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  1. added 2018-02-16
    Faster Than Thought.Thomas Metzinger - 1995 - In Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    In this speculative paper I would like to show how important the integration of mental content is for a theory of phenomenal consciousness. I will draw the reader's attention to two manifestations of this problem which already play a role in the empirical sciences concerned with consciousness: The binding problem and the superposition problem. In doing so I hope to be able to leave the welltrodden paths of the debate over consciousness. My main concern is to gain a fresh access (...)
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  2. added 2017-09-11
    There is Nothing It is Like to See Red: Holism and Subjective Experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.
    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I (...)
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  3. added 2014-03-21
    Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416.
    I defend my earlier argument for incompatibilism, against Helen Beebee’s reply. Beebee’s reply would allow one to have free will despite that nothing one does counts as an exercise of that freedom, and would grant one the ability to do A even when one’s doing A requires something to happen that one cannot bring about and that in fact will not happen.
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  4. added 2014-03-21
    Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2004 - In M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 297-339.
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises from the (...)
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  5. added 2013-10-16
    New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30.R. Stanton, M. Ezcurdia & C. Viger (eds.) - 2004 - University of Calgary Press.
  6. added 2013-01-22
    Individual Consciousness.Roderick Malcolm MacLeod - manuscript
    If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately (...)
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  7. added 2011-08-24
    Have We Vindicated the Motivational Unconscious Yet? A Conceptual Review.Alexandre Billon - 2011 - Frontiers in Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychoanalysis 2.
    Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation to some seemingly non rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the ‘cognitive unconscious’ I assess those objections. I argue that (...)
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  8. added 2010-06-22
    Wisdom: Twelve Essays.Renford Bambrough (ed.) - 1974 - Blackwell.
  9. added 2010-06-22
    Science, Perception, and Reality.Robert Colodny (ed.) - 1963 - Humanities Press/Ridgeview.
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  10. added 2009-04-06
    The Grain Problem.Michael Lockwood - 1993 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 271-291.
  11. added 2008-12-31
    Knowing Our Minds.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Boston Review.
    ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_.
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  12. added 2008-12-31
    The Contents of Phenomenal Consciousness: One Relation to Rule Them All and in the Unity Bind Them.Antti Revonsuo - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    commentary on Dainton, B. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. London: Routledge. ABSTRACT: Stream of Consciousness is a detailed and insightful analysis of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, especially its unity at a time and continuity over stretches of time. I find Dainton's approach to phenomenal consciousness in many ways sound but I also point out one major source of disgreement between us. Dainton believes that to explain phenomenal unity and continuity, no reference to anything outside (...)
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  13. added 2008-12-31
    The Particulate Instantiation of Homogeneous Pink.Austen Clark - 1989 - Synthese 80 (August):277-304.
    If one examines the sky at sunset on a clear night, one seems to see a continuum of colors from reds, oranges and yellows to a deep blue-black. Between any two colored points in the sky there seem to be other colored points. Furthermore, the changes in color across the sky appear to be continuous. Although the colors at the zenith and the horizon are obviously distinct, nowhere in the sky can one see any color borders, and every sufficiently small (...)
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  14. added 2008-12-31
    Ultimate Homogeneity: A Dialogue.Stephen Friedman - 1989 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:425-53.
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  15. added 2008-12-31
    Sellars' "Grain" Argument.William G. Lycan - 1987 - In W.G. Lycan (ed.), Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  16. added 2008-12-31
    Sellars and Sense Impressions.RobertC Richardson & Gregg Muilenburg - 1982 - Erkenntnis 17 (2):171-212.
  17. added 2008-12-31
    The Texture of Mentality.Keith Gunderson - 1974 - In Renford Bambrough (ed.), Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Blackwell.
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  18. added 2008-12-31
    Sellars' Grain Argument.Cornelius F. Delaney - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):14-16.
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  19. added 2008-12-31
    Seeing, Sense Impressions, and Sensa: A Reply to Cornman.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (March):391-447.
  20. added 2008-12-31
    Sellars, Scientific Realism, and Sensa.James W. Cornman - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):417-51.
  21. added 2008-12-31
    Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1962 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 35-78.
    The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible sense' I include such radically different items as not only 'cabbages and kings', but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death. To achieve success in philosophy would be, to use a contemporary turn of phrase, to 'know one's way around' with respect (...)
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