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1 - 20 / 44 2016-10-05Chenguang Lu
independent researcherSome words in my paper:
T(hj|ei)--fuzzy truth function of a predicate hj.
T(hj)--logical probability or average thue-value of a predicate hj.
Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since Logical Probability and Statistical Probability are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The author suggests defining log [1/T(hj)] as testing severity, and T(hj|ei)/T(hj) as verisimilitude. In terms of Likelihood method, P(ei| hi is true)/P(ei) =T(hj|ei)/T(hj) is also called standard likelihood. So, we may say Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) = log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation
If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also define verisimilitude by log [T(hj|ei)/T(hj)].
The figure 8 in the paper shows how positive and negative degrees of believe affect thruthlikeness.Latest replies:
- Chenguang Lu, 2016-10-07 : Logical probability T(hj)=sum i P(xi)T(hj|ei).1/ T(hj) indicates Fallibi lity
- Eray Ozkural, 2017-01-16 : Don't worry about anything Popper said. As far as epistemology goes, his work may be considered pseudoscience. Bette... (read more)
- Aleksandra Samonek, 2017-03-17 : Chenguang Lu, since Popper's original two proposals for defining verisimilitude a lot has been written on the topic... (read more)
Hebrew University of JerusalemHi,I'm looking for a good book/article that analyzes the concept of continuum (not just in space and time but on the general level, including properties, numbers etc.) and surveys its definitions.
I'll be grateful for your references.
- Benjamin Brown, 2016-09-07 : Dear Bill,Thank you for your reply. (BTW, there is some mess in this website regarding the replies. The system puts the... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2016-09-08 : Benjamin - I don't think this delay should be occurring. Are you signed up as a member, or are your posts being re-r... (read more)
- Benjamin Brown, 2016-09-08 : Dear Peter,Thank you for the essay! I will certainly read it soon.&So far I thought I am a member, but I'll check... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2016-09-23 : Are you still around, Benny? I was hoping you'd comment on that essay and whether you felt it addressed your question.
- Benjamin Brown, 2016-10-24 : Dear Peter, I now see I missed your message, and apologize for that. The article is indeed interesting, but does n... (read more)
- 22 more ..
2016-08-08After the publication of this paper, I enjoyed personal communication with Aloysius Martinich and discovered that I misused if and only if in several places of this paper. The corrections are below:
The formula indicates the following:
1. A is relatively identical to the value, but A is not absolutely identical to the value.
2. B is relatively identical to the value, but B is not absolutely identical to the value.
3. The value of A is absolutely identical to the value of B.
4. A is not identical to B.
1. The expression 1 + 3 is relatively identical to the value 4, but 1 + 3 is not absolutely identical to 4.
2. The expression 2 + 2 is relatively identical to the value 4, but 2 + 2 is not absolutely identical to 4.
3. The value of 1 + 3 is absolutely identical to the value of 2 + 2.
4. The expression 1 + 3 is not identical to the expression 2 + 2.
1. The triumvir was relatively identical to Lepidus, but the triumvir was not absolutely identical to Lepidus.
2. The pontifex maximus ... (read more)
2016-07-20It seems to me that this work is very much unavailable to students and professionals. Have not found it online in any form, save for a few hardcover editions for more than $500. Crazy.
Portland State UniversityCan you share your opinion?
University of SydneyI am currently studying objections to modal realism for a section of something I'm writing, and am wondering if people can help me with questions about two related objections which seem important to me. My questions are: are there existing sources for these objections, and if so, what are they?
Reality as a whole could have been different
One objection I would like to find more sources for is the idea that reality as a whole (in the most unrestricted sense) could have been different. Lewis's modal realism leads to the conclusion that the whole system of worlds is the way it is necessarily, but intuitively reality as a whole could have been different, so this is a mark against the theory.
