About this topic
Summary Qualia (singular: quale) are those properties of conscious mental states or events that determine 'what it is like' for the subject of those states or events to undergo them. Paradigm examples of qualia include the particular painfulness of some pain state, the sensation of being tickled, the taste of lemon, or the smell of fresh mown grass. Somewhat more contested examples might include 'primary qualities' presented in perception, such as shape or number; emotions such as feelings of elation or a sensation of creeping depression; or qualititive features that may accompany cognition (such as one's 'internal monologue', or the feeling of something being 'on the tip of one's tongue'). Even within the canonical range of qualia the notion is contested, and some argue that we cannot make clear sense of it at all. If it can be made sense of, then a key question is whether qualia are irreducibly nonphysical, or alternatively can be naturalised through reduction to or identification with some physical or functional property. Questions also arise about our knowledge of qualia (our own and others), and about the relationship between qualia and intentional content: qualia have often been thought of as non-intentional features of mental states, although this position has recently been widely challenged.
Key works C.I. Lewis is generally thought to have coined the term 'qualia' in Lewis 1956, while Dennett 1991 attempts to cast doubt on the coherence of the notion (and see also Rey 1998). Searle 1992 is a well known argument that all conscious mental states, including thoughts and occurrent beliefs, have a qualitative character (and see also Strawson 1994). Several lines of argument have been advanced to try and show that qualia cannot be physical, including the conceivability argument (Kripke 1980, Chalmers 1996), the knowledge argument (Nagel 1974Jackson 1982) and the explanatory gap argument (Levine 1983). Important physicalist responses include the proposal that qualia are naturalisable as a species of intentional property (e.g. Byrne 2001), and the 'phenomenal concepts' strategy that argues that the appearance of a gap between the physical and the phenomenal is merely conceptual and not ontological (Loar 1990).
Introductions Block 2004; Chalmers 1995Nagel 1974Harman 1990Dennett 1988; Shoemaker 1982
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  1. Mathematical Quality and Experiential Qualia.Posina Venkata Rayudu & Sisir Roy - manuscript
    Our conscious experiences are qualitative and unitary. The qualitative universals given in particular experiences, i.e. qualia, combine into the seamless unity of our conscious experience. The problematics of quality and cohesion are not unique to consciousness studies. In mathematics, the study of qualities (e.g., shape) resulting from quantitative variations in cohesive spaces led to the axiomatization of cohesion and quality. Using the mathematical definition of quality, herein we model qualia space as a categorical product of qualities. Thus modeled qualia space (...)
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  2. Can We Empathize With Emotions That We Have Never Felt?Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. Routledge.
    If, as argued in some simulationist accounts, empathy aims at grasping the phenomenal richness of the other’s experience and resonating with it, it is difficult to explain our empathy with emotions that we have never experienced ourselves. According to a long philosophical tradition, imagination is constrained by experience. We have to be acquainted with the qualitative feel of the other’s experience in order to imagine it. A critical view of simulationist accounts would claim that if we cannot imagine how the (...)
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  3. Die Vermessung der Seele: Geltung und Genese der Quantifizierung von Qualia.Christian Bachhiesl, Sonja Maria Bachhiesl & Stefan Köchel (eds.) - 2015 - Wien: Lit.
    Erkenntnistheoretisch gesehen ist es fraglich, ob mentale Zustände, also Qualia, materialisiert und quantifiziert werden können. Dennoch machen sich vor allem die Naturwissenschaften mit Feuereifer an die Quantifizierung von Qualia, an die Vermessung der Seele sozusagen. In diesem Band werden - aus historischer wie aktueller Perspektive - natur- und geisteswissenschaftliche Zugänge vorgestellt, interdisziplinär miteinander in Relation gesetzt und einer gründlichen epistemologischen Reflexion unterzogen.
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  4. How Self-Reference Builds the World (Part 2).Cosmin Visan - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 14 (6):460-478.
    If you were to build a world from Nothing, how would you do it? By investigating the nature of self-reference, we will show how this can be achieved, how starting from Nothing, Everything can be obtained. Various implications of the definition of self-reference will be investigated, showing how it can account for various aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness, thus showing how starting from only 1 principle, a world of infinite complexity can be obtained. Parallels with set theory will be (...)
