20th Century Philosophy

Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903–30) made seminal contributions to philosophy, mathematics and economics. Whilst he was acknowledged as a genius by his contemporaries, some of his most important ideas were not appreciated until decades later; now better appreciated, they continue to bear an influence upon contemporary philosophy. His historic significance was to usher in a new phase of analytic philosophy, which initially built upon the logical atomist doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, raising their ideas to a new level of (...) sophistication, but ultimately he became their successor rather than remain a mere acolyte. (shrink)

This study conducts an epistemological and contextual discourse analysis of the idea of knowledge in the philosophy of the 20th century. The main key stones of this work are as follows: the identification of the essential characteristics indicating the ontological genesis of the existing crisis of epistemological and ethical foundations; consideration of the main distinctive features of knowledge interpretation in epistemology and contextualism as a possible knowledge production instrument; study of the possibility of restoring an integral picture of the world (...) based on phenomenological ontologies; study of possibilities in the language domain from a hermeneutical point of view in the light of the resolution of epistemological contradictions. For all people interested in modern philosophy. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir aspectos do ensino de Filosofia na educação básica à luz do conceito de ação firmado no capítulo V de ACondição Humana de Hannah Arendt, identificado na revelação do agente através do discurso e da ação. Sugerimos a reflexão do conceito de ação como consciência motivadora para o ensino de Filosofia, investindo em políticas educacionais que consideram a diversidade como um elemento favorável para a construção do conhecimento entre professores e alunos. Estamos aqui em um (...) movimento adverso às práticas tecnicistas que investem em experiências estéreis, fadadas ao mecanicismo das relações. Pois acreditamos que ensinar Filosofia além de ser um constante convite à reflexão é também um estímulo à liberdade humana que pode ser impulsionada pela engenhosidade de práticas docentes mais estimulantes. Com base em atividades vivenciadas durante as aulas de filosofia na educação básica, apresentamos aqui algumas reflexões a favor da pluralidade no espaço semipúblico favorecendo perspectivas do ensino da filosofia ao filosofar na sala de aula.PALAVRAS-CHAVE:Arendt; Ação; Educação; Filosofia. -/- FROM TEACHING PHILOSOPHY TOPHILOSOPHIZE: REFLETIONS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF ACTION IN HANNAH ARENDTABSTRACT -/- The aim of this article is to discuss aspects of the teaching of philosophy in basic education in light of the concept of action set forth in chapter V of Human Condition of Hannah Arendt, identified in the revelation of the agent through discourse and action. We suggest the reflection of the concept of action as motivating consciousness for the philosophy teaching investing in educational policies that consider diversity as a favorable element for the construction of knowledge between teachers and students. We’re here in an adverse movement to the technicist practices, that invest in sterile experiments, fated to the mechanism of relations. For we believe that Philosophy Teaching besides being one constant invite to reflection is also a stimulus to human freedom tha can be can be driven by the resourcefulness of more stimulating teaching practices. Based on activities experienced during philosophy classes in basic education, we present some reflections in favor of plurality in semi public space favoring perspectives of philosophy teaching from philosophizing in the classroom. (shrink)

Originally, hermeneutics was applied only to particularly unclear portions of legal, religious, and classical texts. However, since the 18th century, hermeneutics has gradually broadened in scope. By the latter half of the 20th century, hermeneutic philosophers had claimed all human understanding as their domain—the activity of the mind was pervasively interpretive. This universalisation is largely due to the influence of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), whose development of philosophical hermeneutics established interpretation as a fundamental category in studies of knowledge, perception, and textual (...) analysis. The implications for religion are inescapable. If all human understanding is interpreting, this includes the reading of scriptures, the anthropological study of religious communities, inter-religious dialogue, and religious experience itself. (shrink)

This article deploys Whitehead's systematic metaphysics as the basis for a philosophical hermeneutics. Whiteheadian hermeneutics are then compare and contrasted with Schleiermacher's own hermeneutics.

Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological `laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first (...) appears to make the idea of the necessity of logical laws even less plausible, but eventually turns out to speak in favor of this view. (shrink)

Reveals that Bertrand Russell's 1959 book, "The Wisdom of the West", was actually written by Australian philosopher Paul Foulkes.

