About this topic
Summary One of the central debates in the philosophy of time is between the A-theorists and the B-theorists. These unhelpful labels can be traced back to John McTaggart's distinction between the A-series and the B-series. The A-theory of time is typically associated with the idea that the present is metaphysically privileged or singled out in some way from past and future times. Furthermore, there is genuine flow of time as past events recede further and further into the past and future events move closer and closer to the present. The A-theorist holds that the properties of being past, being present and being future are fundamental to the nature of time. Presentism, the Growing Block Theory, and the Moving Spotlight Theory are all versions of the A-theory, providing different accounts of how the present is metaphysically distinguished. The B-theory of time, in contrast, denies that the present is metaphysically privileged over past and future times. Just as there is nothing metaphysically special about, say, London as opposed to Sydney, the B-theorist maintains that there is nothing metaphysically special about the present moment as opposed to, say, the year 1847 or 2157. 
Key works McTaggart introduces the A-series and the B-series in McTaggart 1908. Arthur Prior is one of the most important and influential A-theorists (see Prior 1968 and Prior 1967). Ned Markosian has done a great deal in formulating and defending the A-theory.  See his Markosian 1993 for one such defense. Dean Zimmerman provides an illuminating discussion of drawing the A-theory-B-theory distinction in Zimmerman 2005.
Introductions For good introductions to the A-theory of time, see Markosian 2010 and Zimmerman 2007
Related categories

330 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 330
  1. In Defense of Temporal Passage.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper, I endorse and defend the Common Sense View of Time (CSVT), i.e. Presentism plus the A-theory of time, by arguing for the objective reality of temporal passage.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Our Naïve Representation of Time and of the Open Future.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - manuscript
    It’s generally thought that we naively or pre-theoretically represent the future to be open. While philosophers have modelled future openness in different ways, it’s unclear which, if any, captures our naïve sense that the future is open. In this paper we focus on just one way the future might count as being open: by being nomically open, and empirically investigate whether our naïve representation of the future as open is partly constituted by representing the future as nomically open. We also (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Alethic Opennes and the Growing Block Theory of Time.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew Latham, Jordan Lee-Tory & Kristie Miller - manuscript
    Whatever its ultimate philosophical merits, it is often thought that the growing block theory presents an intuitive picture of reality that accords well with our pre-reflective or folk view of time, and of the past, present and future. This is partly motivated by the idea that we find it intuitive that in some sense the future is open and the past closed, and that the growing block theory is particularly well suited to accommodate this being so. In this paper we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Two-Dimensional Time.Michael Kowalik - manuscript
    Philosophical views about the logical structure of time are typically divided between proponents of A and B theories, based on McTaggart's A and B series. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology, I develop and defend McTaggart's thesis that the C series and the A series working together give a consistent description of temporal experience, provided that the two series are treated as distinct dimensions internal to time. In the proposed two-dimensional model, the C series expresses a nesting order of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Why Do People Represent Time as Dynamical? An Investigation of Temporal Dynamism and the Open Future.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - manuscript
    Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an explanatory burden. If, as they maintain, the world seems to us in experience as though it is non-dynamical, then why do we represent time as dynamical? This paper takes up the challenge of investigating, on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Locating Temporal Passage in a Block World.Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller & Brigitte Everett - manuscript
    This paper aims to determine whether we can locate temporal passage in a non-dynamical (block universe) world. In particular, we seek to determine both whether temporal passage can be located somewhere in our world if it is non-dynamical, and also to home in on where in such a world temporal passage can be located, if it can be located anywhere. We investigate this question by seeking to determine, across three experiments, whether the folk concept of temporal passage can be satisfied (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Schrodinger's Cat Meets McTaggart and the Problem of Other Minds.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    This paper proposes an interpretation of time that is an 'A-theory' in that it incorporates both McTaggart's A-series and his B-series. The A-series characteristics are supposed to be 'ontologically private' analogous to qualia in the problem of other minds and is given a definition. The main idea is that the experimenter and the cat do not share the same A-series characteristics, e.g the same 'now'. So there is no single time at which the cat gets ascribed different states. It is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. From McTaggart to AdS_5 Geometry 2.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    The purpose of this note is to show how an 'AB-series' interpretation of time, given in a companion paper, leads, surprisingly, to AdS_5 geometry. This is not a theory of 2 time dimensions. Rather, it is a theory of 1 time dimension that has both A-series and B-series characteristics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Towards an AB-Series Interpretation of Time in Physics.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    How can McTaggart's A-series notion of time be incorporated into physics while retaining the B-series notion? It may be the A-series 'now' can be construed as ontologically private. How is that modeled? Could a definition of a combined AB-series entropy help with the Past Hypothesis problem? What if the increase in entropy as a system goes from earlier times to later times is canceled by the decrease in entropy as a system goes from future, to present, to past?
