Adverbialism and Qualia Theories

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, St. George Campus, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. added 2019-01-10
    Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences Are Transparent.Laura Gow - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this, and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-19
    How to Be an Adverbialist About Phenomenal Intentionality.Kyle Banick - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    Kriegel has revived adverbialism as a theory of consciousness. But recent attacks have shed doubt on the viability of the theory. To save adverbialism, I propose that the adverbialist take a stance on the nature of adverbial modification. On one leading theory, adverbial modification turns on the instantiation by a substance of a psychological type. But the resulting formulation of adverbialism turns out to be a mere notational variant on the relationalist approaches against which Kriegel dialectically situates adverbialism. By contrast, (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-07
    What is a Pain in a Body Part?Murat Aydede - manuscript
    The IASP definition of 'pain' defines pain as a subjective experience. The Note accompanying the definition emphasizes that as such pains are not to be identified with objective conditions of body parts (such as actual or potential tissue damage). Nevertheless, it goes on to state that a pain "is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional experience." This generates a puzzle that philosophers have been well (...)
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  4. added 2018-11-02
    Sensing, Perceiving, Thinking.Romane Clark - 1979 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 7:273-295.
    This paper is concerned with Chisholm's "adverbial theory of sensing". An attempt is made to give a literal statement of what it means "to sense redly" which is consistent with what Chisholm says about sensing and also meets various objections to adverbial theories. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of why it is that Chisholm does not offer an adverbial theory of perceiving, or of thinking in general, as well as of sensing.
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  5. added 2018-06-09
    Colour Experiences and 'Look' Sentences.Wylie Breckenridge - manuscript
  6. added 2018-06-09
    Visual Experience: A Semantic Approach.Wylie Breckenridge - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    I develop a theory of what we mean by the 'look' sentences that we use to describe our visual experiences, and on that basis develop a new adverbial theory of what it is to have a visual experience with a certain character.
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  7. added 2018-05-20
    The Limits of Adverbialism About Intentionality.Casey Woodling - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):488-512.
    Kriegel has recently developed an adverbial account of intentionality, in part to solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational conception of intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the virtues of adverbialism can (...)
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  8. added 2018-01-17
    Outside Color: Perceptual Science and the Puzzle of Color in Philosophy.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2015 - Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
    Is color real or illusory, mind independent or mind dependent? Does seeing in color give us a true picture of external reality? The metaphysical debate over color has gone on at least since the seventeenth century. In this book, M. Chirimuuta draws on contemporary perceptual science to address these questions. Her account integrates historical philosophical debates, contemporary work in the philosophy of color, and recent findings in neuroscience and vision science to propose a novel theory of the relationship between color (...)
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  9. added 2017-09-03
    Perceiving as Having Subjectively Conditioned Appearances.Gary Hatfield - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):149-178.
    This paper develops an appearance view of perception. When we see an object, we see it by having it appear some way to us. We see the object, not the appearance; but we see the object via the appearance. The appearance is subjectively conditioned: aspects of it depend on attributes of the subject. We mentally have the appearance and can reflect on it as an appearance. But in the primary instance, of veridical perception, it is the object that we focus (...)
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  10. added 2017-08-10
    Thinking with Sensations.Boyd Millar - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (3):134-154.
    If we acknowledge that a perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenology is not inherently representational, we face a puzzle. On the one hand, sensory phenomenology must play an intimate role in the perception of ordinary physical objects; but on the other hand, our experiences’ purely sensory element rarely captures our attention. I maintain that neither indirect realism nor the dual component theory provides a satisfactory solution to this puzzle: indirect realism is inconsistent with the fact that sensory phenomenology typically goes unnoticed by (...)
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  11. added 2017-02-14
    Modes of Predication and Implied Adverbial Complements.Wilkinson Rw - 1976 - Foundations of Language 14 (2):153-194.
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  12. added 2017-02-13
    What Is an Emotion? Musil's Adverbial Theory.Sabine Döring - 2014 - The Monist 97 (1):47-65.
  13. added 2017-01-19
    Symposium: The Adverbial Theory of Perception. On the Adverbial Analysis of Visual Experience.Frank Jackson - 1975 - Metaphilosophy 6 (2):127–135.
  14. added 2017-01-18
    A New Defence of the Adverbial Theory.Wylie Breckenridge - manuscript
    I present a new version of the adverbial theory of visual experience, and give a semantic argument for it.
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  15. added 2017-01-18
    Imaging: An Adverbial Analysis.J. Douglas Rabb - 1975 - Dialogue 14 (2):312-318.
  16. added 2017-01-02
    Attention to Mental Paint and Change Detection.Assaf Weksler - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1991-2007.
