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1 - 20 / 136 2017-01-09Can someone explain to me how to make sense of direct realism, more precisely : how can one claim that to perceive is to have direct access to the object itself if we grant that perceiving is the end product of a certain pattern of neurons firing ?
I can understand direct realism on aristotelian grounds where an objective form leaves the object and penetrates the intellect, but if firing neurons are involved, aren't we obliged to say that the brain reconstructs the "thing in itself" ? (I understand also the problems involved with the theory of sense-data and the motivations that originate from physicalism : my question is purely regarding the constraints imposed by basic neurological ideas).Latest replies:
- Alan Charles McKay, 2017-01-18 : I'll try to give a McDowellian answer to your question,It is of course correct that neuronal mechanisms provide a sc... (read more)
- David DiDomenico, 2017-01-18 : Good question. I'm not sure how the underlying neural patterns would be relevant in this debate. For the direct real... (read more)
- James M. Huebner, 2017-01-18 : I think this issue turns on two senses of the way we use the term "objective". In most cases, the term is mean... (read more)
- Robert Sawyer, 2017-01-18 : One way to make sense of direct realism is to place its claims in the context of human life as we ordinarily understand... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2017-02-16 : Direct realism seems to be incomprehensible. I would go with the view that what we call objects are conceptual imputatio... (read more)
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2016-11-21The psychule is a proposed model for a fundamental type of event related to mind/sentience/consciousness. The term "psychule" is meant to be analogous to the term "molecule" as the fundamental unit of a substance, except that a psychule is not a substance but an event. I would like to say the proposed model describes the fundamental unit of consciousness (as in the subject line), but for many philosophers the term "consciousness" brings along certain expectations which tend to be missing from the simplest requirements of the model. Similarly with the term "sentience". Therefore I have coined (I think) a new term to describe the fundamental unit. I will then claim that any sentient or conscious event is a psychule, and leave it to future generations to decide whether the definitions of consciousness and sentience should be extended to include each and every psychule.
As mentioned, a psychule is an event. More specifically, a psychule is a pattern recognition type of event. I use th ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-12-10 : I see that I have Googled Hoffman before. I am very unimpressed. His theory of combination is an empty muddle as far as... (read more)
- Vycheslav Dianov, 2017-01-18 : All existing versions of the understanding of the Mind can not be reasonable, as they were built on a materialist worldv... (read more)
- James Of Seattle, 2017-01-24 : Vycheslav, you said ""materialism... is incapable to explain meaningfully life, the human, thinking, soul, co... (read more)
- Vycheslav Dianov, 2017-01-30 : First, it is desirable to properly understand the soul as a real object in the objective world. Do you agree?
- James Of Seattle, 2017-01-30 : I disagree. I see no reason to consider the soul as a real object in the objective world. &*
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independent researcherSome words in my paper:
T(hj|ei)--fuzzy truth function of a predicate hj.
T(hj)--logical probability or average thue-value of a predicate hj.
Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since Logical Probability and Statistical Probability are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The author suggests defining log [1/T(hj)] as testing severity, and T(hj|ei)/T(hj) as verisimilitude. In terms of Likelihood method, P(ei| hi is true)/P(ei) =T(hj|ei)/T(hj) is also called standard likelihood. So, we may say Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) = log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation
If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also define verisimilitude by log [T(hj|ei)/T(hj)].
The figure 8 in the paper shows how positive and negative degrees of believe affect thruthlikeness.Latest replies:
- Chenguang Lu, 2016-10-07 : Logical probability T(hj)=sum i P(xi)T(hj|ei).1/ T(hj) indicates Fallibi lity
- Eray Ozkural, 2017-01-16 : Don't worry about anything Popper said. As far as epistemology goes, his work may be considered pseudoscience. Bette... (read more)
- Aleksandra Samonek, 2017-03-17 : Chenguang Lu, since Popper's original two proposals for defining verisimilitude a lot has been written on the topic... (read more)
2016-10-03In foot note 3 of Daniel Dennett's paper "What RoboMary Knows" https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm, Dennett notes:
Robinson (1993) also claims that I beg the question by not honouring a distinction he declares to exist between knowing "what one would say and how one would react" and knowing "what it is like." If there is such a distinction, it has not yet been articulated and defended, by Robinson or anybody else, so far as I know. If Mary knows everything about what she would say and how she would react, it is far from clear that she wouldn't know what it would be like.
