Value Theory, Miscellaneous
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1 - 20 / 36 2016-08-22Michael Kremer
University of ChicagoThe title of this piece is "Problems of Conflict," not "Problems of Conduct," and it occupies pp. 892-893, not just p. 892. (It is a letter to the editor responding to an essay by Evelyn Underhill; it discusses pacificism in the context of World War I.)
The author was a Quaker, pacifist, and educator (part of the National Adult Schools Movement in the United Kingdom). She was also one of Gilbert Ryle's older siblings.
2016-07-20It seems to me that this work is very much unavailable to students and professionals. Have not found it online in any form, save for a few hardcover editions for more than $500. Crazy.
University of Minnesota, MorrisNot out of umbrage so much as a deep concern over ideological censorship in philosophy, I want to publicly note and respond to the negative referee reports this paper has received (when graced with a report at all----it was desk rejected multiple times without comment). I believe the comments I quote below, compared with a reading of the paper itself, will reveal that it was rejected for ideological reasons, and that the paper warrants publication and indeed engagement.
Background: I co-authored this paper with a student, Michael Prideaux, a queer activist who is now studying non-profit management. I disagree with my coauthor on many matters, but we agree on the importance of principles, consistency, and reasoning in ethical debate. Unfortunately, our referee(s) believe in gate-keeping and stifling views they find "troubling." I waited to post a public reply until he was in grad school so as to shield him from controversy.
Below I will quote the only two referee reports I received. I wi ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2016-07-05 : This is not a comment on the quality of the referees’ reports – though on a quick reading it does seem to me that you ma... (read more)
- Dan Demetriou, 2016-07-05 : Thank you for your observation, Derek.&I agree. The terminology around this issue is minefield, and there are many shibb... (read more)
- Dan Demetriou, 2016-07-05 : Readers: Sorry for the typos. I hurriedly wrote this in rural Cameroon, where electricity is spotty, and couldn't pr... (read more)
- Tim O'Keefe, 2016-07-07 : For future reference, there is an extensive discussion of the reports and whether they're ideological policing at Da... (read more)
Portland State UniversityCan you share your opinion?
2015-12-22Richard Y. Chappell
University of YorkHere, for anyone interested!
2015-12-11In Mark Cherry’s article “Non-consensual Treatment is (nearly always) Morally Adherent” he takes a Socratic approach to the issue of involuntary hospitalization and forced treatment of psychiatric patients. Cherry believes that non-consensual treatment does not reserve the patient’s best interest, fails to respect autonomy, and uses the idea of the mentally ill being a threat to others to violate their human rights. I will challenge these ideas by exploring the “thank you theory” as it is related to a wide range of mental illnesses and respect to patient best interest, pondering how the informed consent process can ever be seen as valid with a patient having no true sense of reality, and how never considering someone a threat until they already show violent behavior can result in tragedies occurring that could have been easily prevented.
Though it is true that non-consensual treatment of the mentally ill usually does not result in a “thank you” from the patients, addicts seem to be the ... (read more)
University College LondonWhat kind of academic inquiry can best help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible? Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in this question? Is it because most believe the kind of academic inquiry we have today, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knoweldge and technological know-how, is the best that we can have, judged from the perspective of helping humanity make progress towards a better world? Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in arguments which seem to show decisively that inquiry restricted to the pursuit of knowledge is both profoundly irrational, and a menace? The successful pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how, dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, is almost bound to lead to trouble. Scientific knowledge and technological know-how enormously increase our power to act - for some of us at ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2016-10-20 : _Re: while life expectancy among Māori was 298 years old:' _ I'm assuming this is a typo, Ian? _RE: &q... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-21 : Yessss..There does need to be discussion about this, and in indigenous communities it is a group discussion. In ou... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2016-10-21 : Yes, a very bad typo... should be 28. Identical to the life expectancy of Paris at the time... Yes, most cul... (read more)
- John Hodgson, 2017-01-07 : _"The scientific approach to ethics, which many here have labelled Eugenics, works well within an Indigenous framew... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2017-01-07 : Hi John RE: There currently seems a strong justification for the notion that humanity often doesn't know what is in... (read more)
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North Carolina State UniversityIf you come across this paper while researching philosophy of love, you should watch this: https://youtu.be/ykxNI137sPk
State University of New York, BuffaloI am trying to start a discussion for teaching INSEPARABILITY OF LOGIC AND ETHICS. A COLLEAGUE WROTE: I'm going to be teaching your "Inseparability of Logic and Ethics" in a couple weeks. I was wondering if you had any tips on doing so or thoughts about points to emphasize. I've always loved the paper and found your pedagogical techniques quite helpful.
