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1 - 20 / 64 2016-11-27Piotr Grabowski
Pedagogical University of KrakowBefore the fact, we know based on what has been written, an example might be knowledge of the law and does not commit crimes because of conceptual knowledge. There it is based on experience already przeżytym but on the intellect, namely on this, what not to do in order not to be convicted of a misdemeanor or felony. Rights can learn to read codes that have warned us about what not to do this in ten same way, we can learn a vocabulary of language, call the prior knowledge, knowledge BEFORE the fact. Hindsight is based on our own experience and others. Drawing on the knowledge of this is written, we draw knowledge from others who have already experienced something, it is passed. Hindsight, IS OUR personal knowledge without relying on prior experience. Knowledge Based on previous experience we can verify and, if I upgrade, so how do scientists when previous experience does not agree with the observations, then seek an explanation and often expand or narrow theories. The prior knowledge IS ... (read more)
2016-10-20Is awareness specific to specific parts of an experience?
When we are aware of seeing an apple, are we aware of all other sounds, shapes, tastes, etc which occur simultaneously?Latest replies:
- Douglas Scown, 2016-10-26 : It's difficult, if not impossible these days, to explore questions of consciousness without asking 'what narrati... (read more)
- Thoithoi O'Cottage, 2016-10-26 : Our experience of sensing familiar things (the degrees of familiarity matter) is different in quality and scope of our e... (read more)
independent researcherSome words in my paper:
T(hj|ei)--fuzzy truth function of a predicate hj.
T(hj)--logical probability or average thue-value of a predicate hj.
Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since Logical Probability and Statistical Probability are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The author suggests defining log [1/T(hj)] as testing severity, and T(hj|ei)/T(hj) as verisimilitude. In terms of Likelihood method, P(ei| hi is true)/P(ei) =T(hj|ei)/T(hj) is also called standard likelihood. So, we may say Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) = log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation
If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also define verisimilitude by log [T(hj|ei)/T(hj)].
The figure 8 in the paper shows how positive and negative degrees of believe affect thruthlikeness.Latest replies:
- Chenguang Lu, 2016-10-07 : Logical probability T(hj)=sum i P(xi)T(hj|ei).1/ T(hj) indicates Fallibi lity
- Eray Ozkural, 2017-01-16 : Don't worry about anything Popper said. As far as epistemology goes, his work may be considered pseudoscience. Bette... (read more)
- Aleksandra Samonek, 2017-03-17 : Chenguang Lu, since Popper's original two proposals for defining verisimilitude a lot has been written on the topic... (read more)
2016-09-27Where is color?
In the observer as a feeling, the observed or in the communique between the two?Latest replies:
- Michael David Kurak, 2016-10-21 : Let's look carefully at your claims. 1. You write: "Something can be objective but become subjective on observa... (read more)
- Pooja Soni, 2016-10-21 : Also within Buddhist philosophy, there is only one thing that exists and that is the universe. It is a whole thing... (read more)
- Michael David Kurak, 2016-10-24 : You like the Pali. I prefer the Sanskrit. I disagree. One can develop a sound intellectual understanding of Pratitya Sam... (read more)
- Mradulla Patel, 2016-10-24 : The nature of aesthetic appreciation takes different forms. On observation if the object calls for the attention from th... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2017-01-16 : Nagarjuna is clear. Nothing really exists and nothing really happens. This comment uncovers the subtleties....."So... (read more)
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2016-09-20Does the Phineas P. Gage case show that there are two types of memory?
One emotional and the other intellectual?
2016-09-06Kant believed that noumena was converted into phenomena, where the information from the senses is an object. By noumena he meant the 'communique' between the observer and the physical world which enables the sensing process.
On the contrary I believe, there is no communique, all there is is sensation. However I believe there is phenomenon first and the product of sensing then becomes stored as memory. Memory of an object gives the object a permanent state. A known object as part of memory is shapeless, colorless, etc having only meaning and is senseless. Knowledge is a collection of 'thing-in-itself'.Latest replies:
- Leonid Fainbetg, 2016-10-03 : No, there is one reality but different people perceive it differently. And the proof is that blind people live and funct... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-03 : How do you know that I exist? You have no direct sensation of me.. all you see are the words on the screen - which... (read more)
- Pooja Soni, 2016-10-26 : To know that you exist, a context must summon my inferring your presence. Similarly an object is viewed or is inferred t... (read more)
- Mradulla Patel, 2016-10-28 : The proposition A = P v Q, and or P&Q identify subjectively existence of something/someone unseen by you, such... (read more)
- Boris Itkin, 2016-11-02 : Dear Pooja, I think, perhaps erroneously, that our memory stores several classes of things related with perception... (read more)
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2016-07-07The real materialism states that "all scientific laws are inherent to the matter itself".