The present paper argues that the Venezuelan-Chilean philosopher Andrés Bello constitutes an important but heretofore neglected prefiguration of Richard Rorty. I argue for this thesis by articulating first an Inter-American philosophical narrative (based on previous work by Alex Stehn and Carlos Sanchez) that enables me to highlight certain common characteristics in philosophical projects that flourished across the Americas. Having done this, I show that Rorty’s anti-representationalism and anti-foundationalism are prefigured in Bello’s most important philosophical treatise, Filosofía del Entendimiento, to the (...) extent that Bello recognizes the problems posed by the ocular metaphors that are systematically used by Early modern philosophers such as Descartes or Locke, and suggests their elimination and replacement by other metaphors. Finally, I conclude that, if my arguments are correct, the intellectual geography of neo-pragmatism needs to be expanded beyond traditional geographies such as Europe and the US. (shrink)

Ingineria ontologică, împreună cu tehnologiile Web semantice, permit modelarea și dezvoltarea semantică a fluxului operațional necesar pentru proiectarea TB. Cel mai utilizat sistem de modelare blockchain prin reprezentarea abstractă, descrierea și definirea structurii, a proceselor, a informațiilor și a resurselor, este modelarea intreprinderilor. Modelarea intreprinderii utilizează ontologiile de domeniu folosind limbaje de reprezentare a modelului. Bitcoin este principalul sistem de plată peer-to-peer şi monedă digitală care folosește tehnologia blockchain. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35908.99201 .

The aim of this study is to elucidate the notion of propositional function as exposed by Russell within the no-class theory of Principia Mathematica. According to realistic interpretation, propositional functions are metaphysical objects consisting of individuals, objectual variables and attributes. According to nominalistic interpretation, however, they are rather linguistic expressions. I argue that the latter interpretation is more adequate than the former one.

Bertrand Russell’s conception of philosophy evolved dramatically in 1911 — the year he fell in love with Lady Ottoline Morrell. For many years Russell had been an ardent advocate of the view that philosophers ought to look for truths that are certain. The co-author of Principia Mathematica altered his commitment to certainty in philosophy in 1911. An analysis of his published views and correspondence from this time strongly suggests that the radical transformation was induced by an epiphany brought about by (...) his emotional entanglement with his lover. (shrink)

In this first volume of The Sylvan Jungle, the editors present a scholarly edition of the first chapter, "Exploring Meinong's Jungle," of Richard Routley's 1000-plus page book, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. Going against the Quinean orthodoxy, Routley’s aim was to support Meinong’s idea that we can truthfully refer to non-existent and even impossible objects, like Superman, unicorns and the (infamous) round-square cupola on Berkeley College. The tools of non-classical logic at Routley’s disposal enabled him to update Meinong’s project for (...) a new generation. -/- This volume begins with an Introduction from Dominic Hyde, “The ‘Jungle Book’ in Context,” an essay that situates Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond historically. We provide the original Preface by Routley, followed by Chapter 1: “Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond.” In Chapter 2, Nicholas Griffin argues that Sylvan’s project was insufficiently radical with his essay, “Why the Original Theory of Items Didn’t (Quite) Go Far Enough.” Sylvan revisits his position from this time in Chapter 3, with his article, “Re-Exploring Item-Theory.” Filippo Casati, who has worked in the Routley Archives then takes up the question of the future of Sylvan’s research program in his essay, “The Future Perfect of Exploring Meinong’s Jungle.” -/- Iconic and iconoclastic Australian philosopher Richard Routley (né Sylvan) published Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond in 1980. This work has fallen out of print, yet without great fanfare it has influenced two generations of philosophers and logicians. (shrink)

This essay places Nishida Kitarō in dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty regarding motor-perceptual aspects underlying their theories of artistic expression. The analysis begins by comparing their interpretations of negation as articulated in their later works and seeks to understand their poetic renderings of artistic practice as proposing a mutual and reciprocal form of negation. By analyzing their conceptions of negation as implicit to their depictions of artistic expression, this essay looks to expand their concepts of negation from a perceptual to a (...) motor-perceptual form of negation. Just as perceptual negation results in a multi-perspectival form of perception, motor-perceptual negation renders motion as a multi-volitional event outside and beyond the individuated body, and diffused throughout the motor-perceptual fabric. The artist is an exemplar for both Nishida and Merleau-Ponty because of their ability to create works that express themselves within this form of motor-perceptual negation. Doing so, expressing oneself as a motor-perceptualy negated body entails a bodily form of faith. This study thus expands Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “perceptual faith” (foi perceptive) to disclose its implicit motor aspects, while demonstrating how the expanded conceptions of expression and negation resonate with the faithful form of expression put forth in Nishida’s concept “interexpression” (表現的関係). (shrink)

Le falsificationnisme dogmatique accepte la falsifiabilité de toutes les théories scientifiques sans réserve, mais conserve une base empirique infaillible. Il est strictement empirique sans être inductif : il nie que la certitude de la base empirique puisse être transmise aux théories. Ainsi, le falsificationnisme dogmatique est donc la marque de justification la plus faible. Le signe distinctif de la falsification dogmatique est la reconnaissance du fait que toutes les théories sont également conjecturales. La science ne peut prouver aucune théorie, mais (...) elle peut les rejeter. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26963.32807. (shrink)

