African Philosophy: Ethics

Climate change is a global environmental issue that threatens humanity and the concept of 'Ubuntu' which means 'humanness' would be useful in the conversation for climate change mitigation and adaptation. With the rising global temperature changes to climate, the paper reflects on some critical questions such as: how can African environmental ethics make an epistemic contribution to the conversation on climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies? I argue that the issue of climate change is a problem rooted in anthropocentric activities, (...) individualistic values and capitalism can be minimized by integrating the ideologies of 'Ubuntu' as a cultural value in African environmental ethics into the dialogue on climate change adaptation approaches. Beyond the scientific, political and legal issues involved in the approaches, it is pertinent to consider divergent cultural ethical values in formulating policy for climate change adaptation. I recommend that the ideologies of Ubuntu should be integrated with other ethical principles aimed at providing a solid base for adapting to the problem of climate change. (shrink)

Reply to contributors to a special issue of _Social Theory and Practice_ devoted to _A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent_.

I draw on ideas salient in contemporary literate African philosophy to construct two new theoretical ways of capturing the essence of duties to oneself. According to one theory, a person has a foundational duty to “relate” to herself in ways similar to how the African field has often thought that a person should relate with others, viz., harmoniously. According to the second, one has a foundational duty to produce liveliness in oneself. In addition to articulating these novel attempts to capture (...) what all duties to oneself might have in common and showing that each one captures several intuitions about them, I offer some reasons to think that the harmony theory is more attractive than the vitality one. I conclude that there are values prominent in the African tradition that, upon some reformulation, ground comprehensive accounts of what one owes oneself that merit consideration by a global audience as rivals to, say, Kantian-rationalist approaches common in the West. (shrink)

I consider whether a vitalist axiology, widely accepted in the African philosophical tradition, especially amongst religionists, can make adequate sense of evil, understood as what is bad in itself for a human’s life. I provide an important reason for thinking that it cannot, which African philosophers of religion and ethicists have yet to address. The reason is that a vitalist approach to evil must construe it as the reduction or other lack of vitality, while some evil conditions, such as pain (...) from lung cancer or from torture, cannot be adequately understood in those terms. Some bad states consist of the presence of an undesirable condition, indeed one that can be worse than death (qua cessation of all vitality), and not merely the absence of a desirable condition such as vitality. After replying to some responses on behalf of vitalism, I conclude that it cannot account fully for why evil might be a problem for God’s existence or for how to understand the quality of human life. (shrink)

This book aims to enhance understanding of the meaning of wellbeing in an African context.

In _A Relational Moral Theory: African ethics in and beyond the continent_ ( 2022 ), Thaddeus Metz proposes an African moral theory according to which we ought to respect and honour the capacity of individuals to be party to harmonious relationship. He aims to present a moral theory that should ‘be weighed up against at least contemporary Western moral theories’ (p. 2). As Metz intends his theory to be a serious contender with other moral theories, I assess how his moral (...) theory can be applied and contribute to contemporary moral discussions _‘beyond the continent’_, as the subtitle of the book puts it. In particular, as Metz’s relational moral theory is grounded on the value of harmony, an important question is how well his theory handles _disharmony_ especially if his theory is to have application in our non-ideal world in which disharmony is rife. And here, I hold up Metz’s account to one area of disharmony, disruptive emotions and affective injustice. By first establishing how disruptive emotions and affective injustice pose a challenge to similar relational moral theories grounded in harmony, I argue that Metz’s theory has distinct advantages in the way in which it can indeed engage with such phenomena. I close the paper by considering the objection that Metz’s account is limited in making sense of a common form of disruptive emotion in response to structural injustices where affective injustice can arise, but ultimately conclude that such a limitation is superficial. (shrink)

