Physicists and Philosopher of Science Henry Margenau made these points in an article called "The Problem of Physical Explanation". It was originally in The Monist Vol. 39, No.3, July, 1929, and later replicated in Physics and Philosophy: Selected Essays (Henry Margenau) 1978.

"The term "nature" will occur more frequently than any other in the subsequent discussion; hence it should be more clearly defined, and stripped of all colloquial implications which do not belong to its strictest meaning. Nature, in the most noncommittal sense, is the totality of sense impressions, this latter term including observations of a systematic and scientific character. It comprises nothing external to the human mind and postulates no things in themselves. Nor does it involve any assertions with regard to the non-existence of things in themselves. Data of nature will be understood to be parts of our consciousness, and should imply no suggestion as to their origin. The very word datum is misleading. For if our perceptions be gifts we might expect to find a giver, which some recognize in an objective nature, others in a divine agency. But inductive experience teaches nothing about a giver, nothing about the origin of sense impressions; it leaves us in the bare state of having cognitions, without even an indication of their whereabouts. The term "habita" instead of "data", the use of which was advocated by a philosopher whose name I have forgotten, would appear preferable in the view of this condition. But its introduction would constitute too radical a break from current terminology to warrant its usefulness. The word datum will be employed in this specified sense."

and he went on to say...

"We have seen that nature is the sum total of data. However it is a common practice of the mind to project these data into an external space and time, to endow them with substantiality and construct an objective nature which is a thing in itself. This process is so universal that a few critical remarks need be made concerning its legitimacy. Let us analyze it briefly and consider some of the steps. Certain experiences cause us to form inseparable associations between sense perceptions, persuade us to become convinced of their existence independently of our perceptions, which we finally accustom ourselves to look upon as accidental. We have invested the possibility of sensations with the quality of permanence. So far an objective nature is a psychological structure. Belief in an external world is simply the belief in a permanent possibility of sensation. It is important to recognize that we need not go farther than this to establish a ground for science. But the realist will refuse to stop at this point. His next step will be to class these permanent possibilities as existences distinct from our sensations, and this may be proper if "existence" is not understood in the medieval ontological sense; but if he thinks of them as generally distinct, as causes of our sensations, he is deluding himself by a fault use of what is called causation. The law of causality may not derive its unconditional binding force from, but certainly manifests it in actual experience, and every conceivable case to which it is applicable consists of two sets of data of which one may be inferred if the other is known. Now an objective nature is not a determinable factor of experience, and we have no evidence that it come within the range of entities over which causality has legislation. It is for this reason that the argument fails-that causality can never form a bridge between the known and the ultimately unknowable, and that an objective, if it exists, is forever unintelligible. Another feature which strengthens the fallacy of an objective nature is the tendency of our mind to ascribe greater immediateness, to to use the word reality, to notions which present themselves more readily than other. For instance we are tempted to consider matter as more immediate and real than, for example, energy or an electric field. But it is evident that this propensity is caused by the constitution of our senses, or mind in general, and must therefore be regarded as accidental."

But I think we have a serious problem. We normally assume that there is an external world, a world independent of us humans. We can never know this, and we can just assume that there is, because neither experience or logic can lead us to that conclusion. But people usually take this one step further, and will say something like our perceptions are close to the way the external world is, but not exactly like it. This is wishful thinking itself, and it is not something that experience tells us. We can say there is an external world, but it could be completely different from the way that we have presented to us, or there could be nothing external to us but another mind (which looks nothing like what we experience), or half of what we experience is similar to the way that the external world is that we assume to exist. Maybe it is completely faithful to the way it is. Maybe there is no external world, and there are just minds floating around. We could go on. So we see that we don't really have much to base our second assumption that our experiences are close to the way that this assumed external world are.

But I think we find ourselves in another problem. We like to think that physics leads us to a picture of the way the world is, but this goes against what some physicists say. "The most common misunderstanding about science is that scientists seek and find truth. They don't - they make and test models,", said by Neil Gershenfeld, director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Centre for Bits and Atoms. "In the final analysis, physics is only indirectly about the world of nature. Directly, it is talk about experimental arrangements and observations. Given a particular experimental arrangement, physicists can predict the outcome of certain measurements. There is nothing arbitrary about these outcomes. Anyone with the requisite ability can replicate them- they are perfectly objective in this sense. Nor is there anything arbitrary about the predictions. What is not given to the physicists by nature, but rather is invented by them, is what they say about these outcomes, the language they use to talk about nature. If physicists try to step outside of the scheme of experimental arrangements and observations to envision what sort of independent mechanism in the world “really” produces those observations, in Feynman’s words, they “get ‘down the drain’, into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped.” by Bruce Gregory. And Einstein, as retold by Bruce Gregory, said  "Einstein said we cannot compare our theories with the real world. We can compare predictions with observations of the world, but we "cannot even imagine...the meaning of" comparing our theories with reality." So it seems we are left with our sensations being the world we know.

