73 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Joshua Gert [73]Joshua Noah Gert [1]
See also
Joshua Gert
College of William and Mary
  1.  39
    Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action.Joshua Gert - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  2. Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.
  3. What Colors Could Not Be.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (3):128-155.
  4.  74
    Value and Parity.Joshua Gert - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):492-510.
  5. 10. Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (Pp. 634-638). [REVIEW]Wlodek Rabinowicz, Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen, Douglas Lavin, Rachana Kamtekar, Joshua Gert, Elijah Millgram, David Copp & Stephen M. Gardiner - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3).
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  6. Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-Pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception.Joshua Gert - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Joshua Gert presents an original account of color properties, and of our perception of them. He employs a general philosophical strategy - neo-pragmatism - which challenges an assumption made by virtually all other theories of color: he argues that colors are primitive properties of objects, irreducible to physical or dispositional properties.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  72
    Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):669-690.
  8.  89
    Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength. [REVIEW]Joshua Gert - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (1):5 - 36.
    Many contemporary accounts of normative reasons for action accord a single strength value to normative reasons. This paper first uses some examples to argue against such views by showing that they seem to commit us to intransitive or counterintuitive claims about the rough equivalence of the strengths of certain reasons. The paper then explains and defends an alternate account according to which normative reasons for action have two separable dimensions of strength: requiring strength, and justifying strength. Such an account explains (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  9.  18
    Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Joshua Gert offers an original account of normative facts and properties, those which have implications for how we ought to behave. He argues that our ability to think and talk about normative notions such as reasons and benefits is dependent on how we respond to the world around us, including how we respond to the actions of other people.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10.  50
    Parity, Preference and Puzzlement.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):249-271.
    Ruth Chang has argued for the existence of a fourth positive value relation, distinct from betterness, worseness and equality, which she calls “parity.” In an earlier article I seemed to criticize Chang's suggestion by offering an interval model for the values of items that I claimed could accommodate all the phenomena characteristic of parity. Wlodek Rabinowicz, offering his own model of value relations, endorsed one central feature of my proposal: the need to distinguish permissible preferences from required ones. But he, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. A Realistic Colour Realism.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589.
    Whether or not one endorses realism about colour, it is very tempting to regard realism about determinable colours such as green and yellow as standing or falling together with realism about determinate colours such as unique green or green31. Indeed some of the most prominent representatives of both sides of the colour realism debate explicitly endorse the idea that these two kinds of realism are so linked. Against such theorists, the present paper argues that one can be a realist about (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  12.  32
    A Fitting End to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.Joshua Gert - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):1015-1042.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Michael Smith and the Rationality of Immoral Action.Joshua Gert - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (1):1-23.
    Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith's view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14.  2
    Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):439-459.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  85
    Response-Dependence and Normative Bedrock.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):718-742.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16. Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):171-183.
    Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers. The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17.  56
    Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An Interplanetary Exploration.Joshua Gert & Alfred Mele - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):275-283.
  18.  92
    Korsgaard's Private-Reasons Argument.Joshua Gert - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):303-324.
    In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard presents and defends a neo-Kantian theory of normativity. Her initial account of reasons seems to make them dependent upon the practical identity of the agent, and upon the value the agent must place on her own humanity. This seems to make all reasons agent-relative. But Korsgaard claims that arguments similar to Wittgenstein’s private-language argument can show that reasons are in fact essentially agent-neutral. This paper explains both of Korsgaard’s Wittgensteinian arguments, and shows why (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19.  16
    Disgust, Moral Disgust, and Morality.Joshua Gert - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):33-54.
    This paper calls into question the idea that moral disgust is usefully regarded as a form of genuine disgust. This hypothesis is questionable even if, as some have argued, the spread of moral norms through a community makes use of signaling mechanisms that are central to core disgust. The signaling system is just one part of disgust, and may well be completely separable from it. Moreover, there is plausibly a significant difference between the cognitive scientist’s concept of an emotion and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20.  97
    Brute Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):417–446.
  21.  37
    Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-21.
    Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2013.776297.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22.  15
    Desires, Reasons, and Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):319 - 332.
    Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, and T. M. S canlon, among others, all hold that reasons for action are provided by facts about those actions. They also hold that the fact that an action would promote or achieve the object of an agent's desire is not one of the relevant facts, and does not provide a reason. Rather, the facts that provide reasons are typically facts about valuable states of affairs that the action is likely to bring about, or valuable properties (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23.  66
    A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):353-378.
    One strategy for providing an analysis of practical rationality is to start with the notion of a practical reason as primitive. Then it will be quite tempting to think that the rationality of an action can be defined rather simply in terms of ‘the balance of reasons’. But just as, for many philosophical purposes, it is extremely useful to identify the meaning of a word in terms of the systematic contribution the word makes to the meanings of whole sentences, this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24.  71
    Neo-Sentimentalism and Disgust.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3):345-352.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  25.  48
    Perform a Justified Option.Joshua Gert - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (2):206-217.
    In a number of recent publications, Douglas Portmore has defended consequentialism, largely on the basis of a maximizing view of practical rationality. I have criticized such maximizing views, arguing that we need to distinguish two independent dimensions of normative strength: justifying strength and requiring strength. I have also argued that this distinction helps to explain why we typically have so many rational options. Engaging with these arguments, Portmore has (a) developed his own novel maximization-friendly method of explaining the ubiquity of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26.  46
    Reply to Tenenbaum.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):463-476.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27.  26
    Practical Rationality, Morality, and Purely Justificatory Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):227 - 243.