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  5. How Self-Reference Builds the World (Part 1).Cosmin Visan - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 14 (6):443-459.
    If you were to build a world from Nothing, how would you do it? By investigating the nature of self-reference, we will show how this can be achieved, how starting from Nothing, Everything can be obtained. Various implications of the definition of self-reference will be investigated, showing how it can account for various aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness, thus showing how starting from only 1 principle, a world of infinite complexity can be obtained. Parallels with set theory will be (...)
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  6. The history of qualia and C.I. Lewis’ role in it.Jacob Browning - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (1):173-193.
    In current histories, C.I. Lewis is credited for bringing the strict concept of qualia – concerned solely with sensory states – into contemporary philosophy. It is this strict notion which is then credited with bringing in worries about inverted spectra, philosophical zombies, and the idea that we can individuate the senses introspectively. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistaken reading of Lewis and the history of qualia. I argue that the strict notion of qualia stems from the (...)
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  7. Meaning Representationalism: Between Representationalism and Qualia Realism.da Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93.
    The purpose of this article is to offer a new view of the key relation between the content and the conscious character of visual experience. The author aims to support the following claims. First, the author rejects the qualia realist claim that conscious character is an intrinsic, nonrepresentational property of visual experience, for example, a pattern of activation of neurons. However, the author also rejects the rival widespread representationalist claim that the conscious character of visual experience is identical to, or (...)
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  8. Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2020 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7.
    How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, (...)
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  9. Phänomenale Begriffe.Martina Fürst - 2019 - In Vera Hoffmann-Kolss & Nicole Rathgeb (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. J.B. Metzler. pp. 1-11..
    Viele unserer Bewusstseinszustände sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass es irgendwie für uns ist (Nagel 1974), in diesen Zuständen zu sein. In der Philosophie des Geistes werden derartige Zustände als ‚phänomenale Zustände‘ bezeichnet. ‚Phänomenale Begriffe‘ sind nun spezielle Begriffe, mittels derer wir uns auf phänomenale Zustände beziehen. Paradigmatische Beispiele für phänomenale Zustände, von denen wir einen phänomenalen Begriff besitzen können, sind das bewusste Erlebnis, die Farbe Blau zu sehen, den Klang einer Violine zu hören oder Schmerz zu fühlen. Zentral ist, dass sich (...)
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  10. Knowing qualia: reloading the displaced perception model.Roberto de Sá Pereira - 2020 - Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 7:1-7.
    How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia-beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, as (...)
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  11. Structuralist Qualia.Lucas Jon Van Houten - unknown
    Structuralist theories of properties state that properties are individuated by their nomological or causal roles. It has previously been suggested that structuralism is incompatible with robust conceptions of qualia. In this paper, I argue that structuralism should be taken as a theory of de re representation, and under this formulation it is able to accommodate qualia as intrinsic, introspectable properties of experiences. I then turn to various thought experiments used by qualia theorists to expand the notion of qualia, and find (...)
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  12. Representational Qualia Theory.Allsop Brent - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1 (2).
    This is a paper about a general representational theory of consciousness. It is quite old, and much progress has been made since. We are building and tracking consensus arround the ideas in the Representational Qualia Theory camp on Canonizer.
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  13. Personer, intentioner och qualia: en studie i Wilfrid Sellars medvetandefilosofi.Björn Haglund - 1984 - Göteborg: Institutionen för filosofi, Göteborgs universitet.
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  14. Are qualia computations or substances?Mostyn Jones & Eric LaRock - forthcoming - Mind and Matter:in press.
    Computationalism treats minds as computations. It hasn't explained how our quite similar sensory circuits encode our quite different qualia, nor how these circuits encode the binding of the different qualia into unifi ed perceptions. But there is growing evidence that qualia and binding come from neural electrochemical substances such as sensory detectors and the strong continuous electromagnetic field they create. Qualia may thus be neural substances, not neural computations (though computations may still help modulate qualia). This neuroelectrical view not only (...)
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  15. The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.
    Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...)
