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  1. Cartesianism, the Embodied Mind, and the Future of Cognitive Research.Philippe Gagnon - 2015 - In Dirk Evers, Michael Fuller, Anne Runehov & Knut-Willy Sæther (eds.), Do Emotions Shape the World? Biennial Yearbook of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology 2015-2016. Martin-Luther-Universität. pp. 225-244.
    In his oft-cited book Descartes' Error, Antonio Damasio claims that Descartes is responsible for having stifled the development of modern neurobiological science, in particular as regards the objective study of the physical and physiological bases for emotive and socially-conditioned cognition. Most of Damasio’s book would stand without reference to Descartes, so it is intriguing to ask why he launched this attack. What seems to fuel such claims is a desire for a more holistic understanding of the mind, the brain and (...)
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  2. Computationalism and the Problem of Other Minds.Stuart S. Glennan - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):375-88.
    In this paper I discuss Searle's claim that the computational properties of a system could never cause a system to be conscious. In the first section of the paper I argue that Searle is correct that, even if a system both behaves in a way that is characteristic of conscious agents (like ourselves) and has a computational structure similar to those agents, one cannot be certain that that system is conscious. On the other hand, I suggest that Searle's intuition that (...)
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  3. Testimony and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  4. Theories, Analogies, and Criteria.William Hasker - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):242-256.
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  5. Other Minds as Theoretical Entities.Alec Hyslop - 1976 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (August):158-61.
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  6. A Reply to Don Locke.Alec Hyslop - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-69.
  7. Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others’ Minds.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
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  8. Seeing What You Want.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:554-564.
    There has been recent interest in the hypothesis that we can directly perceive some of each other’s mental features. One popular strategy for defending that hypothesis is to claim that some mental features are embodied in a way that makes them available to perception. Here I argue that this view would imply a particular limit on the kinds of mental feature that would be perceptible (§2). I sketch reasons for thinking that the view is not yet well-motivated (§3). And I (...)
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  9. Review of Alex Hyslop's "Other Minds". [REVIEW]Andrew Melnyk - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):383-384.
  10. Inference to the Best Explanation and Other Minds.Andrew Melnyk - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):482-91.
    Robert Pargetter has argued that we know other minds through an inference to the best explanation. My aim is to show, by criticising Pargetter's account, that this approach to the problem of other minds cannot, as it stands, deliver the goods; it might be part of the right response to the problem, but it cannot be the whole story. More precisely, I will claim that Pargetter does not successfully reconstruct how ordinary people in everyday life come reasonably to believe in (...)
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  11. Evidential Necessity and Other Minds.Anne H. Narveson - 1966 - Mind 75 (January):114-121.
  12. God, Other Minds, and the Inference to the Best Explanation.P. A. Ostein - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4:149-62.
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  13. The Scientific Inference to Other Minds.Robert Pargetter - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (June):158-63.
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  14. Empirical Realism and Other Minds.Hilary Putnam - 1979 - Philosophical Investigations 2:71-72.
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  15. Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds.Johannes Roessler - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues (...)
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  16. On Whether We Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  17. The Hypothesis of Other Minds: Is It the Best Explanation? [REVIEW]Nathan Stemmer - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (January):109-121.
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  18. Leslie, John. Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology.Carl N. Still - 2003 - Review of Metaphysics 57 (1):154-155.