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Hybrid Time Physics.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    I accept that McTaggart's A-series and B-series are not inter-reducible and that both are needed for a complete temporal description of a physical system. I consider the Wigner's Friend thought experiment. The A-series are associated with each (quantum) system, and relativity is associated with the B-series. I consider temporal evolution through this 'hybrid' time. We may define the rate of temporal flow as 1 B-series second per A-series second.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Time Flows at 1 B-Second Per A-Second.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    I suggest time flows at 1 B-series second per A-series second.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Temporal Knowledge Argument 2.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    How does the temporal knowledge argument fair when exposed to Chalmers' 2-dimensional analysis of the knowledge argument?
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. McTaggart Saves Schrodinger's Cat?Paul Merriam - manuscript
    This paper proposes an interpretation of time that is an 'A-theory' in that it incorporates both McTaggart's A-series and his B-series. The A-series characteristics are supposed to be 'ontologically private' analogous to qualia in the Inverted Spectrum thought experiment and is given a definition. The main idea is that the experimenter and the cat do not share the same A-series characteristics. So there is no single time at which the cat gets ascribed different states. It is proposed one may define (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Notes 2 A Theory of Time 6 7 2019.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    A theory of time was proposed in "A theory of time", an early version of which is on PhilPapers. The idea was that the A-series features of a physical system are ontologically private, and this was given a mathematical definition. Also B-series features are ontologically public. This brief note is a detailed rumination on path-integrals and Schrodinger's Cat, in this theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. The Law of Conservation of Time and Its Applications.Ninh Khac Son - manuscript
    Time is a complex category not only in philosophy but also in mathematics and physics. In one thought about time, the author accidentally discovered a new way to explain and solve problems related to time dilation, such as solving the problem of Muon particle when moving from a height of 10 km to the earth’s surface, while the Muon’s lifespan is only 2.2 microseconds, or explaining Michelson-Morley experiment using the new method. In addition, the author also prove that the speed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Lawful Persistence.David Builes & Trevor Teitel - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    The central aim of this paper is to use a particular view about how the laws of nature govern the evolution of our universe in order to develop and evaluate the two main competing options in the metaphysics of persistence, namely endurantism and perdurantism. We begin by motivating the view that our laws of nature dictate not only qualitative facts about the future, but also which objects will instantiate which qualitative properties. We then show that both traditional doctrines in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. The Modal Moving Spotlight Theory.Daniel Deasy - forthcoming - Mind.
    The Moving Spotlight Theory (MST) combines three theses: first, that there is an absolute present time; second, that always, everything exists eternally; and third, that exactly one fundamental property is temporary. In this paper, I argue that MST so defined can be combined with a reductive analysis of the tense operators (i.e. properties of propositions like being past), which I call the 'Modal Analysis'. According to the Modal Analysis, for it to be the case that at a time t, p (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. A (Limited) Defence of Priorianism.Daniel Deasy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper defends Priorianism, a theory in the philosophy of time which combines three theses: first, that there is a metaphysical distinction between the present time and non-present times; second, that there are temporary propositions, that is, propositions that change in truth-value simpliciter over time; and third, that there is change over time only if there are temporary propositions. Priorianism is accepted by many Presentists, Growing Block Theorists, and Moving Spotlight Theorists. However, it is difficult to defend the view without (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Time, Metaphysics Of.Natalja Deng - forthcoming - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Metaphysics is the part of philosophy that asks questions about the nature of reality – about what there is, and what it is like. The metaphysics of time is the part of the philosophy of time that asks questions about the nature of temporal reality. One central such question is that of whether time passes or flows, or whether it has a dynamic aspect.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. How to Get Out of the Labyrinth of Time? Lessons Drawn From Callender.Jerzy Gołosz - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-24.
