Thanks for the comments. Let me try again:
Let's say you want to conceive of a zombie world. How do you do this? You have to think of physical stuff like people, who are, of course, zombies. Whatever you are conceiving of, like all the colors on the zombie people, I bet it has phenomenal character. So someone (you) must not be a zombie.
David Chalmers (1996) briefly speaks about this (at least I think that's what he's talking about), concluding that even if only a partly zombie world is conceivable, the zombie argument still goes through.
One
might also be worried by the fact that the concept of consciousness is
arguably not present at the center of the zombie world, whereas the
application of a primary intention might require the presence of the
relevant concept at the center of the world. (One might even start to
worry about the application of the zombie’s
concept!) I think the situation is more subtle than this--primary
intentions need not require the presence of the original concept--but in
any case, we can bypass this worry altogether simply by considering a partial zombie
world: one in which I am at the center, conscious, with all the
relevant concepts, but in which some other people are zombies [emphasis added] (133).1
1. Chalmers, D. J., 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.