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  16. How to Include Qualia in Science.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    How can we expand science to include what-it’s-like information like qualia? This paper gives the beginning of one possible way forward. It is possible to include qualia in communications as their own terms.
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  17. Sensualism (the Universal Correlates of Qualia).Lorenzo Sleakes - manuscript
    It is hard to believe that colors, sounds, tastes and feelings, the essential ingredients of the world as we know it, never existed in the universe until complex nervous systems appeared. This paper explores the idea that phenomenal experiences made of sensible qualities such as colors and sounds exist physically as the “clothing” of matter and are real public appearances that may be experienced by any locally situated subject, shared by multiple such subjects, or may even exist unperceived. In this (...)
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  18. A Higher Dimension of Consciousness: Constructing an empirically falsifiable panpsychist model of consciousness.Jacob Jolij - manuscript
    Panpsychism is a solution to the mind-body problem that presumes that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality instead of a product or consequence of physical processes (i.e., brain activity). Panpsychism is an elegant solution to the mind-body problem: it effectively rids itself of the explanatory gap materialist theories of consciousness suffer from. However, many theorists and experimentalists doubt panpsychism can ever be successful as a scientific theory, as it cannot be empirically verified or falsified. In this paper, I present (...)
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  19. Dual aspect theory (Spinoza-Velmans) versus the EDWs perspective by Gabriel Vacariu (January 2023).Gabriel Vacariu - manuscript
    On January 2023, I received an email from somebody regarding Velmans’s article 2008. After I took a look at the paper, I started to read his book 2000. Therefore, in this section, I will investigate Velmans’ works from 2000 and 2008. I emphasize that the main difference between Spinoza’s (Velmans) dual aspect theory and my EDWs approach is the framework of thinking: Spinoza, Velmans and everybody until me had been working within the unicorn world (the Universe/world), while my EDWs assumes (...)
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  20. An Argument for Temporal A-theories Based on the Calculus of Qualia 12 23 2022.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    We give an argument for temporal A-theories based on the calculus of qualia.
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  21. O Canada, o quanta qualia.William K. W. Li - 2012 - Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 12 (1):1-4.
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  22. WRIGHT, E. (ed.), The Case for Qualia, MIT, Cambridge (MA), 2009, 384 pp. [REVIEW]Carlos Ortiz de Landázuri - 2009 - Anuario Filosófico 42 (3):701-704.
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  23. Idealism: putting qualia to work.Michael Pelczar - 2020 - In _Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness_. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 328-347.
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  24. Fading qualia: a response to Michael Tye.Ned Block - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  25. Naive realism" and qualia.Hilary Putnam - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  26. Revelation and the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Michelle Liu - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    It is often said that there is no appearance/reality distinction with respect to consciousness. Call this claim ‘NARD’. In contemporary discussions, NARD is closely connected to the thesis of revelation, the claim that the essences of phenomenal properties are revealed in experience, though the connection between the two requires clarification. This paper distinguishes different versions of NARD and homes in on a particular version that is closely connected to revelation. It shows how revelation and the related version of NARD pose (...)
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  27. A Calculus of Qualia 9 30 2022.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    The idea of this paper is to put actual qualia into equations (broadly understood) to get what might be called qualations. Qualations arguably have different meanings and truth behaviors than the analogous equations. For example, the term ‘ black ’ arguably has a different meaning and behavior than the term ‘ █ ’. This is a step in the direction of a ‘calculus of qualia’ and of expanding science to include 1st-person phenomena.
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  28. Intentionality, Qualia, and the Stream of Unconsciousness.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):42.
    According to Brentano, mentality is essentially intentional in nature. Other philosophers have emphasized the phenomenal-qualitative aspect of conscious experiences as core to the mind. A recent philosophical wave – the ‘phenomenal intentionality programme’ – seeks to unite these conceptions in the idea that mental content is grounded in phenomenal qualities. However, a philosophical and scientific current, which includes Freud and contemporary cognitive science, makes widespread use of the posit of unconscious mentality/mental content. I aim to reconcile these disparate, influential strands (...)
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  29. Qualia ain't in the head.David M. Annstrong - 1999 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):12-15.
