19th Century French Philosophy

In 1893, three young men in their early twenties, Xavier Léon, Élie Halévy and Léon Brunschvicg, founded the Revue de métaphysique et de morale. This article explores the motives of this endeavour, and how they made the journal the centre of three great scientific enterprises: in 1894 they promoted the edition of Descartes’s Œuvres completes; in 1900, they organized the first international congress of philosophy in Paris; in 1901, they founded the Societé française de philosophie.

This book connects the philosophy of Henri Bergson to contemporary debates in metaphysics and analytic philosophy of religion. More specifically, the book demonstrates how Bergson’s philosophy of time can respond to the problem of foreknowledge and free will. The question of how humans can be free if God knows everything has been a perennial issue of debate in analytic philosophy of religion. The solution to this problem relies heavily on what one thinks about time. The problem of time is central (...) to Bergson’s philosophical system. In this book, the author offers a systematic application of Bergson’s thought to the freedom and foreknowledge problem. The first chapter presents a discussion of Bergson’s central concept of la durée (duration). The subsequent two chapters link la durée to the relation of time and space. Here the author provides a Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time and develops a novel theory of time connected to Bergson’s analysis of temporal experience. The last three chapters explore the relation between free will, determinism, and divine foreknowledge. The author reconstructs Bergson’s theory of freedom and shows how it undermines the underlying dogmas of contemporary free-will theories. The author then argues that Bergson’s philosophy can be used to resolve the free will and foreknowledge problem in philosophy of religion. The monograph concludes by opening avenues for new research into Bergson and analytic philosophy of religion, such as the philosophy of religious language, the relation between God and modality, religious experience, and religious pluralism. (shrink)

In Bergson and Intensive Magnitude: Dismantling his Critique, Florian Vermeiren argues that Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will is inconsistent with his later philosophy, and even inconsistent with the role of a “difference in degrees of freedom” in Time and Free Will. I argue that it is rather Vermeiren’s analysis which mischaracterizes Bergson’s critique and therefore the interpretation of an inconsistency cannot stand. In the first two sections I reevaluate Bergson’s critique, showing what, according to Bergson, (...) are the good and bad senses of intensity, and how this critique allowed Bergson to institute a new conception of difference as expressed in concrete continuity. In the final section I examine the importance of infinitesimal thought in Bergson’s good sense of intensity. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag betrachte ich die Rezeption des Denkens von J.G. Fichte bei zwei Philosophen, die als die »Begründer des französischen Spiritualismus« gesehen werden können. Es geht um François-Pierre Maine de Biran (Bergerac 1766 - Paris 1824) und Joseph-Luis-Jules Lequier (Quintin 1814 - Saint-Briec 1862). Nach einer kurzen Gesamtdarstellung der Schwerpunkte beider beschäftige ich mich - in zwei verschieden Teilen - mit der historischen und philologischen Frage, was die französischen Philosophen wirklich von den Werken Fichtes gekannt beziehungsweise verstanden haben. Beide (...) sahen in den Werken Fichtes ein Modell für die Überwindung des Determinismus der Natur. Insbesondere wurde diese Überwindung in der ursprünglichen Freiheit des Geistes gesucht. Schließlich lenke ich meine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Ähnlichkeiten der Perspektive Fichtes und der von Biran und Lequier. (shrink)

The article focuses on the relationship between the psychology of Maine de Biran and the work of Thomas Reid. Maine de Biran confronts especially with the Inquiry of Reid, by adopting some central aspects of it but by criticizing and radicalizing it. Continuity is to be found in the distinction, adopted by Maine de Biran, that Reid makes between sensations and perceptions, the latter being the basis of judgements of externality. But according to Maine de Biran Reid’s analysis of the (...) notions of externality and the self is insufficient. These notions are complementary concepts and originate in the “original fact” of the duality of effort and resistance: by actively moving our bodies, our sense of touch comes up against the resistance of external objects. Effort and resistance base the experiences of “Self” and “Not-Self”. (shrink)

