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1 - 17 / 17 2015-04-05Corey W. Dyck
University of Western Ontario
Martin Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg
University of KentThis seems a simple mistake, and it should consequently be simple to rectify it.
In particular, since the bulk of the translation was done by G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, and the front page of the fourth edition states "The German text, with an English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte", Anscombe should be appropriately credited.
University of TokyoAs I got the permission from the Society, now I upload the material.
University of TokyoBecause of Copyright, I am not yet in a position to upload this article. If you have any interest, feel free to contact me anytime. (Author)
Institute for Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia
Methodologically speaking, I wonder why Matilal and S's article has not been enough for further studies of this sort to be the rule on Mind (and other philosophical journals). Does this failure depend on their style? (Or should we just start working as a task-force and submit many articles of this kind?)Latest replies:
- Sigurd Vojnov, 2013-08-22 : Id like to read more_ in here_ about "the context principle". I tried your link but I couldnt get access.Meani... (read more)
- Elisa Freschi, 2013-08-22 : Thanks for the nice example, which highlights a lot about the pragmatics of speech-acts (even more, I would say, than ab... (read more)
- Sigurd Vojnov, 2013-09-10 : Try not restricting ideas by their versions;&Understand objects in "isolation" as constituted by their constit... (read more)
Institute for Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia
Can there be linguistics without ontology?
The context principle and some Indian controversies over Meaning is a milestone in Indian studies, and in the history of their interaction with mainstream (i.e. Western) philosophy. Since it was published in 1988 on Mind (one of the top-5 journals in Philosophy, inaccessible for most authors), virtually everyone (in Indian philosophy) has read it.
Have you also re-read it?
I re-read it after some years this Summer and I have to admit that it was again a surprise. The article starts with a discussion of the Context principle in Frege and Quine (does the principle mean that words HAVE no meaning outside a sentence, or that their meaning can only be UNDERSTOOD within a sentence?). In this connection, Matilal and Sen discuss a strong and a weak interpretation of the Context principle (according to whether it should answer the first or the second question). They end up saying that the strong interpretation clashes with Frege's later work (see belo ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Franson Manjali, 2013-08-22 : Interesting... We get back to this.
- Wayne G. Smith, 2014-08-04 : I regret that I've just discovered this post: Is Derrida's (admittedly 'Western') deconstruction and his... (read more)
- Elisa Freschi, 2016-01-23 : sorry for noticing this reply just now! Matilal and Sen are rigorously analytical philosophers. In this sense, I would n... (read more)
University of Toronto at Scarborough
University of Toronto, St. George CampusThis is awesome. Tractatus power!Latest replies:
- Florence Historienne Du Dictionnaire Et De Historienne Du Dictionnaire Et De L'Alphabet, 2016-02-22 : Very interesting information. I was not informed. These first elements provided leads me to widen the subject.
University of AucklandPerhaps we could begin with Hitchcock and Husserl/Sartre?Latest replies:
- Rami Kaawach, 2010-06-07 : This sounds like a great project, and I will definitely keep my eye on the developing thoughts of fellow posters. Before... (read more)
- Gregory Minissale, 2010-06-19 : Thank you for responding. I will try to find the Zizek. Very interesting what you have to say about having two sets... (read more)
Jawaharlal Nehru UniversityIf one looks at the genesis,growth and achievements of European philosophy
one feature that stands apart is the way "enlightenment rationality" continues to
set the agenda not only for philosophy but,virtually, for every disciplines.
Thanks to Husserl et al. for exposing the limitation of such a highhanded
positivist outlook that treats life as an entity.
Dear Professor Ott. I have enjoyed your work on Malebranche and I'm now considering Berkeley's doctrine of the passivity of ideas. In Principles 25 he argues that essentially if we looks closely at our ideas (objects of sense) we'll come to see (1) they are passive, (2) a stronger stronger claim--it's impossible that they be active--thus non-minded nature must be causally inert. (2) Seems the right way to go--the argument as J Bennett (Learning from Six Philosophers) suggests is a priori; from the doctrine that to be is to be perceived it logically follows that nature is causally inert. I don't quite see the deduction--both K Winkler (Berkeley) and G Strawson (The Secret Connexion) have outlined how the argument might go, but I'm not convinced. Recently Jeff McDonough (J Phil argued that with respect to Berkeley's claim that 'against Malebranche we move our limbs ourselves,' a concurrentist account might save Berkeley from the consequent problem that ... (read more)
2010-03-28The relationship of early Carnap to Husserl is now better known.
English readers may not know that "Überwindung der Metaphysik" is the title of a controversial Heidegger essay which appeared in the early 50's
In this thread I will look at the Joan Stambaugh translation in the light of Faye, Wolin and Rockmore on Heidegger's political thought.
Stambaugh's 1973 translation appears in Richard Wolin's (editor) 1991 collection, "The Heidegger Controversy".
note: Wilfred Sellar's short philosophical autobiography is interesting and amusing as regards the early Carnap.