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  30. Qualia ain't in the head.David M. Annstrong - 1999 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 1 (13):12-15.
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  31. Four clarifications on the soft problem of ‘Qualia as illusions’.Paul Stenner - 2022 - Human Affairs 32 (3):328-333.
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  32. Corpo funzionale e corpo senziente. La tesi forte del carattere incarnato della mente in fenomenologia.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):41-56.
    In questo lavoro distinguo tra due versioni della tesi del carattere incarnato della mente: “debole” e “forte”. Secondo la versione debole, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo che si muove ed agisce nell’ambiente, ossia un corpo funzionale. Secondo la versione forte, invece, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo non solo funzionale ma anche senziente, ossia: il corpo come sede della sensibilità o coscienza fenomenica. Sostengo che alcuni approcci all’interno della “scienza cognitiva incarnata” (...)
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  33. Time, Consciousness and the Foundations of Science.Stephen Deiss - 2010 - Journal of Consciouness Exploration and Research 1 (5).
    This very brief but conceptually dense article provides a useful definition of consciousness, puts self consciousness into proper perspective, clarifies the nature of time, change and inertia, and ties consciousness to the foundations of physics as the inherent and fundamental process in nature. It is an implicit argument for a type of (proto) panpsychism or panexperientialism.
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  34. Sensing Qualia.Paul Skokowski - 2022 - Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 16:1-16.
    Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind—Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory—will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple (...)
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  35. A sketch of a Kripkean theory of consciousnes.Federico Zilio - 2021 - Universa. Recensioni di Filosofia 10 (3):273-292.
    In this paper, I will propose a provisional blueprint of the notion of consciousness. I will start an analysis of the notion from the way we generally use the term “consciousness” in our ordinary language. In this regard, I will use Saul Kripke’s direct reference theory to define the term “consciousness” in a non-descriptive way, that is, interpreting it as a rigid designator. Then, I will critically discuss the idea of a necessary a posteriori relationship between consciousness and brain activity, (...)
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  36. Do Qualia Exist Necessarily? v. 2.0.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Why is there something rather than nothing? I don’t know. But ‘nothing’ may not be the correct default state. It may be that the existence of possibilities requires fewer (weaker) assumptions. In this case, arguably, we should start with the existence of possibilities and not ‘nothing’. In this case, there exists the possibility of (for example) red qualia. But the possible existence of a red quale does not delineate what it is the possibility of if the possibility contains only a (...)
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  37. Chapter fifteen naturalizing phenomenology? Dretske on qualia.Ronald Mcintyre - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Bernard Pachoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford University Press. pp. 429-439.
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  38. The problem of artificial qualia.Wael Basille - 2021 - Dissertation, Sorbonne Université
    Is it possible to build a conscious machine, an artifact that has qualitative experiences such as feeling pain, seeing the redness of a flower or enjoying the taste of coffee ? What makes such experiences conscious is their phenomenal character: it is like something to have such experiences. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the question of the qualitative aspect of conscious experiences is often addressed in terms of qualia. In a pre-theoretical and intuitive sense, qualia refer to the phenomenal character (...)
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  39. Zombies, Functionalism and Qualia.Jim Stone - 2022 - Res Philosophica 99 (1):91-93.
    David Chalmers maintains there is a logically possible world (Z) where we all have physically and functionally identical twins without conscious experiences. Z entails that qualia are extra-physical, hence physicalism is false. I argue that his Zombie Argument (ZA) fails on functionalist grounds. Qualia sometimes affect behavior or they never do. If they do affect behavior, they sometimes individuate functional states; hence my zombie twin cannot be functionally identical to me. To save ZA, we must support the second disjunct. This (...)
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  40. Meaning and Context: A Brief Introduction.Cosmin Visan - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 12 (4):356-382.
    In searching for what is the most natural way to regard the world, it will be shown that existence is an interplay between meanings and contexts. This interplay takes the form of consciousness, which arises on top of an infinite ocean of formless contexts. Various aspects of meaning and context will be explored, going through the emergent structure of consciousness, self-reference, the contradictory nature of the formless realm and love as the ultimate context for existence. Given the infinite ramifications of (...)