This study focuses on the experimental and philosophical analysis of the meaning of life in death situation, according to Wittgenstein’s way of life and sayings during the war. The method of extraction and analysis of information is grounded theory. For this purpose, Wittgenstein’s writings such as his letters and memories, and other’s texts about his life and his internal moods were analyzed. After analyzing the collected information and categorizing them in frames of open codes, axial codes, etc. we recognized that (...) Wittgenstein's point of view in death situation was supernatural God-centered. By reading Tolstoy gospel and Dostoyevsky's works, Wittgenstein has reached a kind of religious awakening in that period of his life. But before and after the war period he had a naturalistic point of view toward the meaning of life, in which moral values are in the core. (shrink)

The present article concentrates on understanding the limits of language from the realm of meaning theory as portrayed by Wittgenstein. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s picture theory provides a glimpse of reality by indicating that a picture could be true or false from the perspective of reality. He talks about an internal limitation of language rather than an external limitation of language. In Wittgenstein’s later works like Philosophical Investigations, the concept of picture theory has faded away, and he deeply becomes more (...) interested in the ‘use theory of meaning’ and ‘language game.’ My other attempt in this paper is to show Husserl’s theory of meaning and try to find out its compatibility with Wittgenstein’s thoughts. Husserl thinks that as a part of phenomenological experience, ‘meaning’ should be an act character that Wittgenstein rejected as an appeal of inner experience. Like Mohanty, I also attempt to show the Husserlian idea of meaning as an essence that is related to the meaning rather than linguistics. Both the giants are talking about description of language from different levels. My effort would be to illustrate how these two giant thinkers proclaim their meaning theories in such a way that leads to a well-known internalism versus externalism debate in the philosophy of mind and language. (shrink)

I argue that the foundational question of continental philosophy of disability is the question of the meaning of ability. Engaging a range of canonical texts across the Western intellectual tradition, I explore three hermeneutic pathways toward this question, concluding with a discussion of its larger sociopolitical and philosophical stakes.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Edmund Husserl’s Experience and Judgement (Erfahrung und Urteil) are based on remarkably different conceptual frameworks and methodologies. After analyzing their respective accounts on the foundations of (formal) logic, I map out their common aims and different conclusions. I hold that Husserl and Wittgenstein both use the epistemic necessity of the existence of logical relations among things as an argument against philosophical scepticism, but their different epistemological convictions lead them to decisively diverging accounts of the nature (...) of those relations. Wittgenstein assumes a syntactic correspondence theory of truth, which identifies general logical form as a necessary condition for accurate representation, apparent in the existence of local truth-functions between propositions. As logical form is the (transcendental) necessary condition of every meaningful proposition, he infers that it is itself not representable and without ontological status. Husserl, by contrast, does not draw from a correspondence theory, but from a processual theory of certainty and truth, which offers genetic instead of categorical distinctions between perception and the logical relations apparent in conceptual knowledge. His theory of formal logic ultimately offers a coherent ontology for logical objects, which avoids logical mysticism. (shrink)

Delimitarea dintre știință și pseudoștiință face parte din sarcina mai generală de a determina care credințe sunt justificate epistemic. Știința poate fi descrisă ca fiind parțial descriptivă, parțial normativă. O definiție a științei se poate concentra pe conținutul descriptiv și specifică modul în care termenul este utilizat efectiv, sau, se poate concentra asupra elementului normativ și poate clarifica sensul mai fundamental al termenului. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.13182.74569.

If "rationalism" refers to the thesis that there is a right way to do whatever it is that we do—a way that we, with our reason, can discover—then Ludwig Wittgenstein is a critic of rationalism. For our words and deeds are justified only by the rules of particular language-games—but these language-games are themselves justified only insofar as they meet our needs; certainly none of them need be justified by reference to any of the others. Together, our language-games constitute our form (...) of life; though this form of life is not entirely arbitrary—some of its features can be explained by reference to our nature—nonetheless it could be different in many ways. Indeed, it has been—and therefore probably will be—different in many ways; on some level, we all know this. Philosophy at its worst is the attempt to forget it; philosophy at its best is, therefore, the attempt to remember it. (shrink)