    According to the influential thesis of attentional transparency, in having or reflecting on an ordinary visual experience, we can attend only outwards, to qualities the experience represents, never to intrinsic qualities of the experience itself, i.e., to “mental paint.” According to the competing view, attentional semitransparency, although we usually attend outwards, to qualities the experience represents, we can also attend inwards, to mental paint. So far, philosophers have debated this topic in strictly armchair means, especially phenomenological reflection. My aim in (...)
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  17. added 2016-12-08
    Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error.M. D. Conduct - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to a relational view of experience and a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-05
    Perception.Barry Maund - 2003 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    The book includes chapters on forms of natural realism, theories of perceptual experience, representationalism, the argument from illusion, phenomenological senses, types of perceptual content, the representationalist/intentionalist thesis, and adverbialist accounts of perceptual experience. The ideas of Austin, Dretske, Heidegger, Millikan, Putnam, and Robinson are considered among others and the reader is given an invaluable philosophical framework within which to consider the issues.
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  19. added 2016-10-27
    A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays.A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.) - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
    A. J. Ayer, who died in 1989, was acknowledged as one of Britain's most distinguished philosophers. In this memorial collection of essays leading Western philosophers reflect on Ayer's place in the history of philosophy and explore aspects of his thought and teaching. The volume also includes a posthumous essay by Ayer himself: 'A defence of empiricism'. These essays are undoubtedly a fitting tribute to a major figure, but the collection is not simply retrospective; rather it looks forward to present and (...)
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  20. added 2016-08-05
    Helmholtz's Physiological Psychology.Lydia Patton - 2018 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 5. Routledge.
    Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) established results both controversial and enduring: analysis of mixed colors and of combination tones, arguments against nativism, and the analysis of sensation and perception using the techniques of natural science. The paper focuses on Helmholtz’s account of sensation, perception, and representation via “physiological psychology”. Helmholtz emphasized that external stimuli of sensations are causes, and sensations are their effects, and he had a practical and naturalist orientation toward the analysis of phenomenal experience. However, he argued as well (...)
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  21. added 2015-12-23
    William Fish, Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction. [REVIEW]Kenneth Hobson - 2014 - Philosophy in Review 34 (1-2):56-58.
    The philosophy of perception has emerged in the past decade as a subfield in its own right and no longer merely as an episode in epistemology and philosophy of mind. In this book, William Fish provides us with a clearly written, informed, and accessible contemporary introduction to the philosophy of perception as well as an update on current debates within this field. The selection of topics is excellent and the attention devoted to each topic is always just about right. In (...)
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  22. added 2015-06-21
    Thomas Reid: Philosophy of Mind.Marina Folescu - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is an encyclopedia entry that can be accessed following this link: http://www.iep.utm.edu/reidmind/ -/- In philosophy of mind, Reid is most celebrated today for the arguments he gave in support of the position known as direct realism, which, at its most basic, states that the primary objects of sense perception are physical objects, not ideas in human minds. However, Reid’s philosophy of mind neither begins nor ends with perception. In addition to arguing for direct realism and, consequently, against “the way (...)
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  23. added 2015-04-07
    The Many-Relations Problem for Adverbialism.Alexander Dinges - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):231-237.
    Adverbialists propose to analyse sentences of the form ‘Jane has a blue afterimage’ as ‘Jane afterimages blue-ly’. One commonly raised objection to adverbialism is the many-property problem, the problem of accounting for sentences that seem to ascribe more than one property to an afterimage . Plausible responses to this objection may be on offer. In this note, however, I will argue that the many-property problem resurfaces at the level of relations and that, at this level, no solution for the problem (...)
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  24. added 2015-04-04
    An Adverbial Approach to Metaphysics.Kelly Joseph Salsbery - 1995 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
    Peter and Mary danced a waltz at midnight. The surface grammatical form of this sentence suggests that there is something which Peter and Mary dance. An adverbialist would claim that what we have is a substance acting in a certain way or mode. In adverbial theories, putative ontological commitment to something like a sense datum is eliminated by eliminating sentences containing such putative reference and replacing them by sentences about a person sensing in a certain way. ;In this work I (...)
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  25. added 2015-03-28
    The Adverbial Theory of Properties.Andrea Borghini - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (2):107-123.
    The paper presents a novel version of universalism—the thesis according to which there are only universals, no individuals—which is cashed out in terms of an adverbial analysis of predication. According to the theory, every spatiotemporal occurrence of a universal U can be expressed by a sentence which asserts the existence of U adverbially modified by the spatiotemporal region at which it exists. After some preliminary remarks on the interpretation of natural language, a formal semantics for the theory is first provided, (...)