But we have to ask ourselves, what is one of the biggest parts of physics? It is based on sensory experience, which is where the experimental physicists comes in. They view things of there senses, and this is to test their models by seeing if they make true or false predictions. But physics is also heavily based on mathematics and sense perception with experiments. The mathematics exist in our human minds and not the world (as far as we can tell, since the assumed external world could just be numbers). But these physicists have minds or brains, and so we have to go to neuroscience to find out how the brain or mind works.

So we have to ask our question, "Which is more important, Neuroscience or physics?".

Neuroscientist make observations, like images on a computer screen that comes from an MRI or EEG experiments. But these scientist are themselves having perceptions, and creating models of perceptions, which themselves will usually talk about what physicists talk about (i.e. photons hitting the retinal walls, even though no one can have a perception of a photon). We seem to come up to a circular argument. Even the neuroscientist has to compare their predictions with observations, and the observations are the only reality they will ever know.

Cognitive  Scientist, and author of perception, Donal Hoffman talked about our perceptions. He said, "Research in the cognitive and neural sciences has made clear that our visual systems are not simply passive recorders of objective reality, but instead are active constructors of the visual realities we perceive. Each of us has within us a reality engine, which takes the images at the eyes and constructs three-dimensional worlds of objects, colors, textures, motions, and depth. What we see with each glance is not the world as it is objectively and as it would be even if there were no observers. Instead what we see is entirely our own construction. Our process of construction proceeds so rapidly and confidently that we are misled by our own prowess into thinking that we are not constructing at all, but simply reporting what is there independent of us. In short, our belief that we see the world as it objectively is, unadorned, is an illusion made possible by the very brilliance and efficiency of our reality creating process."

Long answer:  Being conscious requires a rudimentary self-model.  Awareness is aligned with an organism and is for the purpose of orienting the organism and coordinating its movement and adaptational responses to the environment.  An organism must assess the environment so that it can act against the environment to perform acts that result in successful nutrition, procreation and self protection.  For successful volition the organism must act in a specific way against a specific kind of environment.   To do this it must create a model of the environment that accommodates the kind of tasks it must perform and the kinds of volitional capabilities it possesses.  The organism does not objectively tally ALL the features and characteristics of the environment; it only recognizes the features relevant to its own imperatives, and only in a combination that reflects its own capabilities and characteristics.  The modeling of the world is a creative, interpretive, subjective, inter-accommodative task for an entirely singular purpose: survival.

Physics is the primary way we model the world as humans.  We are adept at discerning the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the environment.  We combine well-articulated concepts about time, space, matter and energy, but we still model the world in the same creative, subjective, interpretive way all creatures do, and for the same basic reasons: to accommodate the kind of thing we are, and to achieve the kinds of things we aspire to do.  As is the case with all other creatures, our world-model is dependent on our self-model and our self-model is dependent on our world-model.  The two are inextricably linked in constant cross-reference and continual reconfirmation.  We like to think we are detached, objective and that the way we tally and combine phenomenal characteristics results in something absolutely true that is entirely separate from us.  We like to think that our world-model is distinct from our needs and purposes, from our capabilities and aspirations.  We like to think that our model of the world is freestanding and that its properties and characteristics are inherent to the world itself.   We like to think that our world-model provides the relevant characteristics by which to understand the universe even were we not in it.       

The assumption that the world we model in physics is equivalent to an objective freestanding model of the world, as it is in-and-of itself, is a somewhat harmless delusion if one is just doing physics.  However, if one desires to understand consciousness, and the cognitive processes by which we model a self and a world, one has to be a little more courageous and admit to the contingency and artifice of physical models, since these are just cognitive products produced in conscious processes for very specific reasons.  This letting-go of the physics delusion is the primary task in the development of a field of consciousness studies.  It is a difficult habit to break.  The empirical project was entirely prefaced on the notion that perception provides us an accurate objective measure of reality; that measuring things provides us the one true absolute truth.  20^th century physics threw a wrench into that, introducing quantum truths about matter in stark contradiction to the classical truths that had been established in explicit relationship to our bodies and our senses.  But converting a matter-based model to an energy-based model, or a quantum model into a string model, does not significantly alter the deluding assumption that we are achieving objective access to absolute truths about the fundamental nature of the universe itself. 

The new models we make in physics are indeed more interesting in relation to the classical model and perhaps more efficacious in relation to our aspirations of control and certainty over a wider range of physical processes, but we cannot claim access to objectivity until we are able to understand the modeling process itself: the inherently subjective, creative, and interpretative nature of sentience which binds self-models to world-models -- a dynamic informing any model be it physical, social, emotional, spiritual, or psychological.  