On pense généralement que l'impossibilité, l'incomplétdulité, la paracohérence, l'indécidabilité, le hasard, la calcul, le paradoxe, l'incertitude et les limites de la raison sont des questions scientifiques physiques ou mathématiques disparates ayant peu ou rien dans terrain d'entente. Je suggère qu'ils sont en grande partie des problèmes philosophiques standard (c.-à-d., jeux de langue) qui ont été la plupart du temps résolus par Wittgenstein plus de 80 ans. Je fournis un bref résumé de quelques-unes des principales conclusions de deux des plus éminents (...) étudiants du comportement des temps modernes, Ludwig Wittgenstein et John Searle, sur la structure logique de l'intentionnalité (esprit, langue, comportement), en prenant comme point de départ La découverte fondamentale de Wittgenstein, à savoir que tous les problèmes véritablement « philosophiques » sont les mêmes, les confusions sur la façon d'utiliser la langue dans un contexte particulier, et donc toutes les solutions sont les mêmes— en regardant comment la langue peut être utilisée dans le contexte en cause afin que sa vérité (Conditions de satisfaction ou COS) sont claires. Le problème fondamental est que l'on peut dire n'importe quoi, mais on ne peut pas signifier (état clair COS pour) toute déclaration arbitraire et le sens n'est possible que dans un contexte très spécifique. Je dissé que quelques écrits de quelques-uns des principaux commentateurs sur ces questions d'un point de vue wittgensteinien dans le cadre de la perspective moderne des deux systèmes de pensée (popularisé comme «penser vite, penser lentement»), en utilisant une nouvelle table de intentionnalité et la nomenclature de nouveaux systèmes doubles. Je montre qu'il s'agit d'un puissant heuristique pour décrire la vraie nature de ces questions scientifiques, physiques ou mathématiques putatives qui sont vraiment mieux abordés comme des problèmes philosophiques standard de la façon dont la langue doit être utilisée (jeux de langue dans Wittgenstein terminologie). (shrink)

A founder of modern analytic philosophy and one of the most important logicians of the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell has influenced generations of philosophers. The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell explores this influence in detail and responds to renewed interest in Russell's philosophical approach, presenting the best guide to research in Russell studies today. -/- Bringing new insights into Russell's relationship with his contemporaries, a team of experts explore his life-long battles with important philosophical issues. They consider how he influenced (...) thinkers and schools of thought, from Schröder, Frege and Meinong to Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, while also covering his impact on individual issues in epistemology, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. Importantly this companion discusses often overlooked topics. Focusing on Russell's later views, including his moral philosophy and his politics, reveals that Russell did make significant contributions to ethics - both theoretical and practical - in the course of his career. -/- Through a combination of enlightening historical background and sustained focus on Russell's impact on contemporary areas of philosophy, The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell demonstrates why Russell continues to influence philosophers of language, mathematics, epistemology and metaphysics. (shrink)

Russell wrote in 1918 in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: -/- When I speak of a fact ... I mean the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false. If I say 'It is raining', what I say is true in a certain condition of weather and is false in other conditions of the weather. The condition of weather that makes my state­ment true (or false as the case may be), is what I should call a 'fact'. If (...) I say, 'Socrates is dead', my statement will be true owing to a certain physiological occurrence which happened in Athens long ago. -/- This classic statement of Russell's version of the correspondence theory of truth is defective on one point only: Russell was unwise to use the word 'fact'. Objects which perform the semantic role Russell accords to facts I shall call simply truth-makers. (shrink)