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  41. On the Big Bang, Qualia, Einstein’s Train, Temporal Flow Rates, Existence, Free Will, Hard Problems, etc.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    On Einstein's Train and the Big Bang in Fragmental Presentism, Temporal Flow Rates, Existence, Free Will, Qualia, Hard Problems, etc.
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  42. Peirce’s legacy for contemporary consciousness studies, the emergence of consciousness from qualia, and its evanescence in habits.Winfried Nöth - 2021 - Semiotica 2021 (243):49-103.
    The paper argues that contemporary consciousness studies can profit from Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of consciousness. It confronts mainstream tendencies in contemporary consciousness studies, including those which consider consciousness as an unsolvable mystery, with Peirce’s phenomenological approach to consciousness. Peirce’s answers to the following contemporary issues are presented: phenomenological consciousness and the qualia, consciousness as self-controlled agency of humans, self-control and self-reflection, consciousness and language, self-consciousness and introspection, consciousness and the other, consciousness of nonhuman animals, and the question of a (...)
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  43. Qualities and the Galilean View.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):147-162.
    It is often thought that sensible qualities such as colours do not exist as properties of physical objects. Focusing on the case of colour, I discuss two views: the Galilean view, according to which colours do not exist as qualities of physical objects, and the naive view, according to which colours are, as our perception presents them to be, qualities instantiated by physical objects. I argue that it is far from clear that the Galilean view is better than the naive (...)
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  44. Physics, Time, and Qualia.M. Cortes & L. Smolin - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):36-51.
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  45. Do Qualia exist Necessarily?Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Why is there something rather than nothing? I don't know. But I give an argument that qualia exist *necessarily*. The *possibility* of the existence of red qualia requires actual red qualia to specify what the possibility is a possibility *of*.
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  46. On the Solutions to the Hard Problems.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    There is a profound difference between asking a 'hard problem' and asking a 'hard problem' that has qualia in the question. There are plausible answers to the former that are nevertheless clearly not answers to the latter. I give a method by which hard problems will be able to be solved, if possible. I speculate on the (possible) causal efficaciousness of consciousness in evolution and in quantum mechanics.
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  47. The Archeology of Qualia.Cosmin Visan - 2021 - Journal Of Anthropological And Archeological Sciences 4 (5):565-569.
    Researching into our past, scientists use different methods, from looking at the night sky to digging traces of our past and analyzing DNA. I propose here another method, that can have the potential of shedding more light into our history and the type of entities that we are. Working under philosophical idealism, I propose that evolution is in the first place the evolution of consciousness, and thus the traces of evolution are mostly not to be found in our physical bodies, (...)
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  48. Fragmental Presentism and Quantum Mechanics.Paul Merriam - 2021
    This paper develops a Fragmentalist theory of Presentism and shows how it can help to develop a interpretation of quantum mechanics. There are several fragmental interpretations of physics. In the interpretation of this paper, each quantum system forms a fragment, and fragment f1 makes a measurement on fragment f2 if and only if f2 makes a corresponding measurement on f1. The main idea is then that each fragment has its own present (or ‘now’) until a mutual quantum measurement—at which time (...)
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  49. The consumer society by Baudrillard : A sociological approach to capitalism.Irfan Ajvazi - 2021 - Germany: Heisenberg Academy and Idea Books.
    Consumer society, by Jean Baudrillard, is a major contribution to contemporary sociology and philosophy, at the height of the Division of Labor Durkheim or The Protestant Ethic and the Ethics of Capitalism Weber.
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  50. Quantum information in neural systems.Danko D. Georgiev - 2021 - Symmetry 13 (5):773.
    Identifying the physiological processes in the central nervous system that underlie our conscious experiences has been at the forefront of cognitive neuroscience. While the principles of classical physics were long found to be unaccommodating for a causally effective consciousness, the inherent indeterminism of quantum physics, together with its characteristic dichotomy between quantum states and quantum observables, provides a fertile ground for the physical modeling of consciousness. Here, we utilize the Schrödinger equation, together with the Planck-Einstein relation between energy and frequency, (...)
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