There is no point in claiming we can explain the fundamental nature of the universe until we can explain the modeling process behind such claims, and until we can fully comprehend the cognitive context in which such claims are made – the meanings, purposes, values , aspirations, and interpretive characteristics that define our conscious condition.  Physical models do not describe the context of our conscious condition, but our conscious condition when well understood can explain our penchant for physical models, our preference for control and certainty, and the fundamental nature of our inescapable cognitive interrelationship with the world around us. 

That is the goal in consciousness studies – to illuminate the processes and purposes behind modeling a self and a world.  It does not help us to get distracted by the truth claims of physics, the false assumption of access to absolute truth about the fundamental nature of reality.  Like it or not, conscious processes are ever and always going to be the decisive element in any equation concerning reality.  And like it or not that equation is never ever going to produce absolute truths.  We are only ever going to be making models of a self and a world in direct relation to our needs, purposes, and world-modeling capabilities.  We have an opportunity and an obligation to render the world-modeling process explicit and fully available to conscious awareness so that we as a global culture can improve our world-modeling capabilities across the board, in every area of endeavor.         

CH

Dear Steven,

Again, I support the sentiment:

‘It is time for philosophers to start banging on the doors of their local neuroscientists, and demanding that someone go look to find the picture that we know is in there! Here is a case where philosophy can inform neuroscience for a change, and tell them exactly what they should be looking for in the brain!’

However, I do worry about your suggestion that we ask scientists to look for a 3D picture. The ‘3Dness’ in our experience is not a feature of some (picture) thing we are beholding but a feature of the way we behold it. That is clear from all the pop-out illusions or indeed the Dalmatian. To get the 3Dness it is reasonable to assume that we would need to manoeuvre ourselves into the position of that part of the brain that accesses the signals that are beheld in a 3D way. (As to see the skull in Holbein’s Ambassadors we need to get in one specific position. http://claudia.weblog.com.pt/arquivo/2007/07/post_76.html) We would also need to be in a form that receives signals the way that bit of the brain does, which probably means that we would have to kindly ask that bit of the brain to step aside and make way for us.

It is not going to work is it? We cannot ask anyone to look for something that has 3Dness for a part of someone else’s brain by looking for 3Dness. What we can do is ask scientists to look for groups of signals that have a sufficient number of independent degrees of freedom relevant to their relations to each other to account for the very wide variety of experiences we can think of having and which are co-available to some part of the brain. As indicated above, a sense of 3Dness in an experience or beholding does not imply anything about the spatial arrangement of that which is beheld any more than the taste of sugar is a property of sugar on its own.

I must admit to having difficulty with certain aspects of your model and one that I worry about is suggested by your statement ‘Representationalism does require that patterns of activation in your brain be somehow aware of their own spatial configuration.’ I cannot think of any account of something being aware of itself that makes any sense in the causal framework that we normally couch all these ideas in. I would be happier with ‘Representationalism does require that something in your brain be somehow aware in a way that is dependent on the spatial configuration of its relation to the influences that inform it.’ Awareness is then tied to a causal path, as I think it must be.

So, yes, we need philosophers to bash scientists over the head – preferably in a civil fashion over a glass of reasonable quality wine – and say ‘No, you are not solving the problem your grant applications say you are going to solve’, but we also need to take into account the concerns philosophers have themselves raised about representationalism construed in terms of ‘pictures’.

"The most common misunderstanding about science is that scientists seek and find truth. They don't - they make and test models,". Neil Gershenfeld, Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Centre for Bits and Atoms

“Science is not about truth. Science is a system of inquiry that seeks to build falsifiable models of the world.” David Helfand chair of Columbia’s Department of Astronomy and creator of Frontiers of Science

"Science never aims to reveal the ultimate reality. Science only tries to make models of reality that have predictive power." Benjamin Crowell

"physical concepts are free creations of the human mind." Albert Einstein

"Are theories 'out there'? I don't think so. Theories are inventions." Heinz Pagels

"In physics, all ‘experience’ consists in ... instruments ‘pointer readings’." Neils Bohr

"Scientific theories serve to facilitate the survey of our observations and experimental findings. Every scientist knows how difficult it is to remember a moderately extended group of facts, before at least some primitive theoretical picture about them has been shaped. It is therefore small wonder, and by no means to be blamed on the authors of original papers or of text-books, that after a reasonably coherent theory has been formed, they do not describe the bare facts they have found or wish to convey to the reader, but clothe them in the terminology of that theory or theories. This procedure, while very useful for our remembering the facts in a well-ordered pattern, tends to obliterate the distinction between the actual observations and the theory arisen from them. And since the former always are of some sensual quality, theories are easily thought to account for sensual qualities; which, of course, they never do." Erwin Schrödinger