I have found one source for this objection - Williamson's 'Necessary Existents', where he says:
'Even if there are mutually disconnected spatiotemporal systems such as Lewis postulates, they are not the distinctive subject matter of modal discourse. They are simply more of what there is, about which we ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Edward Freeman, 2015-06-29 : Here is food for thought, Tristan. _Ex hypothesi_, Modal Reality (as it is conceived by a modal realist... (read more)
- Anthony Dardis, 2015-07-06 : Hi Tristan, A couple of sources: Takashi Yagasawa _Worlds and Individuals: Possible and Otherwise _Oxford 2010 _ _Sam Co... (read more)
- Martin Vacek, 2015-07-27 : I recommend also John Divers's "A Genuine Realist Theory of Advanced Modalising", although Sam Cowling dis... (read more)
- Tristan Haze, 2015-08-12 : Thanks very much for all these responses and references!
- Greg P. Hodes, 2016-09-08 : I am very interested in this problem, but tied up with other commitments. Do keep me informed about your progress. Perha... (read more)
- 5 more ..
2015-02-19Kristin M. Mickelson
University of GothenburgIf you have any questions or comments on "The Zygote Argument is Invalid", I would enjoy discussing them on this thread!
University of EdinburghI would like to know where I can find arguments in favor of the assertion: that there are no first causes, and that there are no things that do not change. Maybe some work of Dr McZed, or if you want to contribute some ideas in favour or against the mentioned assertion, it would be great.Latest replies:
- Albert Halliday, 2015-05-28 : Eetu, In responding to your line that 'if we believe that there exists some changing things', it seemed natural... (read more)
- Eetu Pikkarainen, 2015-06-15 : Albert, Sorry for delay and my English.By an existential clause I mean an existeA: "There exists X, for which it is... (read more)
- Jack McNally, 2015-06-22 : You can lead a scholar to logic, but you can't make it think.
- Karime Bargi, 2015-07-27 : Hi Villacres. I think that you first define what you mean by word cause in your passage. One sense of cause is that what... (read more)
- James Harrod, 2016-08-29 : This is an assertion discussed extensively in Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism. In Vajrayana there are two truths: (a) th... (read more)
- 12 more ..
2015-02-01Terence Rajivan Edward
University of ManchesterI have noticed a small literature on Okin's objection to libertarianism. But I question whether this should be discussed under the heading of "Okin's objection". A very similar objection has been around for centuries by Robert Filmer, which the author briefly mentions but does not present. Filmer's objection is now discussed under the heading of the paradox of self-ownership.
It says that, given common knowledge, we cannot endorse both these propositions, which are essential to (standard?) libertarianism:
(1) Each person owns themselves.
(2) Each person owns the products of their labour.
According to Filmer, a person is the product of their parents' labour so they do not own themselves by (2).
Okin's version says that a person is the product of their mother's labour so they do not own themselves. (It seems she does not give a male parent even 0.000001% labour contribution.)
If the focus is mainly on whether a libertarian can say that individuals are self-owners, I feel it is unfair to discus ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Terence Rajivan Edward, 2015-02-04 : Um, a correction, the history is way more complicated than I thought. I looked at the sources and it seems that Robert F... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2015-03-09 : As a long-time Anarchist (or libertarian communist) I find the concept of ownership problematic enough without rai... (read more)
Hokkaido UniversityI was often thinking about the thread title question while I worked on the ontology of artworks such as a piece of drama or music. Some philosophers show a positive response to the type view of artworks according to which an artwork is a type and its performances are the tokens. (By the word of "type", here I mean an entity that can have its example(s) like universal.)
What about fictional characters then?
I, at first thought, tended to support the particular view of characters.
Yet the type view may be a more plausible position for some reasons.
One of them can be understood easily when you look at the case that many actors have ever played the role of Hamlet in their own ways. It may be natural that their performances are considered as tokens of the Hamlet-type.
