Metaphysics and Epistemology
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1 - 20 / 257 2017-01-30Leslie Allan
La Trobe UniversityI've recently rewritten my critique of Alvin Plantinga's persuasive modal version of the argument for the existence of God. I would be pleased for readers to review this draft version and let me know if I've made any basic logical blunders.
In this essay, I uncover both the strengths and weaknesses of Plantinga's argument. I conclude that while the argument is probably formally valid, it is ultimately unsound. I argue that it's only non-analytic premise is not only false, but necessarily so. You can read the draft version of my essay at www.RationalRealm.com/philosophy/metaphysics/plantinga-ontological-argument.html
2017-01-09Can someone explain to me how to make sense of direct realism, more precisely : how can one claim that to perceive is to have direct access to the object itself if we grant that perceiving is the end product of a certain pattern of neurons firing ?
I can understand direct realism on aristotelian grounds where an objective form leaves the object and penetrates the intellect, but if firing neurons are involved, aren't we obliged to say that the brain reconstructs the "thing in itself" ? (I understand also the problems involved with the theory of sense-data and the motivations that originate from physicalism : my question is purely regarding the constraints imposed by basic neurological ideas).Latest replies:
- Alan Charles McKay, 2017-01-18 : I'll try to give a McDowellian answer to your question,It is of course correct that neuronal mechanisms provide a sc... (read more)
- David DiDomenico, 2017-01-18 : Good question. I'm not sure how the underlying neural patterns would be relevant in this debate. For the direct real... (read more)
- James M. Huebner, 2017-01-18 : I think this issue turns on two senses of the way we use the term "objective". In most cases, the term is mean... (read more)
- Robert Sawyer, 2017-01-18 : One way to make sense of direct realism is to place its claims in the context of human life as we ordinarily understand... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2017-02-16 : Direct realism seems to be incomprehensible. I would go with the view that what we call objects are conceptual imputatio... (read more)
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Pedagogical University of KrakowBefore the fact, we know based on what has been written, an example might be knowledge of the law and does not commit crimes because of conceptual knowledge. There it is based on experience already przeżytym but on the intellect, namely on this, what not to do in order not to be convicted of a misdemeanor or felony. Rights can learn to read codes that have warned us about what not to do this in ten same way, we can learn a vocabulary of language, call the prior knowledge, knowledge BEFORE the fact. Hindsight is based on our own experience and others. Drawing on the knowledge of this is written, we draw knowledge from others who have already experienced something, it is passed. Hindsight, IS OUR personal knowledge without relying on prior experience. Knowledge Based on previous experience we can verify and, if I upgrade, so how do scientists when previous experience does not agree with the observations, then seek an explanation and often expand or narrow theories. The prior knowledge IS ... (read more)
2016-11-21The psychule is a proposed model for a fundamental type of event related to mind/sentience/consciousness. The term "psychule" is meant to be analogous to the term "molecule" as the fundamental unit of a substance, except that a psychule is not a substance but an event. I would like to say the proposed model describes the fundamental unit of consciousness (as in the subject line), but for many philosophers the term "consciousness" brings along certain expectations which tend to be missing from the simplest requirements of the model. Similarly with the term "sentience". Therefore I have coined (I think) a new term to describe the fundamental unit. I will then claim that any sentient or conscious event is a psychule, and leave it to future generations to decide whether the definitions of consciousness and sentience should be extended to include each and every psychule.
As mentioned, a psychule is an event. More specifically, a psychule is a pattern recognition type of event. I use th ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Jonathan C. W. Edwards, 2016-12-10 : I see that I have Googled Hoffman before. I am very unimpressed. His theory of combination is an empty muddle as far as... (read more)
- Vycheslav Dianov, 2017-01-18 : All existing versions of the understanding of the Mind can not be reasonable, as they were built on a materialist worldv... (read more)
- James Of Of Seattle, 2017-01-24 : Vycheslav, you said ""materialism... is incapable to explain meaningfully life, the human, thinking, soul, co... (read more)
- Vycheslav Dianov, 2017-01-30 : First, it is desirable to properly understand the soul as a real object in the objective world. Do you agree?
- James Of Of Seattle, 2017-01-30 : I disagree. I see no reason to consider the soul as a real object in the objective world. &*
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2016-10-21What you can think about comes from what you have observed.
You think about angels. What are angels?
An angel can be that sweet person, something that makes you happy, etc. It's an adjective.
If you think of something which you think doesn't exist in the physical world or have not yet observed, the fact that you can think about it, shows that it is a assembly of selected parts of what has already been observed and exists.Latest replies:
- Piotr Grabowski, 2016-11-08 : I could think about something, if i don't see it, buy I have heard about it to think about it, in other case I could... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-11-14 : Terry,&I agree that proof is not the point, especially with regard to that which is "incapable of being seen or per... (read more)
- Terry Klingberg, 2016-11-15 : Devinely put, madame... gracias
- Tami Williams, 2016-11-17 : And thank you. :-).