“We therefore build our measuring instruments to display their results in terms of position-typically, the position of a meter pointer or of a light pattern on a screen.” Bruce Rosenblum and Fred Kuttner

Steven,

Mlodinow, when I tracked him down in person in Stockholm, denied the significance of the explicitly representationalist statements in the Grand Design, said such explorations had nothing to do with science, were irrelevant dead-ends.  So those passages of their book, which could not have been any more explicit as per the construction of mental models, were either the handiwork of Hawking, or were aspects that simply needed to be avoided as per Mlodinow’s current commercial commitment to representing a specific scientific stance in counterpoint to Deepack Chopra’s spiritual one (they were in town test-running their War of the Worldviews schtick at a conference on consciousness).  I have not been able to reach Hawking for comment through either his university or his publishers.  At any rate, in The Grand Design H&M applied the implications of mental models to physics exclusively and came up with M-theory which simply put, just allows for as many mental models of physics as one needs or wants, no matter how contradictory the models.  So, at least in their minds (ha) they get to maintain the supremacy of physics as a descriptor of reality over and above other models of reality that must sensibly be considered on an equal footing if one considers the implications of mental models that are now allowed to contradict and overlap (social models of the world, psychological models, emotional models, language/meaning models, moral/ethical models, and so on).  <?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

Why is no one else making models of the cognitive dimension (I am currently writing an origin of cognition for this purpose) or pointing to the significance of model-making on neuroscience or vision? You answer the question yourself: the hot pokers administered to the eyes of those who attempt this vital and interesting new work. Yet, a change of thinking is inevitable; there is no logical way around it.  I encourage you to keep at it. You are not alone and you are on the right path.  When you find yourself discouraged just call to mind the church’s peer review of Galileo’s work.  (No one expects the Inquisition, but science is also a belief system with defensive adherents.) Or drop me a line.  I will cheer you on.

CH 

Dear Steven,

Firstly, let’s agree that this is where the real issues are in philosophy of mind – how you get a 3D-looking view and such like. Neuroscientists in general do not appear to see the problem. Philosophers see a problem but are hamstrung because they do not think in terms of causal dynamic models with predictive power; there does not seem to be much point in arguing for and against physicalism if the basic axioms of physics are not recognised.

One of those axioms, equally for Newton and Pauli, is that dynamics and experiences are incommensurable complementaries. The key issue, that I sense is still not taken on board by both your approach and that of JWKMM, is that experience has no metric in the sense that dynamics does. The dynamics underlying an experience do but the experience itself does not.

So, let me take your points in order in that context. You say that experience has 3D informational content. But a computer can handle 3D informational content using a set of connections that have no constraints on their 3D relations. As long as there is a clocked feed to gates nothing else matters. The brain works on a one dimensional computational system in which the position of a signal along a tubular extension of a neuron is the only thing that mattes to its computational import. There is no reason to think that the brain creates ‘images’ in any other way. What would be the point – it would certainly have no ‘informational content’.

All that matters from the informational point of view is the number of degrees of freedom and the number of discrimnable values of each. A single neuron has up to 40,000 degrees of freedom of input, which is probably enough even if there are only two discriminable values for each. What it seems like is irrelevant to this, as a computer shows.

I do not claim that nothing can be inferred about the representational principles of the brain from the observed properties of experience – I have just inferred some things above. But the analogy with a TV screen is entirely false, as I indicate in my book (a pity so few people seem to have looked at it, but never mind). You cannot see the parameters of experience in the way that you can for a TV screen. You cannot see the edges of your vision because to see those edges would be to see beyond your vision and indeed to see beyond those edges and on ad infinitum. Similarly, you cannot see how many pixels there are in experience because that would mean seeing the lines between the pixels and the pixels that made up those lines and the lines between those and to infinity again. The crucial point is that experience has no metric – it cannot be measured in this way because to measure would require experiencing beyond the experience to infinity. When I see five roses of the same red I only need one signal to encode the red. There is no rule that says that you need to repeat the signal for lots of non-existent pixels. A computer programme can manage easily without (you just 'select all' and 'paste colour'. The file just saves this command; only the screen gets updated in pixels but this is not used for further computations.) We need a jolly good number of degrees of freedom, yes, but there is no need for these to be laid out in a spatial metric analogous to that of the referent. The dome of the sky is an interesting feature, but there is no reason why it should not correspond to certain parameters of computations on signals along tubular neuronal extensions.

The world of experience is not analogical to the dynamics that cause it. The dynamics that underlie the world of experience are not going to be analogical to the dynamics being ‘represented’ because they are dynamics of ‘thinking about a thing’ not the dynamics of 'a thing’. They must be totally different in informational/computational structure. The intuitive idea that we create analogies of things is absurd, and in the seventeenth century this was widely understood. How low has philosophy sunk since!