معمولا تصور می شود که عدم امکان ، بی کامل بودن ، پارامونشتها ، Undecidability ، اتفاقی ، قابلیت های مختلف ، پارادوکس ، عدم قطعیت و محدودیت های دلیل ، مسائل فیزیکی و ریاضی علمی و یا با داشتن کمی یا هیچ چیز در مشترک. من پیشنهاد می کنم که آنها تا حد زیادی مشکلات فلسفی استاندارد (به عنوان مثال ، بازی های زبان) که عمدتا توسط ویتگنشتاین بیش از 80 سال پیش حل و فصل شد. -/- "آنچه ما (...) وسوسه می گویند" در چنین موردی است ، البته ، نه فلسفه ، اما آن مواد خام است. بنابراین ، برای مثال ، چه ریاضیدان تمایل به در مورد عینیت و واقعیت حقایق ریاضی می گویند ، فلسفه ریاضیات نیست ، اما چیزی برای درمان فلسفی است. ویتگنشتاین PI ۲۳۴ -/- "فلاسفه به طور مداوم به روش علم قبل از چشم خود را ببینید و irresistibly وسوسه به درخواست و پاسخ به سوالات در علم راه می کند. این گرایش ، منبع واقعی متافیزیک است و فیلسوف را به تاریکی کامل هدایت می کند.» ویتگنشتاین -/- من ارائه خلاصه ای از برخی از یافته های عمده ای از دو نفر از برجسته ترین دانش آموزان از رفتار دوران مدرن ، لودویگ ویتگنشتاین و جان سرل ، در ساختار منطقی از قصدمندی (ذهن ، زبان ، رفتار) ، با توجه به عنوان نقطه شروع من کشف بنیادی ویتگنشتاین-که همه مشکلات فلسفی آن یکسان هستند-ابهامات در مورد چگونگی استفاده از زبان در یک چارچوب خاص ، و به همین ترتیب تمام راه حل ها یکسان هستند-به دنبال چگونه زبان را می توان در زمینه مورد استفاده قرار گیرد به طوری که حقیقت آن شرایط (شرایط رضایت یا COS) روشن است. مشکل اساسی این است که می توان هر چیزی می گویند، اما یکی نمی تواند به معنای (دولت از COS برای) هر گفته های خودسرانه و معنی تنها در یک زمینه بسیار خاص ممکن است. -/- من برخی از نوشته های چند تن از مفسران عمده در این مسائل از نظر Wittgensteinian در چارچوب دیدگاه مدرن از دو سیستم اندیشه (به عنوان "فکر سریع ، تفکر آهسته ') ، استفاده از جدول جدید قصدمندی سیستم های جدید دوگانه نامگذاری. من نشان می دهم که این یک اکتشافی قدرتمند برای توصیف ماهیت واقعی این مسائل علمی ، فیزیکی یا ریاضی است که واقعا بهترین هستند به عنوان مشکلات فلسفی استاندارد چگونه زبان مورد استفاده قرار گیرد (بازی های زبان در ویتگنشتاین اصطلاحات). -/- این مشاجره من است که جدول از معنایی (عقلانیت ، ذهن ، فکر ، زبان ، شخصیت و غیره) که ویژگی های برجسته در اینجا توصیف بیشتر یا کمتر با دقت ، و یا حداقل به عنوان یک اکتشافی برای ، چگونه ما فکر می کنیم و رفتار ، و پس از آن را شامل نمی صرفا فلسفه و روانشناسی ، اما هر چیز دیگری (تاریخ ، ادبیات ، ریاضیات ، سیاست و غیره). توجه داشته باشید به خصوص که قصدمندی و عقلانیت به عنوان من (همراه با سرل ، ویتگنشتاین و دیگران) آن را مشاهده کنید ، شامل هر دو آگاهانه سیستم زبانی ، 2 و ناخودآگاه خودکار سیستم پیش زبانی 1 اقدامات یا رفلکس. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the similarities that stem from Wittgenstein’s (Philosophical Investigations (1953)) and Brandom’s (Making it Explicit (1994)) commitment to pragmatics in the philosophy of language to account for moral utterances. That is, the study of the meaning of moral utterances is carried out resorting to the study of the acts being performed in producing or exhibiting these utterances. Both authors offer, therefore, a pragmatic solution in order to account for the meaning of (...) our moral vocabulary and discursive practices. Secondly, it argues that both approaches lead to differing understandings of the role of “truth” and “falsity” in moral discourse. On the one hand, Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics demonstrate a dismissive attitude towards the notions of truth and falsity in moral discourse. On the other hand, Brandom seems to be committed to a weak version of moral cognitivism: he takes assertions (which express beliefs, i.e. doxastic commitments) as the fundamental linguistic activity in the game of giving and asking for reasons and provides an anaphoric theory of truth to account for “truth” and “falsity” in our discourse. Additionally, it analyses how these differences bear on the Frege–Geach problem. (shrink)

The chapter reconstructs and criticizes one of Anscombe's famous three these, namely the claim that a ‘philosophy of psychology’ is a preliminary task to the construction of any possible ethical theory, or that moral philosophy ‘should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. The claim is that Anscombe’s idea of a philosophy of psychology cannot be simply identified with that of moral psychology with which we are familiar (...) now; that her main claim, namely that actions are analogous to language is quite promising; that among the implications there is not only a criticism to consequentialism but also acknowledgement of a central role for judgement, and accordingly not just a blunt refusal, but instead an unaware rediscovery of Kantian ethics; that her rediscovery of the idea of virtue is promising enough, albeit misunderstood by Anscombe herself when she presents it in terms of coming back to Aristotelian and Thomist ethics as contrasted with modern moral philosophy. (shrink)

I discuss the third of Anscombe’s theses from “Modern Moral Philosophy”, namely that post-Sidgwickian consequentialism makes the worst action acceptable. I scrutinize her comprehension of “consequentialism”, her reconstruction of Sidgwick’s view of intention, her defence of casuistry, her reformulation of the double-effect doctrine, and her view of morality as based on Divine commands. I argue that her characterization of consequentialism suffers from lack of understanding of the history of utilitarianism and its self-transformation through the Intuitionism-Utilitarianism controversy; that she uncritically accepted (...) an impoverished image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism, which was, ironically, an unaware bequest from her consequentialist opponents; that her action theory, yet, is a decisive contribution that may prove useful in formulating answers to questions that have been left open in both utilitarian and Kantian or intuitionist theories; that, to make the best of her actions theory, it is as well to drop her divine law view of ethics, which is incompatible with the former; and that the rather obscure traditional theological doctrine of absolute prohibitions is unnecessary to her project that could fare well with the more sober distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. (shrink)

