Animalism and Personal Ontology

Compiled by Andrew M. Bailey (Yale-NUS College)
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  1.  75
    Were You a Zygote?G. E. M. Anscombe - 1984 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 18:111-115.
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  2. Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.
    : A key consideration in favour of animalism—the thesis that persons like you and me are identical to the animals we walk around with—is that it avoids a too many thinkers problem that arises for non-animalist positions. The problem is that it seems that any person-constituting animal would itself be able to think, but if wherever there is a thinking person there is a thinking animal distinct from it then there are at least two thinkers wherever there is a thinking (...)
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  3. Functionalism and Thinking Animals.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354.
    Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the (...)
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  4. Locke: Epistemology and Ontology.Michael Ayers - 1991 - Routledge.
    This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.
     
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  5. On the Concept of a Spirit.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Religious Studies 53 (4):449-457.
    Substance dualism is on the move. Though the view remains unfashionable, a growing and diverse group of philosophers endorse it on impressive empirical, religious, and purely metaphysical grounds. In this note, I develop and evaluate one conceptual argument for substance dualism. According to that argument, we may derive a conclusion about our nature from the mere fact that we have the concept of a spirit. The argument is intriguing and fruitful; but I shall contend that it is, nonetheless, unsound.
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  6. Composition and the Cases.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):453-470.
    Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition. And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate (...)
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  7. Persons, Animals, Ourselves, by Paul F. Snowdon. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):411-414.
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  8. The Feeling Body. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (4):816-817.
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  9. You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
    According to the doctrine of animalism, we are animals in the primary and non-derivative sense. In this article, I introduce and defend a novel argument for the view.
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  10. Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...)
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  11. The Priority Principle.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):163-174.
    I introduce and argue for a Priority Principle, according to which we exemplify certain of our mental properties in the primary or non-derivative sense. I then apply this principle to several debates in the metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
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  12. The Elimination Argument.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):475-482.
    Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated.
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  13. You Needn't Be Simple.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):145-160.
    Here's an interesting question: what are we? David Barnett has claimed that reflection on consciousness suggests an answer: we are simple. Barnett argues that the mereological simplicity of conscious beings best explains the Datum: that no pair of persons can itself be conscious. In this paper, I offer two alternative explanations of the Datum. If either is correct, Barnett's argument fails. First, there aren't any such things as pairs of persons. Second, consciousness is maximal; no conscious thing is a proper (...)
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  14. How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
    Arguments for substance dualism—the theory that we are at least partly non-material beings—abound. Many such arguments begin with our capacity to engage in conscious thought and end with dualism. Such are familiar. But there is another route to dualism. It begins with our moral value and ends with dualism. In this article, we develop and assess the prospects for this new style of argument. We show that, though one extant version of the argument does not succeed, there may yet be (...)
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  15. No Pairing Problem.Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke van Horn - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum (...)
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  16. Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):7-15.
    Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers to real (...)
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  17. Technology and the Future of Persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - The Monist 96 (1):37-53.
  18. What Does It Mean to Be One of Us?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - Journal of Anthropological Psychology 10:9-11.
    Bransen takes the first question to pose ―the problem of man‘s uniqueness,‖ and his ultimate aim is to dissolve that problem. His method of dissolving it is by way of a detailed answer to the second question, which is the most fundamental. I want to show that Bransen‘s answer to the second question actually provides an answer to each of the other questions, and that instead of dissolving the problem of man‘s uniqueness (posed by question #1), what he offers is (...)
     
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  19. Persons and Other Things.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
    In the large recent literature on the nature of human persons, persons are usually studied in isolation from the world in which they live. What persons are most fundamentally, philosophers say, are human animals, or brains, or perhaps souls -- without any consideration of the social and physical environments without which persons would not exist. In this article, I want to compensate for such overly narrow focus. Instead of beginning with the nature of persons cut off from any environment, I (...)
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  20. Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.
    Theories of the human person differ greatly in their ability to underwrite a metaphysics of resurrection. This paper compares and contrasts a number of such views in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection. In a Christian framework, resurrection requires that the same person who exists on earth also exists in an afterlife, that a postmortem person be embodied, and that the existence of a postmortem person is brought about by a miracle. According to my view of persons (the Constitution (...)
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  21. When Does a Person Begin?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
    According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, (...)
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  22. The Ontological Status of Persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll (...)
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  23.  71
    Material Persons and the Doctrine of Resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (2):151-167.
    Many Christians assume that there are only two possibilities for what a human person is: either Animalism (the view that we are fundamentally animals) or Immaterialism (the view that we are fundamentally immaterial souls). I set out a third possibility: the Constitution View (the view that we are material beings, constituted by bodies but not identical to the bodies that now constitute us.) After setting out and briefly defending the Constitution View, I apply it to the doctrine of resurrection. I (...)
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  24. Why Constitution is Not Identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599-621.
  25.  67
    The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations Into the Existence of the Soul.Mark C. Baker & Stewart Goetz (eds.) - 2011 - Continuum Press.
    Presents views from an interdisciplinary team of scholars addressing questions about the existence and nature of the soul.
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  26. You Are Simple.David Barnett - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 161--174.
    I argue that, unlike your brain, you are not composed of other things: you are simple. My argument centers on what I take to be an uncontroversial datum: for any pair of conscious beings, it is impossible for the pair itself to be conscious. Consider, for instance, the pair comprising you and me. You might pinch your arm and feel a pain. I might simultaneously pinch my arm and feel a qualitatively identical pain. But the pair we form would not (...)
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  27. The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind.David Barnett - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.
    Huxley’s Explanatory Gap: There can be no explanation of how states of consciousness arise from interaction among a collection of physical things.
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  28. Animals, Identity and Persistence.Christopher Belshaw - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):401 - 419.
    A number of claims are closely connected with, though logically distinct from, animalism. One is that organisms cease to exist when they die. Two others concern the relation of the brain, or the brainstem, to animal life. One of these holds that the brainstem is necessary for life?more precisely, that (say) my cat's brainstem is necessary for my cat's life to continue. The other is that it is sufficient for life?more precisely, that so long as (say) my cat's brainstem continues (...)
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  29. Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...)
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  30. A New Argument for Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):685-690.
    The view known as animalism asserts that we are human animals—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the thinking animal argument . But this argument has recently come under attack. So, here, a new argument for animalism is introduced. The animal ancestors argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen to piggyback on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two objections are then considered and answered.
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  31. Animalism and Personal Identity.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.
    After motivating the general problem of personal identity and considering several possible accounts, this entry reviews a variety of arguments for and against the animalist criterion of personal identity.
     
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  32. Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.
    The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I (...)
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  33. Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - In A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.
    This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.
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  34. The Human Person: Animal and Spirit.David Braine - 1992 - University of Notre Dame Press.
     