In the paper Dennett imagines RoboMary as follows:
"1.RoboMary is a standard Mark 19 robot, except that she was brought on line without colour vision; her video cameras are black and white, but everything else in her hardware is equipped for colour vision, which is standard in the Mark 19."
Dennett then, it seems to me, considers that RoboMary would consciously experience red when in a simila ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Glenn Spigel, 2017-01-11 : Hi Jo,&I was going to leave the conversation to give us both time to consider the other's opinion, but you have left... (read more)
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2017-01-11 : The concept of knowledge you are assuming here is a pseudo concept that does not and cannot exist. I cover this in my es... (read more)
- Glenn Spigel, 2017-01-12 : Hi Jo,&Well I mentioned the assumption I was making: "There is no assumption of niave realism, just an assumption that y... (read more)
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2017-01-12 : As I said, Glenn, knowing in the sense most people use it is a pseudo concept. Please read what I have written on this i... (read more)
- Glenn Spigel, 2017-01-12 : Hi Jo,&I asked some questions about two specific issues, and I brought up the "knowing" issue, but reworded so... (read more)
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(1) all atoms in a form that does consciously experience, would behave the same if individually they had the same surroundings in a form which does not.
(2) The reasons for the behaviour would be the same in both cases.
(3) What the form was consciously experiencing is not a reason for any atomic behaviour.
because given (2) the reasons for each atom's behaviour are the same reasons as when in a form that is not consciously experiencing.Latest replies:
- Glenn Spigel, 2016-10-06 : I agree that what we consciously experience is not evidence of a physical world (the film the Matrix touched upon the po... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-18 : How would you respond to the concept that our thoughts are only by-products of the chemical reactions in our brains and... (read more)
- Glenn Spigel, 2016-10-18 : Well with free will, it could be asserted that we do not have free will, but I am not aware of any convincing argument f... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-20 : Thank you. I like this discussion. It's still taking my mind down some very interesting paths - complete... (read more)
- Glenn Spigel, 2016-10-20 : Hi Ian,& Regarding being able to tell that we have free will, I am not suggesting that we can, because I am not suggesti... (read more)
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2016-08-29In two recent papers (Journal of Modern Physics (open access) http://file.scirp.org/pdf/JMP_2016022617412899.pdf, http://file.scirp.org/pdf/JMP_2016082414553470.pdf) I have shown that a fundamentally irreversible world (deduced from a dynamic interpretation of the principle of least action) not only eliminates paradoxes in quantum physics and cosmology, but also leads to maximum entropy production (within the constraints of the systems involved) in self-organized systems. Under such conditions also information systems can self-organize to develop consciousness and mind. Mind can thus be materialistically explained as a higher (self-organized) hierarchy compared to mere computation.
In the second paper I have given three conditions for falsification of this theory. If, on the other hand, they cannot be demonstrated the presently established scientific concept of a fundamentally time invertible, reversible world is shown to be incorrect. This has dramatic consequences for understanding o ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2016-08-30 : Hi Helmut _RE: "__Mind can thus be materialistically explained as a higher (self-organized) hierarchy"._ I use... (read more)
- Helmut Tributsch, 2016-08-31 : Self-organized phenomena are processes which occur far from equilibrium, involve feedback mechanisms and build up... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-09-01 : Hi Helmut Thank you. All of this seems to describe bureaucracies quite well. Which is not surprising, I suppose if... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-09-06 : You are so f***ing profound, Helmut Tiributsch, that I am blown away. I have been studying negative feedback syste... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-09-07 : Feedback to Helmut Tributsch: Part I _ _ Self-organized phenomena are processes which occur far from equilibrium... (read more)
2016-07-20It seems to me that this work is very much unavailable to students and professionals. Have not found it online in any form, save for a few hardcover editions for more than $500. Crazy.
