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2014-08-31
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
Hi! I'm traying to translate a sentence from GA 28 (untranslated) and I need to contrast my interpretation with somebody elses.

The sentence goes like this:

Während aber die Art des Wissens nur ist, was sie sein kann, auf dem Grunde des eigenen Selbst, was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß, wozu eine Offenbarkeit freilich gehört, die aber nur aus der spezifischen Seinsart des Daseins begriffen werden kann.

My version of this monstruosity would be the following (please note that the sentence is incomplete as there is no main clause, and that it has been copied literally from the book).

But while the kind of knowing only is what it can be on the ground of the own self, this itself, that is the own self, must be determined as Being, to which certainly a manifestness belongs, which it self can be understood however only from the specific mode of being of Dasein.

My biggest headache is "was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß"

Is Heidegger saying

i. that the own self must be determined just as Being does by a certain Offenbarkeit

ii. That the own self must be determined as that being which is characterized by Offenbarkeit.

iii. That the own self must be determined as Being, which is characterized by etc. (In the concrete sense that Dasein is Das Sein)

iv. That the own self must be determined as the Being, which is characterized by etc..

Thanks so much!


2014-09-01
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
the authentic self can only be determined as Being -- not by paying attention to the way in which it manifests itself -- but only through grasping the specific form of its kind of being 
(and the specific form of this kind of being is not characterized by manifestness but by a transformation that this kind of being itself brings about)

-- just some ideas.  

2014-09-22
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
Hi Andres,
you certainly found a pig of a sentence here.

I read it as

Knowledge can only be of such a sort, that it is - what it is - based upon a one's Self, which has to be determined in its being, to which admittedly a revelation belongs, one which can only be captured out of the specific way of being of 'being-in-the-world.

As far as I understand it - with the limited context provided here - it is one of his wonderful circles. 

Knowledge depends on a self (Selbst) which needs to be captured in its being (Sein), but that brings with it a certain apparentness, manifestation or revelation which itself can only be grasped out of the specific way of Dasein's being 

I'm certainly not an expert on translating, but - as I am a native German speaker - you may find my take helpful?

Best

Thomas

2014-09-22
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
Dear Andrés Ignacio,

I think the key word is the most untranslatable, the play on words of gehört meaning belonging, and here especially 'mine-ness', fitting a theme or argument or point of an argument, and listening and hearing (the call of Being from the opening that is an affordance for the self determining or attuning to the direction, orientation or determination of one's being ('Self') in response to that call.  All of this is expressed in the word 'gehört'.

Rather than the verb 'be' I would emphasize the word 'become'.

"But while (during) the way of knowing only is what it can-be, on the ground of (its, one's) own Self, which self as Being must become determined, toward an Opening (openness) freely (belonged to, listened to, heard and responded to), [which] but only out of that specific way-of-being Dasein can become grasped"

Good luck,
James Harrod


2014-09-22
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
Dear Andres,I try to convey how I interpret the sentence in German:
"While, however, the type of knowledge is only, what it can be on the foundation of its genuine nature, which needs to be defined as existence itself, which of course comes with an evidence, which can be conceived only by the specific way in which things exist. (Like a craftsman acquires evident knowledge of his his materials and tools by handling them, in a way which is not intellectual and can't be explained...Zuhandenheit)
I know that this is not a good translation but it maybe helps to better understand the meaning...
Best regards
Wolfgang

2014-09-22
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
This is the full quote:  "Woher kommt es aber, dass diese Argumentation so selbstverständlich erscheint? Das eigene Sein wird primär und einzig gefasst von der Bestimmung, dass es Bewusstsein ist, dass das Ich eine res cogitans ist, oder dass das Wissen als Bewusstsein das Sein dieses allein beschreibt. Während aber die Art des Wissens nur ist, was sie sein kann, auf dem Grunde des eigenen Selbst, was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muss, wozu eine Offenbarkeit freilich gehört, die aber nur aus der spezifischen Seinsart des Daseins begriffen werden kann." (339-340).

There is no missing clause, only an interpunctuated line of thoughts. The purpose is to answer the questions: Why is Hegels argument deemed so obvious, and why is there a problem with that?

The first part of the answer ("Das eigene Sein ...") paraphrases the traditional view, that our way of being is determined as consciousness. The second part ("Während aber...") invokes the thesis of Sein und Zeit, that only "Daseins specific way of being" can make conceivable, that there should be "openness" in the meaning of "being", and that such an "openness" must be included, when we talk about our being. 