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  35.  94
    Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects.Jeffrey E. Brower - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Jeffrey E. Brower presents and explains the hylomorphic conception of the material world developed by Thomas Aquinas, according to which material objects are composed of both matter and form. In addition to presenting and explaining Aquinas's views, Brower seeks wherever possible to bring them into dialogue with the best recent literature on related topics. Along the way, he highlights the contribution that Aquinas's views make to a host of contemporary metaphysical debates, including the nature of change, composition, material constitution, the (...)
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  36. Thinking Animals and Epistemology.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):310-314.
    We consider one of Eric Olson's chief arguments for animalism about personal identity: the view that we are each identical to a human animal. The argument was originally given in Olson's book The Human Animal . Olson's argument presupposes an epistemological premise which we examine in detail. We argue that the premise is implausible and that Olson's defense of animalism is therefore in trouble.
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  37. Surviving Resurrection.A. Buckareff Andrei & Wagenen Joel S. Van - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123 - 139.
    In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render (...)
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  38. Dion, Theon, and the Many-Thinkers Problem.Michael B. Burke - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):242–250.
    Dion is a full-bodied man. Theon is that part of him which consists of all of him except his left foot. What becomes of Dion and Theon when Dion’s left foot is amputated? In Burke 1994, employing the doctrine of sortal essentialism, I defended a surprising position last defended by Chrysippus: that Dion survives while the seemingly unscathed Theon perishes. This paper defends that position against objections by Stone, Carter, Olson, and others. Most notably, it offers a novel, conservative solution (...)
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  39. Is My Head a Person?Michael B. Burke - 2003 - In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 107-125.
    It is hard to see why the head and other brain-containing parts of a person are not themselves persons, or at least thinking, conscious beings. Some theorists have sought to reconcile us to the existence of thinking person-parts. Others have sought ways to avoid them, but have relied on radical theories at odds with the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. This paper offers a novel, conservative solution, one on which the heads and other brain-containing parts of persons do (...)
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  40.  40
    Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism.Michael B. Burke - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):457 - 467.
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  41. Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle.Michael B. Burke - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):129-139.
    Dion is a full-bodied man. Theon is that part of him which consists of all of him except his left foot. What becomes of Dion and Theon when Dion’s left foot is amputated? Employing the doctrine of sortal essentialism, I defend a surprising answer last defended by Chrysippus: that Dion survives while the seemingly unscathed Theon perishes. For replies to critics, see my publications of 1997 and (especially) 2004.
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  42. Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions.Michael B. Burke - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):591-624.
    This article offers a novel, conservative account of material constitution, one that incorporates sortal essentialism and features a theory of dominant sortals. It avoids coinciding objects, temporal parts, relativizations of identity, mereological essentialism, anti-essentialism, denials of the reality of the objects of our ordinary ontology, and other departures from the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. Defenses of the account against important objections are found in Burke 1997, 2003, and 2004, as well as in the often neglected six paragraphs (...)
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  43.  75
    Are We Our Brains?Stephen Burwood - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):113-133.
    My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...)
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  44. Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning.Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.
    We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism —the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning : dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
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  45.  2
    Review: 'Partist' Resistance to the Many. [REVIEW]W. R. Carter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):713 - 723.
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  46.  53
    Many Minds, No Persons.W. R. Carter - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70.
    Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a (...)
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  47. Will I Be a Dead Person?W. R. Carter - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167 - 171.
    Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson’s favored Biological View of personal identity.
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  48. Why Personal Identity is Animal Identity.W. R. Carter - 1990 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 11:71-81.
     
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  49. How to Change Your Mind.W. R. Carter - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):1 - 14.
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  50.  90
    Our Bodies, Our Selves.W. R. Carter - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):308-319.
  51.  30
    Death and Bodily Transfiguration.W. R. Carter - 1984 - Mind 93 (371):412-418.
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  52.  35
    Do Zygotes Become People?W. R. Carter - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):77-95.
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  53.  11
    Once and Future Persons.W. R. Carter - 1980 - American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1):61 - 66.
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  54. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1976 - Open Court.
  55.  16
    Rethinking Human Nature.Kevin Corcoran - 2006 - Grand Rapids: Mich.: Baker Academic.
    Presents a new way of looking at what it means to be human, offering a convincing case that humans are more than immaterial souls or "biological computers".
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  56. Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons.Kevin Corcoran (ed.) - 2001 - Cornell University Press.
    This collection brings together cutting-edge research on the metaphysics of human nature and soul-body dualism.Kevin Corcoran's collection, Soul, Body, and ...
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  57.  52
    Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation.Kevin Corcoran - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):1-20.
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  58. Animalism and Deferentialism.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):605-609.
    Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory neo-Lockean constitutionalism or Lockeanism for short. Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism. In this note, we present our own objection to Blatti's argument, and (...)
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  59.  87
    I Think, Therefore I Persist.Matt Duncan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):740-756.
    Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2 + 2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2 + 2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal (...)
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  60.  84
    A Challenge to Anti-Criterialism.Matt Duncan - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):283-296.
    Most theists believe that they will survive death. Indeed, they believe that any given person will survive death and persist into an afterlife while remaining the very same person. In light of this belief, one might ask: how—or, in virtue of what—do people survive death? Perhaps the most natural way to answer this question is by appealing to some general account of personal identity through time. That way one can say that people persist through the time of their death in (...)
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  61.  49
    Animalism and the Persistence of Human Organisms.John Dupré - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):6-23.
    Humans are a kind of animal, and it is a natural and sensible idea that the way to understand what it is for a human person to persist over time is to reflect on what it is for an animal to persist. This paper accepts this strategy. However, especially in the light of a range of recent biological findings, the persistence of animals turns out to be much more problematic than is generally supposed. The main philosophical premise of the paper (...)
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  62. The Termination Thesis.Fred Feldman - 2000 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):98–115.
    The Termination Thesis (or “TT”) is the view that people go out of existence when they die. Lots of philosophers seem to believe it. Epicurus, for example, apparently makes use of TT in his efforts to show that it is irrational to fear death. He says, “as long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist.”1 Lucretius says pretty much the same thing, but in many more words and more poetically: “Death (...)
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  63.  74
    The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind.John Foster - 1991 - Routledge.
    Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self. John Foster's new book exposes the inadequacies (...)
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  64. Some Thoughts on Animalism.Brian Garrett - 2003 - In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 1--41.
     
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  65.  58
    Think Twice, It's All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self.Alexander Geddes - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):371-380.
    According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases—cases in which a human animal lacks some form of mental unity—are often thought to pose a problem for animalism. Tim Bayne (2010) has recently offered some novel arguments against animalism based on one particular disunity case, namely Cerberus: a single animal with two heads, each housing its own stream of consciousness. I show that Bayne's arguments are flawed, and that animalism is capable of handling the (...)
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  66. Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.
    Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what (...)
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  67.  34
    Brains, Neuroscience, and Animalism: On the Implications of Thinking Brains.Carl Gillett - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):41-52.
    The neuroscience revolution has led many scientists to posit “expansive” or “thinking” brains that instantiate rich psychological properties. As a result, some scientists now even claim you are identical to such a brain. However, Eric Olson has offered new arguments that thinking brains cannot exist due to their intuitively “abominable” implications. After situating the commitment to thinking brains in the wider scientific discussions in which they are posited, I then critically assess Olson's arguments against such entities. Although highlighting an important (...)
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  68. What You Are and the Evolution of Organs, Souls and Superorganisms: A Reply to Blatti.Carl Gillett - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):271-279.
    Stephan Blatti claims to have a new line of reasoning using evolutionary theory that resolves arguments over our deeper natures in favor of the Animalist position that we are identical to Homo sapiens organisms. Blatti thus raises an important question about which views of what we are can take us to be evolved. However, in this response I show that Blatti’s argument using evolution is based upon a false assumption about contemporary biology. I highlight how a better understanding of evolutionary (...)
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  69.  59
    Personhood, Potentiality, and Normativity.Michael Gorman - 2011 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):483-498.
    The lives of persons are valuable, but are all humans persons? Some humans—the immature, the damaged, and the defective—are not capable, here and now, of engaging in the rational activities characteristic of persons, and for this reason, one might call their personhood into question. A standard way of defendingit is by appeal to potentiality: we know they are persons because we know they have the potentiality to engage in rational activities. In this paper I develop acomplementary strategy based on normativity. (...)
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  70.  76
    The Engines of the Soul.William D. Hart - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Dr Hart sets out to answer this question by showing that the issue is as much about the nature of causation as it is about the natures of mind and matter.
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  71. Persons and the Unity of Consciousness.William Hasker - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
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  72. The Emergent Self.William Hasker - 2001 - Cornell University Press.
    In The Emergent Self, William Hasker joins one of the most heated debates in contemporary analytic philosophy, that over the nature of mind.
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  73.  91
    The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection.David Hershenov - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):24-36.
    If one does not possess an immaterial and immortal soul, then the prospect of conscious experience after death would appear to depend upon the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of one’s biological life.[i] By “resurrection,” I don’t mean just the possibility that a dead but still existing and well preserved individual could be brought back to life. My contention is that the human organism can even cease to exist, perhaps as a result of cremation or extensive decay, and yet still (...)
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  74. Four-Dimensional Animalism.David B. Hershenov - forthcoming - In Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity.
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  75.  76
    Who Doesn't Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?David B. Hershenov - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):203.
    Animalists accuse the advocates of psychological approaches of identity of having to suffer a Problem of Too Many Thinkers. Eric Olson, for instance, is an animalist who maintains that if the person is spatially coincident but numerically distinct from the animal, then provided that the person can use its brain to think, so too can the physically indistinguishable animal. However, not all defenders of psychological views of identity assume the spatial coincidence of the person and the animal. Jeff McMahan and (...)
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  76. Personal Identity.David B. Hershenov - 2012 - In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. pp. 198.
     
