African Philosophy: Ethics

W artykule tym przedstawiam i krytycznie analizuję główne wątki rozważań nigeryjskiego filozofa Ifeanyiego A. Menkitiego o przyszłości afrykańskiego państwa. Menkiti jest w pełni świadomy historycznej, etnicznej i terytorialnej specyfiki typowego pokolonialnego państwa w Afryce. Powstało ono w XX w. jako organizm charakteryzujący się bardzo głębokimi podziałami etnokulturowymi. Przebieg jego granic został jeszcze w czasach kolonialnych arbitralnie ustanowiony przez Europejczyków. W konsekwencji ich decyzji większość afrykańskich granic dzieli dziś członków wielu ludów na nominalnych obywateli różnych państw. Z drugiej strony, w granicach (...) jednego państwa mieszkają ludy o odmiennym pochodzeniu i kulturze. Jak to ujmuje Menkiti, w następstwie działań Europejczyków Afryka jest dziś zatem narzuconym z zewnątrz zbiorem bytów prawnych. Afrykańscy przywódcy oficjalnie uznają granice państwowe w Afryce za nienaruszalne. Tym niemniej Afryka pokolonialna była, jest i zapewne będzie w przyszłości targana konfliktami o rozmaitej proweniencji, w tym granicznymi i separatystycznymi, w których kwestia wieloetniczności będzie odgrywać istotną rolę. O ile wieloetniczność sama w sobie nie jest przyczyną powstawania afrykańskich konfliktów, może stanowić dla nich podłoże, zwłaszcza gdy jest wykorzystywana przez ich głównych aktorów dla osiągnięcia określonych celów. Zdaniem Menkitiego, dalsze istnienie w Afryce granic o kolonialnym pochodzeniu jest kwestią wtórną. Filozof zdaje się bowiem postrzegać przyszłość wspólnej, pomyślnej koegzystencji różnych ludów w ramach afrykańskiego państwa przede wszystkim z perspektywy zaistnienia w nim sprawiedliwości. Odnosząc się do relacji między sprawiedliwością a dalszym trwaniem afrykańskiego państwa w kolonialnych granicach, Menkiti zauważa, że „choć może w końcu zaistnieć potrzeba nowego wytyczenia granic, nie musimy tego czynić natychmiast. Sprawiedliwość społeczna jest nadal silnym, cichym partnerem w zachowaniu granic państwowych. Jeśli państwo afrykańskie zdobywa szacunek swoich obywateli przez osiągnięcie sprawiedliwości w domenie publicznej, wówczas może nie być istotne, czy Afryka pozostanie taką, jaką jest ze swoimi obecnymi granicami czy też zostanie na powrót dopasowana do [jakichś] swoich wcześniejszych rozwiązań. Ważne jest, aby obywatele czuli się bezpieczni i aby wiedzieli, że ich życiowe szanse nie są rozwiewane przez to właśnie państwo, które ma ich wspierać”. (shrink)

Unlike the Chinese, Indian, and Western ethical traditions, the African one had not been text-based until as recently as the 1960s. Since a very large majority of indigenous sub-Saharan societies had oral cultures, there are no classic texts in the field of African ethics and hence also no Big Names; there's nothing comparable to, say, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics or Confucius’ Analects. However, some names and texts have been more influential than others in shaping ethical reflection, particularly over the past 30 (...) years or so with the development of a decent cohort of Africans lecturing in universities. In my contribution, I engage with those contemporary African philosophers whose writings have made some of the most difference to field, favouring those whose views are particularly distinct from salient western approaches to ethics and should be taken seriously as rivals to them. (shrink)

The most prominent strand of moral thought in the African philosophical tradition is relational and cohesive, roughly demanding that we enter into community with each other. Familiar is the view that being a real person means sharing a way of life with others, perhaps even in their fate. What does such a communal ethic prescribe for the coronavirus pandemic? Might it forbid one from social distancing, at least away from intimates? Or would it entail that social distancing is wrong to (...) some degree, although morally permissible on balance? Or could it mean that social distancing is not wrong to any degree and could, under certain circumstances, be the right way to commune? In this article, I defend the latter view. I argue that, given an independently attractive understanding of how to value communal relationship, distancing oneself from others when necessary to protect them from serious incapacitation or harm can come at no cost to right action. However, I also discuss cases in which social distancing would evince a lack of good character, despite being the right thing to do. (shrink)