You decry a homunculus, yet you talk of a view from within - so what is viewing? What has the view? I fear that your model is the true homunculus fallacy because you want the mind to create an analogy of just the sort that Dennett said would make the homunculus a bogeyman – repeating entirely the talents the homunculus has been rung in to explain. Like Descartes, I go for a viewer that does not need a ‘3D image’ to view, but rather just enough data with enough degrees of freedom to experience according to rules that have no dynamic description because they are immediate in the sense of being unmediated. At some point we have to get beyond reduction and have the unmediated immediate interaction – nothing else makes sense in science or anywhere, so Descartes’s proposal is in no way a cop out.

I am absolutely clear on this point Steve!! I have no hesitations, just rejections of self-contradictory proposals!

Best wishes

Jo

(SL):
I acknowledge that the modern trend in science is to consider models of reality as merely models, not as reality itself. However nobody would bother to propose any models if they did not believe there was a reality out there to be modeled in the first place. Ultimately, a physical model of the force of gravity, for example, is not a model of observations or experiences of falling objects, it is a model of a force field which is believed to have actual existence, even if that model is later supplanted by one that models gravity as a warp in space-time. If gravity did not exist in some form in the first place, there would be no point in modeling it. In the end, even the solipsistic professor of philosophy drives home to his home and family confident in their continuing existence *as if* they were objectively real.

But this entire idealist issue is a total diversion from the issue that I raised originally, which is that our mind and experience take the form of explicit spatial structures, and that therefore our models of our experience must also take the form of explicit spatial structures, even if our experience does not have objective existence, but appears only to ME in my own solitary solipsistic universe, its STILL a spatial structure!

(CH):
Although we do not as yet (as a culture or as a species) render our model-making processes and purposes explicit, it would be more honest to say that we do not model for reality, we model to get specific kinds of things done.  The models we make of gravity are an exact reflection of what we hope to do with it or about it: our models are for incorporating or overcoming its force (but keep in mind that even the notion of a force, of cause and effect, of a linear temporal order, etc. are also defined in relation to or as a reflection of our own needs and purposes).  It would be more honest to say that all of our models (whether physical or teleological) are pragmatisms rather than truths. Bernard O. Williams claimed something to the effect that when we make up a story about events, and the story provides a satisfying and useful explanation, we are obliged to invest in all the elements of the story as if they were absolutely true. Whatever notion of reality we are entertaining, it is always going to be that kind of story, with projections and investments made for specific purposes.

And as I began to parenthetically point out above, the temporal order, causation, a differentiation between self and world, the survival imperative, and many other conceptual orientational parameters in addition to the spatial structures you mention combine to produce the standard reality model for living systems.  Were this model not in our heads we would not be living systems.  But this does not mean that any of these orientational parameters represent an absolute truth.  Yes.  Shocking.  Appalling.  Yet that is not the end of the game!  By exploring the way we model the world, and by rendering our purposes more explicit, we can eventual correct for the kinds of distortions we would by our nature prefer. It is a matter of knowing ourselves better in order to understand the world in a new, more objective, and much more interesting way.

The field of consciousness studies is positioned to deliver that analysis and that particular kind of self understanding and world understanding. However, rather than admitting to the contingency and artifice of all versions of reality so that we can get to the task of mapping world-modeling and meaning-making in more generalized terms, it is a field mired in infantile arguments about whose reality version is the really real one.  Instead of letting go of the absolute truth investment inherent to all satisfying and useful world-models, everyone is digging in their heels to assert and defend their own unique personal or professional version. And the philosphers just speculate, poll, wield their doubts, and hedge their bets on the sidelines. It is a funny thing to watch but also deeply distressing since we could be doing so much more, amassing more interesting analysis, if people would just let go of it.  I guess their fear is that if they let go, their world will implode; that somehow their beliefs are holding it all together.  That may be so to some extent but I assert that humanity survived many such implosions in the past: in our (Western world) transition from paganism to monotheism for example, and between monotheism and empiricism.  It is not easy but it has got to be done. It is best in my opinion to just rip the bandage off in one quick pull.  Otherwise it is just this interminable mulling about in limbo, moaning about the explanatory gap.

It is interesting what you mention about your friends because it is something I have noticed too about people in general who are not in the sciences or academia.  They don't give a damn about proofs, they are fully willing to accept the notion that reality is a useful delusion.  It is a part of the culture already.  As in all paradigmatic transitions, the learned lag behind, and instead of articualting new truths are only forestalling progress.

You speak of philosophy as if it were theology, where we each state our personal beliefs and don't care if we ever come to any kind of consensus.

But unlike the theologian, the philosopher is supposed to care if his philosophy embodies a fatal logical flaw that renders it unreasonable.

