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2015-06-30
The problem with defining.
I have a following trouble.

If I want to defining some word, and I want that my definition will be correct in the meaning of Semantical Conception of Truth or Classical, I have to know something about object, attribute or relation that I want to define. In other words: If I wand define "wisdom" I have to know what the wisdom is. If I don't know what the wisdom is, my definition will be arbitrary and could be incorrect (not in logical meaning but in ontological meaning), it would be fake definition.

The question is: How would I know about the subject, object, relation, attribute to give its proper definition ?

2015-07-06
The problem with defining.
Hello Piotr---There is knowledge and there is metaknowledge. You know that x is circle. This is knowledge. 
Should you also you know that x is the area bounded by a class of co-planar points or uniform curvature, then you have metaknowledge: you know what it is that you know by virtue of knowing that x is circle.          There are three levels of awareness: 

(1) Purely objectual. 
In being aware of a tree, or a pain in one's foot, one has objectual awareness. 

(2) First-order propositional. 
In being aware THAT there is a tree yonder, or THAT you have a certain sensation in a certain bodily region, you have this sort of knowledge. 
    Note that Type-2 awareness---this being knowledge-- is conceptually articulated, whereas Type-1 awareness---this not being knowledge (hence the distinction between 'kennen' and 'wissen', 'saber' and 'conocer', etc.)---is conceptually articulated. Type-2 awareness is awareness of awareness. 

(3) Discursive (hyper-conceptually articulated) awareness. 
This is knowledge of what it is that one knows by virtue of having Type-2 awareness. It is awareness of awareness of awareness. 

Regards--JM Kuczynski



2015-07-09
The problem with defining.
Thank You.

Now I see, that this is epistemological trouble. It is connected with problem of distinguish doxa and episteme.

Kind regards
pg 

2015-07-09
The problem with defining.
Hi, you write 'You know that x is circle. This is knowledge. 
Should you also you know that x is the area bounded by a class of co-planar points or uniform curvature, then you have metaknowledge: you know what it is that you know by virtue of knowing that x is circle'.

In trying to grasp your response, am I correct in thinking that a circle is the boundary of an area - and that a circle is not the area itself? The problem is one of defining: what do you mean when you use certain words in a certain order?

If I do not understand what you mean then, surely, it cannot be possible to communicate clearly?


2015-07-27
The problem with defining.
Yes, this is the problem with defining. And that we defining with notions who have to be defining by other notions. In other words: I see some object, and I want to defining term for this object, this term should describe properties of this object, but properties is too some other object. When I say: 'Snow is white" i sad that snow got some properties and this properties is white colour. I have to defining "white" to defining "snow". And when I want to have some knowledge about snow i have to see some example. We can derive some knowledge from seeing and from thinking. But both thinking knowledge and seeing knowledge is problematic. Our reasn and sense can be tool to derive knowledge, but next it follow as to expres this in language, and notions sends as to other notions, who shoul be defined.

2015-07-27
The problem with defining.

It is standard practice to introduce the entries in a work of reference with a definition of the topic. However, the concept of object—that concept of object which is of fundamental interest within philosophy—is among the most general concepts (or categories) which we possess. It seems very doubtful that it can be defined in more general terms; the best that seems possible is to trace relationships with other highly general concepts.


Thanks !!
Source

2015-07-27
The problem with defining.
You are incorrect in both regards, for in thinking that a circle is the boundary of an area, what you are really thinking of is the perimeter; and in thinking that a circle is the area itself, what you are really thinking of is simply the area. The circle would be the 2-D planar figure enclosed within this boundary, but inclusive of it, as well. The difference between 'area of a circle' and the shape itself lies in the classification of the two entities, one being a quantitative measure of spatial extension, the other being a 2-D abstract entity.
In response to your final question, I believe the answer to be no. For instance, I mention 'perimeter' above, with an associated definition that is fairly easy to conceive. I cannot think of an instant where 'perimeter' can be construed with any other word in any meaningful way, although I welcome any attempts at doing so.

2015-07-28
The problem with defining.
Reply to Matt Diller
Yes, I think I understand your argument. However, we usually think of a "circle" and an "area" as two separate concepts. An area has a boundary that is integral to it. If an area is bounded by a circle, then they are separate and must, therefore, be conceived of as such.
It is also possible to define "boundary", and so on. But, the word boundary is integral to ... while circle is separate from.


2016-05-09
The problem with defining.
You imagine that it could exist a true definition? You might take a look on Pitkin's Wittgenstein and Justice. She might have a liberating answer from this 'classical' impass, 

2016-09-13
The problem with defining.
The object is it's current state. The observer is the only object that exists. Memory and the physical world is filled with qualities representing objects of the past, with no current state, such objects do not exist, there is no collective meaning to the set of qualities comprising the memory or physical world. The only meaningful group of qualities (Phenomenal qualities) is of the context, the observer itself. 