In this contribution, we will analyse the inquiry (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), written by Ethiopian scholar, Zera Yaqob, ዘርአ፡ያዕቆብ, Seed of Jacob (Sumner, 1976: 4, I). His philosophy resists a division into the basic disciplines customary in Western philosophy, his arguments, as we wish to propose with caution, combine metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology in a way that is almost impossible to separate. We will thus not be able to identify purely epistemological principles in his philosophy. However, since Zera Yaqob is deeply concerned (...) about truth, we still find profound philosophical insights about knowledge and being and their relationship to one another. We will finish our reconstruction of some of the main ideas of the inquiry, (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), with some rather critical notes on some of the hidden premises and their seemingly superioristic implications. (shrink)

Karl Marx's normative views have routinely been contrasted with moral-political theories such as utilitarianism and Rawlsian justice. They have not been systematically contrasted with characteristically African, and specifically communal, values, with post-independence African leaders such as Nyerere and Nkrumah instead having emphasized the similarities. In this article, a work of analytic philosophy, I sketch the essentials of Marx’s approach to the human good, especially his early writings on alienation from 1843-1845, and weigh them up against a theoretical interpretation of the (...) under-explored African moral-political tradition. According to the latter perspective, a person displays human excellence insofar as she prizes communal relationships, ones of sharing a way of life and caring for others’ quality of life. My aims are to identify key differences between this Afro-communalism and the young Marx’s views, and, where they diverge, to provide some reasons for favouring one approach over the other. I conclude that insofar as the two ethics differ, the African ideal is the better candidate for capturing a moral point view, one that includes human rights, whereas Marx’s is preferable, and even compelling to a wide contemporary audience, as a broader account of how to live well. (shrink)

This chapter expounds relational values characteristic of indigenous Africa and considers how they might usefully be adopted when contemporary societies interact with each other. Specifically, it notes respects in which genuinely human or communal relationship has been missing in the two contexts of globalization and international relations, and suggests what a greater appreciation of this good by the rest of the world would mean for them.

French translation of 'What Africa Can Contribute to the World', a commissioned chapter for UNESCO'S General History of Africa project.

Scholars have compared the transitional justice processes of Colombia and South Africa in some respects, but there has yet to be a systematic moral-philosophical evaluation of them regarding how they have sought to allocate economic goods. Here I appraise the ways that South Africa and Colombia have responded to their respective historical conflicts in respect of the distribution of property and opportunities. I do so in the light of a conception of reconciliation informed by a relational ethic of harmony, a (...) value salient in the worldviews of many indigenous peoples in both Africa and South America. I argue that, given such an account of reconciliation, one of Colombia’s major proposed ways of allocating property and opportunities, whereby offenders would labour for the sake of improving victims’ socio-economic conditions, would be much better than what South Africa has done, even if Colombia has yet to put such a policy systematically into practice. (shrink)

For more than ten years, I have advanced a conception of human dignity informed by ideas about community salient in the African philosophical tradition. According to it, an individual has a dignity if she is by her nature able to commune with others and to be communed with by them. I have argued that this conception of dignity grounded on our communal nature not only helps to make good foundational sense of many characteristically African moral prescriptions, but also constitutes a (...) strong rival to the globally dominant Kantian account in terms of our capacity for autonomy/rationality. In this contribution, I provide a summarizing statement of my position and articulate some reasons why I believe it should be considered philosophically defensible. Of particular interest, I argue that it is able to account for certain human rights better than three other conceptions of human dignity salient in the African tradition, viz., the views that we have a dignity in virtue of our vitality, moral behaviour, or capacity to care for others. (shrink)

Reprint of an article that first appeared in the journal _Education as Change_ (2019).