Between 1930 and 1956, John Wisdom set the tone in analytic philosophy in the United Kingdom. Nobody expressed this better than J. O. Urmson in his Philosophical Analysis: Its Development Between the Two World Wars (1956) where, after Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wisdom is the most frequently quoted philosopher. Wisdom was the leading figure of the Cambridge School of Therapeutic Analysis (which included other thinkers such as B. A. Farrell, G. A. Paul, M. Lazerowitz, and Norman Malcolm); the other (...) major British school of analytic philosophy was that of ordinary language philosophy centered primarily at Oxford University. Wisdom adopted the positions of both G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein, but he rejected the radical critique of metaphysics levelled by the Wittgenstein-inspired Vienna Circle. In contrast to Wittgenstein, Wisdom was not a philosopher of language: he maintained that most significant philosophical problems originate not with language but, in the first instance, as a result of our encounter with problems of the real world. From this standpoint, Wisdom introduced into analytic philosophy the discourse on the meaning of life and on problems of philosophy of religion. Be this as it may, prior to the appearance of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wisdom’s published works were read as indicators of the directions that Wittgenstein’s thought was taking following the latter’s return to philosophy in 1929. By the 1960s, Wisdom’s influence had radically diminished. This was due largely to the ascendancy of exact philosophy of language and analytic metaphysics. This development, together with increasing emphasis on the power of scientific knowledge and its techniques, largely overshadowed the exploration of philosophical puzzles, human understanding (“apprehension”), and techniques of deliberation, which were Wisdom’s three chief theoretical concerns. (shrink)

В книге выявлены аргументы, противоречия и границы философии логического атомизма. Выделены отдельные варианты логического атомизма Рассела и дана характеристика каждого из них. Философские идеи Витгенштейна классифицированы и квалифицированы на основе детального анализа и сопоставления афоризмов "Дневников 1914-1916" и "Трактата", его многочисленных писем, а также воспоминаний о нем. Делается попытка проанализировать по-новому его логические и философские понятия на основе его "теории символов" и "теории выражения". Результаты анализа, который сделан в работе, могут служить основой дальнейшего исследования логического атомизма, логического позитивизма, а также (...) оксфордской философии обыденного языка. Книга предназначена для студентов, аспирантов и университетских преподавателей не только логики и философии, но также теории языка и теории наук. (shrink)

La méthodologie des programmes de recherche scientifique est une collection d'articles publiés au fil du temps, exprimant une révision radicale du critère de démarcation de Popper entre science et non-science, conduisant à une nouvelle théorie de la rationalité scientifique. Le volume I aborde des aspects de la philosophie des sciences et le volume II contient des travaux sur la philosophie des mathématiques. Pour un historien des sciences, la reconstruction proposée par Lakatos est attrayante et explique l’évolution de la science à (...) un niveau jamais atteint auparavant. L'unité d'évaluation de base proposée par Lakatos est le programme de recherche. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22465.92006 . (shrink)

While increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the relation between Foucault’s conception of critique and Kant’s, much controversy remains over whether Foucault’s most sustained early engagement with Kant, his dissertation on Kant’s Anthropology, should be read as a wholesale rejection of Kant’s views or as the source of Foucault’s late return to ethics and critique. In this paper, I propose a new reading of the dissertation, considering it alongside 1950s-era archival materials of which I advance the first (...) scholarly appraisal. I argue that Foucault manifests a fundamental ambivalence to Kantian anthropology, rejecting it in theoretical terms while embracing its practical (‘pragmatic’) conception of the subject. Furthermore, I take these texts to collectively evidence Foucault’s attempt to situate himself within the anthropological-critical tradition rather than extricating himself from it. If we interpret Foucault to reject this tradition’s appeal to an essentialized, theoretical conception of subjectivity, what remains of anthropology is its inherent practical reflexivity in structure. Thus, I situate Foucault’s conception of ethics as one’s relation to oneself in continuity with this tradition. (shrink)

Cantor’s proof that the reals are uncountable forms a central pillar in the edifices of higher order recursion theory and set theory. It also has important applications in model theory, and in the foundations of topology and analysis. Due partly to these factors, and to the simplicity and elegance of the proof, it has come to be accepted as part of the ABC’s of mathematics. But even if as an Archimedean point it supports tomes of mathematical theory, there is a (...) question that demands clarification: What, exactly, does Cantor’s proof show? One of few places where this question is addressed is Appendix II of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. This essay is devoted to clarifying Wittgenstein’s remarks in that section. (shrink)

