Please note that the PhilPapers forums will be closed in March 2017 and replaced by a newer, more modern feature shortly thereafter. To minimize disruption, we have now disabled the creation of new threads. We encourage forum participants to wrap up discussions before March.

Continental Philosophy

 1 - 12 / 12 
Latest replies:
  • Kane Tran, 2015-07-27 : I argue that the received conception of the aim and results of Kant’s Paralogisms must be revised in light of a proper u... (read more)
Permanent link: Reply

Hi! I'm traying to translate a sentence from GA 28 (untranslated) and I need to contrast my interpretation with somebody elses.

The sentence goes like this:

Während aber die Art des Wissens nur ist, was sie sein kann, auf dem Grunde des eigenen Selbst, was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß, wozu eine Offenbarkeit freilich gehört, die aber nur aus der spezifischen Seinsart des Daseins begriffen werden kann.

My version of this monstruosity would be the following (please note that the sentence is incomplete as there is no main clause, and that it has been copied literally from the book).

But while the kind of knowing only is what it can be on the ground of the own self, this itself, that is the own self, must be determined as Being, to which certainly a manifestness belongs, which it self can be understood however only from the specific mode of being of Dasein.

My biggest headache is "was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß"

Is Heidegger saying

i. that the own self must be determined ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

Hi everyone,

Can anyone please explain to me in simple terms what Derrida understand by the concept of "Scene" and what is it its realtion to the concept of authorship.

I'm truly sorry for not adding any further background to my quarry but I'm totally and completelly lost.

Thanks so much everyone!

Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

I don't think Heidegger is a conceptualist.Since,Heidegger believes,Being finds itself in a "world" already interpreted in someway and its  grasp over its "world" is not something empirically given primordially Being is said to be interpretation all the way down.The modalities(What and How of the world) of our grasp over our world precedes any semantic conceptualization of such graspings.Hence
the basic or core purchase that we have of our world can not come in to total clarity with regard to their nature:whether they are conceptual or non conceptual.They,it seems,are more like practical know how(Verstehen) rather than conceptual know that.    
Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

Perhaps we could begin with Hitchcock and Husserl/Sartre?
Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

Gadamer was not properly understood by Habermas.To deny tradition and authority their proper place in our discursive practices is to build castles in the air of idealism and  to  overlook  our fallibility

 and  finitude  that  stand for who  we are.
Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

Today I am comparing my old, defective, James S. Churchill translation of "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" with an edition published in 1934 by Verlag Gerhard Shulte-Bulmke, Frankfurt am Main.
What struck me was how the 1962 Indiana U. Press translation had largely stayed with the German footnotes of this 1934 edition: footnotes vary across the langauges as "WW (Cass.)" versus "Works (Cass.)".  The 1962 replicates the German in one place introducing the full surname (Cassirer) in an early footnote, but nowhere "Ernst Cassirer".

But does this demolition of Kant not arise out of the lectures at Davos? The 1934 edition has an untitled "preface" saying "und bei den Davoser Hochschulkursen im Maerz d.J.) ", i.e., in spring 1929 with Ernst Cassirer - but with no mention of Cassirer.

In the Richard Taft translation, a note indicates only that Heidegger's footnotes are to the Cassirer edition.

Cassirer did not live to return to reclaim his teaching position in Germany.  He began his caree ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

I was just wondering if anyone could steer me towards any pertinent literature on Heidegger and religion/theology or (what I have discovered some call) his phenomenology of religion.  I believe I want to direct a research paper towards that idea although I am not sure in what way yet.  I thought I had detected some religious or mystic inclinations in Division I of Being and Time in placing so much importance on the Being of Dasein (perhaps, his twisted re-interpretation of the soul?) but, after reading the sections on death (in Being and Time), it seems that that interpretation may be a little off (considering he dispels any notion of an afterlife or immortality in his thought).  But I can't help but think a man who was so religious in his upbringing and early academic years could shake off religious notions completely albeit in a fierce rejection of them or in an underlying acceptance.

Any thoughts and/or references to materials?

P.S.  I am an undergrad senior with only Being and Time ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

That's an interesting myth-busting. However, the subject might gain from a deeper discussion. I don't really understand what Hegel's rhetoric would be in such a context: why does he even take the Timaeus' series, and why the change in it? If he's not happy with aprioristic thinking, why does he use it? Is it a form of sarcasm, or a reductio ad absurdum?

Some time ago in Melbourne there was a conference at which a number of philosophers from both analytic and continental backgrounds met together to try to identify key differences between the two schools of thought.  I wasn't there so I don't know how it went, or how many were present from each persuasion, but it occurrred to me recently that there might be some interest among philosophers on philpapers in discussing the same issue.

It always seems odd to me that there are these two schools of thought, both claiming to do philosophy, but which have so little to do with each other. They have separate conferences, separate journals and so on. A naive outsider might say 'Well, how odd! Philosophers claim to be clear thinkers yet here they are split into two camps and they can't even seem to work out why.'

I read a short book recently by Simon Critchley called 'Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction' in which he tries to identify the main differences. I thought the book qui ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

This is a good attempt from an analytical perspective to examine an interpretation of Kant which has tended to be the preserve of Continental philosophers. However, it seems to have generated little comment that I can trace.  Imagination is the faculty of the gaps in Kant's epistemology - an uncomfortable position if Kant is to be seen as a cognitive realist.  But the transcendental component of his dualism is perhaps a matter ultimately of imagination so Gibbons' work is a useful balance to interpretations of Kant which emphasise his attempt to defeat Humean scepticism.
Latest replies: Permanent link: Reply

Dear reader,

I am looking for feedback on this paper.  I have never sent anything (except book notes) to be published because I have never felt that my work was up to standard.  I do not want to publish something that will not be read or that will not provide some inspiration and interest when read.  If you feel you can provide constructive criticism, then please do so.

All the best,

Max Bini

 1 - 12 / 12