  28.  77
    Color Constancy and Dispositionalism.Joshua Gert - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):183-200.
    This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there will be no uniquely veridical appearance of any given color. The second is to show that once this move is made, dispositionalism is in a position to provide interesting answers to some of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29.  92
    Vague Terms, Indexicals, and Vague Indexicals.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):437 - 445.
    Jason Stanley has criticized a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox that treats vagueness as a kind of indexicality. His objection rests on a feature of indexicals that seems plausible: that their reference remains fixed in verb phrase ellipsis. But the force of Stanley’s criticism depends on the undefended assumption that vague terms, if they are a special sort of indexical, must function in the same way that more paradigmatic indexicals do. This paper argues that there can be more than (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30.  35
    Expressivism and Language Learning.Joshua Gert - 2002 - Ethics 112 (2):292-314.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Religious, and Ethnic Aversions, the More Likely It is That They Will Let Them-Selves Be Persuaded to Overcome Them.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):484.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  63
    Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.
    Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even for secondary qualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such descriptive properties as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Brute Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):145-146.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34.  39
    Skepticism About Practical Reasons Internalism.Joshua Gert - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):59-77.
  35.  58
    Breaking the Law of Desire.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (3):295-319.
    This paper offers one formal reason why it may often be inappropriate to hold, of two conflicting desires, that the first must be weaker than, stronger than, or of the same strength as the second. The explanation of this fact does not rely on vagueness or epistemological problems in determining the strengths of desires. Nor does it make use of the problematic notion of incommensurability. Rather, the suggestion is that the motivational capacities of many desires might best be characterized by (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36.  67
    Color Constancy and the Color/Value Analogy.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):58-87.
    This article explains and defends the existence of value constancy, understood on the model of color constancy. Color constancy involves a phenomenal distinction between the transient color appearances of objects and the unchanging colors that those objects appear to have. The existence of value constancy allows advocates of response-dependent accounts of value to reject the question “What is the uniquely appropriate attitude to have toward this evaluative property?” as containing a false uniqueness assumption. Rejecting this assumption allows response-dependent accounts of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37.  70
    Internalism and Different Kinds of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (1):53–72.
  38.  87
    Toward an Epistemology of Certain Substantive a Priori Truths.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (2):214-236.
    Abstract: This article explains and motivates an account of one way in which we might have substantive a priori knowledge in one important class of domains: domains in which the central concepts are response-dependent. The central example will be our knowledge of the connection between something's being harmful and the fact that it is irrational for us to fail to be averse to that thing. The idea is that although the relevant responses (basic aversion in the case of harm, and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  27
    The Color of Mirrors.Joshua Gert - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):369 - 377.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40.  10
    Neo-Pragmatism, Morality, and the Specification Problem.Joshua Gert - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):447-467.
    A defender of any view of moral language must explain how people with different moral views can be be talking to each other, rather than past each other. For expressivists this problem drastically constrains the search for the specific attitude expressed by, say, ‘immoral’. But cognitivists face a similar difficulty; they need to find a specific meaning for ‘immoral’ that underwrites genuine disagreement while accommodating the fact that different speakers have very different criteria for the use of that term. This (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  83
    Putting Particularism in its Place.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
    Abstract: The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42.  13
    Crazy Relations.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):315-330.
    In The Red and the Real, Jonathan Cohen defends a relationalist view of color: the view that colors are constituted by relations between objects, perceivers, and circumstances. Cohen’s defense of relationalism is often ingenious, but it also commits him to some extremely counterintuitive—one might say “crazy”—claims. The present paper argues that the phenomena that are captured by Cohen’s ingenious defense of his interesting view can be captured equally well by a more “boring” view. Such a view distinguishes between colors and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Naturalistic Metaethics at Half Price.Joshua Gert - 2011 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44.  56
    Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy.Joshua Gert - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):88-95.
    Over-simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Response-Dependence and Normative Bedrock.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):718-742.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46.  93
    Colour, Emotion and Objectivity.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):714-721.
    1. IntroductionThe Emotional Construction of Morals is a tour de force that combines empirical data and philosophical argument in an impressively coherent way. Certainly it resists any sweeping assessment; a mere presentation of the principal lines of argument would itself take the space of an article. Also, and despite its systematic structure, I do not think Prinz's view places decisive weight on any small number of points. Consequently, I do not think it can be refuted in any wholesale way. Nevertheless, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  17
    Neo‐Pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions.Joshua Gert - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):454-478.
    This paper offers a neo-pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo-pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. One of those things might be called ‘assessing representational accuracy’, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  62
    Moral Reasons and Rational Status.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 171-196.
  49.  32
    Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism.Joshua Gert - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):217-224.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  22
    Fine-Grained Colour Discrimination Without Fine-Grained Colour.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):602-605.
    René Jagnow [2012] argues that David Rosenthal's theory of consciousness cannot account for certain experiences that involve colours so fine-grained that we do not and cannot have concepts of them. Jagnow claims that an appeal to comparative concepts such as being slightly darker than cannot help Rosenthal, since, in order to apply such concepts, we would already need to be conscious of two distinct fine-grained colours. The present paper contests this claim. It appeals to the Cornsweet illusion and some other (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 73