POST YOUR ADVICE AND I WILL FORWARD IT .
MY ADVICE TO MY COLLEAGUE: First, before assigning the paper to be read, ask the students to look up “ethics” and “logic” in a dictionary or other reference work and then to write a paragraph on what the two have to do with each other. Second, after the students were supposed to have read the paper, ask them what they got out of it. Just let them talk and prompt them where necessary. No contentiousness. Third, read the first page aloud to them and see what happens. As you go read chunks aloud and ask questions—just like I did teaching you Tarski’s truth-definition paper. Fourth, go around the clas ... (read more)
State University of New York, Buffalo
This applied-logic lecture builds on  arguing that character traits fostered by logic serve clarity and understanding in ethics, confirming hopeful views of Alfred Tarski [2, Preface, and personal communication].
Hypotheses in one strict usage are propositions not known to be true and not known to be false or—more loosely—propositions so considered for discussion purposes [1, p. 38].
Logic studies hypotheses by determining their implications (propositions they imply) and their implicants (propositions that imply them). Logic also studies hypotheses by seeing how variations affect implications and implicants. People versed in logical methods are more inclined to enjoy working with hypotheses and less inclined to dismiss them or to accept them without sufficient evidence.
Cosmic Justice Hypotheses (CJHs), such as “in the fullness of time every act will be rewarded or punished in exact proportion to its goodness or badness ... (read more)
Portland State University
The writing describes a new sort of individual, “a delude”. People like Hitler would well fit the description. He was mentally healthy, however overwhelmed by grossly deluded opinions.
Here is the description from the text:
"Even when a person is born possessing a healthy mental state, the familial and environmental assault during childhood with deluded opinions and behavior can be the basis for an individual to develop into a delude, an individual in a deluded mental state. In this writing, the label fool, or imbecile, is sometimes interchangeable with the underlying primary conditions of the delude. A fool is predisposed to accept deluded opinions as true; however, he or she can have an overall good awareness of social norms and laws that he or she learned to comply with. A fool is not, because of his mental condition alone, a villain. In contrast, the delude typically develops overwhelming extreme views. These views can be held as more important than any social or legal consideration ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Ian Stuart, 2015-01-21 : Absolutely.&However there are major issues here. I think, to paraphrase Foucault a little, the centre (norm, socia... (read more)
- Joseph Krecz, 2015-02-07 : Thanks for your response. During years, I gathered a bunch of notes on the unfortunate condition of human nature... (read more)
- Ian Stuart, 2015-02-17 : Dear Yoji Awesome. I think you are onto something. And it is something important in the contemporary world... (read more)
- Tami Williams, 2016-06-21 : I'm a psychologist (dr of philosophy not dr in philosophy). I find Hitler, like some odd bohemian friends of... (read more)
2014-06-26Any disagreement, agreement, argument or any evaluation would do. Need a help from you all to write a critical review for this article.
Université du Québec à Montréal
University of Southampton(1) That sentient life will one day come to an end is no solace for those sentients existing and suffering today.
(2) Whether it is better to have been or not to have been is a Cartesian koan I can ponder concrerning myself, but not one I have a right to decide concerning another sentient that is or has been; all the less right have I to create or support the creation of another sentient, out of nothing.
(3) Pain and pleasure are incommensurable; only pain is pertinent to moral musings like these: No number of orgasms (for me) compensates for one fallen sparrow; and, again, the sparrow’s pains or solaces are not for me to weigh -- for the sparrow.
(4) Christianity is particularly self-righteous and presumptuous on such questions, always ready to sanction temporal risk and suffering for the bodies of others for the salvation of their immaterial, immortal souls, sub specie aeternitatis.Latest replies:
- Stevan Harnad, 2014-05-18 : _Revision:_ (1) That sentient life will one day come to an end is no solace for those sentients existing (2) Whether it... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2014-06-11 : Hi Steve Interesting thoughts.Couple of brief comments: RE: That sentient life will one day come to an end is no solace... (read more)
Nice paper!. However, if I may, I wasn't convinced by your response to objection five. The objection, I take it, is that the intuitions you are marshaling about incoherence derive from a non-moral standpoint, that is, they are intuitions that arise when one is doing metaethics and not when one is actually moralizing. And it seems undeniable that Moore paradoxical sentences are straightforwardly bizarre when uttered by persons in the context of actual moralizing (just imagine actually having the relevant conversation). At the outset of your paper, you correctly note that expressivism is a theory about actual moralizing, so it seems like this is one objection to which you should be very sensitive. You respond:
This is not really a rejection of C3, but a rejection of C1, since it admits that it is not always the case that affective or conative attitudes are expressed by moral assertions. If non-cognitive mental states are only sometimes expressed by moral assertions, then the clai ... (read more)
This is a very interesting paper. I am in agreement with the basic premise, namely, that we should be suspicious of moral intuitions which are highly contingent or "flippable". However, I have one or two questions about the argument.
