Philosophy of Probability
- All discussions (665)
- Paper discussions (134)
- In the profession (28)
- PhilJobs (6)
- About PhilPapers (180)
- Philosophy discussions (457)
- Epistemology (64)Metaphilosophy (29)Metaphysics (43)Philosophy of Action (23)Philosophy of Language (45)Philosophy of Mind (140)Philosophy of Religion (17)M&E, Misc (6)Value Theory (108)
- Aesthetics (12)Applied Ethics (24)Meta-Ethics (24)Normative Ethics (26)Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality (13)Philosophy of Law (4)Social and Political Philosophy (56)Value Theory, Miscellaneous (63)
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic (39)Philosophy of Biology (18)Philosophy of Cognitive Science (43)Philosophy of Computing and Information (8)Philosophy of Mathematics (39)Philosophy of Physical Science (14)Philosophy of Social Science (11)Philosophy of Probability (6)General Philosophy of Science (39)Philosophy of Science, Misc (7)
- Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy (11)Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (1)17th/18th Century Philosophy (10)19th Century Philosophy (6)20th Century Philosophy (20)History of Western Philosophy, Misc (4)
- African/Africana Philosophy (2)Asian Philosophy (9)Continental Philosophy (12)European Philosophy (24)Philosophy of the Americas (4)Philosophical Traditions, Miscellaneous (2)Philosophy, Misc (14)
- Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies (2)Philosophy, General Works (4)Teaching Philosophy (1)Philosophy, Miscellaneous (8)Other Academic Areas (20)
- Natural Sciences (2)Social Sciences (1)Cognitive Sciences (9)Formal Sciences (1)
1 - 6 / 6 2016-10-05Chenguang Lu
independent researcherSome words in my paper:
T(hj|ei)--fuzzy truth function of a predicate hj.
T(hj)--logical probability or average thue-value of a predicate hj.
Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since Logical Probability and Statistical Probability are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The author suggests defining log [1/T(hj)] as testing severity, and T(hj|ei)/T(hj) as verisimilitude. In terms of Likelihood method, P(ei| hi is true)/P(ei) =T(hj|ei)/T(hj) is also called standard likelihood. So, we may say Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) = log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation
If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also define verisimilitude by log [T(hj|ei)/T(hj)].
The figure 8 in the paper shows how positive and negative degrees of believe affect thruthlikeness.Latest replies:
- Chenguang Lu, 2016-10-07 : Logical probability T(hj)=sum i P(xi)T(hj|ei).1/ T(hj) indicates Fallibi lity
- Eray Ozkural, 2017-01-16 : Don't worry about anything Popper said. As far as epistemology goes, his work may be considered pseudoscience. Bette... (read more)
- Aleksandra Samonek, 2017-03-17 : Chenguang Lu, since Popper's original two proposals for defining verisimilitude a lot has been written on the topic... (read more)
London School of EconomicsNotwithstanding the arguments of Matthen&Ariew, there is still a simple and banal sense in which "natural selection is a cause of evolution". I presume Matthen & Ariew would not dispute that complex adaptations arise as the cumulative effect of the selection of genes. So the selection of genes causes the evolution of complex adaptations.
As far as I can see, this claim is compatible with seeing the "selection" here as a statistical trend (or "outcome") rather than a causal process (or "force"). Of course, if by "evolution", one merely means "change in gene frequencies", it would be questionable to call selection a cause of evolution for all the reasons Matthen & Ariew give. But if one means "evolution of complex adaptations", selection most certainly is a cause, however one conceives of selection.Latest replies:
- Jonathan Birch, 2009-10-24 : Thanks Kris. The difference I'm getting at here is that the evolution of complex adaptations involves the _cumulativ... (read more)
- Mohan Matthen, 2009-11-10 : I agree that the appearance and increase of _Ab _is some sort of cause of the fixation of _AB_. I even agree that... (read more)
- Jonathan Birch, 2009-11-12 : Thanks Mohan, and thanks for an interesting paper. I like the arguments you make. I just don't think they can establ... (read more)
- Mohan Matthen, 2009-11-12 : Thanks Jonathan. This is an interesting suggestion. I have a question, though, about your labels. Supp... (read more)
- Jonathan Birch, 2009-12-08 : Thanks Mohan. What I have in mind is something like this: suppose "natural selection" just means "frequen... (read more)
- 1 more ..