    Callender [2017] claims that contemporary science demonstrates that there is no objective present and no objective flow of time, especially since all sensed events come from the past, our various senses need different amounts of time to react, and there are enough asymmetries in the physical world to explain our experience of time. This paper holds that, although Callender’s arguments for the subjectivity of the flow of time are unconvincing, the scientific discoveries and arguments he indicates can still be applied (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Do the Folk Represent Time as Essentially Dynamical?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Recent research (Latham, Miller and Norton, forthcoming) reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e., does what satisfies the folk representation of time in counterfactual worlds depend on what satisfies it actually—sensitive—or does is not depend on what satisfies it actually—insensitive, and (b) do (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  22. Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of Our Attitudes.Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    We direct different attitudes towards states of affairs depending on where in time those states of affairs are located. Call this the type asymmetry. The type asymmetry appears fitting. For instance, it seems fitting to feel guilt or regret only about states of affairs that are past, and anticipation only of states of affairs that are future. It has been argued that the type asymmetry could only be fitting if there are tensed facts, and hence that since it is fitting, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. The Growing Block and What Was Once Present.Peter Tan - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    According to the growing block ontology of time, there exist past and present objects and events, but no future objects or events. The growing block is made attractive not just because of the attractiveness of its ontological basis for past-tensed truths, the past’s fixity, and future’s openness, but by underlying principles about the right way to fill in this sort of ontology. I shall argue that given these underlying views about the connection between truth and ontology, growing blockers incur an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Growing Block, the Open Future, and Future Truths.Stephan Torre - forthcoming - Disputatio.
    For a book symposium in Disputatio on Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz's Nothing to Come.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Time, and Time Again.Sam Baron & Yi-Cheng Lin - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):259-282.
    A number of philosophers uphold a metaphysical symmetry between time and hypertime, in this sense: in so far as hypertime exists, the nature of hypertime should agree with the nature of time. Others allow that we can mix and match the metaphysics of time and hypertime. Thus, it may be that time really passes, but hypertime does not or vice versa. In this paper, we provide a preliminary defense of the mix and match approach. We outline a number of arguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Out of Time: A Philosophical Study of Timelessness.Sam Baron, Kristie Miller & Jonathan Tallant - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The idea that time does not exist is, for many, unthinkable: time must exist. Almost every experience we have tells us so. There has been plenty of debate around what time is like, but not whether it exists. The goal of this book is to make the absence of time thinkable. Time might not exist. Beginning with an empirically flavoured examination of the 'folk' concept of time, the book explores the implications this has for our understanding of agency, and the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. The a-Theory of Time, Temporal Passage, and Comprehensiveness.Bahadir Eker - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-20.
    It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Fragmenting Reality: On Fragmentalism, Time, and Modality.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuliano Torrengo - 2022 - London: Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics.
    In this book, we develop a fragmentalist theory of time, which we call Flow Fragmentalism, and then explore its ramifications in a number of philosophical topics. In Chapter 1, after presenting the view, we argue that it offers an explanation of the passage of time that is unavailable to standard tense realism, and it is thus more effective than the latter in vindicating the inherent dynamism of reality. Chapter 2 presents a branching-time version of Flow Fragmentalism, in which a genuine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Presentism.David Ingram & Jonathan Tallant - 2022 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Presentism is the view that only present things exist. So understood, presentism is primarily an ontological doctrine; it’s a view about what exists, absolutely and unrestrictedly. The view is the subject of extensive discussion in the literature on time and change, with much of it focused on the problems that presentism allegedly faces. Thus, most of the literature that frames the development of presentism has grown up either in formulating objections to the view (e.g., Sider 2001: 11–52), or in response (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  30. Robust Passage Phenomenology Probably Does Not Explain Future-Bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-23.