 I propose now we are ready to include naive realism amongst those views which are demonstrably untrue, at many different levels.

Yes it is true that the direct perceptionists will never be persuaded, and will carry their error to their graves, but their objections are clearly unreasonable. The absurdity of perception being "epistemically direct" is clear from the simplest example of a representationalist system: the stupid  automatic door-opener that opens the door, not when a person approaches the doorway, nor when they block the light beam, but when the voltage in the photocell drops below threshold, that what causes the door to open. Is there a way to make this opening response operate "epistemically directly" even though it comes at the end of the causal chain? We can, by simply declaring it to be "epistemically direct". But that does not change its causal dependence on the rest of the causal chain.

The sensible naive realist will have no interest in declaring perception to be causally independent of the rest of the causal chain.

The fact that the notion of "epistemic directness" is totally meaningless when applied to a real physical sensory system that operates by causal laws, is exactly why the theory of direct perception has no place in science, but belongs in the naive fantasy world with Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy, as impossible abstractions that have never been observed, and can never be demonstrated even in the simplest sensory systems.

The progress of philosophy is glacially slow. But at every critical period, there are those who see the light, and others who cling desperately to outmoded views: theists who believe in supernatural spirits, animists who believe in superscientific influences, and naive realists who believe they can see the world directly. In each critical era, philosophers had a choice to make their mark in history as forward-thinking men of reason who adopt the reasonable view, or backward-thinking dogmatists who defend the naive view.

Claims to have "seen the light" seem to me not the best way of introducing an attack on others' dogmatism and theological leanings.  I take metaphysical claims of the sort "Phenomenalism is true!!" (along with, maybe, some dancing in a circle)  to be great examples of an old-fashioned style of dogmatism that, in my view, ought to have had no place in philosophy since Russell--or at least since Quine's "On What There Is."

In sum, I enjoyed your post very much, but while you make much of my relative indifference to consensus (which, as I've said, I can't deny), I think you might think a little about your own passion to be right about something that is generally taken to be neither a scientific claim nor a matter to be settled by revelation nor the volume of the assertions by which they are claimed.  I'm curious: do you take the same sort of stance about such propositions as "There are universals."?

All best,

Walter Horn

I suspect that the present argument reflects a weakness of that thing called reason. What seems reasonable to one person seems quite unreasonable to another.

To judge between two cognitive constructs (positions, perspectives, points of view, world view, model, mental model, theory, paradigm, policy, etc.) there must be some criteria. If the criteria are somewhat objective, we may have some way so say which position is best. Otherwise, our only tool for measurement is some intuitive feeling of what makes sense. Then,m unfortunately, we end up looking for a consensus of opinion, or holding some wort of popularity contest. Those, of course, are not very good ways to advance our thinking. Sadly, objective criteria do not exist in the mainstream. Thus, we need new ways of thinking about how we do our thinking

Let us first consider three generally accepted ways to determine the validity of a presented point of view.

First, there is empirical validity. This is the favored approach for mainstream science. It becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First, because there are things that are difficult or impossible to measure (consider, for example, measuring the level of morale in a work team or the existence of a deity). The second problem is that we measure depends on what we think we are measuring.Recall the saying, "We do not see the world as it is, we see it as we are." Or less prosaically, if we don't have the right point of view we won't see the right empirical "things." A researcher who believes in an omnipotent deity will say that everything he sees is prrof of that deity. A non-believer will see other things. That is not to say that one view is better ore more true than another, simply that we have no way to evaluate those observations as having some sort of objective validity.

Second, there is the notion of coherence - does the point of view fit with existing points of view. For example, back in the days of Darwin, scientific papers were judged by their adherence to church dogma. A paper attempting to explain an odd geological formation would be deemed more reasonable if that paper explained how the new geological insight was related to the flood of Noah. So, one way to judge what is reasonable is to ask if the new point of view will fit some existing (usually dominant) point of view. The problem with such a measure is what I would call a fallacy of regress. There is no way to determine if the dominant paradigm is valid, or not.

Typically, the dominant paradigm is judged acceptable because "it works." This goes back to the first example. Unfortunately, this is again something that it very difficult to measure because everything "works" to some extent. Even church dogma can be said to work. One trick, therefore, is to find a way to measure how one point of view works better than another.

The third approach is to look at the internal coherence of the position or argument. Historically, this has been done in an ad hoc way. Generally by reading an argument and asking if it seems reasonable. As suggested above, that approach does not seem to work very well. And, it may be that such intuitive tests of "reason" rest on each person's personal point of view. Typically, such points of view include many hidden assumptions. Thus, they are not useful for clear and rigorous analyses. Yet, we persist in using our intuitive sense of what is reasonable - because it seems to have worked in the past (see above for what seems to work).