It is these laws that, for billions of years (at least 13) determine the causal evolution of the atomOs (atomOs of Democritos&alii), and thus determines the causal evolution of photons, so the agglomerated material, so the causal evolution of living matter and therefore the causal evolution of human society.
So we can say that the laws of biology are inherent in the laws of physics. They are only summaries of these basic laws.
As a result, physics and biology have a common body of scientific laws - they are what we will call "philosophical laws."
These laws obviously add to the laws of knowledge (epistemological laws)
So we will call "materiological laws" these laws that will add to the "epistemological laws" to form the set of "philosophical laws."
The first materiological laws - so a law common to physics and biology - is the law of transformation quantity quality law.-(LTQQ)
It was discovered by Hegel ... (read more)
University of SydneyIs anyone aware of any philosophical discussions of the following kind of question?
Can you rationally (or justifiably, or without irrationality, or the like) believe that p while also believing that you do not know that p?
Also, what do you think the answer is?Latest replies:
- Anthony Rifkin, 2016-07-13 : What you’ve captured in your description is good, as these are the dynamics involved as we operate as interlocutors. The... (read more)
- Mike Radford, 2016-07-13 : Thanks Anthony. I may have sufficient justification to say that I believe 'x' to be the case. We don't need... (read more)
- Anthony Rifkin, 2016-07-14 : ... and when we are uncertain, we say, "I don't know, but I believe it may be true." Thanks Mike
- Peter G. Jones, 2016-09-30 : My answer to the OP would be no, unless 'believe' means 'strongly favour an hypothesis'.
- Andrew Philip Albers, 2016-10-21 : So belief without knowledge? Two terms that need careful definition before proceeding.
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Queen's University, BelfastMy alarm bells went off seeing mention of Al Qaeda and 9/11 in an abstract from 1999. Turns out the DOI and abstract here are not for Keeley's 1999 paper, but for an SSRN working paper by Sunstein and Vermeule from 2008 (which doesn't seem to have a separate philpapers entry). I can delete the abstract from this entry, but I can't find a way to edit the DOI.
What's the best thing for a user like me to do? I could create another entry with the correct DOI (which is 10.2307/2564659)© over the information from this one, then edit this one to describe the Sunstein and Vermeule paper, but I feel like there's got to be a better way--especially since that would distort the download stats for the two papers.
2016-03-07For your review, discussion, and to provide feedback on this paper I have submitted. Thank you. Tim
University of GlasgowIn epistemology, very little has been said of what can be perceived through the objective world to its objects. This short paper argues that light is a barrier to that world and that direct knowledge of it is not possible.
This is based on general readings only. I don't know if this aspect of epistemology has been discussed already. However, and irrespective of that, it is interesting and does add another dimension to the study of perception.Latest replies:
- Albert Halliday, 2016-02-16 : Sorry I didn't mention this in my last post. Each of the senses has its own, separate, cortex. The visual cortex is... (read more)
- Sergey Ershov, 2016-07-14 : Particles of light photons massless, when photons passing through Higgs field they did not get any mass, but only energy... (read more)
- Dayawansa Chandra Wijeratna, 2016-07-15 : "it receives/processes data from the eyes". Doesn't the eye select what data to send to the visual cortex... (read more)
- Albert Halliday, 2016-07-25 : Yes, I should have used the word 'retina'. Looking is the conscious part of perception - and we choose the objec... (read more)
- Sergey Ershov, 2016-07-26 : _there is possibility that our perception can be distorted in eye itself before reaching the brain. it have been reporte... (read more)
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University of GlasgowI have written a short paper on an issue that I have not come across before. In it I attempt to argue that light waves are an opaque barrier between the eye of the observer and the objective world. And, that light waves prevent direct knowledge of objects in the world. I would be grateful for criticism and responses. BertLatest replies:
- Albert Halliday, 2017-02-24 : Thanks, Eric. I'm not a religious person. Having said that, I think that my paper does make a point. It is true that... (read more)
- Eric Demaree, 2017-02-27 : I agree completely. We all only assume we perceive the objective world. We have faith (not religious faith) in our sense... (read more)
- Albert Halliday, 2017-03-03 : Yes, the - in this case - visual processing system is simply the mechanics. It interprets wavelength into the colour tha... (read more)
- Eric Demaree, 2017-03-06 : Yes, it is probably not the "real" world. However, it'll do for now--until we find something better.