- Isabel De Assis Ribeiro De Oliveira, 2017-02-10 : Good question. Guess one should not talk abou imagining without some kind of observation of something 'outside'... (read more)
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2016-10-20Is awareness specific to specific parts of an experience?
When we are aware of seeing an apple, are we aware of all other sounds, shapes, tastes, etc which occur simultaneously?Latest replies:
- Douglas Scown, 2016-10-26 : It's difficult, if not impossible these days, to explore questions of consciousness without asking 'what narrati... (read more)
- Thoithoi O'Cottage, 2016-10-26 : Our experience of sensing familiar things (the degrees of familiarity matter) is different in quality and scope of our e... (read more)
independent researcherSome words in my paper:
T(hj|ei)--fuzzy truth function of a predicate hj.
T(hj)--logical probability or average thue-value of a predicate hj.
Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since Logical Probability and Statistical Probability are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The author suggests defining log [1/T(hj)] as testing severity, and T(hj|ei)/T(hj) as verisimilitude. In terms of Likelihood method, P(ei| hi is true)/P(ei) =T(hj|ei)/T(hj) is also called standard likelihood. So, we may say Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) = log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation
If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also define verisimilitude by log [T(hj|ei)/T(hj)].
The figure 8 in the paper shows how positive and negative degrees of believe affect thruthlikeness.Latest replies:
- Chenguang Lu, 2016-10-07 : Logical probability T(hj)=sum i P(xi)T(hj|ei).1/ T(hj) indicates Fallibi lity
- Eray Ozkural, 2017-01-16 : Don't worry about anything Popper said. As far as epistemology goes, his work may be considered pseudoscience. Bette... (read more)
- Aleksandra Samonek, 2017-03-17 : Chenguang Lu, since Popper's original two proposals for defining verisimilitude a lot has been written on the topic... (read more)
2016-10-03In foot note 3 of Daniel Dennett's paper "What RoboMary Knows" https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm, Dennett notes:
Robinson (1993) also claims that I beg the question by not honouring a distinction he declares to exist between knowing "what one would say and how one would react" and knowing "what it is like." If there is such a distinction, it has not yet been articulated and defended, by Robinson or anybody else, so far as I know. If Mary knows everything about what she would say and how she would react, it is far from clear that she wouldn't know what it would be like.
In the paper Dennett imagines RoboMary as follows:
"1.RoboMary is a standard Mark 19 robot, except that she was brought on line without colour vision; her video cameras are black and white, but everything else in her hardware is equipped for colour vision, which is standard in the Mark 19."
Dennett then, it seems to me, considers that RoboMary would consciously experience red when in a simila ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Glenn Spigel, 2017-01-11 : Hi Jo,&I was going to leave the conversation to give us both time to consider the other's opinion, but you have left... (read more)
- Jonathan C. W. Edwards, 2017-01-11 : The concept of knowledge you are assuming here is a pseudo concept that does not and cannot exist. I cover this in my es... (read more)
- Glenn Spigel, 2017-01-12 : Hi Jo,&Well I mentioned the assumption I was making: "There is no assumption of niave realism, just an assumption that y... (read more)
- Jonathan C. W. Edwards, 2017-01-12 : As I said, Glenn, knowing in the sense most people use it is a pseudo concept. Please read what I have written on this i... (read more)
- Glenn Spigel, 2017-01-12 : Hi Jo,&I asked some questions about two specific issues, and I brought up the "knowing" issue, but reworded so... (read more)
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2016-09-27Where is color?
In the observer as a feeling, the observed or in the communique between the two?Latest replies:
- Michael David Kurak, 2016-10-21 : Let's look carefully at your claims. 1. You write: "Something can be objective but become subjective on observa... (read more)
- Pooja Soni, 2016-10-21 : Also within Buddhist philosophy, there is only one thing that exists and that is the universe. It is a whole thing... (read more)
- Michael David Kurak, 2016-10-24 : You like the Pali. I prefer the Sanskrit. I disagree. One can develop a sound intellectual understanding of Pratitya Sam... (read more)
- Mradulla Patel, 2016-10-24 : The nature of aesthetic appreciation takes different forms. On observation if the object calls for the attention from th... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2017-01-16 : Nagarjuna is clear. Nothing really exists and nothing really happens. This comment uncovers the subtleties....."So... (read more)
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2016-09-20Does the Phineas P. Gage case show that there are two types of memory?
One emotional and the other intellectual?