In one section, you're dealing with the problem of "typing" mechanisms. The point, as I understand it, is to show that your argument defeats demandingness intuitions but does not defeat other moral intuitions (such as those concerning the wrongness of slavery). You say:
Given these considerations, how generally should we type the testimonial process behind my moral belief that slavery is wrong? The reliability of (say) my mother’s anti-racist moral testimony in the actual world should not necessarily be impugned by the unreliability of her moral testimony were she a racist bigot, for her epistemic situation (i.e., her foundational moral beliefs) in the latter case would be radically mistaken. The two types of testimonial processes, then, are plausibl ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Matthew Braddock, 2013-06-19 : Hi Nick,Your comments much appreciated. & Your main comment focuses on the _Argument from Socialization Effects _(p... (read more)
- Nick Smyth, 2013-06-24 : Thanks again for the chance to discuss this really interesting issue. I hope you take these comments (from a rando... (read more)
- Matthew Braddock, 2013-06-24 : Hi Nick, thanks for your useful (very constructive) comments. Quick response. Of course, no attempt to solve... (read more)
- Nick Smyth, 2013-06-26 : The only sense I can make of a "type" of socialization is by thinking of it as a distinct social-psychological... (read more)
- Matthew Braddock, 2013-06-26 : Good stuff, Nick. My _Argument from Socialization Effects_ intends to stay neutral on the question of moral semantics.&n... (read more)
2013-06-11Hi Professor Demetriou,
I've just read the draft of your paper, and I really enjoyed it, especially the bits where you complicate the somewhat simplistic just-so cultural-evolutionary story provided by Ross and Nisbett. One rarely sees such deep engagement with actual anthropological data in moral-philosophical papers about disagreement, and I think your reflections here are a valuable contribution to this literature.
However, I have a question about the "pluralism" that is on offer, which is "a view urging the moral correctness of multiple and mutually irreducible comprehensive ethical outlooks , each suited to its own dimension of social life ." A familiar worry emerges here, which is that you are covertly drawing on a kind of monism which serves to make each of the competing moral systems appear attractive. The trouble begins with the word "suited": what does it mean to say that a moral outlook is "suited" t ... (read more)
2013-06-11This was a solid paper guys I really must commend you for the excellent work. With that said, I do agree with you about Raz's arguments. They seemed to possess little to no substance whatsoever and his argument of self-interest towards the end seemed to be more of a forfeiture of his premise than anything else. I will at least credit him for attempting to untangle the knots in this complex field we call moral philosophy but I had some major objections while reading. Please do correct me if I speak ignorantly or from a misinformed position.
1. Raz says to be moral is to see value in others and one's self. This value is derived from the virtue of being a person. Are we to take it that the recognition of this value disregards how we cultivate that value through action which subsequently has consequences? If I see value in someone, but still decide to take away their life because I perceive myself to be more valuable, am I moral or not.
2. A refutation of point 1 would be that to see value ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Derek Allan, 2013-06-24 : Hi Terence Yes I agree. The term “amoralist” is in itself very problematic, isn’t it? What would such a person be like... (read more)
- Terence Rajivan Edward, 2013-06-25 : Hi Derek, Actually, on reflection, I can see an argument for investigating whether the amoralist can be argued into some... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2013-06-27 : Hi Terence I’m not sure I follow your argument completely, so correct me if I seem to be missing the point. I take... (read more)
- Terence Rajivan Edward, 2013-06-28 : I was hoping my last reply was clear, but a reference to the 'domain of morality' in an earlier post to Jo... (read more)
- Derek Allan, 2013-06-29 : Hi Terence Thanks for these additional remarks – which all seem Just an added thought on the reason/emotion point. Suppo... (read more)
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2013-03-25Richard Y. Chappell
University of YorkFor anyone interested, I've written up a brief critique of this paper at Philosophy, et cetera.
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