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  77.  71
    Soulless Organisms?: Hylomorphism Vs. Animalism.David B. Hershenov - 2011 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):465-482.
    It is worthwhile comparing Hylomorphic and Animalistic accounts of personal identity since they both identify the human animal and the human person.The topics of comparison will be three: The first is accounting for our intuitions in cerebrum transplant and irreversible coma cases. Hylomorphism, unlike animalism, appears to capture “commonsense” beliefs here, preserves the maxim that identity matters, and does not run afoul of the Only x and y rule. The next topic of comparison reveals how the rival explanations of transplants (...)
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  78.  15
    Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons.David B. Hershenov - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (2):291.
    ABSTRACT: There are some problems with Lynne Baker’s constitution account of personal identity that become evident when we consider brain transplant thought experiments and two kinds of rare cases of conjoined twins — the first appears to be one organism but two persons and the second seems to involve two organisms associated with one person. To handle the problems arising from brain transplants, the constitution theorist must admit an additional level of constitution between the organism and the person. To resolve (...)
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  79. A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity.David B. Hershenov - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3):481-502.
    Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity, which maintain that psychology is irrelevant to our persistence, andneo-Lockean accounts, which deny that humans are animals. This paper provides a Thomistic account that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones. This account does not have to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity which matters in survival, or countenance the puzzles of (...)
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  80.  45
    Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers.David B. Hershenov - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:225-236.
    Shoemaker maintains that when a functionalist theory of mind is combined with his belief about individuating properties and the well-known cerebrumtransplant thought experiment, the resulting position will be a version of the psychological approach to personal identity that can avoid The Problem of Too Many Thinkers. I maintain that the costs of his solution—that the human animal is incapable of thought—are too high. Shoemaker also has not provided an argumentagainst there existing a merely conscious being that is not essentially self-conscious (...)
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  81. Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms.David B. Hershenov - 2005 - Theoria 71 (1):29-37.
    Defenders of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity (PAPI) insist that the possession of some kind of mind is essential to us. We are essentially thinking beings, not living creatures. We would cease to exist if our capacity for thought was irreversibly lost due to a coma or permanent vegetative state. However, the onset of such conditions would not mean the death of an organism. It would survive in a mindless state. But this would appear to mean that before the (...)
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  82.  98
    Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection.David B. Hershenov - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (4):451-469.
    Peter van Inwagen's brand of materialism leads him to speculate that God actually removes the deceased at the moment of death and replaces the corpse with a simulacrum that decays or is cremated. Dean Zimmerman offers an account of resurrection that is loyal to Peter van Inwagen's commitment to a materialist metaphysics, with its stress on the earlier life processes of an organism immanently causing its later ones, while maintaining that resurrection is possible without involving God in any ‘body snatching’. (...)
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  83.  79
    Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?David B. Hershenov - 2001 - Mind 114 (453):31-59.
    One reason why the Biological Approach to personal identity is attractive is that it doesn’t make its advocates deny that they were each once a mindless fetus.[i] According to the Biological Approach, we are essentially organisms and exist as long as certain life processes continue. Since the Psychological Account of personal identity posits some mental traits as essential to our persistence, not only does it follow that we could not survive in a permanently vegetative state or irreversible coma, but it (...)
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  84.  32
    Split Brains: No Headache for the Soul Theorist.David B. Hershenov & Adam P. Taylor - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (4):487-503.
    Split brains that result in two simultaneous streams of consciousness cut off from each other are wrongly held to be grounds for doubting the existence of the divinely created soul. The mistake is based on two related errors: first, a failure to appreciate the soul's dependence upon neurological functioning; second, a fallacious belief that if the soul is simple, i.e. without parts, then there must be a unity to its thought, all of its thoughts being potentially accessible to reflection or (...)
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  85.  41
    Explaining Why This Body Gives Rise to Me Qua Subject Instead of Someone Else : An Argument for Classical Substance Dualism.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):431 - 448.
    Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else.In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on the (...)
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  86. I Am Not an Animal.Hud Hudson - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press. pp. 216--34.
     