2016-09-06Kant believed that noumena was converted into phenomena, where the information from the senses is an object. By noumena he meant the 'communique' between the observer and the physical world which enables the sensing process.
On the contrary I believe, there is no communique, all there is is sensation. However I believe there is phenomenon first and the product of sensing then becomes stored as memory. Memory of an object gives the object a permanent state. A known object as part of memory is shapeless, colorless, etc having only meaning and is senseless. Knowledge is a collection of 'thing-in-itself'.Latest replies:
- Leonid Fainbetg, 2016-10-03 : No, there is one reality but different people perceive it differently. And the proof is that blind people live and funct... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-03 : How do you know that I exist? You have no direct sensation of me.. all you see are the words on the screen - which... (read more)
- Pooja Soni, 2016-10-26 : To know that you exist, a context must summon my inferring your presence. Similarly an object is viewed or is inferred t... (read more)
- Mradulla Patel, 2016-10-28 : The proposition A = P v Q, and or P&Q identify subjectively existence of something/someone unseen by you, such... (read more)
- Boris Itkin, 2016-11-02 : Dear Pooja, I think, perhaps erroneously, that our memory stores several classes of things related with perception... (read more)
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(1) all atoms in a form that does consciously experience, would behave the same if individually they had the same surroundings in a form which does not.
(2) The reasons for the behaviour would be the same in both cases.
(3) What the form was consciously experiencing is not a reason for any atomic behaviour.
because given (2) the reasons for each atom's behaviour are the same reasons as when in a form that is not consciously experiencing.Latest replies:
- Glenn Spigel, 2016-10-06 : I agree that what we consciously experience is not evidence of a physical world (the film the Matrix touched upon the po... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-18 : How would you respond to the concept that our thoughts are only by-products of the chemical reactions in our brains and... (read more)
- Glenn Spigel, 2016-10-18 : Well with free will, it could be asserted that we do not have free will, but I am not aware of any convincing argument f... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-20 : Thank you. I like this discussion. It's still taking my mind down some very interesting paths - complete... (read more)
- Glenn Spigel, 2016-10-20 : Hi Ian,& Regarding being able to tell that we have free will, I am not suggesting that we can, because I am not suggesti... (read more)
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2016-08-29In two recent papers (Journal of Modern Physics (open access) http://file.scirp.org/pdf/JMP_2016022617412899.pdf, http://file.scirp.org/pdf/JMP_2016082414553470.pdf) I have shown that a fundamentally irreversible world (deduced from a dynamic interpretation of the principle of least action) not only eliminates paradoxes in quantum physics and cosmology, but also leads to maximum entropy production (within the constraints of the systems involved) in self-organized systems. Under such conditions also information systems can self-organize to develop consciousness and mind. Mind can thus be materialistically explained as a higher (self-organized) hierarchy compared to mere computation.
In the second paper I have given three conditions for falsification of this theory. If, on the other hand, they cannot be demonstrated the presently established scientific concept of a fundamentally time invertible, reversible world is shown to be incorrect. This has dramatic consequences for understanding o ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2016-08-30 : Hi Helmut _RE: "__Mind can thus be materialistically explained as a higher (self-organized) hierarchy"._ I use... (read more)
- Helmut Tributsch, 2016-08-31 : Self-organized phenomena are processes which occur far from equilibrium, involve feedback mechanisms and build up... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-09-01 : Hi Helmut Thank you. All of this seems to describe bureaucracies quite well. Which is not surprising, I suppose if... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-09-06 : You are so f***ing profound, Helmut Tiributsch, that I am blown away. I have been studying negative feedback syste... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-09-07 : Feedback to Helmut Tributsch: Part I _ _ Self-organized phenomena are processes which occur far from equilibrium... (read more)
Hebrew University of JerusalemHi,I'm looking for a good book/article that analyzes the concept of continuum (not just in space and time but on the general level, including properties, numbers etc.) and surveys its definitions.
I'll be grateful for your references.
- Benjamin Brown, 2016-09-07 : Dear Bill,Thank you for your reply. (BTW, there is some mess in this website regarding the replies. The system puts the... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2016-09-08 : Benjamin - I don't think this delay should be occurring. Are you signed up as a member, or are your posts being re-r... (read more)
- Benjamin Brown, 2016-09-08 : Dear Peter,Thank you for the essay! I will certainly read it soon.&So far I thought I am a member, but I'll check... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2016-09-23 : Are you still around, Benny? I was hoping you'd comment on that essay and whether you felt it addressed your question.
