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Philosophical Traditions

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  • Kane Tran, 2015-07-27 : I argue that the received conception of the aim and results of Kant’s Paralogisms must be revised in light of a proper u... (read more)
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This seems a simple mistake, and it should consequently be simple to rectify it. 

In particular, since the bulk of the translation was done by G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, and the front page of the fourth edition states "The German text, with an English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte", Anscombe should be appropriately credited. 


JOHN CORCORAN AND HASSAN MASOUD, Three-logical-theories redux.

  The 1969 paper, “Three logical theories” [1], considers three logical systems all based on the same interpreted language and having the same semantics.

  The first, a logistic system LS, codifies tautologies (logical truths)—using tautological axioms and tautology-preserving rules that are not required to be consequence-preserving.

  The second, a consequence system CS, codifies valid premise-conclusion arguments—using tautological axioms and consequence-preserving rules that are not required to be cogency-preserving [2]. A rule is cogency-preserving if in every application the conclusion is known to follow from its premises if the premises are all known to follow from their premises.

  The third, a deductive system DS, codifies deductions, or cogent argumentations [2]—using cogency-preserving rules. The derivations in a DS represent deduction: the process by which conclusions are deduced from premises, i. e. the way knowl ... (read more)


JOHN CORCORAN, Two-method errors.

  Where there are two or more methods for the same thing, sometimes errors occur if two are mixed. Two-method errors, TMEs, occur in technical contexts but they occur more frequently in non-technical writing. Examples of both are cited.

  We can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other ways: ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws’ or ‘Abe knows whether Ben draws or not’. But a TME occurs in ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws or not’.

  We can say “Abe knows how Ben looks” using ‘Abe knows what Ben looks like’. But a TME occurs in ‘Abe knows what Ben looks’ and also in ‘Abe knows how Ben looks like’. Again, we can deny that Abe knows Ben by prefixing ‘It isn’t   that’ or by interpolating ‘doesn’t’. But a TME occurs in trying to deny that Abe knows Ben by using ‘It isn’t that Abe doesn’t know Ben’.

  There are two standard ways of defining truth for first-order languages: using finite sequences or infinite sequences. Quine’s discussion in the 1970 first ... (read more)


The writing describes a new sort of individual, “a delude”. People like Hitler would well fit the description. He was mentally healthy, however overwhelmed by grossly deluded opinions.

Here is the description from the text: 

"Even when a person is born possessing a healthy mental state, the familial and environmental assault during childhood with deluded opinions and behavior can be the basis for an individual to develop into a delude, an individual in a deluded mental state. In this writing, the label fool, or imbecile, is sometimes interchangeable with the underlying primary conditions of the delude. A fool is predisposed to accept deluded opinions as true; however, he or she can have an overall good awareness of social norms and laws that he or she learned to comply with. A fool is not, because of his mental condition alone, a villain. In contrast, the delude typically develops overwhelming extreme views. These views can be held as more important than any social or legal consideration ... (read more)

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Because of Copyright, I am not yet in a position to upload this article. If you have any interest, feel free to contact me anytime.  (Author)

Hi! I'm traying to translate a sentence from GA 28 (untranslated) and I need to contrast my interpretation with somebody elses.

The sentence goes like this:

Während aber die Art des Wissens nur ist, was sie sein kann, auf dem Grunde des eigenen Selbst, was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß, wozu eine Offenbarkeit freilich gehört, die aber nur aus der spezifischen Seinsart des Daseins begriffen werden kann.

My version of this monstruosity would be the following (please note that the sentence is incomplete as there is no main clause, and that it has been copied literally from the book).

But while the kind of knowing only is what it can be on the ground of the own self, this itself, that is the own self, must be determined as Being, to which certainly a manifestness belongs, which it self can be understood however only from the specific mode of being of Dasein.

My biggest headache is "was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß"

Is Heidegger saying

i. that the own self must be determined ... (read more)

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Methodologically speaking, I wonder why Matilal and S's article has not been enough for  further studies of this sort to be the rule on Mind (and other philosophical journals). Does this failure depend on their style? (Or should we just start working as a task-force and submit many articles of this kind?)

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Can there be linguistics without ontology?

The context principle and some Indian controversies over Meaning is a milestone in Indian studies, and in the history of their interaction with mainstream (i.e. Western) philosophy. Since it was published in 1988 on Mind (one of the top-5 journals in Philosophy, inaccessible for most authors), virtually everyone (in Indian philosophy) has read it.

Have you also re-read it?