2016-06-22Hugh M Noble
Robert Gordon UniversityI have been following the discussion thread here on the topic of qualia. I was also interested in recent reports about observations made by brain scanning on brains affected by LSD (Carhart-Harris 2016) which seem to show that a great many additional areas of the brain are activated as the test subject experiences vivid drug-induced hallucinations. That seems to suggest that it is not in the nature of the data itself to be of a special kind that contains the information stored in a quale, but rather it is due to the procedure that is interpreting the data. That is analogous, perhaps, to a person, accustomed to reading novels, reading a dictionary by mistake and wondering why the plot seemed so confusing. I accept that the information content of an experience must be stored internally in some form. However, rather than being a replication of something which forms the input to our sensory perceptions, it must instead be a replication of some aspect of the output. A replication of the inp ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2016-06-26 : _RE: " a great many additional areas of the brain are activated as the test subject experiences vivid drug-ind... (read more)
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-06-26 : Dear Hugh,I think you are right. Qualia patterns are going to be determined by the output from the collating sensory pat... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-06-27 : RE : “So experiences of tomatoes in my head could be quite different from those in others” E.g. if you like them an... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-06-27 : By the way, Hugh, how do you define “input” and “output” in these cases? You say that “a great many additional area... (read more)
- William J. Letzkus, 2016-06-27 : An interesting observation. I agree completely that the raw quale itself is not stored, but rather the interpretat... (read more)
I'd love some feedback on my prediction that we can "detect" qualia, simply by qualitatively interpreting correctly what we are observing. I also describe, or at least predict, why we are currently "qualia blind" when we interpret things the "intuitive" way.
- Derek Allan, 2016-06-25 : RE: “My definition is likely to be unfamiliar to the masses… » Ah yes, the great unwashed, the riff raff, the hoi p... (read more)
- Brent Allsop, 2016-06-27 : Hi Jo, I wish I could understand more of your model. My examples, mostly using chemical events and neurotransmitte... (read more)
- Brent Allsop, 2016-07-04 : If you still don't have the faintest idea, maybe you can help me understand your model and how you think about consc... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-07-05 : _Hi Brent_ _RE: "..an elemental quality like redness..."_ It always amuses me that philosophers so often take... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-07-05 : I am still contemplating your post and would like to respond more comprehensively later, but.... How can knowing be unid... (read more)
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Technische Universität Chemnitz-Zwickau
In a recent article “From Sexuality to Eroticism: The Making of The Human Mind” http://www.scirp.org/journal/AA/ I have tried to describe and to explain the uniqueness of human consciousness in the light of our unusual erotic experience. Eroticism is difficult to define as it is close to sexuality and at the same time transforming it into spiritual issues. Unfortunately, my Eroticism-hypothesis is often identified with Freud’s pansexual position. Instead, I am aware of the fact that sexual exploits take only a small part in human life-history. Nevertheless I am pleading for a structural or formal analogy between the erotic and the function of human consciousness. Both show a curious ambiguity in the experience of the outer and the inner world, combining reality and appearance. The interference of physical experience and emotional imagination distances the human mind from mere animal awareness---a difference that is not merely gradual but qualitative.
Evolutionary biologists do not like ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Mark Titus, 2016-07-26 : Re: "...most physicists could give plausible definitions for proton, neutron, electron, and Higgs boson..." Th... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-07-26 : Hi Mark RE: That’s not the question. The question is whether the physicist has a definition of "physical" whic... (read more)
- Ferdinand Fellmann, 2016-07-27 : I am talking about being "omniscient like God", because I consider it to be the backside or ground of your agn... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-07-27 : Hi Ferdinand_ _ RE: You hold that nothing is known of the existence of consciousness or of anything beyond material... (read more)
- Ferdinand Fellmann, 2016-07-31 : Hi Derek, I think significant advances in the philosophy of consciousness have been made in the last decades by Foucault... (read more)
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Portland State UniversityCan you share your opinion?
2016-05-24In https://arcturantimes.wordpress.com/2016/04/16/consciousness-from-the-bottom-up-speculation-on-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-and-qualia-2-leaning-on-the-premise/, I try out a speculative way through the hard problem of consciousness and dealing with qualia. It's very incomplete and tentative, but I'd appreciate any feedback or criticisms.
Basically, I take Chalmers's idea of consciousness as a fundamental property, but instead of seeing it as a high-level, emergent property arising from complex information processing, I consider that it might be a low-level input into the full, constructed mind. Specifically, I suggest the qualia might be the direct (not mediated) experience of individual, or small groups of, cells.