- Albert Halliday, 2017-03-07 : There has always been doubt: whether we can have 'faith' in what we perceive as our only visual world. The hard... (read more)
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University College LondonWhat kind of academic inquiry can best help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible? Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in this question? Is it because most believe the kind of academic inquiry we have today, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knoweldge and technological know-how, is the best that we can have, judged from the perspective of helping humanity make progress towards a better world? Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in arguments which seem to show decisively that inquiry restricted to the pursuit of knowledge is both profoundly irrational, and a menace? The successful pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how, dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, is almost bound to lead to trouble. Scientific knowledge and technological know-how enormously increase our power to act - for some of us at ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2016-10-20 : _Re: while life expectancy among Māori was 298 years old:' _ I'm assuming this is a typo, Ian? _RE: &q... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-21 : Yessss..There does need to be discussion about this, and in indigenous communities it is a group discussion. In ou... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-21 : Yes, a very bad typo... should be 28. Identical to the life expectancy of Paris at the time... Yes, most cul... (read more)
- John Hodgson, 2017-01-07 : _"The scientific approach to ethics, which many here have labelled Eugenics, works well within an Indigenous framew... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2017-01-07 : Hi John RE: There currently seems a strong justification for the notion that humanity often doesn't know what is in... (read more)
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North Carolina State UniversityIf you come across this paper while researching philosophy of love, you should watch this: https://youtu.be/ykxNI137sPk
State University of New York, Buffalo
JOHN CORCORAN AND HASSAN MASOUD, Three-logical-theories redux.
The 1969 paper, “Three logical theories” , considers three logical systems all based on the same interpreted language and having the same semantics.
The first, a logistic system LS, codifies tautologies (logical truths)—using tautological axioms and tautology-preserving rules that are not required to be consequence-preserving.
The second, a consequence system CS, codifies valid premise-conclusion arguments—using tautological axioms and consequence-preserving rules that are not required to be cogency-preserving . A rule is cogency-preserving if in every application the conclusion is known to follow from its premises if the premises are all known to follow from their premises.
The third, a deductive system DS, codifies deductions, or cogent argumentations —using cogency-preserving rules. The derivations in a DS represent deduction: the process by which conclusions are deduced from premises, i. e. the way knowl ... (read more)
Portland State University
The writing describes a new sort of individual, “a delude”. People like Hitler would well fit the description. He was mentally healthy, however overwhelmed by grossly deluded opinions.
Here is the description from the text:
"Even when a person is born possessing a healthy mental state, the familial and environmental assault during childhood with deluded opinions and behavior can be the basis for an individual to develop into a delude, an individual in a deluded mental state. In this writing, the label fool, or imbecile, is sometimes interchangeable with the underlying primary conditions of the delude. A fool is predisposed to accept deluded opinions as true; however, he or she can have an overall good awareness of social norms and laws that he or she learned to comply with. A fool is not, because of his mental condition alone, a villain. In contrast, the delude typically develops overwhelming extreme views. These views can be held as more important than any social or legal consideration ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Ian Stuart, 2015-01-21 : Absolutely.&However there are major issues here. I think, to paraphrase Foucault a little, the centre (norm, socia... (read more)
- Joseph Krecz, 2015-02-07 : Thanks for your response. During years, I gathered a bunch of notes on the unfortunate condition of human nature... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2015-02-17 : Dear Yoji Awesome. I think you are onto something. And it is something important in the contemporary world... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-06-21 : I'm a psychologist (dr of philosophy not dr in philosophy). I find Hitler, like some odd bohemian friends of... (read more)
University of New OrleansHere is an argument against reliabilism. Grateful for comments. Also, is this argument already out there? Wouldn’t be surprised. The argument proceeds in two parts. Here’s part A, an analogy.
