A. J. Ayer

I have told elsewhere the story of my first meeting with Freddie Ayer, but I shall re-tell it. It made a great impact on me, though, I believe, none on him. Certainly at no point in our friendship did he ever bring it up. It was mid or late 1946. I was an undergraduate at Balliol, having returned from three years in the army, and I was reading for Part II of the History Schools. Most of my friends, most of (...) my intellectual friends, were reading philosophy, and there was a necessity, which I already sensed, for my returning to Oxford once again to follow in their footsteps. This happened later in the autumn of 1947. Post-war Oxford was a very different place from the Firbankian hothouse of wartime Oxford, at least as I knew it. We were all said to be ‘more mature’, but within the confines of austerity, we were determined to enjoy ourselves. Oxford was not, in the famous words that Max Beerbohm put into the mouth of Mrs Humphrey Ward, ‘wholly serious’. (shrink)

In an article contributed to Mind in 1934, the young A. J. Ayer declared war on metaphysics, claiming that his destruction of the metaphysicians' arguments rested on the establishment of the sheerly non-sensical character of their statements. Their errors were syntactical; the combination of symbols in the sentences with which they expressed their propositions violated fundamental principles of significance.

Some books are like parents, grandparents or old friends. They have been with us from our earliest days and one treats them almost with familiarity. They belong to one's youth and the recognition that they have been around for months and years keeps company with surprise. For philosophers such a book is A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, first published over fifty years ago in 1936. There is a sense in which a similar point may be made about some (...) individuals, but discretion and good manners should deter us from succumbing to the philosophical disease of pressing an analogy too far. Suffice it to say that over a period during which most English speaking philosophers were content to work within a context which was significantly influenced by Ayer's clear and cajoling formulation of a twentieth century of empiricism, F. C. Copleston provided one of the few distinctive alternative philosophical perspectives on major metaphysical questions. This essay will reflect upon the influence of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic some fifty years after its publication, upon the philosophical discussion of religion and theological questions. (shrink)

I am very much honoured to have been asked to make the closing speech at this Conference. Since this is the first time for over fifty years that a philosophical congress of this scope has been held in England, I hope that you will think it suitable for me to devote my lecture to the revival of the empiricist tradition in British philosophy during this century. I shall begin by examining the contribution of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore. Though (...) he first owed his fame to his book Principia Ethica regarded as a work of genius by the Cambridge Apostles and their associates in Bloomsbury, who did not venture to question Moore's mistaken view of ‘good’ as an unanalysable non-natural quality, his reputation now chiefly rests on his subsequent defence of common sense. (shrink)

As the editor noted in the last number Freddie Ayer, or Professor Sir Alfred Ayer, played a considerable part in launching the vast enterprise of the Bentham edition. It is fitting, therefore, that something be said in Utilitas about his achievement as a philosopher and the extent to which he falls within the same broad empiricist and utilitarian tradition to which Bentham and J. S. Mill belonged.

In contrast to many of his contemporaries, A. J. Ayer was an analytic philosopher who had sustained throughout his career some interest in developments in the work of his ‘continental’ peers. Ayer, who spoke French, held friendships with some important Parisian intellectuals, such as Camus, Bataille, Wahl and Merleau-Ponty. This paper examines the circumstances of a meeting between Ayer, Merleau-Ponty, Wahl, Ambrosino and Bataille, which took place in 1951 at some Parisian bar. The question under discussion during this meeting was (...) whether the sun existed before humans did, over which the various philosophers disagreed. This disagreement is tangled with a variety of issues, such as Ayer’s critique of Heidegger and Sartre, Ayer’s response to Merleau-Ponty’s critique of empiricism, and Bataille’s response to Sartre’s critique of his notion of ‘unknowing’, which uncannily resembles Ayer’s critique of Sartre. Amidst this tangle one finds Bataille’s statement that an ‘abyss’ separates English from French and German philosophy, the first recorded announcement of the analytic-continental divide in the twentieth century. (shrink)

(2013). Is the Royaumont Colloquium the Locus Classicus of the Divide Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy? Reply to Overgaard. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 177-188. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.689751.

Ayer’s critique of Metaphysics is much indebted to Hume and Kant’s pioneering appraisals of metaphysics. Its uniqueness lies mainly in the attempt to ground the rejection of metaphysics on a linguistic basis rather than epistemic premise as Hume and Kant before him. Yet it remains to be seen whether Ayer’s initiative fares better than its predecessors in discrediting metaphysics.

_Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy_ provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems about (...) the mind and perception, and on thinkers including Locke, Berkeley and Ayer, the book demonstrates how such autonomous habits of thought systematically generate unsound intuitions and philosophical delusions, whose clash with reality, or among each other, gives rise to ill-motivated but maddening problems. The book re-examines models of therapeutic philosophy, due to Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, and develops an approach that may let us overcome philosophical delusions and the problems they engender. In this way, the book explains where and why therapy in called for in philosophy, and develops techniques to carry it out. (shrink)

1986 is the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, which is commonly considered one of the most influential books in twentieth-century philosophy. These essays offer a comprehensive appraisal of the influence and impact of Ayer's work and analyze the ways in which Ayer's arguments have been absorbed, modified, or rejected by various philosophers. A noteworthy feature of the book is an original essay by A. J. Ayer that assesses the influence of his work (...) in philosophy over the last fifty years. (shrink)

Professor Ayer's new book 1 is of very great interest. All the discussion is skilful, much of it is ingenious; the arguments ramify, but never get out of control; the prose is pleasant, the presentation polished and civilized. Once before, Professor Ayer investigated the foundations of empirical knowledge; and the central topics of his new book are, to a large extent, the same as those of his earlier one. These are topics which have been much discussed since 1940. Ayer takes (...) account of many of these discussions, and his views, in consequence, have changed. They have not changed quite so radically as one might have expected. Ayer thinks that the old-style sceptic ought still to be given a run on the old course against the old competitors. If I am not mistaken, it is important to keep this guiding thought in mind in trying to understand his book. For it is easy to glide comfortably over the smooth surface of this prose without noticing transitions and modulations which, in a less expertly composed treatise, might have given one a jolt. (shrink)

Eight short papers, semi-popular in intent, surveying British philosophy from Bradley, through Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, to the contemporary analysis of Ryle and Austin. Coverage is spotty, and some of the treatments are so brief and sketchy as to be of dubious value. Ryle's introduction, however, and concluding papers by Strawson and Warnock are both pleasant and instructive.--V. C. C.

A. J. Ayer, who died in 1989, was acknowledged as one of Britain's most distinguished philosophers. In this memorial collection of essays leading Western philosophers reflect on Ayer's place in the history of philosophy and explore aspects of his thought and teaching. The volume also includes a posthumous essay by Ayer himself: 'A defence of empiricism'. These essays are undoubtedly a fitting tribute to a major figure, but the collection is not simply retrospective; rather it looks forward to present and (...) future developments in philosophical thought that Ayer's work has stimulated. (shrink)

Objections are raised to the demand that one be either exclusively for or against continental philosophy, and two arguments are developed; one in support of, and one against, positions developed within the continental tradition. The first is a quick argument against A.J. Ayer’s rejection, on the basis of Frege’s logical insights, of Heidegger and Sartre’s use of ‘nothing’. The second is a longer argument against Derrida’s claim, on the basis of his critique of Husserl’s phenomenology, that the difference between signifier (...) and signified is nothing. The second argument develops an exposition of Derrida’s critique of phenomenology, from the point of view of language, and argues, on the basis of that reading, that his claim is either banal or highly implausible. (shrink)