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  87. A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Hud Hudson - 2001 - Cornell University Press.
    Introduction In the first four chapters of this book, I develop and defend a monistic account of human persons according to which human persons are highly ...
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  88.  12
    What Do We Refer to When We Say “I”?Peter van Inwagen - 2002 - In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 175-189.
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  89.  89
    Hylomorphism and the Metaphysics of Structure.William Jaworski - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (2):179-201.
    Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle; it accounts for what things are and what they can do. My goal is to articulate a metaphysic of hylomorphic structure different from those currently on offer. It is based on a substance-attribute ontology that takes properties to be powers and tropes. Hylomorphic structures emerge, on this account, as powers to configure the materials that compose individuals.
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  90.  73
    Hylomorphism.William Jaworski - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:173-187.
    “Hylomorphism” has recently become a buzzword in metaphysics. Kit Fine, Kathryn Koslicki, and Mark Johnston, among others, have argued that hylomorphism provides an account of parthood and material constitution that has certain advantages over its competitors. But what exactly is it, and what are its implications for an account of what we are? Hylomorphism, I argue, is fundamentally a claim about structure. It says that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. I argue that hylomorphism is compatible with physicalism, (...)
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  91.  83
    Hylomorphism and Post-Cartesian Philosophy of Mind.William Jaworski - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:209-224.
    Descartes developed a compelling characterization of mental and physical phenomena which has remained more or less canonical for Western philosophy ever since. The greatest testament to the power of Cartesian thinking is its ubiquity. Even philosophers who are critical of post-Cartesian anthropology (philosophers,for instance, who are self-professed exponents of one or another form of hylomorphism) nevertheless tacitly endorse Cartesian assumptions. Part of what leads to this strange inconsistency is that by and large philosophers no longer know what a non-Cartesian anthropology (...)
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  92.  58
    Hylomorphism and Mental Causation.William Jaworski - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:201-216.
    Mind-body problems are predicated on two things: a distinction between the mental and the physical, and premises that make it difficult to see how the two are related. Before Descartes there were no mind-body problems of the sort now forming the stock in trade of philosophy of mind. One possible explanation for this is that pre-Cartesian philosophers working in the Aristotelian tradition had a different way of understanding the mental-physical distinction, the nature of causation, and the character of psychological discourse, (...)
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  93. Hylomorphism and the Mind-Body Problem.William Jaworski - 2004 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:178-192.
    The dualist-materialist dichotomy can be understood in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims: materialism, mental realism, and antireductionism.At one time, functionalism seemed capable of resolving the apparent inconsistency, but recent work in the philosophy of mind suggests it cannot. Functionalism’sfailure invites exploration into alternative strategies for resolution, one of which is suggested by Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The latter rejects PostulationalRealism, a semantic model for psychological discourse endorsed by regnant forms of dualism and materialism, as well as by functionalism. Several (...)
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  94.  56
    Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move.William Jaworski - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308.
    The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay ofanti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctionsof physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to be desired. (...)
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  95.  98
    What is Animalism?Jens Johansson - 2007 - Ratio 20 (2):194–205.
  96. Human Beings Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal.Mark Johnston - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:33-74.
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  97. Hylomorphism.Mark Johnston - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):652-698.
  98. Constitution is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):89-106.
  99. Human Beings.Mark Johnston - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (February):59-83.
  100. The Structure of Objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    The objects we encounter in ordinary life and scientific practice - cars, trees, people, houses, molecules, galaxies, and the like - have long been a fruitful source of perplexity for metaphysicians. The Structure of Objects gives an original analysis of those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in our ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. Koslicki focuses on material objects in particular, or, as metaphysicians like to call them "concrete particulars", i.e., objects which occupy a single region of (...)
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  101.  83
    Self-Made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
    The Problem of Overlappers is a puzzle about what makes it the case, and how we can know, that we have the parts we intuitively think we have. In this paper, I develop and motivate an overlooked solution to this puzzle. According to what I call the self-making view it is within our power to decide what we refer to with the personal pronoun ‘I’, so the truth of most of our beliefs about our parts is ensured by the very (...)
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  102. Is There a Conservative Solution to the Many Thinkers Problem?David Mark Kovacs - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):275-290.
    On a widely shared assumption, our mental states supervene on our microphysical properties – that is, microphysical supervenience is true. When this thesis is combined with the apparent truism that human persons have proper parts, a grave difficulty arises: what prevents some of these proper parts from being themselves thinkers as well? How can I know that I am a human person and not a smaller thinker enclosed in a human person? Most solutions to this puzzle make radical, if not (...)
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  103. Is Personal Identity Analysable?Simon Langford - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):309-316.
    Trenton Merricks has argued that given endurantism personal identity is unanalysable in terms of psychological continuity, while Anthony Brueckner has argued against this claim. This article shows that neither philosopher has made a compelling case and also shows what it would take to settle the issue either way. It is then argued that whether personal identity is analysable or not may not be of crucial importance to those wanting to defend a psychological continuity approach to personal identity.
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  104.  72
    On What We Are and How We Persist.Simon Langford - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):356-371.
    This article defends novel approaches to what we are and how we persist. First it is claimed that we have disjunctive persistence conditions: we can persist by way of either biological continuity or psychological continuity. Then it is claimed that we are neither human beings nor persons essentially. Rather, we are essentially bio-psycho-continuers, a concept to be explained along the way. A variety of objections are considered and found wanting.
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  105. Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
  106.  57
    Twinning, Inorganic Replacement, and the Organism View.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):59-72.
    In explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while (...)
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  107.  93
    The Organism View Defended.S. Matthew Liao - 2006 - The Monist 89 (3):334-350.
    What are you and I essentially? When do you and I come into and go out of existence? A common response is that we are essentially organisms, that is, we come into existence as organisms and go out of existence when we cease to be organisms. Jeff McMahan has put forward two arguments against the Organism View: the case of dicephalus and a special case of hemispheric commissurotomy. In this paper, I defend the Organism View against these two cases. Because (...)
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  108.  65
    You 'Re an Animal, Plain and Simple'.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2014 - Think 13 (36):61-70.
    In this essay, I argue that we are merely biological organisms. This view (animalism) explains everyday practices like watching ourselves in the mirror. The claim that we are psychological in nature cannot explain something as trivial as watching ourselves in the mirror. Thus, we should accept animalism.
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  109.  25
    Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2012 - Prolegomena 11 (2):169-180.
  110. The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body.Douglas C. Long - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the (...)
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  111. Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self.E. J. Lowe - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
     
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  112.  23
    Persimals.Steven Luper - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):140-162.
    What sort of thing, fundamentally, are you and I? For convenience, I use the term persimal to refer to the kind of thing we are, whatever that kind turns out to be. Accordingly, the question is, what are persimals? One possible answer is that persimalhood consists in being a human animal, but many theorists, including Derek Parfit and Jeff McMahan, not to mention John Locke, reject this idea in favor of a radically different view, according to which persimalhood consists in (...)
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  113. Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):369-376.
    In ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo‐Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo‐Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo‐Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and that Noonan’s (...)
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  114. Personal Identity and Dead People.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-42.
  115. Problems From Locke.J. L. Mackie - 1976 - Clarendon Press.
    Annotation In this book Mr. Mackie selects for critical discussion six related topic which are prominent in John Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding: ...
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  116. Property Dualism and Substance Dualism.Penelope Mackie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
    I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of ‘garden variety’ material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the ‘speculative materialism’ that is (...)
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  117. The Persistence of Animate Organisms.Rory Madden - manuscript
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  118. Thinking Parts.Rory Madden - forthcoming - In Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
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  119.  43
    The Place of The Self in Contemporary Metaphysics.Rory Madden - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:77-95.
    I explain why the compositionalist conception of ordinary objects prevalent in contemporary metaphysics places the manifest image of the human self in a precarious position: the two theoretically simplest views of the existence of composites each jeopardize some central element of the manifest image. I present an alternative, nomological conception of ordinary objects, which secures the manifest image of the human self without the arbitrariness that afflicts compositionalist attempts to do the same. I close by sketching the consequences of the (...)
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  120.  91
    The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject.Rory Madden - 2015 - Noûs 49 (1):55-70.
    What does our naïve conception of a conscious subject demand of the nature of conscious beings? In a series of recent papers David Barnett has argued that a range of powerful intuitions in the philosophy of mind are best explained by the hypothesis that our naïve conception imposes a requirement of mereological simplicity on the nature of conscious beings. It is argued here that there is a much more plausible explanation of the intuitions in question. Our naïve conception of a (...)
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  121. Intention and the Self.Rory Madden - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
    Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a (...)
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  122. Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity.Ned Markosian - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (S1):16-22.
  123.  19
    The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity.Raymond Martin & John Barresi - 2006 - Columbia University Press.
    Raymond Martin and John Barresi trace the development of Western ideas about personal identity and reveal the larger intellectual trends, controversies, and ideas that have revolutionized the way we think about ourselves.
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  124. Reductionism and the First Person.John McDowell - 1997 - In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. pp. 230--50.
     