There is an ambiguity in the phrase "wozu eine Offenbarkeit freilich gehört", since it is ambiguous, whether it means, that "the own self" is to be determined as "being" (per se), or as "that [specific kind of] being, to which an openness belongs". Heideggers use of "freilich" dissolves the disambiguity: when we talk about our knowledge and "what it can be" (Wissen as cogitare or Bewusstsein), we inherently talk about something, that can only be understood "on the ground of the own self".

That own self is to be understood as "Being". But there is another ambiguity or two in the phrase "was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muss".

First, it is unclear, if "was" denotes the "ground", the "own self", or simply the conjunction of the two. "Was" can be used in both ways, much in the same way as "which" in english - and the english translation would do better in simply preserving the ambiguity ("which itself must be determined as Being, to which, however, an openness belongs, that, however, can only be conceived of out of Dasein's specific way of being." However, that is a lot of however's for one sentence that already starts one. The first would be replaced with a "Yet", the second with an "albeit", and the third left as is.

Second, it is unclear, what "selbst" means to say: is it meant de dicto or de re? Is it talk about our own self (apperception), or talk about the talk about our own self (the expression "the own self")? Yet there is little to be won by choosing the one over the other, since both are obviously in play in Heideggers reading of Hegel, which is basically an apology with footnotes: Don't think, that Hegel was so stupid as to be caught simplifying things, - although he did get caught in a simplifying "Metaphysik des Daseins" (cf. p. 210).

No matter what, however, the sentence states the same: Although the conception of our own being as "not merely human finite knowledge" leads Hegel to the argument, that we must think of ourselves as infinite knowledge, there is still the problem to deal with, that knowledge stems from our own self, that this own self is to be understood as "Being", that there is openness in that kind of being, and that openness only is to be found in the way of Being that Heidegger calls "Dasein". - If Hegel wants to talk about ourselves as "infinite knowledge", he has to keep in mind, that he is committed to the "problem of the Being of the Absolute" (p. 210), viz. "not whether it 'is' ... but more originally, what 'Being' is to mean here, and whether this is and can be an absolute concept." (p. 210). 

So, that is the problem Heidegger poses: Hegel says, that we cannot think of ourselves as finite knowledge, but does the concept of infinite knowledge really help us in solving the problem of "the Being of the Absolute"? Since that is the main question of Heideggers text (§20 of the lecture), it goes without saying, that "our own self" would be determined as "Being". Hegels questions, answers and problems are thus led back to the question of "Being". That is the main motor in Heideggers lectures of the late twenties, if you ask me.

2014-09-22
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
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2014-09-22
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
Dear Ignacio,
The mode of speech of Heidegger is realy monstruos. I have learned in the school that nobody begins a sentence with the word "während". This word can signify 'while', but also 'in or to the contrary', My sugestion to translate the sentence is:

"But in the contrary, the kind of knowing only is what it can be on the ground of the own self, which itself has to be determined as the Being, to which belongs, naturally, some kind of Offenbarkeit (lightnes or revelation), that (or which), however, can be comprended only in the perspective of the specific mode of being of Dasein (human existence)."

I hope that I could help you
With kind regards
Jakob Hans Josef Schneider (Universidade Federal de Uberlândia, Brazil)

2014-09-29
Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 28
I think it helps to view the full passage:

"Woher kommt es aber, dass diese Argumentation so selbstverständlich erscheint? Das eigene Sein wird primär und einzig gefasst von der Bestimmung, dass es Bewusstsein ist, dass das Ich eine res cogitans ist, oder dass das Wissen als Bewusstsein das Sein dieses allein beschreibt. Während aber die Art des Wissens nur ist, was sie sein kann, auf dem Grunde des eigenen Selbst, was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muss, wozu eine Offenbarkeit freilich gehört, die aber aus der spezifischen Seinsart des Daseins begriffen werden kann."

Taking lots of liberties in order to trans-late it:

"Yet why does this argumentation seem so self-evident? It is because one's own Being is primarily, indeed solely understood according to the definition of it as consciousness, or in other words, because the I is viewed as a res cogitans, or [in yet other words] because [it is assumed that] knowledge qua consciousness alone describes its [knowledge's] Being. Whereas, however, the nature of knowledge only is what it can be on the basis of one's own self, which must itself be defined as Being, to which there belongs, to be sure, a manifestness [or openness] that can [only] be grasped out of Dasein's specific kind of Being."

Best,

Stephen Langfur