Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility.Alan Millar - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
    Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give a more satisfying response (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. The Normativity of Meaning.Alan Millar - 2002 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Cambridge University Press. pp. 57-73.
    In a discussion of rule-following inspired by Wittgenstein, Kripke asks us to consider the relation which holds between meaning plus by ‘+’ and answering questions like, ‘What is the sum of 68 and 57?’. A dispositional theory has it that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then you will probably answer, ‘125’. That is because, according to such a theory, to mean plus by ‘+’ is , roughly speaking, to be disposed, by and large, and among other things, to answer (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  33.  66
    The State of Knowing.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):179–196.
  34.  63
    The Idea of Experience.Alan Millar - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):75-90.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  35.  52
    Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality.José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    The essays in this volume investigate the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36.  10
    The Logic of God Incarnate.Alan Millar - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (155):245-247.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  37.  5
    V—The Idea of Experience.Alan Millar - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):75-90.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  38. Possessing Concepts: Christopher Peacocke's a Study of Concepts. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):73-82.
  39.  95
    Concepts, Experience, and Inference.Alan Millar - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):495-505.
  40. Truth and Understanding.Alan Millar - 1977 - Mind 86 (343):405-416.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  41. A Précis of Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2007 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind 6 (1).
    The article provides a summary of the author's book Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). It details three areas in which the notion of a normative commitment is made central. These are (1) believing and intending, (2) practices conceived as essentially rule-governed activities, and (3) meaning and concepts. An account is given of how we may best explain the commitments incurred by beliefs and intentions. It is held that those states are themselves essentially normative. A problem (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Possessing Concepts. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):73-82.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43.  35
    The Epistemological Significance of Practices.Alan Millar - 2011 - ProtoSociology 28:213-230.
    There are countless occasions when we find people’s thought or action intelligible, or anticipate what they will think or do, or are at least unsurprised by what they think or do, despite our having little if any information about their attitudes other than what we can gather from their situation and non-verbal behaviour. This article explores the role of practices, conceived as essentially rule-governed activities, is making this possible. Consideration is given to practicies for the use of words.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44.  7
    Metaphor and Religious Language.Alan Millar - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):224-226.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  45. Reasons for Action and Instrumental Normativity.Alan Millar - 2002 - In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
  46. Reason and Nature.Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.) - 2002 - Clarendon Press.
    Reason and Nature investigates the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and language, to (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47.  60
    The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution • by Robert J. Matthews. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):185-187.
    The deflationary aim of this book, which occupies Part I, is to show that a widely held view has little to be said for it. The constructive aim, pursued in Part II, is to make plausible a measure-theoretic account of propositional attitudes. The discussion is throughout instructive, illuminating and sensitive to the many intricacies surrounding attitude ascriptions and how they can carry information about a subject's psychology. There is close engagement with cognitive science. The book should be read by anyone (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  33
    Following Nature.Alan Millar - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):165-185.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. Mill on Religion.Alan Millar - 1998 - In John Skorupski (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mill. Cambridge University Press. pp. 176--202.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50.  89
    Veridicality: More on Searle.Alan Millar - 1985 - Analysis 45 (March):120-124.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 105