- Benjamin Brown, 2016-10-24 : Dear Peter, I now see I missed your message, and apologize for that. The article is indeed interesting, but does n... (read more)
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2016-08-08After the publication of this paper, I enjoyed personal communication with Aloysius Martinich and discovered that I misused if and only if in several places of this paper. The corrections are below:
The formula indicates the following:
1. A is relatively identical to the value, but A is not absolutely identical to the value.
2. B is relatively identical to the value, but B is not absolutely identical to the value.
3. The value of A is absolutely identical to the value of B.
4. A is not identical to B.
1. The expression 1 + 3 is relatively identical to the value 4, but 1 + 3 is not absolutely identical to 4.
2. The expression 2 + 2 is relatively identical to the value 4, but 2 + 2 is not absolutely identical to 4.
3. The value of 1 + 3 is absolutely identical to the value of 2 + 2.
4. The expression 1 + 3 is not identical to the expression 2 + 2.
1. The triumvir was relatively identical to Lepidus, but the triumvir was not absolutely identical to Lepidus.
2. The pontifex maximus ... (read more)
Cardiff UniversityTHE INTEGRAL TEXT
I describe a novel textual structure which gave rise to the so-called analytic/continental divide, and which describes the origin and nature of divides in general.
The source of the analytic-continental divide is organizational and not conceptual, the divide arising as a consequence of the structure of the University "text". This structure I refer to as the "integral text". It is a tangible, self-referring structure through which the University stores knowledge and retains influence. (Those who wish to grasp the main conjecture quickly can move straight to the description of the integral text, about half-way through this essay.)
I develop the model of the integral text to describe both the structure through which an interpretive community fixes knowledge within its institutional repository and the way in which this structure restricts and promotes communication and academic influence.The integral text is not itself a body of knowledge, but a single, indivisible structur ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2016-08-26 : Hi John RE: Footnotes and references are not just isolated entries, they cross-link to each other and hence form a strat... (read more)
- John Jones, 2016-08-29 : three points: 1) _Scholars_ may see only the minutiae of the referential protocol that they observe and apply, and fail... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-08-29 : Hi John RE: “Wittgenstein and Frege, for example, failed to acknowledge this superstructure and were admonished because... (read more)
- Tom Anderson, 2017-02-13 : With all due respect to this threads author, I firmly agree with DA's responses. I want only to provide a cursory re... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2017-02-14 : Hi Tom Nice to have your contribution. (I thought this thread had died – as so many do these days. I don’t know what’s h... (read more)
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2016-07-20It seems to me that this work is very much unavailable to students and professionals. Have not found it online in any form, save for a few hardcover editions for more than $500. Crazy.
2016-07-07The real materialism states that "all scientific laws are inherent to the matter itself".
It is these laws that, for billions of years (at least 13) determine the causal evolution of the atomOs (atomOs of Democritos&alii), and thus determines the causal evolution of photons, so the agglomerated material, so the causal evolution of living matter and therefore the causal evolution of human society.
So we can say that the laws of biology are inherent in the laws of physics. They are only summaries of these basic laws.
As a result, physics and biology have a common body of scientific laws - they are what we will call "philosophical laws."
These laws obviously add to the laws of knowledge (epistemological laws)
So we will call "materiological laws" these laws that will add to the "epistemological laws" to form the set of "philosophical laws."
The first materiological laws - so a law common to physics and biology - is the law of transformation quantity quality law.-(LTQQ)
It was discovered by Hegel ... (read more)
2016-06-22Hugh M. Noble
Robert Gordon UniversityI have been following the discussion thread here on the topic of qualia. I was also interested in recent reports about observations made by brain scanning on brains affected by LSD (Carhart-Harris 2016) which seem to show that a great many additional areas of the brain are activated as the test subject experiences vivid drug-induced hallucinations. That seems to suggest that it is not in the nature of the data itself to be of a special kind that contains the information stored in a quale, but rather it is due to the procedure that is interpreting the data. That is analogous, perhaps, to a person, accustomed to reading novels, reading a dictionary by mistake and wondering why the plot seemed so confusing. I accept that the information content of an experience must be stored internally in some form. However, rather than being a replication of something which forms the input to our sensory perceptions, it must instead be a replication of some aspect of the output. A replication of the inp ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2016-06-26 : _RE: " a great many additional areas of the brain are activated as the test subject experiences vivid drug-ind... (read more)
- Jonathan C. W. Edwards, 2016-06-26 : Dear Hugh,I think you are right. Qualia patterns are going to be determined by the output from the collating sensory pat... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-06-27 : RE : “So experiences of tomatoes in my head could be quite different from those in others” E.g. if you like them an... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-06-27 : By the way, Hugh, how do you define “input” and “output” in these cases? You say that “a great many additional area... (read more)
- William J. Letzkus, 2016-06-27 : An interesting observation. I agree completely that the raw quale itself is not stored, but rather the interpretat... (read more)
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