Of course, this would push the qualia/consciousness mystery down to the cellular level, but at least it could help explain what is happening in the brain at higher levels of organization!Latest replies:
- Ethan Jordan, 2016-06-26 : Jonathan - I think you misunderstand somewhat what I meant. I do see selfhood as an illusion but I think of it mostly as... (read more)
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-06-26 : Dear Ethan,OK, so the self excludes consciousness, and is purely an operational, cognitive or computational concept? Tha... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-06-27 : I didn't read all of either Ethan or Jonathan's posts, just to be transparent. Frankly I got bored, not to... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-06-27 : I don't know that my previous post will be accepted as I don't have Pro status here but wanted to add something... (read more)
- Leonid Fainbetg, 2016-07-28 : http://rationalargumentator.com/issue113/phylogenesis.html
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2016-04-24Terence Rajivan Edward
University of ManchesterI told this philosophy joke to some friends, and they think I should tell it to philosophers, but I wonder whether it is already known. Just in case not:
How many homunculi does it take to change a lightbulb?
An infinite number, getting smaller and smaller.Latest replies:
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-05-22 : I guess my thought is that if philosophers need 'theories' to cover something as obvious as the idea that if you... (read more)
- Mark Pharoah, 2016-05-24 : Jonathan,So... you say it's the "dynamic units" (presumably these are the components of the system) that d... (read more)
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-06-04 : Dear Mark,I do not see why it 'begs the question' it simply poses the question. And presumably the answer has so... (read more)
- Mark Pharoah, 2016-06-06 : Jonathan: "And presumably the answer has something to do with the physical dynamics involved"Well, _of course... (read more)
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-06-06 : What more than a correlative link are you looking for Mark? Maybe a 'mechanism' but at some point we want to sto... (read more)
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Birkbeck CollegeIf you have any thoughts, comments or questions about this paper, let me know!Latest replies:
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-04-16 : Dear Michael,What your paper appears to be exposing is that once one tries to analyse concepts such as freedom and agenc... (read more)
- Hachem El Ouggouti, 2016-05-24 : I have tried to read your text about inner freedom, but I have to admit that I gave up after a couple of pages. It sound... (read more)
Bilkent UniversityConcerning his recent paper I agree almost 100% but I am more receptive to IIT than Curello. I am arguing in a new paper that it addresses some aspects of consciousness, but not all.
The main problem that Tononi and Koch seem entirely unaware of is that a theory of consciousness that does not address intelligence cannot be a theory of consciousness at all.
Eray Ozkural, PhDLatest replies:
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-05-18 : OK, so by 'of' you do not mean 'about', but what does this of amount to then, other than giving a name... (read more)
- Enrique Aramendia, 2016-05-20 : Let me do some further effort towards the distintion between single and double typed theories. First, double typed theor... (read more)
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-05-20 : Thanks Enrique,Your comments are intriguing but I cannot grasp the arguments quite. Your double type theory seems to use... (read more)
- Bernie Ranson, 2016-05-24 : You wrote: OK, so by 'of' you do not mean 'about', but what does this of amount to then, other than givi... (read more)
- Enrique Aramendia, 2016-05-24 : By reticular theories I am just refering to pre-Waldeyer's Neuron Doctrine approaches, that is, theories which posed... (read more)
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Some people are dualists and some are materialists, but for some reason they can't convince each other, they always seem to be talking past each other, so what is going on?
Here is what is going on: The only information that our brains (we) receive from outside are electrical pulses from our sensory nerves, these pulses are not random, they carry very complicated mathematical patterns, you would expect that we would be completely overwhelmed if we tried to find and track these patterns, but fortunately we have customized - less conscious - brain features that help us and this results in new sensations that we can understand, like pictures and sounds and our sense of space and time in general, but this sub conscious help comes at a price, because we forget that they are just mathematical patterns and we start making stupid assumptions e.g. a force field is more mysterious then a rock i.e. a rock is a "thing" and a magnetic field is not, or that rel ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Leibel Morosow, 2016-02-27 : Hi Jack, I don't believe in panpsychisim for several reasons, 1) how and why does the "conscious"... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-03-26 : Still waiting for someone to say what they think the "hard problem" _is_... DA.
- Charles Dyer, 2016-04-06 : Features (see Treisman) are special types of universal perceptual patterns. Our neurons, both surface sensors and intern... (read more)
- Roger Sousa, 2016-04-06 : When I hear or when I am asked what is the "hard problem of consciousness" I summarize it as simply but of cou... (read more)
- Roger Sousa, 2016-04-06 : Before asking my question, to confirm if..."we forget that they are just mathematical patterns" and further to... (read more)
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Università degli Studi di Siena
Hi everybody, Hi philosophy of mind lovers!