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  125.  24
    We Are Human Beings.Andrew McGee - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (2):148-171.
    In this paper, I examine Jeff McMahan’s arguments for his claim that we are not human organisms, and the arguments of Derek Parfit to the same effect in a recent paper. McMahan uses these arguments to derive conclusions concerning the moral status of embryos and permanent vegetative state patients. My claim will be that neither thinker has successfully shown that we are not human beings, and therefore these arguments do not establish the ethical conclusions that McMahan has sought to draw (...)
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  126.  17
    The Ethics of Killing.Jeff Mcmahan - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):477-490.
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  127. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.Jeff McMahan - 2002 - Oup Usa.
    This magisterial work is the first comprehensive study of the ethics of killing, where the moral status of the individual is uncertain or controversial. Drawing on philosophical notions of personal identity and the wrongness of killing, McMahan looks carefully at a host of practical issues including abortion, infanticide, the killing of animals, assisted suicide and euthanasia.
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  128. Materialism Does Not Save the Phenomena and the Alternative Which Does.Uwe Meixner - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
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  129. The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psychophysical Dualism.Uwe Meixner - 2004 - Mentis.
    This book is intended as a comprehensive defense of psycho-physical dualism. It gives answers to the question of what dualism may consist in, and inquires into the broadly cultural motivation behind accepting dualism or its opponent physicalism. Arguments for dualism, among them strengthened versions of the famous classical arguments, are presented and defended against objections. Moreover, the various general objections to dualism are criticized in detail, for example, the allegation that dualism is of an anti-scientific nature. The book issues into (...)
     
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  130. Animalism and Person as a Basic Sort.Roger Melin - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):69-86.
    In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism it will be argued (...)
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  131. Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
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  132.  98
    Realism About Personal Identity Over Time.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):173 - 187.
  133. Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
    This paper argues that if persons last over time by “enduring”, then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in tenus of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in tenus of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyses of personal identity---as we must if persons endure---Parfit’s argument for the claim that identity does (...)
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  134.  14
    Review of Jonathan Dancy's (Ed.) Reading Parfit. [REVIEW]Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):422-425.
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  135. There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time.Trenton Merricks - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):106-124.
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  136. Fission and Personal Identity Over Time.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2):163-186.
  137. A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism.Trenton Merricks - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):81-85.
  138. The Body Problem.Barbara Montero - 1999 - Noûs 33 (2):183-200.
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  139.  94
    A Conceptualist Argument for a Spiritual Substantial Soul.J. P. Moreland - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):35-43.
    I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter is metaphysically possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept (...)
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  140. Substance Dualism and the Argument From Self-Awareness.J. P. Moreland - 2011 - Philosophia Christi 13 (1):21-34.
  141. The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
    Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage point that is, in Nagel's words, "nowhere in particular". At the same time, each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world, a view that we can recognize as just one aspect of the (...)
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  142. Substance Concepts and Personal Identity.Peter Nichols - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.
    According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal , on the (...)
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  143. Intuitions About Personal Identity: An Empirical Study.Shaun Nichols & Michael Bruno - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):293-312.
    Williams (1970) argues that our intuitions about personal identity vary depending on how a given thought experiment is framed. Some frames lead us to think that persistence of self requires persistence of one's psychological characteristics; other frames lead us to think that the self persists even after the loss of one's distinctive psychological characteristics. The current paper takes an empirical approach to these issues. We find that framing does affect whether or not people judge that persistence of psychological characteristics is (...)
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  144. The Argument for Subject Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity Defended.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):702-714.
    In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument either. The discussion of this (...)
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  145. Personal Pronoun Revisionism - Asking the Right Question.Harold W. Noonan - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):316-318.
    Personal pronoun revisionism (so-called by Olson, E. 2007. What are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press) is a response to the problem of the thinking animal on behalf of the neo-Lockean theorist. Many worry about this response. The worry rests on asking the wrong question, namely: how can two thinkers that are so alike differ in this way in their cognitive capacities? This is the wrong question because they don't. The right question is: how can they (...)
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  146.  5
    Persons, Animals, and Human Beings.Harold W. Noonan - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press.
    This chapter discusses the suggestion that a psychological approach must be mistaken, because, in fact, the correct account of personal identity is given by the biological approach, according to which we are human beings whose identity over time requires no kind of psychological continuity or connectedness whatsoever. A number of authors support this suggestion, including Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and Eric Olson. This also presumes that humans, i.e. members of the species Homo sapiens, are animals of a certain kind. (...)
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  147. The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism.Harold W. Noonan - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):93-98.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  148.  20
    Personal Identity (2nd Edition).Harold W. Noonan - 2003 - Routledge.
    Personal Identity is a comprehensive introduction to the nature of the self and its relation to the body. Harold Noonan places the problem of personal identity in the context of more general puzzles about identity, discussing the major historical theories and more recent debates. The second edition of Personal Identity contains a new chapter on 'animalism' and a new section on vagueness.
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  149. Animalism Versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie.Harold W. Noonan - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):83-90.
  150. Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy.Harold W. Noonan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):302-318.
  151. Emergent Individuals.Timothy O'Connor & Jonathan D. Jacobs - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):540-555.
    We explain the thesis that human mental states are ontologically emergent aspects of a fundamentally biological organism. We then explore the consequences of this thesis for the identity of a human person over time. As these consequences are not obviously independent of one's general ontology of objects and their properties, we consider four such accounts: transcendent universals, kind-Aristotelianism, immanent universals, and tropes. We suggest there are reasons for emergentists to favor the latter two accounts. We then argue that within such (...)
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  152. Hylemorphic Dualism.David S. Oderberg - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):70-99.
    To the extent that dualism is even taken to be a serious option in contemporary discussions of personal identity and the philosophy of mind, it is almost exclusively either Cartesian dualism or property dualism that is considered. The more traditional dualism defended by Aristotelians and Thomists, what I call hylemorphic dualism, has only received scattered attention. In this essay I set out the main lines of the hylemorphic dualist position, with particular reference to personal identity. First I argue that overemphasis (...)
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  153. Johnston on Human Beings.David S. Oderberg - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (March):137-41.
  154.  91
    In Search of the Simple View.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press.
    Accounts of personal identity over time are supposed to fall into two broad categories: 'complex views' saying that our persistence consists in something else, and 'simple views' saying that it doesn' t. But it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed. After arguing for this claim, the paper says something about how the debate might be better characterized.
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  155.  36
    The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In A. Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays. Philosophia.
    In The Human Animal I argued that we are animals, and that those animals do not persist by virtue of any sort of psychological continuity. Rather, personal identity in this sense consists in having the same biological life. And I said that a human life requires a functioning brainstem. Rina Tzinman takes this and other remarks to imply that personal identity consists in the continued functioning of the brainstem, which looks clearly false. I say it doesn’t follow. But Alan Shewmon (...)
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  156. The Remnant-Person Problem.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In Stephan Blatti Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press.
    Animalism is the view that you and I are animals. That is, we are animals in the straightforward sense of having the property of being an animal, or in that each of us is identical to an animal-not merely in the derivative sense of having animal bodies, or of being "constituted by" animals. And by 'animal' I mean an organism of the animal kingdom." Sensible though it may appear, animalism is highly contentious. The most common objection is that it conflicts (...)
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  157. The Zombies Among Us.Eric T. Olson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):216-226.
    Philosophers disagree about whether there could be “zombies”: beings physically identical to normal human people but lacking consciousness. Establishing their possibility would refute physicalism. But it is seldom noted that the popular “constitution view” of human people implies that our bodies actually are zombies. This would contradict several widely held views in the philosophy of mind.
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  158. Life After Death and the Devastation of the Grave.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 409-423.
    This paper—written for nonspecialist readers—asks whether life after death is in any sense possible given the apparent fact that after we die our remains decay to the point where only randomly scattered atoms remain. The paper argues that this is possible only if our remains are not in fact dispersed in this way, and discusses how that might be the case. -/- 1. Life After Death -- 2. Total Destruction -- 3. The Soul -- 4. Body-Snatching -- 5. Radical Resurrection (...)
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  159.  58
    On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:39-56.
    Derek Parfit claims that we are not human beings. Rather, each of us is the part of a human being that thinks in the strictest sense. This is said to solve a number of difficult metaphysical problems. I argue that the view has metaphysical problems of its own, and is inconsistent with any psychological-continuity account of personal identity over time, including Parfit's own.
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  160. Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem.Eric T. Olson - 2015 - In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. pp. 21-40.
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  161.  47
    The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning.Eric T. Olson - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):24-40.
    Conjoined twinning is said to show that the number of human people—the number of us—can differ from the number of human organisms, and hence that we are not organisms. The paper shows that these arguments either assume the point at issue, rely on dubious and undefended assumptions, or add nothing to more familiar arguments for the same conclusion.
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  162. The Person and the Corpse.Eric T. Olson - 2013 - In Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oup Usa. pp. 80.
  163. The Extended Self.Eric T. Olson - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):481-495.
    The extended-mind thesis says that mental states can extend beyond one’s skin. Clark and Chalmers infer from this that the subjects of such states also extend beyond their skin: the extended-self thesis. The paper asks what exactly the extended-self thesis says, whether it really does follow from the extended-mind thesis, and what it would mean if it were true. It concludes that the extended-self thesis is unattractive, and does not follow from the extended mind unless thinking beings are literally bundles (...)
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  164.  11
    Replies.Eric T. Olson - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (S1):32-42.
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  165. What Are We?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):37-55.
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.
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  166. The Paradox of Increase.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - The Monist 89 (3):390-417.
    It seems evident that things sometimes get bigger by acquiring new parts. But there is an ancient argument purporting to show that this is impossible: the paradox of increase or growing argument.i Here is a sketch of the paradox. Suppose we have an object, A, and we want to make it bigger by adding a part, B. That is, we want to bring it about that A first lacks and then has B as a part. Imagine, then, that we conjoin (...)
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  167. Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):500-503.
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  168. Animalism and the Corpse Problem.Eric T. Olson - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74.
    The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
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  169. An Argument for Animalism.Eric T. Olson - 2003 - In John P. Lizza (ed.), Defining the Beginning and End of Life: Readings on Personal Identity and Bioethics. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    The view that we are human animals, " animalism ", is deeply unpopular. This paper explains what that claim says and why it is so contentious. It then argues that those who deny it face an awkward choice. They must either deny that there are any human animals, deny that human animals can think, or deny that we are the thinking things located where we are.
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  170. Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Personal identity deals with questions about ourselves qua people (or persons). Many of these questions are familiar ones that occur to everyone at some time: What am I? When did I begin? What will happen to me when I die? Discussions of personal identity go right back to the origins of Western philosophy, and most major figures have had something to say about it. (There is also a rich literature on personal identity in Eastern philosophy, which I am not competent (...)
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  171.  23
    Review of Hud Hudson, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person[REVIEW]Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (4).
  172. What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity?Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):682-698.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us (...)
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  173. Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):189-207.
    In this essay I explore the idea that the solution to some important problems of personal identity lies in the philosophy of language: more precisely in the nature of first-person reference. I will argue that the “linguistic solution” is at best partly successful.
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  174. A Compound of Two Substances.Eric T. Olson - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think.
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  175. There is No Problem of the Self.Eric T. Olson - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):645-657.
    Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves.
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  176.  82
    Human Atoms.Eric T. Olson - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):396-406.
    In this paper I shall explore a novel alternative to these familiar views. In his recent book Sub ects of Ex erience, E. J. Lowe argues, as many others have done before, that you and I are not animals. It follows from this, he says, that we must be simple substances without parts. That may sound like Cartesian dualism. But Lowe is no Cartesian. He argues from premises that many present-day materialists accept. And he claims that our being mereologically simple (...)
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  177. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous thought-experiments dealing (...)
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  178. Was I Ever a Fetus?Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.
    The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus--contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what (...)
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  179. Dion's Foot.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (5):260-265.
    Suppose a certain man, Dion, has his foot amputated, and lives to tell the tale. That tale involves a well-known metaphysical puzzle, for most of us assume that there was, before the operation, an object made up of all of Dion’s parts except those that overlapped with his foot-- ”all of Dion except for his foot”, we might say, or Dion’s “foot-complement”. Call that object Theon. (Anyone who doubts that there is such a thing as Dion’s undetached foot-complement may imagine (...)
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  180. Composition and Coincidence.Eric T. Olson - 1996 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):374-403.
  181. Why I Have No Hands.Eric T. Olson - 1995 - Theoria 61 (2):182-197.
    Trust me: my chair isn't big enough for two. You may doubt that every rational, conscious being is a person; perhaps there are beings that mistakenly believe themselves to be people. If so, read ‘rational, conscious being’ or the like for 'person'.
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  182. Is Psychology Relevant to Personal Identity?Eric T. Olson - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):173-186.
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  183. We Are Not Human Beings.Derek Parfit - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (1):5-28.
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  184. Persons, Bodies, and Human Beings.Derek Parfit - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell.
     