    People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, according to which future-bias (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Presentism and times as propositions.Luca Banfi & Daniel Deasy - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):725-743.
    Some Presentists—according to whom everything is present—identify instants of time with propositions of a certain kind. However, the view that times are propositions seems to be at odds with Presentism: if there are times then there are past times, and therefore things that are past; but how could there be things that are past if everything is present? In this paper, we describe the Presentist view that times are propositions ; we set out the argument that Presentism is incompatible with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Relativity and the A-Theory.Antony Eagle - 2021 - In Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 86–98.
    The special theory of relativity (STR) is widely supposed to be in tension with A-theories of time, those giving special significance to the present moment. A-theories are diverse in the features they regard as distinctive of the present, but all agree that there is an absolute fact of the matter about which events have the feature of presentness. Famously, the standard notion of simultaneity operationalised within the theory of relativity is not absolute. If A-theorists accept relativistic physics, they must either (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Dynamic Absolutism and Qualitative Change.Bahadır Eker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):281-291.
    According to Fine’s famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Correia and Rosenkranz have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. A Song Turned Sideways Would Sound as Sweet.Zachary Ferguson - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):14-18.
    Markosian presents an argument against certain theories of time based on the aesthetic value of music. He argues that turning a piece of music sideways in time destroys its intrinsic value, which would not be possible if the Spacetime Thesis were true. In this paper I show that sideways music poses no problems for any theory of time by demonstrating that turning a piece of music sideways does not affect its intrinsic value. I do this by appealing to spatial analogies (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Measuring the Present: What is the Duration of ‘Now’?Brittany A. Gentry - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9357-9371.
    Presentists argue that only the present is real. In this paper, I ask what duration the present has on a presentist’s account. While several answers are available, each of them requires the adoption of a measure and, with that adoption, additional work must be done to define the present. Whether presentists conclude that a reductionist account of duration is acceptable, that duration is not an applicable concept for their notion of the present, that the present has a duration of zero, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?Samuele Iaquinto & Claudio Calosi - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2009-2019.
    Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and discussed, and different developments of the original insight have been proposed. In a celebrated paper, Jonathan Simon contends that fragmentalism delivers a new realist account of the quantum state—which he calls conservative realism—according to which: the quantum state is a complete description of a physical system, the quantum state is grounded in its terms, and the superposition terms are themselves grounded in local goings-on about the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. Can time flow at different rates? The differential passage of A-ness.Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):255-280.
    According to the No Alternate Possibilities argument, if time passes then the rate at which it passes could be different but time cannot pass at different rates, and hence time cannot pass. Typically, defenders of the NAP argument have focussed on defending premise, and have taken the truth of for granted: they accept the orthodox view of rate necessitarianism. In this paper we argue that the defender of the NAP argument needs to turn her attention to. We describe a series (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. If Time Can Pass, Time Can Pass at Different Rates.Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):21-32.
    According to the No Alternate Possibilities argument, if time passes then the rate at which it passes could be different. Thus, time cannot pass, since if time passes, then necessarily it passes at a rate of 1 second per second. One response to this argument is to posit hypertime, and to argue that at different worlds, time passes at different rates when measured against hypertime. Since many A-theorists think we can make sense of temporal passage without positing hypertime, we pursue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Philosophy of Time: A Contemporary Introduction.Sean Enda Power - 2021 - Routledge.
    As a growing area of research, the philosophy of time is increasingly relevant to different areas of philosophy and even other disciplines. This book describes and evaluates the most important debates in philosophy of time, under several subject areas: metaphysics, epistemology, physics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, rationality, and art. -/- Questions this book investigates include: Can we know what time really is? Is time possible, especially given modern physics? Must there be time because we cannot think (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. Exploring People’s Beliefs About the Experience of Time.Jack Shardlow, Ruth Lee, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, Patrick Burns & Alison S. Fernandes - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10709-10731.