Università degli Studi di Roma La SapienzaReceived views are an important part of our symbolic order. Once it becomes apparent that they cannot possibly be true, it is sometimes a valuable philosophical task to preserve them, since no rational and educated person could actually believe them. As an example of a critically endangered received view, consider Jerry Coyne's excellent book, Why Evolution Is True:
[T]he process of evolution -- natural selection, the mechanism that drove the first naked, replicating molecule into the diversity of millions of fossil and living forms -- is a mechanism of staggering simplicity and beauty.The received view is that natural selection is a mechanism or process that shapes all living things, and that the study of natural selection explains a lot about the history of life on Earth. Natural selection makes it possible to treat the billion years of organic evolution as a coherent narrative, making biology an endless reserve of wonder, understanding, and enjoyment.
Matthen and Ariew (2002, e ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Mohan Matthen, 2009-11-24 : Ah, I see (better) now what you are getting at, Arlin. (Thanks Marcello.) Stephen's point is independent of yo... (read more)
- Arlin Stoltzfus, 2009-12-04 : Thanks for replying. Generally, I think we understand each other, but I wanted to clarify that I am not tryin... (read more)
- Marcello Pucciarelli, 2010-04-25 : Let me go back to Darwinian selection. My intention would be to defend Darwinian selection while rejecting the forc... (read more)
- Arlin Stoltzfus, 2010-04-28 : I'm sorry to bog down this discussion with another long post, but I think there is an enormous potential benefit if... (read more)
- Marcello Pucciarelli, 2010-04-30 : Thank you Arlin, I have to admit that I am actually more interested in your argument than in my own. I understand t... (read more)
- 5 more ..
University of Birmingham
I found this a particularly interesting paper. I’m in firm agreement with the main gist of Williams’ view- that the notion of typicality is in principle better adapted to deal with chancy similarity than the notion of ‘non-remarkableness’. That said, we found plenty of potential pressure points.
- Firstly, I’m not sure that quantum mechanics really has as wide-reaching consequences as is assumed in the paper. Depending on your response to the measurement problem, it could be that outcomes such as plates flying off sideways are not genuine quantum possibilities after all, because the low-amplitude branches are in some way ‘lost in the noise’. Although I think this issue is worth further investigation, I don’t think it’s critical to the debate between Williams, Hawthorne, and Lewis. Their worries can be raised about considerably less unlikely events – in fact, we can restrict ... (read more)
University of BirminghamCross-posted from http://mleseminar.wordpress.com/
You can find the handout for this week here. I thought this was a really good paper, and we didn’t find all that much to criticise in it. It was a bit frustrating not to hear more about Fitelson’s positive story, in particular about the bridge principle that he would endorse instead of the various versions of RTE that he criticises. He’s clearly saving the juicy stuff for his book.
In particular, I find it hard to see how he plans to steer a middle ground between the Carnap/Williamson-style ‘a priori priors’ version of objective bayesianism, and the subjective bayesian approach. My naive take on the matter is that you either think that there’s a unique correct set of priors or you don’t. Maybe these priors aren’t a priori knowable (contra the Carnap/Williamson approach), although it seems that a position like this would be committed to complete epistemic rationality being in principle unattainable.
I wasn’t sure how strongly Fitelson m ... (read more)
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, MünchenI have spent some time recently reading various discussions of the Dutch book theorem. Nowhere have I found a really good explanation that sets out clearly and formally the conditions on rational betting preference that must obtain for the argument to work. (That's not entirely true, I found a good discussion of betting preference in [Halpern, 2003, Reasoning about uncertainty], but "the proof is left as an exercise"...
Have I missed some classic paper or book chapter in my (admittedly superficial) survey of the area?Latest replies:
- Gary Merrill, 2009-03-25 : Have you tried Kyburg's paper "Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections, and Problems"? (Note that... (read more)
- Hykel Hosni, 2009-03-31 : All the details of the proof appear in _The uncertain reasoner's companion_, - a mathematical perspective, Cambridge... (read more)
1 - 6 / 6loading ..Home | New books and articles | Bibliographies | Philosophy journals | Discussions | Article Index | About PhilPapers | API | Contact us | Code of conduct
terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).
Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Page generated Mon Nov 19 11:38:18 2018 on pp1