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Roy A. Sorensen [87]Roy Arnold Sorensen [1]
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Roy Sorensen
Washington University in St. Louis
  1. Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen here offers a unified solution to a large family of philosophical puzzles and paradoxes through a study of "blindspots": consistent propositions that cannot be rationally accepted by certain individuals even though they might by true.
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  2. Thought Experiments.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. Although he grants that (...)
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  3.  49
    Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):15-44.
  4.  79
    Yablo's Paradox and Kindred Infinite Liars.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):137-155.
    This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form 'None of these subsequent sentences are true' generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo's technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called 'self-referential' paradoxes. A representative sample is provided which includes counterparts of the preface paradox, Pseudo-Scotus's validity paradox, the Knower, and other enigmas of the genre. I (...)
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  5. Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):433-454.
  6. Ducking Harm.Christopher Boorse & Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):115-134.
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  7.  83
    `P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (5):245-266.
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  8.  41
    Anti-Expertise, Instability, and Rational Choice.Roy A. Sorensen - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):301 – 315.
  9.  63
    Conditional Blindspots and the Knowledge Squeeze: A Solution to the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):126 – 135.
    (1984). Conditional blindspots and the knowledge squeeze: A solution to the prediction paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 126-135.
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  10. A Thousand Clones.Roy A. Sorensen - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):47-54.
  11.  32
    Logical Luck.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):319-334.
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  12.  2
    `P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (5):245-266.
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  13. Symposium: Vagueness and Sharp Boundaries: A Thousand Clones.Roy A. Sorensen - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):47-54.
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  14.  91
    Knowing, Believing, and Guessing.Roy A. Sorensen - 1982 - Analysis 42 (4):212 - 213.
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  15.  74
    An Argument for the Vagueness of 'Vague'.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Analysis 45 (3):134 - 137.
    The argument proceeds by exploiting the gradually decreasing vagueness of a certain sequence of predicates. the vagueness of 'vague' is then used to show that the thesis that all vague predicates are incoherent is self-defeating. a second casualty is the view that the probems of vagueness can be avoided by restricting the scope of logic to nonvague predicates.
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  16. The Egg Came Before the Chicken.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):541-2.
    Vagueness theorists tend to think that evolutionary theory dissolves the riddle "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?". After all, 'chicken' is vague. The idea is that Charles Darwin demonstrated that the chicken was preceded by borderline chickens and so it is simply indeterminate as to where the pre-chickens end and the chickens begin.
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  17.  43
    Recalcitrant Variations of the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):355 – 362.
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  18.  57
    Vagueness, Measurement, and Blurriness.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Synthese 75 (1):45 - 82.
  19.  85
    Moral Dilemmas, Thought Experiments, and Conflict Vagueness.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (3):291 - 308.
  20.  26
    Self-Strengthening Empathy.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):75-98.
    Stepping into the other guy's shoes works best when you resemble him. After all, the procedure is to use yourself as a model: in goes hypothetical beliefs and desires, out comes hypothetical actions and revised beliefs and desires. If you are structurally analogous to the empathee, then accurate inputs generate accurate outputs-just as with any other simulation. The greater the degree of isomorphism, the more dependable and precise the results. This sensitivity to degrees of resemblance suggests that the method of (...)
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  21.  23
    Sharp Boundaries for Blobs.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (3):275-295.
  22.  86
    Is Epistemic Preferability Transitive?Roy A. Sorensen - 1980 - Analysis 41 (3):122 - 123.
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  23.  57
    Mirror Notation: Symbol Manipulation Without Inscription Manipulation. [REVIEW]Roy A. Sorensen - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):141-164.
    Stereotypically, computation involves intrinsic changes to the medium of representation: writing new symbols, erasing old symbols, turning gears, flipping switches, sliding abacus beads. Perspectival computation leaves the original inscriptions untouched. The problem solver obtains the output by merely alters his orientation toward the input. There is no rewriting or copying of the input inscriptions; the output inscriptions are numerically identical to the input inscriptions. This suggests a loophole through some of the computational limits apparently imposed by physics. There can be (...)
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  24.  21
    Modal Bloopers: Why Believable Impossibilities Are Necessary.Roy A. Sorensen - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):247 - 261.
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  25.  36
    A Vague Demonstration.Roy A. Sorensen - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):507-522.
    Poindexter points and asserts `That is Clinton''. But it is vague as to whether he pointed at Clinton or pointed at the more salient man, Gore. Since the vagueness only occurs at the level of reference fixing, the content of the identity proposition is precise. Indeed, it is either a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood. Since Poindexter''s utterance has a hidden truth value by virtue of vagueness, it increases the plausibility of epistemicism. Epistemicism says that vague statements have hidden (...)
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  26.  27
    Vagueness Within the Language of Thought.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):389-413.