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  185. The Unimportance of Identity.Derek Parfit - 1995 - In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 13-45.
    We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. The information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and he is in (...)
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  186. Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  187. On the Importance of Self-Identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):683-90.
  188. Personal Identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
  189.  44
    Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms.Ingmar Persson - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):519-.
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  190.  61
    Materialism and Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press. pp. 99--141.
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  191. Against Materialism.Alvin Plantinga - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):3-32.
  192. The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism.Karl R. Popper & John C. Eccles - 1977 - Springer.
    Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical...
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  193. A Deflationary Theory Of Diachronic Identity.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):19 - 37.
    Substantive theories of diachronic identity have been offered for different kinds of entities. The kind of entity whose diachronic identity has received the most attention in the literature is person, where such theories as the psychological theory, the body theory, the soul theory, and animalism have been defended. At the same time, Wittgenstein's remark that ?to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say (...)
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  194. Brain Bisection and Personal Identity.Roland Puccetti - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (April):339-55.
  195. Hylomorphism Reconditioned.Michael C. Rea - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358.
    My goal in this paper is to provide characterizations of matter, form and constituency in a way that avoids what I take to be the three main drawbacks of other hylomorphic theories: (i) commitment to the universal-particular distinction; (ii) commitment to a primitive or problematic notion of inherence or constituency; (iii) inability to identify viable candidates for matter and form in nature, or to characterize them in terms of primitives widely regarded to be intelligible.
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  196. Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival.Denis Robinson - 2007 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-32.
    I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...)
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  197. Reflections on Persimals.Marya Schechtman - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):163-170.
    Steven Luper offers richly-textured arguments against the Embodied Part View developed by Jeff McMahan and offered as an answer to the “too many thinkers” problem. One of the major objections he raises is connected to McMahan's claim that the mind, and so the person, is to be identified with the part of the brain in which consciousness is directly realized. This view has the implausible consequence, Luper argues, that persons do not and cannot think or reason or have desires or (...)
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  198.  80
    Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life.Marya Schechtman - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Marya Schechtman offers a new theory of personal identity, which captures the importance of being able to reidentify people in our daily lives. She sees persons as loci of practical interaction, and defines the unity of such a locus in terms of biological, psychological, and social functions, mediated through social and cultural infrastructure.
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  199. Memory and Identity.Marya Schechtman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):65-79.
    Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I (...)
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  200. The Constitution of Selves.Marya Schechtman - 1996 - Cornell University Press.
    Marya Schechtman takes issue with analytic philosophy's emphasis on the first sort of question to the exclusion of the second.
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  201.  90
    The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity.Marya Schechtman - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):199-212.
  202. Personhood and Personal Identity.Marya Schechtman - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):71-92.
  203.  90
    Animalism and Person Essentialism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (1):53-72.
    Animalism is the view that human persons are human animals – biological organisms that belong to the species Homo sapiens. This paper concerns a family of modal objections to animalism based on the essentiality of personhood (persons and animals differ in their persistence conditions; psychological considerations are relevant for the persistence of persons, but not animals; persons, but not animals, are essentially psychological beings). Such arguments are typically used to support constitutionalism, animalism’s main neo-Lockean rival. The problem with such arguments (...)
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  204. On What We Are.Sydney Shoemaker - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article evaluates whether personal identity should be sought only in the biological or embodied existence of the person or exclusively in psychological existence. It suggests that whatever the answer turns out to be, it would involve causality. It argues against the animalist view of personal identity and defends the classical neo-Lockean view by arguing that the thick properties of person are psychological or mental ones. The author's answer to the question of what we are is in part that we (...)
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  205. Persons, Animals, and Identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 2008 - Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
    The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and (...)
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  206.  26
    Self, Body, and Coincidence.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:287-306.
  207.  78
    Critical Notice. Eric Olson, the Human Animal (New York: Oxford University Press, L997).Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):496–504.
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  208. Self and Substance.Sydney Shoemaker - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):283-304.
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  209. Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Blackwell.
  210. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1963 - Cornell University Press.
  211.  86
    The Case for Dualism.J. R. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.) - 1989 - University of Virginia Press.
  212.  42
    Animalism and the Lives of Human Animals.Paul F. Snowdon - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):171-184.
    It is suggested that the best way to interpret animalism is as an identity thesis saying that each of us is identical to an animal. Since there are disagreements about the nature of animal persistence, this means that animalism itself not does not explicitly propose criteria of identity for persons. It implies the negative claim that features that have nothing to do with animal persistence have nothing to do with our persistence. Thinking of it as an identity thesis also makes (...)
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  213. Persons, Animals, Ourselves.Paul F. Snowdon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    What kind of thing are we? Paul Snowdon's answer is that we are animals, of a sort. This view--'animalism'--may seem obvious but on the whole philosophers have rejected it. Snowdon argues that animalism is a defensible way of thinking about ourselves. Its rejection rests on the tendency when doing philosophy to mistake fantasy for reality.
     
