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Kant's material criterion of truth
I am attempting to paraphrase Kant's argument for a material criterion of truth, based on the principle of sufficient reason, from the first critique. Two questions: (1) Is this a fair representation of Kant's argument and (2) is it circular as stated? Any additional comments are welcome.

Given: truth consists of the correspondence between a cognition and its object.

Since it is a universal condition of all experience that everything which happens has a reason for happening the way that it does rather than some other way, then every true cognition must have an object which is, or at least in principle can be, the object of an actual experience in order to determine whether it corresponds to something which does, or can, actually happen.

Kant's material criterion of truth

A linked point, I think, is: are there something like assertion conditions on a judgment that don't inherit the conditions on some content associated with that judgment, especially in so far as a content is a matter of cognitive linkage? That is, treating a 'material criterion' as equivalent to 'some actualization' ...