  27. A Definite No-No.Roy A. Sorensen - 2004 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.
     
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  28.  63
    Subjective Probability and Indifference.Roy A. Sorensen - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):15 -.
  29.  30
    Newcomb's Problem: Recalculations for the One-Boxer.Roy A. Sorensen - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (4):399-404.
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  30.  5
    'P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (5):245-266.
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  31.  36
    Self-Deception and Scattered Events.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):64-69.
  32.  29
    A Strengthened Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (145):504-513.
  33.  78
    Nozick, Justice, and the Sorites.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - Analysis 46 (2):102 - 106.
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  34.  21
    The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness: Comments on Wright.Roy A. Sorensen - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):161-170.
  35.  9
    Rationality as an Absolute Concept: Roy A. Sorensen.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (258):473-486.
    My thesis is that ‘rational’ is an absolute concept like ‘flat’ and ‘clean’. Absolute concepts are best defined as absences. In the case of flatness, the absence of bumps, curves, and irregularities. In the case of cleanliness, the absence of dirt. Rationality, then, is the absence of irrationalities such as bias, circularity, dogmatism, and inconsistency.
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  36.  85
    Was Descartes's Cogito a Diagonal Deduction?Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):346-351.
    Peter Slezak and William Boos have independently advanced a novel interpretation of Descartes's "cogito". The interpretation portrays the "cogito" as a diagonal deduction and emphasizes its resemblance to Godel's theorem and the Liar. I object that this approach is flawed by the fact that it assigns 'Buridan sentences' a legitimate role in Descartes's philosophy. The paradoxical nature of these sentences would have the peculiar result of undermining Descartes's "cogito" while enabling him to "disprove" God's existence.
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  37.  38
    The Iterated Versions of Newcomb's Problem and the Prisoner's Dilemma.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Synthese 63 (2):157 - 166.
  38.  47
    The Importance of Being Completely Wrong.Roy A. Sorensen - 1984 - Analysis 44 (1):41 - 43.
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  39.  41
    The Metaphysics of Precision and Scientific Language.Roy A. Sorensen - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):349-374.
  40.  8
    Symposium: Vagueness and Sharp Boundaries.Roy A. Sorensen - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):47-54.
  41.  14
    Rationality as an Absolute Concept.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (258):473 - 486.
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  42.  33
    Commentary.Roy A. Sorensen - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):161-170.
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  43.  35
    Time Travel, Parahistory and Hume.Roy A. Sorensen - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (240):227 - 236.
    THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO SHOW HOW HUME’S SCEPTICISM ABOUT MIRACLES GENERATES "EPISTEMOLOGICAL" SCEPTICISM ABOUT TIME TRAVEL. SO THE PRIMARY QUESTION RAISED HERE IS "CAN ONE KNOW THAT TIME TRAVEL HAS OCCURED?" RATHER THAN "CAN TIME TRAVEL OCCUR?" I ARGUE THAT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF TIME TRAVEL WOULD FACE THE SAME METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AS THE ONES CONFRONTING ATTEMPTS TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF PARANORMAL EVENTS. SINCE HUMEAN SCEPTICISM EXTENDS TO THE STUDY OF PARANORMAL EVENTS (PARAPSYCHOLOGY), HUMEANS (...)
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  44.  12
    Blindspotting and Choice Variations of the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):337 - 352.
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  45.  16
    Diary of a Telepathic Solipsist.Roy A. Sorensen - 2018 - Ratio 31 (1):1-19.
    A thorough telepath in an otherwise mindless world would have an observational basis for solipsism. He would perceive an absence of other minds. How would things appear to the lone telepath? Given sufficient scepticism about introspection, exactly as they now seem to you. This perceptual solipsist would exclude other minds on the basis of evidence rather than the absence of evidence. He would be open-minded, ready to revise his opinion as rapidly as any perceiver. Any intransigence would be a side-effect (...)
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  46.  36
    Transitions.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):187 - 193.
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  47.  25
    Process Vagueness.Roy A. Sorensen - 1990 - Linguistics and Philosophy 13 (5):589 - 618.
  48.  27
    Pseudo-Problems: How Analytic Philosophy Gets Done.Roy A. Sorensen - 1993 - Routledge.
    In the twentieth century, philosophers tackled many of the philosophical problems of previous generations by dissolving them--attacking them as linguistic illusions and showing that the problems, when closely inspected, were not problems at all. Roy A. Sorensen takes the most important and interesting examples from one hundred years of analytic philosophy to consolidate a different theory of dissolution. Pseudo-Problems offers a fascinating alternative history of twentieth century analytic philosophy. It seeks to outline a unified account of dissolution that can consolidate (...)
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  49.  21
    Pure Moorean Propositions.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):489 - 505.
  50.  26
    The Bottle Imp and the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - Philosophia 15 (4):421-424.
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