As you may guess, I have some frustration around this topic. It seems clear that there are many problems in the world that might be solved if we had better theories of psychology, sociology, economics, and policy (to say nothing of philosophy!). Yet, we are unable to advance those fields because mainstream science has no way to judge between two theories and so no way to advance the field.

My research provides new methods for objectively analyzing cognitive structures - the internal coherence of concepts within a cognitive structure. These methods seem applicable to a wide range of such structures including theories of the social and natural sciences as well as policies (and, apropos of the present argument, points of view).

The key to this approach is called Propositional Analysis (PA). In a nutshell, this is a rigorous, objective method for quantifying the internal logics of a theory, policy, or point of view. This approach allows us to measure cognitive constructs in two ways. First, by measuring the Complexity of a cognitive structure (essentially, the number of concepts it contains) and the Robustness (the degree to which those concepts are conceptually linked).

By itself, that is an advancement over the old methods of evaluating arguments by asking if they are "reasonable" because we can assign a number to the structure that defines how reasonable it is. The research also goes a step further by linking the Complexity and Robustness of a cognitive structure with the effectiveness of that structure in practical application. For an example from the natural sciences, theories in ancient times had low levels of Complexity and Robustness were not effective in practical application. During the scientific revolution, theories became more Robust and Complex - and were somewhat useful in practical application. After the scientific revolution, theories were highly Robust - and highly effective in practical application.

It seems , therefore, that we can use Propositional Analysis to analyze cognitive structures (including theories, policies, and philosophical positions) and get some indication as to how useful they will be in practical application. For those who are interested in such concepts as "truth" and "reality" this may also be understood as a method to measure those things.

So, yes, there is a way to judge between these two perspectives with some level of rigor and objectivity.

I would note that there is some measure of effort involved. This kind of analysis is much more effective when applied to a causal diagram or a set of clear causal propositions. I would not want to analyze long conversations... too much ambiguity.

If the arguers are willing to have their positions judged by this new method, the results might be quite interesting. Using PA, I can identify which parts of the positions are well understood compared to those parts of the positions which are not so well defined.

To make it workable for my own participation (I am more than a little bit busy at the moment) I would ask that the arguers present their positions as a set of propositions (numbered, indicating causal relationships). Or, better, as a diagram with concepts in boxes and causal relationships as arrows. Further, if anyone would like to learn this method, we can analyze the positions in parallel - and see if we come up with similar results (thus creating an experiment in the repeatability of this method).

I have a number of published writings on this general topic. Some available on this site, others available on request (depending on how much reading time you have).

Using this new approach offers the opportunity to advance philosophy more rapidly and gain more relevance in the world. Much better, in my humble opinion, than unresolvable arguments, attempting to develop a consensus of opinion, relying on intuition, or the many other approaches that have not served to advance philosophy in recent years..

Thanks,

Steve

[email protected]

One caveat – many of these representations are “atomistic” – essentially claiming or implying truth and value within themselves. So, although it is better to work with the actual propositions, I will adjust the propositions slightly to show casual relationships. If I misrepresent in any way, let me know and I will be glad to fix it.

1: Visual experience depends on a causal chain, which involves illumination of the scene, an image on the retina, a signal up the optic nerve, and a particular pattern of activation on the visual cortex.

VERSION A:

Because the relationships are all linear logics (no concatenated logics) our logical understanding of each aspect is informed only by one other aspect (for #1 – there is no causation – illumination seems to happen… magically).

While the intervening steps may add something descriptively (the breadth), they do not add to the explanatory power (the depth) of the logical structure. One might just as well say that more illumination causes more visual experiences. Such a position would assume the existence of an observer (along with retinas, etc). The existence of such assumptions, however, is key… because they are everywhere. For example, the above logical chain mentions retinas and optic nerves… but only assumes the next level of detail. The model might be made more complex by including descriptions of the electro chemical actions within the retina, nerves and brain. However, we would still be left with a linear logical chain. And, we would still know full well that there are many assumptions that are not addressed.

That said, another way to interpret this model might be to say that:

VERSION B:

        Diagram here

Direct Perception:

1: No it does not. Visual experience is direct. We see the world directly, even though we view it through the mediation of the causal chain, the view is direct nonetheless.

If I get the gist, this may be diagramed simply as:

[ this one worked for some reason - perhaps simplicity has its uses]

1. Visual experience is direct

As we all know, a truth claim must be supported. When it stands by itself it has little explanatory power or standing. It remains wide open to interpretation. Another point to be made here regards the testability of models. Here, the atomistic claim provides no causal relationships that might be tested experimentally/experientially.

COMPARISON

Based on the measure of Complexity, Representationalism wins easily. A model containing a greater number of aspects has more explanatory power – more breadth. More causal connections means more logic and more reason.