In the beginning, I am very grateful for reading this new thread. The question is as follows,but I suppose before that, I give a brief explanation of my background. I entered to the realm of western philosophy especially with concentration on mind issues around 2 years before. In fact, my main background in philosophy comes from an eastern philosophy (especially Sufism). That`s why most of articles I submit to the conferences and journal about mind based on eastern philosophy are rejected in the west !!! (No problem! This is life!)
In any case, I passed a cumbersome path to reach in a level of analytical philosophy that I understand somehow what is going on here. So, for me, it is the time to choose a topic for my thesis in philosophy of mind. My professors have proposed me some topics, but I ask you here based on your strong background in philosophy of mind: which topic do you recommend to me to start? Which topic is the most challenging iss ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Peter G. Jones, 2016-01-25 : I cannot know what interests you, but a good dissertation explaining how Sufism deals with the issues that concern philo... (read more)
- Malek Malek, 2016-01-26 : Hi, I think it is better that you choose a topic that you like yourself to think about it, otherwise there is a lo... (read more)
- Morteza Izadifar, 2016-01-26 : Thanks for your kind reply...Yes, they would be great. In the meantime, I am not very strict to continue my dissertation... (read more)
- Morteza Izadifar, 2016-01-26 : Thanks for your help...You are right. I will follow your instruction.
Australian National UniversityVia the internet, I’ve recently been watching an excellent series of televised lectures by a leading researcher in palaeoanthropology at the Collège de France. I am by no means a specialist in this field and a lot of what he has to say is too technical for me and goes over my head. But I understand enough to feel reassured in a conclusion I had already reached, namely that philosophical attempts to explain human consciousness in evolutionary terms are, and probably always will be, doomed to failure, as are attempts in the philosophy of art to explain art in evolutionary terms. (I should add that the lectures in question don’t address either question specifically; they’re about human evolution generally.)
I’ve read very little of the relevant philosophical literature (and most of what I have read relates to art) because I tend to avoid topics that strike me as a waste of time. But I’m aware that there are some who would disagree with me and who believe that philosophy has important thing ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Ferdinand Fellmann, 2016-07-02 : True, experience is always subjective as we are bound to our senses. But in the perception of the external world (Intent... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-07-03 : RE: “Your "I'm not likely to read your article" reminds me of Steerforth”. Well, I’m cheered, Ferdinand, t... (read more)
- Ferdinand Fellmann, 2016-07-03 : the use of terms like "subjective" or "aesthetic" is always intriguing. This applies even to "c... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2016-07-04 : Hi Ferdinand RE: the use of terms like "subjective" or "aesthetic" is always intriguing. This applie... (read more)
- Ferdinand Fellmann, 2016-07-05 : thanks for the hint at Malraux. I will read _Le musée imaginaire _again (I did read it in 1959!). The gist of the matter... (read more)
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Bilkent UniversityHello there,
Do you have any recommendations to submit a philosophy of mind paper that argues strongly against dualism? I am looking for a respectable journal about philosophy of mind that is open to philosophical, lengthy, inquiring articles that are written from a strictly scientific and logical point of view. Basically, I regard dualism as an anti-scientific attitude, and I would like to be able to liberally criticize a philosophical position that I view as intellectually lazy and harmful.
Eray Ozkural, PhD.Latest replies:
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-02-03 : Dear Aleksander (and Eray),I think maybe I am more trying to catch linguistics in a consciousness trap. I was trying to... (read more)
- Amit Saad, 2016-02-09 : Dear Jonathan, When you suggested your definition of ‘force’ it seemed to me that we don’t simply agree on the meaning o... (read more)
- Eray Ozkural, 2016-02-09 : I think that neuroscience is indeed offering much on the biophysics front and the modeling of the biophysical function a... (read more)
- Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2016-02-10 : I agree on that, Eray, but the Bayesian bit is not truth evaluation. I actually think that there has been some very good... (read more)
- Jeremy Horne, 2016-03-29 : I am the editor of a forthcoming book_ Philosophical Perceptions on Logic and Order_, to be published by IGI. Part of wh... (read more)
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