This essay is a lengthy response to six contributors to a special issue edited by Adeshina Afolayan and devoted to critical discussions of _A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and Beyond the Continent_. Key topics include: the proper role of metaphysics when doing moral philosophy; the appropriate aims of moral philosophy in the light of relational values and properties; the ir/relevance of imperceptible agents for an African ethic; the un/attractiveness of the principle that one morally should promote the common (...) good; the nature of virtue (vice) and its relation to rightness (wrongness); and how to capture self-regarding virtues and duties to oneself theoretically. (shrink)

I critically survey three different respects in which indigenous African philosophical ideas could influence psychology as a way of interpreting and treating the human mind. One involves the postulation of imperceptible agents, forces, and properties such as the living-dead, witchcraft, and destiny, which are salient features of indigenous sub-Saharan views of the nature of reality, including of the causes of mental illness. Along with this ontology is an epistemology of how to acquire knowledge of this imperceptible realm, with, say, divination (...) techniques employed to receive messages from the living-dead. Awareness of this worldview is essential when dealing with clients steeped in indigenous African cultures, and there could be reasons of epistemic and cultural justice for psychologists to engage with these philosophical perspectives when teaching. However, insofar as psychology is properly understood as an evidential enquiry grounded on empirically verifiable data, it would be difficult for it to accept these ontological and epistemological views. In contrast, the other two ways in which African philosophical ideas might affect psychology are on the face of it fully consistent with a scientific orientation and so are prima facie more relevant to intellectual understanding and therapeutic practice in at least a multicultural setting. A second characteristically African philosophical view is about the nature of a thing’s essence or identity, namely, that it is constituted by relational properties and not merely by intrinsic ones. Applied to the self, such a view entails that what it is to be a self is to have been in or be in relationship with other selves (and a broader society and environment), and that what it is to be a particular self as distinct from other selves is also to have been in or be in particular relationships with other selves. Western psychologists instead invariably take the self to be something inner, say, a chain of mental states such as preferences, values, experiences, and memories, with their empirical studies and theoretical reflections arguably having been biased by presuming this conception of personal identity. A third African philosophical view that might affect psychology concerns final values, such as how to understand what mental health and a good life more generally are and hence which interventions such as medication and therapy to adopt. Western psychologists usually conceive of values in individualist ways, prizing goods that make no essential reference to others, such as creativity, vitality, positive experiences, smooth function of an internal mechanism, autonomy, self-reliance, a true/strong/whole self, and self-realization––where the self, of course, is again presumed to be something internal. In contrast, the approach prominent amongst indigenous sub-Saharans is to highlight the importance of relationships with others when it comes to understanding the nature of mental health, meaning in life, flourishing, and related values. Here, too, the more African approach cannot be dismissed as ‘unscientific’ and should be given its due as a reasonable account of what most merits pursuit. (shrink)

In Menkiti’s Moral Man, Oritsegbubemi Oyowe aims to provide a sympathetic interpretation of the works of Ifeanyi Menkiti as they address personhood, community, and other facets of morality. In my contribution I maintain that, while Oyowe’s Menkiti is more plausible than the way Menkiti has often been read, there are still respects in which the account of personhood advanced invites criticism. One criticism is that it is implausible to think that personhood is constituted by others recognizing one as a person. (...) Instead, insofar as community constitutes one’s personhood, it is insofar as one lived up to norms of interpersonal morality. A second criticism is that there are intuitively some dimensions of personhood that are not constituted by the community or other-regard at all. In particular, I argue that there are moral duties to oneself that exist and that are not well captured by any sensible understanding of the view that community alone constitutes personhood, such that part of what it is to be a full person is to treat oneself in certain ways. In sum, personhood, while admittedly social, is not as social as Oyowe’s Menkiti believes. (shrink)

Reprint of an article that first appeared in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics (2017).