Krzysztof Trzciński, 'Some Remarks on the Idea of Rotational Presidency in an African State.' The main aim of this article is to explain and analyze in a critical way the concept of the rotational presidency, proposed for an African state by a Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye. In his opinion, the presidency should be rotated between all ethnic groups. According to Gyekye, this system will allow a share of power between ethnic groups in a state, create trust in their relations and, (...) as a consequence, improve the coherence of a multiethnic state. However, Gyekye’s concept lacks some essential details and seems very difficult to be implemented. Wielu afrykańskich badaczy polityki i innych intelektualistów niezadowolonych z realiów sprawowania, czy wręcz zawłaszczania władzy przez rządzących we współczesnym afrykańskim państwie, szuka rozwiązań ustrojowych alternatywnych wobec obecnie istniejących. Pragną oni ustanowienia w afrykańskim państwie porządku demokratycznego, ale skrojonego na potrzeby jego wieloetnicznej specyfiki. Jedną z wysuwanych propozycji jest osłabienie pozycji prezydenta, który w Afryce zwykle wywodzi się z najliczniejszej lub najsilniejszej grupy etnicznej i posiada bardzo ważne oraz rozbudowane prerogatywy. Sposobem umniejszenia roli urzędu prezydenckiego może być rotacja przywództwa, która stosowana jest w niektórych porządkach ustrojowych (zwłaszcza w Szwajcarii, Bośni i Hercegowinie, na Komorach), a jej współczesnych korzeni należy szukać w ustroju dyrektoriatu z czasów Rewolucji Francuskiej. (shrink)

Globalization is seen positively by those to whose societies it brings measurable benefits. Claude Ake, one of the most outstanding African thinkers of the second half of the 20th century and a great advocate for constructing democracy in Africa, primarily viewed the progress of globalization in terms of its numerous dangers. In Ake's opinion, globalization negatively affects the condition of contemporary societies, whose members place increasing importance on market values and principles. He thought that when consumer identity finally triumphs over (...) civic identity, the culture of democracy will be at an end. Democracy, after all, is connected with the common good and consumption with particularism and egoism. Consumerism kills the sense of civic duty and political engagement. Even though the members of poorer societies, including African ones, are not significant consumers, the global consumer culture has an effect on their lives as well, destroying traditional ties of solidarity and transforming local cultures. In many such societies, this state of affairs produces a rise in frustration and stress, and often a desire to return to the society's origins and a strengthening of antipathy towards outsiders or 'others'. Although Ake's works contain finely-wrought arguments, his theories raise important questions and are very debatable in their trend. In this article, I consider the main underlying assumptions of Ake's ideas and analyze selected aspects. Published in the book: Metropolitan Areas in Transition, ed. by M.Czerny and J. Tapia Quevedo, Warsaw University Press, 2011, pp. 311-323. (shrink)

In many African states, numerous different pre-colonial systems of power – such as kingships, sultanates or chieftaincies – which have a traditional legitimacy often confirmed in colonial and post-colonial times, have survived till our day. Their role in the contemporary republican state has been studied by many African intellectuals, and the views of Kwame Anthony Appiah, a thinker originating from Ghana, are of particular interest. He believes that in order to understand the significance of traditional authority and the phenomenon of (...) its continued existence in contemporary Africa, it is important to consider the source of its legitimacy. Appiah presents various sources – symbolic, religious and state – from which local African rulers derive the right to exert power and to exact obedience from their subjects. He minimizes the significance of most of these, however, and concludes that the basic source of legitimacy for traditional authority in the contemporary African state is the fact that this power, being a very important point of reference for the group over which it is wielded, reinforces its members’ sense of self-respect, and helps form their identity. He uses this idea to attempt to reconcile the continued existence of African power systems with liberal theory. Appiah, who is very unfavorably disposed towards most political and social hierarchies, views the political rights of individuals as the rights of citizens, not as the rights of persons who are the depositaries of some attributed or hereditary status. He enumerates the costs, in terms of liberal principles, of allowing traditional monarchy to persist. In his view, it is contrary to the liberal principle of public offices being open to persons of merit for the king of the Ashanti to be chosen from among persons of royal lineage. Such a perspective should generate a generally negative attitude towards the monarchy of the Ashanti, a people from whom Appiah originates, and yet he views Ashanti’s traditional monarchy as a source of pride. Published in "Africana Bulletin" 2010, No. 58, pp. 47-74. (shrink)