1. Suppose I’m imprisoned permanently in a windowless prison cell. However there is a large TV screen. My jailer tells me it shows, by cameras that focus on various events in the world outside, what is really happening.
2. As my life continues I believe that the events on the screen are accurate, but naturally I have doubts–maybe I’m being shown old reruns or computer generated confabulations or...– and I wonder if what I’m seeing is really going on. Sometimes images appear on the screen of how the system itself works–the cameras, their construction, the lens, examples of them capturing events in the world, the way the images are relayed accurately to the screen in my cell...I believe these are accurate but it’s hardly unreasonable to continue to wonder whether what I’m seeing is really going on–th ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Argon Gruber, 2014-01-14 : If we omit your analogy and its being cashed in, we get the argument: "1. I wonder whether I perceive the external world... (read more)
- Argon Gruber, 2014-01-14 : If it is the case that _knowing p__ _does not block rational doubt/wonder, but _knowing that p is known_ does... (read more)
- Argon Gruber, 2014-01-14 : Let me re-work your argument: _1._ I know P. _2._ If I can rationally wonder whether not-P is true, then not-P is e... (read more)
- Alessandro Giordani, 2014-01-14 : Dear Jim, I have developed a reconstruction of your argument. I have subdivided it into two parts, a more formal one and... (read more)
- Jim Stone, 2014-01-15 : Thanks for all these comments. Generally sympathetic. I have just about finished the paper and will send it to a journal... (read more)
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I am unsure if this is the correct forum for this. Kant is famous for asking what the conditions are for the possibility of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason. I think that his answers are more right than not.
How can we apply this question to the phenomenology of Sartre or Heidegger? That is, what, are the conditions for knowledge, if any, for some of the claims in Being and Time and Being and Nothingness. I refer to the assertions about Being, Dasein, Nothingness, authenticity and the terminology therein. I realize that this is a huge and difficult question that is worthy of a book. My reason for asking is to challenge the entire projects of these texts. Their conclusions, after all, are not empirical and little or no evidence is given because that is not the intention, except with Husserl, arguably. Their claims are speculative and perhaps fallacious.
. Would you consider their assertions non-propositional in that no definite truth or falsity can be known? I think Ayer would a ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Albert Halliday, 2015-12-09 : Hi, concerning your earlier response on science. I did not mention the 'philosophy of science' - only that '... (read more)
- Steven Lehar, 2015-12-09 : >&If the Representationalist can view the objective world 'indirectly', how is that possible if they cannot s... (read more)
- Albert Halliday, 2015-12-14 : I stay with my contention that we cannot see the objective world. But, if we could see through that Representation, how... (read more)
- Steven Lehar, 2015-12-15 : The represented world is NOT AT ALL visually identical to the Objective world studied by science! In the first place our... (read more)
- Albert Halliday, 2015-12-16 : It is well understood that the human eye does not have the resolving power of even a small microscope. My argument... (read more)
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Brown UniversityHi Jack,
Nice paper!. However, if I may, I wasn't convinced by your response to objection five. The objection, I take it, is that the intuitions you are marshaling about incoherence derive from a non-moral standpoint, that is, they are intuitions that arise when one is doing metaethics and not when one is actually moralizing. And it seems undeniable that Moore paradoxical sentences are straightforwardly bizarre when uttered by persons in the context of actual moralizing (just imagine actually having the relevant conversation). At the outset of your paper, you correctly note that expressivism is a theory about actual moralizing, so it seems like this is one objection to which you should be very sensitive. You respond:
This is not really a rejection of C3, but a rejection of C1, since it admits that it is not always the case that affective or conative attitudes are expressed by moral assertions. If non-cognitive mental states are only sometimes expressed by moral assertions, then the clai ... (read more)
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneYour article is very interesting.
In the same spirit I propose a more modal formalism to speak about "true announcements" and "learning" : http://philpapers.org/rec/MARFPS
This representation allow to make the difference between a world before and after the learning act. Then it becomes easier to deal with expression about knowledge and learning.
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