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  214.  44
    Animalism.Paul F. Snowdon - 2010 - The Philosophers' Magazine 50:104-105.
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  215.  30
    'Persons' and Persons.Paul F. Snowdon - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (4):449-476.
    In chapter 3 of Individuals, entitled ‘Persons’, Strawson argues against dualism and the no-ownership theory, and proposes instead that our concept of a person is a primitive concept. In this paper, it is argued that the basic questions that frame Strawson’s discussion, and some of his main arguments and claims, are dubious. A general diagnosis of the source of these problems is proposed. It is argued that despite these problems Strawson gives an accurate and very insightful description of the way (...)
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  216.  24
    The Self and Personal Identity.Paul F. Snowdon - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
  217.  35
    I, Animal.Paul F. Snowdon - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 12:48-49.
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  218.  33
    Persons, Animals and Bodies.Paul F. Snowdon - 1995 - In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
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  219. Human Beings.Paul F. Snowdon - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  220.  83
    Personal Identity and Brain Transplants.Paul F. Snowdon - 1991 - In David Cockburn (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 109-126.
    My topic is personal identity, or rather, our identity. There is general, but not, of course, unanimous, agreement that it is wrong to give an account of what is involved in, and essential to, our persistence over time which requires the existence of immaterial entities, but, it seems to me, there is no consensus about how, within, what might be called this naturalistic framework, we should best procede. This lack of consensus, no doubt, reflects the difficulty, which must strike anyone (...)
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  221. Persons, Animals, and Ourselves.Paul F. Snowdon - 1990 - In Christopher Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
     
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  222. On Formulating Materialism and Dualism.Paul F. Snowdon - 1989 - In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
     
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  223.  49
    The Essentials of Persons.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):227-41.
    This paper tries to clarify the nature of philosophical questions as to the ontological nature of things, especially persons. It considers implications of an Aristotelian account, which leads to an ontology that makes subjects and other things epistemologically remote. This makes the account doubtfully reconcilable with the special epistemic relation that each of us has to oneself, via for example the cogito.
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  224. Why There Still Are No People.Jim Stone - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.
    This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that (...)
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  225. Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People.Jim Stone - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (March):519-32.
  226. Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism.Eleonore Stump - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):505-531.
    The major Western monotheisms, and Christianity in particular, are often supposed to be committed to a substance dualism of a Cartesian sort. Aquinas, however, has an account of the soul which is non-Cartesian in character. He takes the soul to be something essentially immaterial or configurational but nonetheless realized in material components. In this paper, I argue that Aquinas’s account is coherent and philosophically interesting; in my view, it suggests not only that Cartesian dualism isn’t essential to Christianity but also (...)
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  227. The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem.C. S. Sutton - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):619-639.
    Persons think. Bodies, time-slices of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is (...)
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  228.  60
    Possibilities in the Philosophy of Mind.Charles Taliaferro - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):127-37.
    This paper seeks to overturn the claim that Cartesian arguments for dualism based on the conceivable separation of person and body lack warrant, since it is just as conceivable that persons are identical with their bodies as it is that persons and their bodies are distinct. If the thesis of the paper is cogent, then it is not as easy to imagine person-body identity as many anti-Cartesians suppose.
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  229. Animals, Brains, and Spirits.Charles Taliaferro - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):567-581.
    This paper contains an overview of the significance of dualism for theism and a modal argument for dualism. It concludes with remarks on the relevance of the modal case on behalf of dualism for an intramural materialist quarrel between animalists and brain-identity theorists.
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  230. Chisholm's Idea of a Person.Richard Taylor - 1997 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 25--45.
     
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  231. People and Their Bodies.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell.
     