Little is known about the world’s first sociological society, Émile Littré’s Société de Sociologie (1872—4). This article, based on prosopographic research, offers an interpretation of the foundation, political-intellectual orientation and early demise of the society. As indicated by recruitment and texts by its founding members, the Société de Sociologie was in fact conceived more as a political club than a learned society. Guided in this by Littré’s heterodox positivism and the redefinition of sociology he proposed around 1870, the Société de (...) Sociologie was intended first and foremost to accompany intellectually the political changes that Littré considered imperative in the early years of the Third Republic (1870— 1940). This expectation found little echo among the members of the society, and it seems possible that Littré himself and his closest associates were the ones to interrupt the society’s meetings. Some of its members’ general studies on the status of the social sciences and their main divisions were continued in the framework of the journal La Philosophie positive (1867—83), but the authors most committed to those studies were on the margins of the Littré network. Neither the dominant positivist republicanism, centered around Littré and Dubost, nor the general sociology of the more peripheral members of the network (Mesmer, Roberty, Vitry) represented an important intellectual contribution to the formation of academic sociology in France. Given that the Société de Sociologie did contribute to diffuse the project of a sociological science and developed forms of sociology coherent enough to be rejected by the pioneers of university sociology, the group constitutes a significant case of failure in the history of the discipline. (shrink)

Le positivisme, de Comte à Carnap, a marqué une étape dans le développement d’une science spéciale en dehors des sujets traités jusque là par la philosophie. Cette communication montre que la « syntaxe logique » de Carnap comme la « synthèse subjective » de Comte est un hybride, — une tranche de la philosophie en train de devenir science, et essayant, à l’étape intermédiaire de son processus, d’être à la fois science et philosophie.

A common and enduring early modern intuition is that materialists reduce organisms in general and human beings in particular to automata. Wasn’t a famous book of the time entitled L’Homme-Machine? In fact, the machine is employed as an analogy, and there was a specifically materialist form of embodiment, in which the body is not reduced to an inanimate machine, but is conceived as an affective, flesh-and-blood entity. We discuss how mechanist and vitalist models of organism exist in a more complementary (...) relation than hitherto imagined, with conceptions of embodiment resulting from experimental physiology. From La Mettrie to Bernard, mechanism, body and embodiment are constantly overlapping, modifying and overdetermining one another; embodiment came to be scientifically addressed under the successive figures of vie organique and then milieu intérieur, thereby overcoming the often lamented divide between scientific image and living experience. (shrink)

This paper attempts to resolve the puzzle associated with the non-spatiality of monads by investigating the possibility that Leibniz employed a version of the extension of power doctrine, a Scholastic concept that explains the relationship between immaterial and material beings. As will be demonstrated, not only does the extension of power doctrine lead to a better understanding of Leibniz’ reasons for claiming that monads are non-spatial, but it also supports those interpretations of Leibniz’ metaphysics that accepts the real extension of (...) bodies. (shrink)

Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from Worrall's, in which he defends a position whose historical roots he attributes to Poincare. In the renewed debate inspired by Worrall, it is thus not uncommon to find Poincare's name associated with various structuralist positions. However, Poincare's structuralism is deeply entwined with both his conventionalism and his idealism, and in this paper we explore the nature of these dependencies. What comes out in the end is not only a (...) clearer picture of Poincare's position regarding structuralism, but also two arguments for versions of epistemic structuralism different in kind from that given by Worrall. (shrink)

