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  1. Abduction as a Aspect of Retroduction.Phyllis Chiasson - 2001 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    One of the most intriguing mysteries in American philosophy falls under the question: “Just what does Charles Sanders Peirce’s concept of abductive reasoning comprise?” Peirce used the terms “abduction” and “retroduction” interchangeably as names for a distinct form of logical inference, as well as for the method by which hypotheses are engendered. He considered his theory of abduction essential to his theory of pragmatism. Yet nearly a century after his death, Peirce’s concept of abduction is still poorly understood. This entry (...)
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  2. Cartesianism, the Embodied Mind, and the Future of Cognitive Research.Philippe Gagnon - 2015 - In Dirk Evers, Michael Fuller, Anne Runehov & Knut-Willy Sæther (eds.), Do Emotions Shape the World? Biennial Yearbook of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology 2015-2016. Martin-Luther-Universität. pp. 225-244.
    In his oft-cited book Descartes' Error, Antonio Damasio claims that Descartes is responsible for having stifled the development of modern neurobiological science, in particular as regards the objective study of the physical and physiological bases for emotive and socially-conditioned cognition. Most of Damasio’s book would stand without reference to Descartes, so it is intriguing to ask why he launched this attack. What seems to fuel such claims is a desire for a more holistic understanding of the mind, the brain and (...)
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  3. Computationalism and the Problem of Other Minds.Stuart S. Glennan - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):375-88.
    In this paper I discuss Searle's claim that the computational properties of a system could never cause a system to be conscious. In the first section of the paper I argue that Searle is correct that, even if a system both behaves in a way that is characteristic of conscious agents (like ourselves) and has a computational structure similar to those agents, one cannot be certain that that system is conscious. On the other hand, I suggest that Searle's intuition that (...)
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  4. Testimony and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  5. Theories, Analogies, and Criteria.William Hasker - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):242-256.
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  6. Other Minds as Theoretical Entities.Alec Hyslop - 1976 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):158-61.
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  7. A Reply to Don Locke.Alec Hyslop - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-69.
  8. Abduction as Practical Inference.Tomis Kapitan - 2000 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    According to C. S. Peirce, abduction is a rational attempt to locate an explanation for a puzzling phenomenon, where this is a process that includes both generating explanatory hypotheses and selecting certain hypotheses for further scrutiny. Since inference is a controlled process that can be subjected to normative standards, essential to his view of abductive rasoning is that it is correlated to a unique species of correctness that cannot be reduced to deductive validity or inductive strength. This irreducibility claim is (...)
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  9. Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others’ Minds.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
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  10. Seeing What You Want.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:554-564.
    There has been recent interest in the hypothesis that we can directly perceive some of each other’s mental features. One popular strategy for defending that hypothesis is to claim that some mental features are embodied in a way that makes them available to perception. Here I argue that this view would imply a particular limit on the kinds of mental feature that would be perceptible (§2). I sketch reasons for thinking that the view is not yet well-motivated (§3). And I (...)
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  11. Review of Alex Hyslop's "Other Minds". [REVIEW]Andrew Melnyk - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):383-384.
  12. Inference to the Best Explanation and Other Minds.Andrew Melnyk - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):482-91.
    Robert Pargetter has argued that we know other minds through an inference to the best explanation. My aim is to show, by criticising Pargetter's account, that this approach to the problem of other minds cannot, as it stands, deliver the goods; it might be part of the right response to the problem, but it cannot be the whole story. More precisely, I will claim that Pargetter does not successfully reconstruct how ordinary people in everyday life come reasonably to believe in (...)
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  13. Evidential Necessity and Other Minds.Anne H. Narveson - 1966 - Mind 75 (January):114-121.
  14. God, Other Minds, and the Inference to the Best Explanation.P. A. Ostein - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4:149-62.
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  15. The Scientific Inference to Other Minds.Robert Pargetter - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):158-63.
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  16. Peirce and the Continuum of Means and Ends.Chiasson Phyllis - 2001 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    It may seem obvious that, before we can begin to verify a hypothesis, we must somehow “acquire” one. Yet, until Peirce began working on his theory of abduction, little thought had been given to the issue of hypothesis acquisition and its everyday equivalent goal acquisition. Even today, most people seem satisfied with the idea that goals and hypotheses arise “somehow,” and that the primary purpose of scientific inquiry is to verify a hypothesis; and, of ordinary life, to achieve goals. The (...)
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  17. The Role of Optimism in Abduction.Chiasson Phyllis - 2001 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    Optimism may not seem like a topic with which good scientific minds need bother themselves. After all, it would seem that neither optimism nor pessimism should have anything to do with the neutral and objective performance of good scientific reasoning. Science is usually thought of as a collection of disciplines from which well-trained minds seek actual truths‹not an arena for seemingly psychological factors such as “optimism” and “pessimism.” Yet if so, then why would Charles Sanders Peirce, perhaps the consummate scientific (...)
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  18. Empirical Realism and Other Minds.Hilary Putnam - 1979 - Philosophical Investigations 2:71-72.
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  19. Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds.Johannes Roessler - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues (...)
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  20. On Whether We Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  21. The Hypothesis of Other Minds: Is It the Best Explanation? [REVIEW]Nathan Stemmer - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (January):109-121.
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  22. Leslie, John. Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology.Carl N. Still - 2003 - Review of Metaphysics 57 (1):154-155.
  23. Abductive Reasoning and Language Philosophy: Peirce's and Davidson's Account of Interpretation.Wirth Uwe - 2001 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    The Peircean idea of interpretation as an inferential process of hypothesis adoption reveals a suprising anticipation of the account of interpretation deployed by Davidson in his article “A nice Derangement of Epitaphs”. For Davidson, the process of interpretation is a transformation of “prior theories” into “passing theories”. In the following I want to point out the similarities between the Davidsonian and the Peircean model of interpretation by highlighting the crucial role that the interpreter´s “abductive competence” plays in the process of (...)
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  24. Abduction, Wit, Stupidity- From Peirce to Freud.Uwe Wirth - 2000 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    According to Kant, human stupidity reveals, a lack of “power of judgement”, or as Peirce might say, a lack of abductive competence that confuses the relevant and the irrelevant. Peirce anticipated this idea. He writes: “I have come to the conclusion that it is folly to attempt to set limits which human stupidity cannot overpass. Apparently both, Semiosis and human Stupidity are unlimited. The only two possible reactions to this condition humain are either critical reasoning or laughing. It was Aristotle (...)
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