Besides, trademark protection for fictional characters like Disney's may imply the idea that they are types. They seem to think the characters have their tokens, and then to prevent a third party from producing some token ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Thor Olsen, 2014-12-16 : Hi again,I have a doctoral degree in Philosophy from Tromsø, Norway: Doctor Philosophiae, University of Tromsø, Tromsø... (read more)
- Thor Olsen, 2014-12-16 : Hi,This is a correction: My degree is Doctor Philosophiae in Philosophy, and not Doctor Philosophia in Philosopy. Sincer... (read more)
- Thor Olsen, 2014-12-16 : To talk about fictional characters as types, which tokens, isn't, in my mind, a stright forward question. Let me exp... (read more)
- Fabian Ascencio, 2014-12-16 : Well, there are both type and token in my opinion. Of course, there are particular instances that make every moment or p... (read more)
- Thor Olsen, 2014-12-16 : I have already written my answer. Sincerely, Thor Olav Olsen. Doctor Philosophiae in Philosophy.
- 2 more ..
Université du Québec à Montréal
University of Southampton(1) That sentient life will one day come to an end is no solace for those sentients existing and suffering today.
(2) Whether it is better to have been or not to have been is a Cartesian koan I can ponder concrerning myself, but not one I have a right to decide concerning another sentient that is or has been; all the less right have I to create or support the creation of another sentient, out of nothing.
(3) Pain and pleasure are incommensurable; only pain is pertinent to moral musings like these: No number of orgasms (for me) compensates for one fallen sparrow; and, again, the sparrow’s pains or solaces are not for me to weigh -- for the sparrow.
(4) Christianity is particularly self-righteous and presumptuous on such questions, always ready to sanction temporal risk and suffering for the bodies of others for the salvation of their immaterial, immortal souls, sub specie aeternitatis.Latest replies:
- Stevan Harnad, 2014-05-18 : _Revision:_ (1) That sentient life will one day come to an end is no solace for those sentients existing (2) Whether it... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2014-06-11 : Hi Steve Interesting thoughts.Couple of brief comments: RE: That sentient life will one day come to an end is no solace... (read more)
Brown UniversityHi Jack,
Nice paper!. However, if I may, I wasn't convinced by your response to objection five. The objection, I take it, is that the intuitions you are marshaling about incoherence derive from a non-moral standpoint, that is, they are intuitions that arise when one is doing metaethics and not when one is actually moralizing. And it seems undeniable that Moore paradoxical sentences are straightforwardly bizarre when uttered by persons in the context of actual moralizing (just imagine actually having the relevant conversation). At the outset of your paper, you correctly note that expressivism is a theory about actual moralizing, so it seems like this is one objection to which you should be very sensitive. You respond:
This is not really a rejection of C3, but a rejection of C1, since it admits that it is not always the case that affective or conative attitudes are expressed by moral assertions. If non-cognitive mental states are only sometimes expressed by moral assertions, then the clai ... (read more)
University of ZürichHallo
I am interested in further arguments pro and in objections contra my distinction between world and culture.
Sincerely Erwin Sonderegger
University of Central Oklahoma
University of OklahomaAll comments are welcome!Latest replies:
- Jim Stone, 2013-08-08 : A note to say that I will get to this paper shortly. Thanks for posting, Jim
- Andrew Russo, 2013-08-09 : Thanks Jim. You're very kind to look at the paper again. Please feel no obligation.
- Jim Stone, 2013-08-09 : Some comments, very much tentative and for The writing in the first part is very good–simple, lucid, forceful. The paper... (read more)
- Andrew Russo, 2013-08-09 : These are great comments and quite helpful for focusing on getting the paper accepted by a journal. Thanks again f... (read more)
- Jim Stone, 2013-08-09 : Thanks for letting me read it, Jim
University of Central Oklahoma
University of OklahomaHere's the place to be critical! Anything that can help me develop this argument is much appreciated. This is something I develop a bit in my dissertation and the hope is to develop it more here and eventually have something worthy of publication.Latest replies:
- Jim Stone, 2013-06-23 : Here are some comments. Thanks for t 1. It will help your reader to say early on what nonreductive physicalism is, and w... (read more)
- Adrian Alba, 2013-06-24 : I just wanted to say first and foremost before I go any further that I am not a Professor of Philosophy nor have I ever... (read more)
- Andrew Russo, 2013-06-24 : First of all, thanks for taking the time to read my paper and provide me with comments. This is what I hoped would... (read more)
- Andrew Russo, 2013-06-24 : Thank you for reading my paper and commenting on it. Whatever comments you give, whether or not they are from some... (read more)
- Jim Stone, 2013-06-24 : Thanks for answering. The dialectic between us is for me now a little complicated. I follow this protocol in commenting... (read more)
Brown UniversityHi Professor Demetriou,
I've just read the draft of your paper, and I really enjoyed it, especially the bits where you complicate the somewhat simplistic just-so cultural-evolutionary story provided by Ross and Nisbett. One rarely sees such deep engagement with actual anthropological data in moral-philosophical papers about disagreement, and I think your reflections here are a valuable contribution to this literature.
