Quine criticized the so-called two dogmas of Empiricism, and Davidson criticized the so-called third dogma of Empiricism. Then, McDowell criticized the existence of non-conceptual content of experience. we will show that their arguments are all wrong. Their arguments are some kind of proof by contradiction. If we accept some principle of Empiricism, then we have to face some problems, thus we could not accept some principle of Empiricism. We will show that these problems could be solved. In fact, Wittgenstein had solved these problems. Therefore, their arguments are all invalid. At last, we will examine proof by contradiction. What contradictions can tell us? What about ability and inability of conceptual analysis?

1. The first So-called dogmas of Empiricism

Quine criticize Frege's definition of analyticity, but it doesnot mean that there are no other definition s of analyticity. In fact, Wittgenstein had given another definition of analyticity: logically true statements are analytic. The analytic-synthetic distinction is still clear.

Quine’s argument is wrong.

2. The second So-called dogma of Empiricism

Quine showed that there are close relations between statements, but his holism is obscure. In fact, Reductionism could accept the relations between statements. For example, in an Axiomatic system, the valid of theorems depend on all the reasoning chains: the related axioms and related reasoning rules.

In his later work, Quine’s moderate holism is much closer to Reductionism.

Quine’s argument is wrong.

3. The third So-called dogma of Empiricism

In the paper "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", Davidson criticized the so-called dogma of Empiricism. Davidson argued that there has to something common for the people, who have different conceptual schemes and different language, to understanding each other. What is the common thing? Davidson could not find, so he said this problem is unsolvable.  Wittgenstein solved this problem. The common thing is form of life.

Davidson’s argument is wrong.

4. Non-existence of non-conceptual content

In the book "Mind and World", McDowell argued that there are no non-conceptual content. If there are non-conceptual contents, then non-conceptual contents could not offer conceptual reasons for conceptual statements (or beliefs).

But why non-conceptual contents have to offer conceptual reasons for conceptual statements (or beliefs)? Why not conceptual statements (or beliefs) describe and explain non-conceptual contents? Wittgenstein said that the task of philosophy is much more description than conceptual reasons. Actually, the task of science is also description and explanation of form of life.

McDowell’s argument is wrong.

5. What contradictions can tell us?

The conclusions of Quine, Davidson and McDowell are all wrong. The common mistake of Quine, Davidson and McDowell is the reasoning procedure. Their arguments are some kind of proof by contradiction. If we accept some principle of Empiricism, then we have to face some problems, thus we could not accept some principle of Empiricism.

We have face with some problems or contradictions. What contradictions can tell us?  What is the origination of problems?

The problems may originate in the all reasoning chains. In above cases, originations of problems are not the demises, but the prejudices of authors.

Contradictions could tell us that there are incoherent in the present conceptual schemes. Contradictions could tell us that existence of non-existence of experience.

If someone says there is a beautiful flower somewhere, we have to go and look. We could not say that:” Wait, wait…let me think about the possibility first.”

In the sense, Wittgenstein said that: “Don't think but look!”

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