I re-read it after some years this Summer and I have to admit that it was again a surprise. The article starts with a discussion of the Context principle in Frege and Quine (does the principle mean that words HAVE no meaning outside a sentence, or that their meaning can only be UNDERSTOOD within a sentence?). In this connection, Matilal and Sen discuss a strong and a weak interpretation of the Context principle (according to whether it should answer the first or the second question). They end up saying that the strong interpretation clashes with Frege's later work (see belo ... (read more)

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Heritage of the Yoga Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology:

 The Interlocution of  Knowledge and Wisdom across Two Traditions of Philosophy


Koshy Tharakan

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy

 Goa University


Abstract  Comparative philosophy has been subjected to much criticism in the latter half of the last century, though some of these criticisms were appropriate and justified. However, in our present cultural milieu, where traditions and culture transcend their geographical boundaries, seeping through the global network of views and ideas, it seems to be a legitimate enterprise to understand one’s own traditions and culture through the critical lens of the ‘other culture’. It is such cross-cultural understanding that paved the way towards legitimizing “human rights” as a universal discourse. So also, the discourse on “environmental ethics” has gained acceptance in a similar manner across cultures and traditions.  The paper attempts at an understan ... (read more)

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  • Joseph Alia, 2013-06-11 : I find this article refreshing and appreciate this kind of work as enabling development of more and better ways of think... (read more)
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I am a reader of Asian Philosophy, and also involved in research and study of 'Asian Philosophy', the ' Vedic Philosophy. In this course, what surprises me is the 'term used 'Indian Philosophy'. Vedic Philsophy is neither an Indian Philosophy nor Nepali Philosophy, nor Bengali. In South Asia, there are otther countries with traditions based on Vedas, Nepal is one of them. In Bangladesh, there are Hindus who believe in this tradition. There are people following traditions in Burma, Thailand, Malayasia, Indonesia, Sri-Lanka and also Tibet, and most recently in many countirs. Ancient South Asia was a nation called India. India is known to be so called after East India Company occupation. In South Asia, there were nations like 'Beidhe' where King Janak ruled.

I therefore express my reservation on word called 'Indian' philosophy. Something, which is recently developed may called Indian philosophy. Mahatma Gandhi's ahimsa theory can be Indian Philosophy. But How people can put Bu ... (read more)
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Hi everyone,

Can anyone please explain to me in simple terms what Derrida understand by the concept of "Scene" and what is it its realtion to the concept of authorship.

I'm truly sorry for not adding any further background to my quarry but I'm totally and completelly lost.

Thanks so much everyone!

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I don't think Heidegger is a conceptualist.Since,Heidegger believes,Being finds itself in a "world" already interpreted in someway and its  grasp over its "world" is not something empirically given primordially Being is said to be interpretation all the way down.The modalities(What and How of the world) of our grasp over our world precedes any semantic conceptualization of such graspings.Hence
the basic or core purchase that we have of our world can not come in to total clarity with regard to their nature:whether they are conceptual or non conceptual.They,it seems,are more like practical know how(Verstehen) rather than conceptual know that.    
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This is awesome. Tractatus power!
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I have not yet read the full version of Joseph's book, but I can tell this ties directly into my own theoretical perspectives involving assessment, learning, behavior, and consciousness. To me, as laid out in my Education PhD dissertation at Colorado State University (2005), the core essence of being (reality) is individual and collective consciousness interacting and interconnecting with consciousness at every level of existence (seen and unseen) as an ongoing here and now creative process." Thus, primary learning is intuitive and secondary learning is rational-objective.

Rational objective, is by my definition, fixtional thinking that allows one to "fix" or position relations "as if" they were separate and disconnected in a cause and effect relationship and in which they must of necessity substantiate existence "as if" it were true. It entails a sort of machine mentality of parts, in which the parts equals the whole and the whole is what the parts c ... (read more)

Not withstanding their disparate temporal and socio-cultural context, both Sankara and Heidegger share a degree of commonality in thought and in their allegiance to their predecessors which is more than isomorphic in nature to escape attention.Sankara reaffirms his faith in Vedantic teachings and insists on doing philosophy in so far as it truely reflects the former's insights and intutions.Heidegger,similarly,is reputed to have traced his ontology to ancient philosophers such as
Hearclitus,Parmenides and, as some would say,even to Aristotle to find out the meaning of Being.Both are critical of any attempt to ontologise Being(Brahman, in case of Sankar)with categories and concepts derived from sources whose ontological merits are suspect.Intellect for Sankara is a rough equivalent of what Heidegger would say calculative thinking as opposed to mediative thinking.In this sense both find in logic-the rule of pure thought- a common enemy to be attacked and be rendered inadequate as it tric ... (read more)
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