Thinking of an academic discipline in terms of a ‘social practice’ (MacIntyre) helps in formulating what the ideal captured in the slogan ‘African scholarship’ can contribute to the discipline. For every practice is threatened by the attractiveness of goods external to the practice – in particular, competitiveness for its own sake – and to counter this virtues of character are needed. African traditional culture prioritizes a normative picture of the human person which could very well contribute here to upholding the (...) values internal to scholarship. I argue, contrary to Matolino, that for these purposes Tempels’ notion of the transactional process of becoming more of what you are by virtue of the human insertion in nature, is a useful starting point. But the dominant way philosophy is framed today, the human person outside of ‘nature’, omitting the key notion of presence-to-self, disallows this dialogue between the dominant tradition and African thought culture. I show, by interrogating what I take to be an impoverished understanding of objectivity in the dominant philosophical approach, how the idea of personal, subjective, growth is crucial to introductory philosophy if the project of African scholarship is to find purchase. As an example I look at rival ways of understanding the value of justice, procedurally or, alternatively, substantively and hence foregrounding participation. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to construct an African philosophy of education, focusing particularly on how notions of ubuntu and community guide educational practices.

In this article, I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. According to one principle, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes community with other human persons. According to the other principle, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes vitality in oneself and others. I argue that, at least upon some refinement, both of these African conceptions of meaning merit global consideration from philosophers, but that the (...) vitality approach is more promising than the community one for capturing a wider array of intuitions about what confers meaning on a life. I further argue, however, that there are objections that apply with comparable force to both theories; neither one does a good job of entailing that and explaining why certain types of reason and progress can make a life more meaningful. Although these objections are characteristic of a ‘modern’ western outlook, I maintain that they are difficult for contemporary African philosophers to ignore and consider some ways they might respond to the objections. (shrink)

Moderately updated version of this encyclopaedia entry.

I examine Dr. van den Berg’s review article of ‘’Philosophy from Africa –a text with readings’’, with a view to setting aside the false allegation concerning the racist intentions of the editors.

This article focuses on the religious information inside Ghanaian and Nigerian video movies regarding Akan and Yoruba women. More specifically, it focuses on the indigenous religious, Christian, and Islamic messages inside these movies in relation to women. The article demonstrates that Akan and Yoruba filmmakers, who dominate the Ghanaian and Nigerian video movie industries, are part of networks of religious institutions, predominantly Pentecostal-Charismatic Christian and modest Islamic ones. These organizations sponsor filmmakers to spread religious messages that promote hierarchical gender relations (...) and the suppression of equal rights for women, e.g., economic independence. By providing an overview of Akan and Yoruba belief systems, in respect of indigenous, Christian, and Islamic gender-related positional concepts and ideological communication on what is appropriate behavior for women, the author will show and support the hypothesis that these movies contribute to women’s demonization and (economic) discrimination. (shrink)

Several treatises have been written on the foundations of African moral systems. A significant number of them favours the claim that these systems are founded on religion, with the latter providing a justification for the former. Others have taken a contrary position, denying the supposed necessary causal connection between religion and African moral systems. This paper neither seeks to support nor rebut any of the foundations proposed, but rather to argue for the thesis that from whichever perspective it is viewed (...) - religious, humanistic or rationalist - the Yoruba moral system has strictly consequentialist foundations, and is hence subsumable under the general consequentialist ethical programme. However, the paper notes that Yoruba consequentialism diverges significantly from its western counterpart on the claim that “the end justifies the means”; for whereas this is true of western consequentialism, according to Yoruba consequentialism no evil, however well-intended, can bring about a good end. The Yoruba oral tradition, and particularly the Yoruba language as currently spoken and written among the Yoruba people of southwestern Nigeria, supplies tools of analysis, while ethical consequentialism provides the theoretical framework. (shrink)