However, I have a question about the "pluralism" that is on offer, which is "a view urging the moral correctness of multiple and mutually irreducible comprehensive ethical outlooks , each suited to its own dimension of social life ." A familiar worry emerges here, which is that you are covertly drawing on a kind of monism which serves to make each of the competing moral systems appear attractive. The trouble begins with the word "suited": what does it mean to say that a moral outlook is "suited" t ... (read more)
2013-03-25Richard Y. Chappell
University of YorkFor anyone interested, I've written up a brief critique of this paper at Philosophy, et cetera.
2012-11-12I am delighted that someone of Kitcher's ability has tackled the meta-ethical implications of understanding morality as an evolutionary adaptation. Further, Christine Clavien has advanced that good cause by providing an inspiringly insightful and clear review of important implications of his work.
However, the science of the matter actually supports a much stronger hypothesis than Kitcher's "morality evolved to overcome altruism failures".That stronger hypothesis may have different meta-ethical implications.
Relevant criteria for scientific truth regarding morality as an evolutionary adaptation Include explanatory power for descriptive facts and puzzles, no contradiction with known facts, simplicity, and integration with the rest of science. By these criteria, a superior hypothesis can be stated as "morality overcomes a universal cooperation-exploitation dilemma by motivating or advocating altruistic cooperation strategies". That is, morality is composed of assemblies of biolog ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Kevin Corbett, 2013-01-11 : It remains to be seen that the concept of ethics is "intrinsically bound" to concept of altruism. In order for... (read more)
- Reid A. Ashbaucher, 2013-02-01 : I can appreciate this conversation which focuses on the question of morality. It's interesting to me how same approa... (read more)
- Kevin Corbett, 2013-02-24 : Even if it is the case that morality is deontological and derives from God, natural selection is basically an establishe... (read more)
2012-08-08Excellent paper first and foremost Mr. MacLeod! As I was reading your thoughts on plurality and the nature of the individual conscious, it made me think of the ideal of Solipsism. For those who don't know, Solipsism is defined as: The view or theory that the self is all that can be known to exist. Would you say that your case for a plurality of consciousness "immediately present." defeats the ideal of a Solipsistic Philosophy?Latest replies:
- Daniel Davis, 2012-08-11 : I haven't seen the paper you refer to by Mr. MacLeod but was interested in your explanation of solipsism "for t... (read more)
- Adrian Alba, 2012-08-12 : Forgive me, I merely meant anyone who was unfamiliar with the term and I got the straight to the dictionary definition... (read more)
- Daniel Davis, 2012-08-12 : I just meant, if Solipsism is true, there are no "others" with whom to discourse.
- Adrian Alba, 2012-08-19 : Ahhh, now I understand you Mr. Davis. For in Solipsism, my reality is the only true reality and anyone else is merely a... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2013-01-11 : If solipsism was demonstrably absurd then it would be falsifiable. It is not absurd, but just difficult to wea... (read more)
2011-09-10Richard Y. Chappell
University of YorkI couldn't find Tim's email so am instead posting here a link to my critical discussion of his paper (which may also be of interest to other readers):
Moral Judgments, 2Dism, and Attitudinal Commitments.
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