    Philosophical debates about the metaphysics of time typically revolve around two contrasting views of time. On the A-theory, time is something that itself undergoes change, as captured by the idea of the passage of time; on the B-theory, all there is to time is events standing in before/after or simultaneity relations to each other, and these temporal relations are unchanging. Philosophers typically regard the A-theory as being supported by our experience of time, and they take it that the B-theory clashes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. Explanation and the A-Theory.David Storrs-Fox - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:4239-4259.
    Propositional temporalism is the view that there are temporary propositions: propositions that are true, but not always true. Factual futurism is the view that there are futurist facts: facts that obtain, but that will at some point not obtain. Most A-theoretic views in the philosophy of time are committed both to propositional temporalism and to factual futurism. Mark Richard, Jeffrey King and others have argued that temporary propositions are not fit to be the contents of propositional attitudes, or to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Unfreezing the Spotlight: Tense Realism and Temporal Passage.Fabrice Correia & Sven Rosenkranz - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):21-30.
    Realism about tense is the view that the contrast between what was, what is and what will be the case is real, and not merely a projection of our ways of thinking. Does this view entail realism about temporal passage, namely the view that time really passes, in the same sense of ‘real’? We argue that the answer is affirmative for many versions of tense realism, and indeed for all sensible versions. We thereby address an important conceptual issue regarding these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43. Diamonds Are Forever.Cian Dorr & Jeremy Goodman - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):632-665.
    We defend the thesis that every necessarily true proposition is always true. Since not every proposition that is always true is necessarily true, our thesis is at odds with theories of modality and time, such as those of Kit Fine and David Kaplan, which posit a fundamental symmetry between modal and tense operators. According to such theories, just as it is a contingent matter what is true at a given time, it is likewise a temporary matter what is true at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  44. Explaining Temporal Qualia.Matt Farr - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
    Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  45. Modal Fragmentalism.Samuele Iaquinto - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):570-587.
    In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46. McTaggart on the Unreality of Time: Boghossian's Argument against Error-Theory.Ali Hossein Khani & Saeedeh Shahmir - 2020 - Zehn 81:91-115.
    McTaggart, in his famous paper, “The Unreality of Time” (1908), argues in favor of the sceptical claim that time is unreal. His main argument is based on detecting a paradox in our ordinary descriptions of time or events occurring in time. Based on our common sense conception of time, time and the events happening in it can be described in two ways: either as having the properties of “being past”, “being present” and “being future”, or as having the properties of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Being Pessimistic About the Objective Present.Derek Lam - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-16.
    Some philosophers argue that non-presentist A-theories problematically imply that we cannot know that this moment is present. The problem is usually presented as arising from the combination of the A-theoretic ideology of a privileged presentness and a non-presentist ontology. The goal of this essay is to show that the epistemic problem can be rephrased as a pessimistic induction. By doing so, I will show that the epistemic problem, in fact, stems from the A-theoretic ideology alone. Hence, once it is properly (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Temporal Phenomenology: Phenomenological Illusion Versus Cognitive Error.Kristie Miller, Alex Holcombe & Andrew J. Latham - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):751-771.
    Temporal non-dynamists hold that there is no temporal passage, but concede that many of us judge that it seems as though time passes. Phenomenal Illusionists suppose that things do seem this way, even though things are not this way. They attempt to explain how it is that we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion. More recently, Cognitive Error Theorists have argued that our experiences do not seem that way; rather, we are subject to an error that leads us mistakenly (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  49. Time Will Tell: An Interview with Kristie Miller.Christina Rawls & Kristie Miller - 2020 - Blog of the APA.
  50. The Invisible Thin Red Line.Giuliano Torrengo & Samuele Iaquinto - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):354-382.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism, and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, we elaborate what we call Flow Fragmentalism, a view inspired by Kit Fine (2005)’s non-standard tense realism, according to which reality is divided up into maximally coherent collections of tensed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 330