Recently, the salient idea of personhood in the tradition of African philosophy has been objected to on various grounds. Two such objections stand out – the book deals with a lot more. The first criticism is that the idea of personhood is patriarchal insofar as it elevates the status of men and marginalises women in society. The second criticism observes that the idea of personhood is characterised by speciesism. The essence of these concerns is that personhood fails to embody a (...) robust moral-political view. -/- African Personhood and Applied Ethics offers a philosophical explication of the ethics of personhood to give reasons why we should take it seriously as an African moral perspective that can contribute to global moral-political issues. The book points to the two facets that constitute the ethics of personhood – an account of (1) moral perfection and (2) dignity. It then draws on the under-explored view of dignity qua the capacity for sympathy inherent in the moral idea of personhood to offer a unified account of selected themes in applied ethics, specifically women, animal and development. (shrink)

This article articulates an African conception of development. I call such an account African insofar as it is based on the moral worldview of ubuntu, which is salient largely among the Bantu peoples. To articulate a conception of development, I rely on the paradigm of development ethics, which construes development as an ethical or philosophical enterprise constituted by three questions: what is a good life? what is a just society? and what duties do we owe to the environment? Answers to (...) these questions constitute a conception of development. This article answers two of these questions in the light of ubuntu. Ultimately, I argue that a good life is a function of having a virtuous character, and a just society is one that respects persons in their capacity for virtue and operates on the moral logic of the common good. I conclude by considering the means prized by ubuntu for pursuing the goal of development—the ethics of means. (shrink)

Online reprint of part of an encyclopedia entry (from the Encyclopaedia of Quality of Life and Well-being Research 2014).

A large swathe of the indigenous African ethical tradition is frequently encapsulated in the maxim, “A person is a person through other persons.” This phrasing is an overly literal translation of some sayings that are prominent in the southern and central regions of Africa, but that resonate with most indigenous sub-Saharan cultures. This chapter articulates and motivates a philosophical interpretation of the maxim for an international readership interested in virtue. According to the initial formulation, one should strive to become a (...) real person, which one can do insofar as one prizes other persons’ capacity to relate harmoniously, where harmony consists of identifying with and exhibiting solidarity toward them. The chapter also explores ways of revising this theory to respond to some powerful criticisms, such as that virtue is not purely relational, but also includes some self-regarding dispositions, and that virtue can be manifested by relating to parts of the natural world, particularly to some non-human animals. (shrink)

In this article I critically discuss Professor Oladele Abiodun Balogun’s reflections on the proper final ends of doing philosophy and related sorts of abstract, speculative, or theoretical inquiry. Professor Balogun appears to argue that one should undertake philosophical studies only insofar as they are likely to make a practical difference to people’s lives, particularly by contributing to politico-economic development, or, in other words, that one should eschew seeking knowledge for its own sake. However, there is one line of thought from (...) Professor Balogun, about philosophy being able to make life meaningful, that I argue ultimately––perhaps contrary to his intentions––entails that it can be appropriate to some degree to pursue philosophy that is unlikely to ameliorate poverty and similar social ills. My central aims in this article are to identify Professor Balogun’s strongest argument against pursuing any knowledge for its own sake and to argue that an appeal to meaningfulness constitutes a strong, competing reason to seek out some of it. (shrink)

While there is a budding literature on media ethics in the light of characteristic sub-Saharan moral values, there is virtually nothing on wartime reporting more specifically. Furthermore, the literature insofar as it has a bearing on wartime reporting suggests that embedded journalism and patriotic journalism are ethically justified during war. In this essay, I sketch a prima facie attractive African moral theory, grounded on a certain interpretation of the value of communal relationship, and bring out what it entails for the (...) ways journalists should report on war. My aims are the normative ones of showing how this Afro-communal ethic can provide a unitary foundation for a wide array of plausible conclusions about reporting on war, and, in particular, can avoid objectionable implications such as support for embedded and patriotic journalism. (shrink)

Reprint of a 2017 article from the Journal of Animal Ethics.