Drawing on phenomenological literature author presents understanding of the aesthetic experience of the musical work pointing to several things: 1. the deep grounding of the experience in myth and Orphic tradition, 2. to the metaphor of building worlds and 3. to being in the moment as one of the most important description of the experience of musical work. Further on author underlines the dynamic as well as fickle character of the experience of musical work, suspended between the sensual audio experience (...) and the conscious mental one. Phenomenological descriptions capture the aesthetic experience of musical work as processual, subjective, emotional, quality based and unfinished, in which they realize perfectly the complexity of the experience, claims the author. (shrink)

Two currently much discussed views about truth, truth pluralism and truth relativism, are found in Sellars’s writings. I show that his motivations for adoping these views are interestingly different from those shared by most of their recent advocates. First, I explain how Sellars comes to embrace a version of truth pluralism. I argue that his version overcomes a difficulty confronting pluralists, albeit at a serious cost. Then I argue that Sellars’s truth pluralism isn’t motivated by his interest in domains of (...) discourse beyond the “matter-of-factual.” Rather, the key to his truth pluralism, his analysis of truth as “semantical assertibility,” is motivated by the same consideration that leads him to adopt truth relativism. This is his interest in applying semantic notions to discourse that embodies conceptual structures other than ours. Despite their common motivation, I conclude that Sellars’s relativism is independent of, and indeed stands in tension with, the analysis of truth that underlies his pluralism. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that such topics as Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were resolved by Wittgenstein over 80 years ago. -/- Wittgenstein also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as (...) a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. “Gödel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Gödel and Chaitin show. Wittgenstein commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies a test. Wittgenstein often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the real world either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra- systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with -/- ‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is meaning [semantics]…” -/- I make some brief remarks which note the similarities of these ‘mathematical’ issues to economics, physics, game theory, and decision theory. -/- Those wishing further comments on philosophy and science from a Wittgensteinian two systems of thought viewpoint may consult my other writings -- Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, and Economics and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019), Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason in Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych, Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock and Yanofsky (2019), and The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Religion, Politics, Economics, Literature and History (2019). (shrink)

My dissertation is an inquiry into the foundations of meaning. Its starting point is the challenge formulated more than three decades ago by Saul Kripke’s semantic sceptic. I offer an interpretation of this challenge which emphasises the significance of the distinction between a third-personal perspective on the use of an expression and the speaker’s own perspective on it. I defend the view according to which to mean something by an expression is to commit oneself, in one’s uses of that expression, (...) to a standard of correctness. I do so by appealing to Donald Davidson’s later writings, revolving around the idea of triangulation with a second creature and a shared world. (shrink)

Aristotle first investigated different modes, or ways of being. Unfortunately, in the modern literature the discussion of this concept has been largely neglected. Only recently, the interest towards the concept of ways increased. Usually, it is explored in connection with the existence of universals and particulars. The approach we are going to follow in this chapter is different. It discusses Wittgenstein’s conception of higher ontological levels as ways of arranging elements of lower ontological levels. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein developed his (...) ontology of ways (Art und Weise) in six steps: (i) Constructing states of affairs out of objects; (ii) Constructing propositions out of states of affairs; (iii) Constructing propositional signs; (iv) Constructing thoughts with the help of propositional signs; (v) Constructing truth / falsity; (vi) Constructing works of art. In Philosophical Investigations he added further five ways of producing new ontological levels: (vii) the meaning of a proposition is the way in which it is verified; (viii) the child gets command on language/calculus in the way it replicates demonstrations of the teacher; (ix) the products of mind are ways of doing something; (x) an action is a way of carrying out the instructions for acting. (shrink)

I attend to the temporal schema of open/closed by examining its elaboration in Bergson's philosophy and critically parsing the possibilities for its destabilization. Though Bergson wrote in a colonial context, this context barely receives acknowledgement in his work. This obscures the uncomfortable resonances between Bergson's late work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, and the temporal narratives that justify French colonialism. Given Bergson's uptake by philosophers, such as Gilles Deleuze, and by contemporary feminist and political theorists (especially “new materialists”), (...) a critical re-examination is called for. The Two Sources not only introduces a new dichotomy into Bergsonian philosophy—that of open/closed—it puts an end to the movement of duration by defining its possibilities as goals already given in advance. By turning the tools of Bergsonian critique onto The Two Sources, I propose an alternative to the open/closed—that of the “half-open”—creating in this way the conditions for decolonizing duration. (shrink)