University of SzczecinIn "On Denoting" (1905), Russell presents a theory of denotation which relies on the notion of a variable. Russell says very little about variables in this paper. He says only that they are "fundamental," and that they are "essentially and wholly undetermined" constituents of propositional functions. I think I understand the role of this notion in Russell's theory, and why Russell says what he does about it, He appeals to non-denoting elements in propositions in order to avoid having to interpret "a=b" as "a=a." By using variables, he can claim that no elements in a propositional function serve the role of the denoting phrase. For example, in the fully explicit presentation of "Scott is the author of Waverley," we do not find anything for which we could substitute the phrase "the author of Waverley." The meaning of the denoting phrase is only found when we interpret the proposition as a whole, and cannot be found in any of its parts.
My problem is, I don't know what it means to say ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Dave S. Henley, 2012-02-09 : Dear Jason I think you may be right. In the applied use of logic [in which words are mixed with symbols] we often seem t... (read more)
- Charles Dyer, 2014-09-29 : I believe the best solution is to think of two layers of booleans. The lower layer consists of predicates and the upper... (read more)
- Charles Dyer, 2014-09-29 : I use the mnemonic z=(y=x) to help me negotiate the confusing aspects of propositional calculus.The statement has two lo... (read more)
- Mostofa N. Mansur, 2015-12-07 : A propositional function is an expression that contains at least one occurrence of a _free variable_; whereas a proposit... (read more)
- Jason Streitfeld, 2015-12-11 : Hi Mustafa. Thanks for contributing. Whie the free/bound distintion is a coherent one, I don't think it... (read more)
- 10 more ..
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
This much seems clear. Wittgenstein held that Christians, at some level of devoutness, should believe in the alleged historical event (believe that it actually occurred – could have been photographed, etc.) but with a sort of certainty, and fervor, that is quite inappropriate in regard to historical events in general. Something like that? I think it is clear that he did not think that they should keep the objective uncertainty of such beliefs in mind. That is to say, he was strongly opposed to what I take to be the Kierkegaardian view.Latest replies:
- Peter G. Jones, 2010-02-23 : Jim - I had read your post above, and have read more of them elsewhere. You clearly know far more than I... (read more)
- Jim Stone, 2010-02-23 : Thank you. Most kind. Buddhism can be viewed as many things, of course; a philosophy of life, etc. But I do think, for t... (read more)
- Hugh Chandler, 2010-02-23 : One of the central claims of my paper is that some genuine religious beliefs are ‘risky'.’ It is a mistake to think... (read more)
- Jim Stone, 2010-02-23 : Definitely risky. It is certainly possible that there is no such state as Nirvana. It is possible that no one has attain... (read more)
- Peter G. Jones, 2010-02-24 : Thank you for being tolerant of my earlier wildness.& It's possible that I have an unusual take on this.&n... (read more)
- 16 more ..
2009-08-11That's an interesting myth-busting. However, the subject might gain from a deeper discussion. I don't really understand what Hegel's rhetoric would be in such a context: why does he even take the Timaeus' series, and why the change in it? If he's not happy with aprioristic thinking, why does he use it? Is it a form of sarcasm, or a reductio ad absurdum?
University of SzczecinHere is a bit of background: I came across Millican's 1994 paper over the weekend while I was independently researching the philosophy of P.F. Strawson online. (My resources are quite limited, incidentally.) I only last week learned of Strawson via the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy while I was looking for interpretations of the Liar's Paradox, and I was struck by an apparent similarity between his and my own. My interest in Strawson was furthered when I came across the first four pages of "On Referring," in which he claims that expressions do not refer, but that people can refer using expressions. (This is the idea Millican indicates as Strawson's distinction between sentences and statements, where the latter is determined by a sentence's usage.) This Wittgensteinian notion had occured to me only days earlier, and is what led me to formulate my own arguments about the Liar's Paradox. In fact, I had written virtually the exact same sentence as Strawson to express t
he same id ... (read more)Latest replies:
- Jason Streitfeld, 2009-11-19 : I don't see where Strawson stakes out the position you are attributing to him. Perhaps you do not mean to attr... (read more)
- Jim Stone, 2009-11-20 : Right, I am trying to explicate Millican's account of Strawson, not Strawson, and I am in no position now to check S... (read more)
- Jim Stone, 2009-11-20 : Just to add that Millican lists in his bibliography: Strawson P.F. (1971). Logico-Linguistic Papers, London: Methu... (read more)
- Jason Streitfeld, 2009-11-22 : I've gone through Millican and Wolfram more closely, and I think I have a better grasp of what's going on. My or... (read more)
- Jason Streitfeld, 2009-11-22 : Just two small clarifications of my last post. I wrote, "It is not that a sentence is _analytically true_ if... (read more)
- 6 more ..
2009-02-24Mark Stanley Frankel
University of Wales LampeterThis is a good attempt from an analytical perspective to examine an interpretation of Kant which has tended to be the preserve of Continental philosophers. However, it seems to have generated little comment that I can trace. Imagination is the faculty of the gaps in Kant's epistemology - an uncomfortable position if Kant is to be seen as a cognitive realist. But the transcendental component of his dualism is perhaps a matter ultimately of imagination so Gibbons' work is a useful balance to interpretations of Kant which emphasise his attempt to defeat Humean scepticism.
I am looking for feedback on this paper. I have never sent anything (except book notes) to be published because I have never felt that my work was up to standard. I do not want to publish something that will not be read or that will not provide some inspiration and interest when read. If you feel you can provide constructive criticism, then please do so.
All the best,
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