This dissertation is a critical evaluation of Placide Tempels' account of African thought as outlined in his book Bantu Philosophy. ;The purpose of the dissertation is to examine Tempels' thesis that African thought, as it relates to ethics, is founded on a religious understanding of the world; a world in which humans, referred to as "forces", are portrayed as sharing in the being of God, the Supreme Force, through the exercise of "vital activities". ;This view of African thought has exercised (...) considerable influence over what today is referred to as African philosophy. I contend not only that this view is misleading in that it overemphasizes the religious content of African thought, but also in that Tempels misconceived and failed to do justice to the underlying principle of African traditional beliefs because he neglected the role "community" plays in those beliefs. ;The focus of the dissertation is an examination of two views of African ethics: one is presented by Tempels, the other I will call the "community model" because of its inclusion of the role community plays in African thought. ;Under the "community model" the concern is to assess how my thesis--that African moral thought is primarily communitarian--can contribute to a balanced perspective of African traditional beliefs and practices in contrast to the religious interpretation. Against the background of this communitarian outlook, I make the attempt to show how central the religious interpretation is to Tempels' own understanding of philosophy. Correspondingly, I make some effort to underscore crucial differences between a Judeo-Christian understanding of God and African views of God, differences that Tempels may have taken for granted. And, based upon these differences, I argue that African thought and African ethical ideas be reinterpreted and analyzed to include a reliance on the concept of community. ;On the basis of my analysis, I suggest that, by relying on a special understanding of the notion of the person and kinship in African traditional thought, the community model can be shown to be a defensible philosophical basis for analyzing African beliefs and practices. Overall, I will attempt to show how this analysis is superior to that of Tempels'. (shrink)

Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought” is criticized from the standpoint that the author assumes a dichotomous framework taken over in his decision to articulate the African view of the person in the idiom of modern philosophy. Kwame Gyekye’s critique of Menkiti in “Person and Community in Akan Thought” is also scrutinized to see if it manages to break free from this framework. I conclude by calling for a departure from quasi-scientific approaches to human nature and experience (...) that attempt to apprehend culture from a position without culture. (shrink)

Given the largely Eurocentric nature of moral theology in the history of the Roman Catholic Church, what will it take to invest the theological community in the history and moral challenges of the Church in other parts of the world, especially Africa? What is to be gained for the whole Church when this happens in a deep and lasting way? In this timely and important study, Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor brings greater theological clarity to the issue of the relationship between Christianity (...) and African tradition in the area of ethical foundations. He also provides a constructive example of what fundamental moral theology done from an African and Christian moral theological point of view could look like._ Following a brief history of the development of African Christian theology, Odozor examines responses of African theologians to African tradition and Christian responses to the reality of non-Christian religions. In a context where the African religious experience and heritage are powerful sources of meaning and identity, Christian evangelization raises questions both about the African primal religions and about Christianity itself and its claims. Odozor takes up the subject of moral reasoning in an African Christian theological ethics and concludes with case studies that show how the African Church has tried to inculturate moral discourse on a religiously pluralistic continent and relate the healing gospel message to African situations. Students and scholars of moral theology and ethics and church leaders will profit from the issues raised in _Morality Truly Christian, Truly African_. "This is an ambitious book. The scholarship is sound and the author engages a range of authors and their views. Odozor takes seriously the critical and moral demands of Christian theology as well as those of African indigenous religions and their cultures. There is perhaps nothing so thoroughgoing on this topic since Bénézet Bujo’s _Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality_." — M. Shawn Copeland, Boston College_. (shrink)

Sceptics of an Africanisation of education have often lambasted its proponents for re-inventing something that has very little, if any, role to play in contemporary African society. The contributors to this issue hold a different view and, through the papers included in this issue, arguments are proffered in defence of an Africanisation of education on the African continent, particularly through the notion of ubuntu. Since the 1960s, Africana philosophy as an instance of Africanisation has emerged as a gathering notion for (...) philosophical endeavours practised by professional philosophers and intellectuals, either of African descent, including those living in the diaspora, or those of non-African descent but who are devoted to matters pertaining to African and African-descended individuals and communities . These philosophical endeavours mostly relate to a critical analysis and reflective evaluation of the evidence and reasoning that constitute the beliefs, customs, values, traditions, oral literature , languages and histories of African and African-descended peoples . The articles presented at this symposium analytically explore ideas and practices central to Africana philosophy, their underlying rationales, and how these forms of philosophical inquiry can potentially engender defensible educative relationships. (shrink)

This book examines the idea of communalism in African cultures as a dominant philosophical theme that provides the conceptual foundation for African traditional moral thoughts, moral education, values, beliefs, conceptions of reality, practices, ways of life, and the now popular African saying, 'it takes a village to raise a child.' It defends communalism against various criticisms and argues that when properly understood and harnessed, it could provide the necessary foundation for Africa's development.