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  232. Ruminations on an Account of Personal Identity.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1987 - In J. J. Thomson (ed.), On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright. MIT Press. pp. 215-240.
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  233.  33
    Varieties of Animalism.Allison Krile Thornton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (9):515-526.
    Animalism in its basic form is the view that we are animals. Whether it is a thesis about anything else – like what the conditions of our persistence through time are or whether we're wholly material things – depends on the facts about the persistence conditions and ontology of animals. Thus, I will argue, there are different varieties of animalism, differing with respect to which other theses are taken in conjunction with animalism in its basic form. The different varieties of (...)
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  234.  7
    Animals and Machines: On Their Beginnings and Endings.Chris Tollefsen - 2007 - Lyceum 8:19-33.
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  235.  70
    Hylemorphism, Remnant Persons and Personhood.Patrick Toner - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):76-96.
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  236.  57
    St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers.Patrick Toner - 2012 - Modern Schoolman 89 (3-4):209-222.
    It has been argued that St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological views fall prey to the problem of “Too Many Thinkers.” The worry, roughly, is that his views entail that I—a human person—am able to think, but that my soul—which is not a human person—is also able to think. Hence, too many thinkers: there are too many ofus having my thoughts. In this paper, I show why this is not a problem for St. Thomas. Along the way, I also address Peter Unger’s (...)
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  237. Hylemorphic Animalism.Patrick Toner - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.
    Roughly, animalism is the doctrine that each of us is identical with an organism. This paper explains and defends a hylemorphic version of animalism. I show how hylemorphic animalism handles standard objections to animalism in compelling ways. I also show what the costs of endorsing hylemorphic animalism are. The paper's contention is that despite the costs, the view is worth taking seriously.
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  238. On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity.Patrick Toner - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):454-473.
    Abstract: There is no such thing as ‘the’ hylemorphic account of personal identity. There are several views that count as hylemorphic, and these views can be grouped into two main families—the corruptionist view, and the survivalist view. The differentiating factor is that the corruptionist view holds that the persistence of the soul is not sufficient for the persistence of the person, while the survivalist view holds that the persistence of the soul is sufficient for the persistence of the person. In (...)
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  239.  99
    Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.Michael Tye - 2003 - MIT Press.
    In Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, Michael Tye takes on the thorny issue of the unity of consciousness and answers these important questions: What exactly is the unity of consciousness? Can a single person have a divided consciousness? What is a single person? Tye argues that unity is a fundamental part of human consciousness -- something so basic to everyday experience that it is easy to overlook. For example, when we hear the sound of waves crashing on a beach (...)
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  240.  21
    In Defense of the Words 'Human Body'.Michael Tye - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (2):177 - 182.
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  241. Against the Brainstem View of the Persistence of Human Animals.Rina Tzinman - forthcoming - In A. Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays. Philosophia.
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  242.  58
    All the Power in the World.Peter Unger - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    This bold and original work of philosophy presents an exciting new picture of concrete reality. Peter Unger provocatively breaks with what he terms the conservatism of present-day philosophy, and returns to central themes from Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Russell. Wiping the slate clean, Unger works, from the ground up, to formulate a new metaphysic capable of accommodating our distinctly human perspective. He proposes a world with inherently powerful particulars of two basic sorts: one mental but not physical, the other (...)
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  243. Identity, Consciousness, and Value.Peter Unger - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
    The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his (...)
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  244. The Mental Problems of the Many.Peter K. Unger - 2004 - In D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  245. I Do Not Exist.Peter K. Unger - 1979 - In Graham F. Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity. Cornell University Press.
     
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  246. Why There Are No People.Peter K. Unger - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):177-222.
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  247. I See Dead People: Disembodied Souls and Aquinas’s ‘Two-Person’ Problem.Christina Van Dyke - 2014 - In Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy. pp. 25-45.
    Aquinas’s account of the human soul is the key to his theory of human nature. The soul’s nature as the substantial form of the human body appears at times to be in tension with its nature as immaterial intellect, however, and nowhere is this tension more evident than in Aquinas’s discussion of the ‘separated’ soul. In this paper I use the Biblical story of the rich man and Lazarus (which Aquinas took to involve actual separated souls) to highlight what I (...)
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  248.  53
    The End of (Human) Life as We Know It.Christina Van Dyke - 2012 - Modern Schoolman 89 (3-4):243-257.
    Is the being in an irreversible persistent vegetative state as the result of a horrible accident numerically identical to the human person, Lindsay, who existed before the accident? Many proponents of Thomistic metaphysics have argued that Aquinas’s answer to this question must be “yes.” In particular, it seems that Aquinas’s commitment to both Aristotelian hylomorphism and the unity of substantial form (viz., that each body/soul composite possesses one and only one substantial form) entails the position that the human person remains (...)
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  249.  39
    Merricks's Soulless Savior.Luke Van Horn - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):330-341.
    Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation.
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  250. A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person.Peter van Inwagen - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press.
     
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  251. The Self: The Incredulous Stare Articulated.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - Ratio 17 (4):478-491.
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  252. Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity.Peter van Inwagen - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):305-319.
  253. Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
    The topic of this book is material objects. Like most interesting concepts, the concept of a material object is one without precise boundaries.
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  254. Philosophers and the Words 'Human Body'.Peter van Inwagen - 1980 - In van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause.
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  255. In Defense of a Dualism.Richard Warner - 1994 - In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
     
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  256.  53
    Précis of Sameness and Substance Renewed. [REVIEW]David Wiggins - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):442–448.
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  257.  64
    Sameness, Substance and the Human Animal.David Wiggins - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 12 (12):50-53.
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  258. The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value.David Wiggins - 1987 - In Arthur R. Peacocke & Grant R. Gillett (eds.), Persons and Personality. Blackwell.
     
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  259.  49
    Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
  260.  68
    Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity.David Wiggins - 1967 - Blackwell.
  261. Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of personDS a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity andx dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness, and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes (...)
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  262. Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.
    A volume of philosophical studies, centred on problems of personal identity and extending to related topics in the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy.
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  263. Personal Identity and Individuation.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:229-52.
  264. Unrestricted Animalism and the Too Many Candidates Problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.
    Standard animalists are committed to a stringent form of restricted composition, thereby denying the existence of brains, hands, and other proper parts of an organism . One reason for positing this near-nihilistic ontology comes from various challenges to animalism such as the Thinking Parts Argument, the Unity Argument, and the Argument from the Problem of the Many. In this paper, I show that these putatively distinct arguments are all instances of a more general problem, which I call the ‘Too Many (...)
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  265.  83
    Thinking Animals, Disagreement, and Skepticism.Eric Yang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.
    According to Eric Olson, the Thinking Animal Argument (TAA) is the best reason to accept animalism, the view that we are identical to animals. A novel criticism has been advanced against TAA, suggesting that it implicitly employs a dubious epistemological principle. I will argue that other epistemological principles can do the trick of saving the TAA, principles that appeal to recent issues regarding disagreement with peers and experts. I conclude with some remarks about the consequence of accepting these modified principles, (...)
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  266.  47
    From Experience to Experiencer.Dean Zimmerman - 2011 - In Mark C. Baker & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations Into the Existence of the Soul. Continuum Press. pp. 168.
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  267. From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119 - 150.
    Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they (...)
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  268. Problems for Animalism.Dean Zimmerman - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (S1):23-31.
    My comments have two parts. I begin by laying out the argument that seems to me to be at the core of Olson’s thinking about human persons; and I suggest a problem with his reasons for accepting one of its premises. The premise is warranted by its platitudinous or commonsensical status; but Olson’s arguments lead him to conclusions that undermine the family of platitudes to which it belongs. Then I’ll raise a question about how Olson should construe the vagueness that (...)
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  269. The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival.Dean Zimmerman - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):194-212.
    It is not easy to be a materialist and yet believe that there is a way for human beings to survive death. Peter van Inwagen identifies the central obstacle the materialist faces: Namely, the need to posit appropriate “immanent-causal” connections between my body as it is at death and some living body elsewhere or elsewhen. I offer a proposal, consistent with van Inwagen’s own materialist metaphysics, for making materialism compatible with the possibility of survival.
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    Criteria of Identity and the 'Identity Mystics'.Dean Zimmerman - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):281 - 301.
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    Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the Soul.Dean Zimmerman - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (July):127-37.
    The most well-known arguments for the simplicity of the soul - i.e., for the thesis that the subject of psychological states must be an unextended substance -are based upon the logical possibility of disembodiment. Descartes introduced this sort of argument into modern philosophy, and a version of it has been defended recently by Richard Swinburne. Some of the underlying assumptions of both arguments are examined and defended, but a closer look reveals that each depends upon unjustified inferences from the conceivability (...)
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