L’opera più importante per la filosofia dell’azione dopo l’Etica di Aristotele: così Donald Davidson ha definito il libro di Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Intention, che Elisa Grimi ci presenta oggi attraverso questa preziosa guida alla lettura, il primo testo di questo genere in lingua italiana. dalla Prefazione di Cyrille Michon. Che cosa sia un’intenzione, quale sia il ruolo che essa svolge all'interno di un’azione, se vi si possa trovare traccia della vera intenzione del soggetto guardando l’azione che compie: questi e (...) molti altri sono gli interrogativi ai quali Anscombe tenta di rispondere. Intention non è un’opera di etica o di politica ma si muove su uno sfondo etico o politico, uno sfondo da cui lo scritto trae la propria forza e il proprio spirito. L’intenzione infatti è capace di modellare l’azione e generare una storia. Come un mazzo di fiori scelto ad hoc è capace di suscitare emozioni e sentimenti e, allo stesso tempo, custodire la promessa di una storia a venire. (shrink)

Passare da Wittgenstein per arrivare a san Tommaso non è un percorso a ritroso, filosoficamente parlando. Lo sostengono importanti pensatori britannici della tradizione post-analitica come Peter Geach, Elizabeth Anscombe e Anthony Kenny, i quali propongono una lettura molto originale del Dottor Angelico e dell’autore delle Ricerche filosofiche. Roger Pouivet ricostruisce in Dopo Wittgenstein, san Tommaso i percorsi di una nuova e provocatoria corrente filosofica che ha preso il nome di “tomismo analitico” ed è una delle più coraggiose frontiere filosofiche di (...) oggi. (shrink)

IT_Nel panorama analitico emerge la gura di Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. Ella, accanto a suo marito Peter Geach e al losofo Anthony Kenny, è stata indicata da John Haldane, tra i promotori di una nuova corrente denominata “tomismo analitico”. In questo saggio, oltre a sottolineare le debolezze che sono presenti in tale dicitura e allo stesso tempo il carattere innovativo della ri essione di questi loso , si è scelto di ripercorrere in modo critico le pagine che Anscombe dedica ad (...) un tema caro ai loso sin dalla classicità, vale a dire il tema della “sostanza”. È possibile, così, mostrare come tale concetto abbia subito delle modi che lungo tutta la storia del pensiero e, in ne, chiarire la de nizione che ne dà Anscombe. In conclusione, vengono presi in considerazioni quelli che possono essere con- siderati, sia in positivo che in negativo, i punti rilevanti della questione. EN_In the analytic philosophical panorama it is very relevant the gure of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. Along her husband Peter Geach and the philosopher Anthony Kenny, she was identi ed by John Haldane as one of the promoters of a new philosophical current called “Analytical Thomism”. In this paper, in addition to highlighting the weaknesses that is present in this statement and at the same time the character of innovation o ered by the re ection of these philosophers, the Author choses to analyze the topic of substance, considered by philosophers since the classical antiquity. She will show brie y how this con- cept has been changed in the history of thought, culminating in the elaboration developed by Anscombe. In the conclusion the Author shows the fallacy and the strong points of the problem. (shrink)

-- abstract is not requested by the Editor.

Questo studio costituisce la prima monografia italiana su una delle più complesse pensatrici dell’ultimo millennio. Filosofa dal pensiero formidabile, così ne parlò Sarah Boxer sul New York Times, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, moglie di Peter Geach e madre di sette figli, ha sempre battagliato per la verità. In lei vita, passione e filosofia sono un tutt’uno e in tale unità si cela l’irriducibilità e il fascino del suo pensiero. In compagnia dei classici dell’antichità, dei moderni e di quei filosofi del (...) panorama contemporaneo con cui era solita dialogare, in primis Ludwig Wittgenstein, ella arrivò a elaborare un pensiero del tutto personale quale risposta ai diversi problemi sollevati in ambito sociale. Non a caso, come osserva Jane O’Grady, talvolta venne soprannominata la Dragon Lady di Oxford. Basti citare la sua opposizione pubblica al conferimento della laurea honoris causa al presidente Truman, o alle sfide che fronteggiò in campo morale. Autrice di numerosissime pubblicazioni, nel 1958 stilò il famoso scritto Modern Moral Philosophy, poi divenuto il manifesto della rinascita di un’etica di tipo neo-aristotelico. Il volume si conclude con una breve raccolta di testimonianze di persone, docenti, allievi e amici che hanno avuto occasione di incontrarla. E come ricorda Rosalind Hursthouse, Anscombe era una “filosofa straordinaria, e del tutto eccezionale”. (shrink)

---abstract not requested by the Editors.