Back    All discussions

Burge's Frege's Hierarchy

I wonder if anyone knows of useful recent discussions of Tyler Burge on Frege's hierarchy of senses (in 'Frege and the Hierarchy')? And I would be interested in anyone's comments on the extended Postscript to the reprint of the paper in Burge's 'Truth, Structure, and Method', or especially interested in hearing of anyone's thoughts on the section in the Postscript that discusses his 'Principle for Canonical Names of Senses'. Does anyone think the discussion demode?

Burge's Frege's Hierarchy
If I remember right, Chris Peacocke discusses it in a chapter towards the end of his Truly Understood.

Burge's Frege's Hierarchy

Thank you. Looking at that Peacocke chapter (which is very clear) I thought if concatenated bracketed Thoughts are problematically associated with individuals that actually too immediately problematises a notion of Concepts. Some guidance - linked to 'leverage' perhaps - in terms of canonical names for senses is immediately required just to be able to state a problem. In the Burge paper I mentioned there was a resolution of some presentations constructed from the piling up of subscripts with functional guidance accorded to something called 'cannonical senses', or the subscript piling could be construed as a device for formally representing individual beliefs with their subscripted content-like correlates prior to any choice about the interpretation of 'correlates' (or one view tying correlates to ambiguities associated with formal representation and a second view tying them to varying symboliic uses where some account might be owed of that tethering). Partly what interests me about the Burge paper and Postscript was the explicit attention given to the representation of ascriptions terminating in the view that the combination of structure and appropriate opacity in that- clauses thought of as singular terms was problematic for a smooth reading of the involved quantificational structures of some true statements at least in English. That there was a problem in giving 'glosses'.

I also thought that Peacocke too easily goes to constraints. if there seems to be a consensus that drives intuitions relating to substitution failures in reports should reports be mediated in any way (when one is discussing them) by intuitions which may depend on the representational forms of reports? Certain sorts of involute composites, say, being preferable (in terms of what might be aimed for) to some intuitive psychological underpinning merely as a pull in cases of the representation of complex contents apllied to content (with the possibility that those underpinnings were sketches for potentials that may develop out of some representational complex and were essentially linked to generalisations out that type of thing).