One caveat here is to ask exactly what is being explained. The Representationalism approach seems to be describing biological functions. Is that relevant or useful for the reader? This model may be of more use to a biology student, than a philosopher.

Based on the measure of Robustness, all models are at such a low level that they have little depth of explanatory power. By this I mean that the aspects within each model are not well defined/explained. Recall here that just because something is accepted as being true or well known, does not mean that it is well explained logically. While the existence of an external light source is now considered well known, the ancient Greeks believed that the source of illumination came from within a person’s own eyes.

The models of Representationalism may be tested through experimentation. One might set up an experiment where the causal aspects are varied and subjects are asked to report on their visual experiences. No such experiment seems possible for the Direct Perception model because there are no causal relationships.

To improve all models, they should be made more complex, with more causal interconnections between the conceptual aspects. The act of developing those models will help to focus the conversation and provide theories/models that are amenable to testing.

DEEPER VIEWS?

These models are (of course) incomplete. And, they may misrepresent the intended focus.

Are we really trying to describe/diagram/model the experience? Or, would it be more useful to develop a model of the philosophical implications of the alternative views?

For example,

As you will note, if you have learned quickly from the above analyses, these simple models may be no better than the above analyses from a structural perspective (they are simple and linear instead of complex and concatenated). They may however be more closely focused on the philosophy of the discussion.

Oh yes, check out a short audio-visual presentation I have. Please download and hit F5 to play: http://projectfast.org/DRAFT-Wallis-POSTER-SESSION-ICP 2012.ppt

Thanks,

Steve

[email protected]

Nice one, Bertie!!  I reckon we could also say the opposite, that the world is NEITHER in our head NOR our head in the world, that the concepts of INNER/OUTER, ME/NOT ME, are just useful cognitive artifices that evolved for managing our biological conundrum (i.e., nutrition, procreation, self-protection, etc.).  Our minds evolved to formulate and utilize dichotomies (i.e., SELF/NON-SELF, LIGHT/DARK, HOT/COLD, NUTRITION/TOXIN, PREDETOR/PREY, etc., etc.).  These are OUR concepts and have nothing to do with the world’s own characteristics, per se.

Ergo…… if we are looking to elucidate the subject of consciousness we must ultimately forgo our reliance on concepts that were self-fabricated for other purposes. 

Best,

CH

Steven, you wrote, 'It is indeed a replica, in the sense that the experience is distinct from the world it represents, which by definition is beyond experience.’

I said in an earlier post that there is the problem of language and meaning (And, doubtless, I also fall into this unavoidable, unavoidable.) The fact that what we experience represents the objective world is what philosophers have been arguing about since the Ancient Greeks. Therefore human experience and the world that we experience are not distinct - that is: easily seen, clear. That is why they are, after more than 2,500 years, still argued about?

For sensory beings, such as humans, experience is all. There is nothing else, apart from sharing an experience with others which, naturally, is nothing more than another experience. We argue over whether we experience, are in contact with, an objective world and how that might come about.

I find, after reading some earlier posts, that there is a great deal of confusion over what is Indirect and what is Direct Reality. Some of the argument is not concerned with focusing on the basics of epistemology. Rather it is about science: such as the biology or the physics of the physical processes of seeing. Respondents have diverged, often quite dramatically, from your initial question into the deeper science, not the grasping of the basics of the philosophy.

In your reply to Paul Niesiobedzki you wrote that: 'Perception is indirect but perceived directly; Perception is time-lagged but perceived directly'. I agree with that. A simplified causal chain looks like this:

Perceiver > Image < Casual Chain (The senses etc) < 3D-objective world

Perception is Indirect, both because it is perceived via a casual chain and because there is a time lag. The casual chain and the time lag are the "cause" of the Indirectness.

For some, Direct Reality restricts seeing to the simple viewing of the image that appears at the end of the causal chain. In simple terms it would look like this:

Perceiver > Image

Even this is made more confusing by alternative definitions and language use. For example, In Reid's Non-Naive Direct Realism, Rebecca Copenhaver wrote: 'Indirect realsits hold that it is in virtue of the intrinsic characters of mediating entities and external objects that the former represent the latter, while direct realists hold that it is in virtue of an extrinsic relation that mediating entities represent external objects.'

So, what is Direct Realism, and what is Indirect Realism? If someone could explain that to me then I would be very grateful. If I cannot grasp the difference (Or are they, at heart, fundamentally the same thing: only different viewpoints of perception and of what happens between the subjective and the objective worlds?) then perhaps I should stay in bed each morning when the sun comes up to show me the world in which I think I live! Bert

Instead of "perceptual replica", I suggest a "neuronal analog" as the brain representation of the external world. For more about this, see "Where Am I? Redux" on my Research Gate page here:

Albert, you are wrong

Colors exists, color exists both completely independently of human perception.  Color is objective.