2016-09-19
The problem with defining.
Object is diferent in state of time, then We should aks of identity meaning as be the same object.

Lets imagine:

Uświadomiłem sobie, że już nie jestem sobą, że doszło do wymiany wszystkich komórek w moim organizmie, że zostały zastąpione przez inne, a jednak to ja, lecz już nie tylko to przypadkowe połączenie plemnika z komórką jajową jedyne w swoim rodzaju, a jednak to ja, choć moje komórki zostały zastąpione przez komórki inych zwierząt, roślin, substancji. Czyli żarłem, piłem, srałem, paliłem i trochę się zmieniłem, a tożsamość mam te samą. Dlatego gdy umrę chciałbym zostać skremowany, aby nie zamienić się w kupy robaków.

But I'm in some specific sense that same object. And of in me something significant will be diferent, then I would't be that same object.



2016-09-20
The problem with defining.
Hi Joce,  Wonderful comment, thanks for putting this together! This is obviously one great post.

Thanks !!
Chri. J@Redgage

2016-09-27
The problem with defining.
I agree with you, but it is necessary to consider what is meant by 'object'. It is natural to consider two or more objects being combined to make a larger object, and that a whole can be dismantled.  A car has wheels, and so on, that can be thought of as both object and as a part. Leaves falling from a tree. We are surrounded by examples. Bert


2016-09-30
The problem with defining.
I's mereological problem but, if we want to define meres of some object alone or together we should do analysis and next synthesis. We could construe definition which includes properties, also is named conotation definition or could be named definitio per conotatio. B

Problem is little bit different now, is it:

obiekt - bodziec - receptor - podmiot


podmiot a - podmiot b


język a - język b


postrzeżenie a - postrzeżenie b


pos a = pos b


pos a -=pos b


pos a(pod a) = pos b (pod b)) -> jęz a = jęz b) ze wzgl na desygnat.

pos a(pod a) -= pos b (pod b)) -> jęz a -= jęz b) ze wzgl. na desygnat.


O ile, postrzeżnie a, podmiotu a jest równoważne postrzeżeniu b, podmiotu b, to ze względu na desygnat, język a jest równoważny językowi b. Sensy terminów mogą być różne lecz wtedy nie będzie to ten sam język, z tego względu, że w inny sposób opisują fenomen.


Przymiotniki wchodzące w skład opisu mogą być częścią definicji, definicja taka nazywana jest definicją konotacyjną.


x jest P

         I

         J

         K

         L


Jeżeli prawdą jest, że x jest P,I,J,K,L, to prawdą jest że x jest P,I,J,K,L.

Jeżeli prawdą jest, że x jest P,I,J,K, to nie jest prawdą, że x jest P,I,J,K,L


Cechy przypisywane danemu obiektowi mogą stanowić jego wyczerujący opis

O tym, czy opis jest wyczerujący świadczy to, czy zostały uwzględnione wszystkie jego cechy.


Ze względu na postrzeżenie, cechy przypisywane przez podmiot danemu obiektowi mogą być różne, np. w zależności od warunków. Dwa podmioty mogą percypować dany przedmiot na dwa różne sposoby czyli przypisywać im dwie różne cechy takie jak kształt, kolor, twardość, miękkość, smak, zapach. Różne cechy przypisują im ze względu na jakość zmysłów, która u różnych podmiotów poznających jest odmienna.


Jeśli sprowadzimy język do funkcji denotat - desygnat dwa podmioty poznające posługują się różnymi językami ze względu na odmienną jakość zmysłów. Różnica pomiędzy językami nie występuję tylko na poziomie terminu i jego sensu, lecz również na poziomie desygnatu i denotatu.


Funkcje w obrębie języka.


f: desygnat – denotat

f: termin – sens v definiens - definiendum

f: sąd – wypowiedź

 

2017-01-22
The problem with defining.
I got answer. Answer is that, feeleing of adjectives is relatived to subject. I show it in dialog.

- Dress cap - said grandmother
- I'm warm.
- You think you go out into the field and immediately blows Yourself.
- I'm talking, that's just me warm. And you like it?
- Cool.
- And me warm.
- Do not be cheeky little shit.

2017-01-23
The problem with defining.
I got answer. Answer is that, feeleing of adverbs and adjectives is relatived to subject. I show it in dialog.

- Dress cap - said grandmother
- I'm warm.
- You think you go out into the field and immediately blows Yourself.
- I'm talking, that's just me warm. And you like it?
- Cool.
- And me warm.
- Do not be cheeky little shit.

After two hours.

- It was you warm.
- Enough.
- I see.
- This can not be seen. It is  possible to feel alone.
- Do not take more LSD.
- We talk in another language.
- Why ? We talk in English.
- Cause We got different designates.