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  26. added 2015-03-19
    Propositions and Adverbial Metaphysics.Peter H. Hare - 1969 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):267-271.
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  27. added 2014-10-12
    A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 239-266.
    [This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of a satisfied experiential-desire (...)
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  28. added 2014-09-29
    How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
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  29. added 2014-09-02
    Arnauld's Verbal Distinction Between Ideas and Perceptions.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2016 - History and Philosophy of Logic 37 (4):375-390.
    In his dispute with Malebranche about the nature of ideas, Arnauld endorses a form of direct realism. This appears to conflict with views put forward by Arnauld and his collaborators in the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic where ideas are treated as objects in the mind. This tension can be resolved by a careful examination of Arnauld's remarks on the semantics of ‘perception’ and ‘idea’ in light of the Port-Royal theory of language. This examination leads to the conclusion that Arnauld's ideas (...)
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  30. added 2014-08-16
    Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2017 - Synthese:1-32.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the Transparency Datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some (...)
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  31. added 2014-04-03
    Two More Proofs of Present Qualia.Edmond L. Wright - 1990 - Theoria 56 (1-2):3-22.
  32. added 2014-04-02
    Sensing, Perceiving, Thinking.Romane L. Clark - 1979 - Grazer Philosophische Studien/ 8:273-295.
    This paper is concerned with Chisholm's "adverbial theory of sensing". An attempt is made to give a literal statement of what it means "to sense redly" which is consistent with what Chisholm says about sensing and also meets various objections to adverbial theories. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of why it is that Chisholm does not offer an adverbial theory of perceiving, or of thinking in general, as well as of sensing.
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  33. added 2014-03-30
    Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology.Gary Hatfield - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-21
    Experiences, Thoughts, and Qualia.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.
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  35. added 2014-03-14
    Sensory Experience and Intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
    Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing.
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  36. added 2014-02-28
    Against Qualia: Our Direct Perception of Physical Reality.Michael C. Loughlin - 1994 - In Gianfranco Soldati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, 1: Philosophy of Mind. CSLI Publications. pp. 77-88.
  37. added 2014-02-10
    Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation.Walter Ott - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
    Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...)
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  38. added 2014-02-10
    An Alternative to the Adverbial Theory: Dis-Phenomenalism.Ran Lahav - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):553-568.
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  39. added 2011-01-30
    Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates.Derek H. Brown - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  40. added 2010-06-22
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology.Richard A. Fumerton - 2000 - Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.
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  41. added 2010-06-22
    European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind.Michael C. Loui - 1994 - Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  42. added 2010-06-22
    Ayerian 'Qualia' and the Empiricist Heritage.Desiree Park - 1992 - In Lewis E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of A.J. Ayer. Peru: Open Court.
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  43. added 2010-06-22
    The Philosophy of G. E. Moore.Paul Arthur Schilpp - 1952 - New York: Tudor Pub. Co..
    --Moore's autobiography.--Descriptive and critical essays on the philosophy of G. E. Moore.--The philosopher replies.--Bibliography of the writings of G. E. Moore (to July, 1952) compiled by Emerson Buchanan and G. E. Moore (p. [689]-699).
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  44. added 2009-07-03
    Reasons and Experience.Alan Millar - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
    Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the (...)
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  45. added 2009-07-03
    Moore's Refutation of Idealism.C. J. Ducasse - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court. pp. 232-3.
  46. added 2009-04-22
    Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded Defense.William G. Lycan - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.
  47. added 2009-04-06
    Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia.Brian Loar - 2002 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  48. added 2008-12-31
    Identism Without Objective Qualia: Commentary on Crooks.James W. Kalat - 2002 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):233-238.
    Crooks has rightly pointed out that perceptions are unlike the external stimuli that trigger them, and that any discussion of "objective qualia" is likely to confuse or mislead. The important issue is whether the concept of objective qualia has been just unfortunate terminology and a bad example, or whether discarding the concept seriously harms the underlying position of mind-body identity. Neuroscience research to date has been fully consistent with some version of mind-brain monism, and is beginning to establish which brain (...)
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  49. added 2008-12-31
    Relational, Non-Relational, and Mixed Theories of Experience.Richard A. Fumerton - 2000 - In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 21-28.
    In this paper I argue that there are excellent reasons to embrace nonrelational (adverbial) analyses of sensations and intentional states. I shall further argue, however, that the epistemology of experience requires that we recognize at least one conscious state that is genuinely relational—awareness or acquaintance. It is through the relational state of being acquainted with non-relational mental states that one can end a regress of justification.
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  50. added 2008-12-31
    A Defence of the Adverbial Theory.Gregg Caruso - 1999 - Philosophical Writings 10:51-65.
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