This major work of reference is an indispensable resource for anyone conducting research or teaching in philosophy. An international team of over 100 leading scholars has been brought together under the general editorship of Alan Schrift and the volume editors to provide authoritative analyses of the continental tradition of philosophy from Kant to the present day. Divided, chronologically, into eight volumes, "The History of Continental Philosophy" is designed to be accessible to a wide range of readers, from the scholar looking (...) for original insight and the latest thinking to the student wishing for a masterly encapsulation of a particular thinker's views. By placing continental philosophy within a historical context, "The History of Continental Philosophy" helps define what the continental tradition has been and where it is moving. It will become a landmark publication in its field. Volume 1 covers the period from 1780 until 1848, focusing primarily on the main philosophical figures and developments in Germany during that period, but also including a description of economic and social theories in France that set the stage for the philosophical and social movements that predominated in Germany and France during the second half of the nineteenth century. Volume 2 examines what is often referred to as the 'Age of Revolution' as various responses to Hegel, while also attending to developments in science, mathematics, sociology and aesthetics during the second half of the nineteenth century that would set the stage for the twentieth century. Volume 3 examines the earliest developments in the twentieth century: while attending to a number of key thinkers, it also discusses the emergence of French sociology in the Durkheim school, developments in modern science, the philosophical response to evolution, and the schools of phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. Volume 4, as the title indicates, charts the various responses to phenomenology that appeared in the years following Husserl, with particular attention to the emergence of existentialism and existential theology, as well as its relations with philosophy of science, aesthetics and ethics. Volume 5 surveys some of the main continental movements and philosophers associated with social and political philosophy and philosophy of the human sciences during the period from 1940 through to 1968. Volume 6 looks at the major figures associated with the two dominant movements that emerge in the 1960s - poststructuralism and critical theory - while also attending to the emergence of philosophical feminism and some influential figures in those years not easily situated in the "standard" histories of the period. Volume 7 examines the developments in Continental philosophy in the years, roughly, 1980-95, the period immediately after the hegemony of poststructuralism in France and of Habermas in Germany. Volume 8 attempts to situate the present scene in continental philosophy in terms of various new developments that are framed as attempts to rethink some of the classic themes with which the history of continental philosophy has been more or less consistently engaged. (shrink)

This essay examines Tocqueville's conception of the “social” against the background of debates over the relationship between the social and the political in France from the Revolution to mid-century. It focuses on three groups: those associated with the social philosophy of industrialisme, those concerned with the evils of pauperism from the standpoint of Catholic social reform, and those allied with the new Doctrinaire view of society and politics. It argues that Tocqueville consistently resisted the primacy of the “social” as articulated (...) by these thinkers, even in the seductive form offered by François Guizot, whose influence on Tocqueville is examined in light of recent debates over this issue. (shrink)

Summary This article looks at a specific case of intellectual exchange by approaching Luís Pereira Barreto (1840?1923), a Brazilian medic who, having studied in Brussels in the 1850s, came into contact with Comte's positivism and with the ideas of his disciples. While in Europe, Barreto established a long-lasting friendship with Pierre Lafitte, and became a convert to Comte's Religion of Humanity. Upon his return to Brazil in 1864, Barreto sought to apply Comte's principles to Brazilian society and politics. Although Barreto's (...) use of positivism extends beyond the issue of slavery and slave work, I will focus on this priest of humanity's considerations about positivism, social evolutionism, and Brazilian slavery. This will allow me to extrapolate some qualified conclusions about the nature of the intellectual exchange that occurred between Barreto and the French positivists, and the development of Brazilian positivism as a political philosophy and social theory which had to address the problem of slavery in the 1870s and 1880s. (shrink)

In response to Robert H. Bass's charge that no significant moral thinker ever advocated altruism as Ayn Rand defined it, Campbell points to the writings of Auguste Comte, who invented the word. For Comte, altruism meant living for others, repressing one's "personality," and subordinating oneself to "the Great Being, Humanity." Rand's own conception of altruism was thoroughly Comtean. What's more, her decision (made in 1942, while completing The Vountainhtad) to use "altruism" as her primary term for the moral tendencies that (...) she opposed was plausibly occasioned by an encounter with Comte's ideas. (shrink)