Up to now, nearly all the work in the religious philosophy of life’s meaning and the axiology of theism has presumed a conception of an afterlife that is Abrahamic. In contrast, in this article I critically discuss some of the desirable and undesirable facets of Traditional African Religion’s salient conceptions of the afterlife as they bear on meaning in life. Given an interest in a maximally meaningful life, and supposing meaning would come from living beyond the death of this body, (...) would it be reasonable to prefer the afterlife as characteristically conceived by African philosophers of religion to exist instead of the Abrahamic conception of Heaven/Hell? I answer this question in the context of four main topics: time, i.e., being immortal versus living for another five or so generations; space, that is, living in a transcedent realm versus continuing to reside on Earth; activity, e.g., receiving just deserts versus looking after family; and proximity to God, enjoying the beatific vision versus being an ancestor. (shrink)

Reprint of a chapter first appearing in African Values, Ethics, and Technology: Questions, Issues, and Approaches (2021).

For the more than a decade, I have advanced an account of what makes persons, animals, and other beings entitled to moral treatment for their own sake that is informed by characteristically African ideas about dignity, a great chain of being, and community. Roughly according to this account, a being has a greater moral status, the more it is capable of communing (as a subject) or of us communing with it (as an object). I have mainly argued that this characteristically (...) African and relational approach to moral status is a better account than salient Western approaches, especially individualist views associated with utilitarianism and Kantianism. Over the years, several commentators have raised criticisms of my approach, including that it objectionably: entails that we may rightly dominate mentally incapacitated human beings; prioritizes mentally incapacitated human beings over animals with similar cognitive abilities without sufficient justification; entails that intelligent aliens lack moral status; cannot make sense of our duties towards the dead; and is unable to account for the standing of species as distinct from their members. In this chapter I provide a comprehensive response to these and related objections, defending the initial account as an attractive way to understand what makes a being matter morally for non-instrumental reasons. (shrink)

I critically discuss respects in which conceptions of community have featured in African moral-political philosophy over the past 40 years or so. Some of the discussion is in the vein of intellectual history, recounting key theoretical moves for those unfamiliar with the field. However, my discussion is also opinionated, noting prima facie weaknesses with certain positions and presenting others as more promising, particularly relative to prominent Western competitors. There are a variety of forms that African communitarianism has taken and could (...) take in respect of moral status, good character, and just policy, and my aims include arguing that some are more plausible than others and should give more individualist thinkers in Euro-American traditions pause. (shrink)

In contributions elsewhere to this volume, we considered the histories of Colombia and South Africa and how some of the values indigenous to those locales might plausibly bear on transitional justice in them. We advanced broadly relational and constructive (non-retributive) approaches to the social conflicts that had taken place there, ones that make victim compensation central. In this chapter we consider how Metz’s ubuntu-based reconciliatory approach to reparations might be relevant to Colombia in ways he did not consider, after which (...) we reflect on how the kinds of communitarian practices advanced by Bautista might apply to South Africa. We conclude that these cross-applications are revealing, pointing out how economic compensation in Colombia should plausibly be influenced by cultural factors, and how considerations of culture in South Africa call for compensation beyond economic factors. (shrink)

A collection of several articles on African moral and political philosophy by Thaddeus Metz, translated into French by Emmanuel Fopa, and edited and introduced by Pius Mosima of the University of Bamenda, Cameroon.

This essay argues that African palaver ethics makes a vital contribution to the common good tradition in Catholic social ethics. It highlights the significance of solidarity in both Bénézet Bujo’s account of palaver ethics and David Hollenbach’s account of the common good. Yet it concedes that palaver ethics is not perfect as it does not adequately address the missing voices of women. Therefore, it calls for the ethical conversion of the palaver so as to duly recognize the voices of African (...) women and their various contributions to the common good. (shrink)

Much of what is taught in the discipline of philosophy in most universities in African countries is European philosophy. This is the reality that Thaddeus Metz met when he moved to South Africa in...

A collection of several previously published articles by Thaddeus Metz translated into Igbo, with an introduction by Prof L. O. Ugwuanyi of the University of Abuja.

Purpose This paper aims to demonstrate the relevance of worldviews of the global south to debates of artificial intelligence, enhancing the human rights debate on artificial intelligence (AI) and critically reviewing the paper of UNESCO Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) that preceded the drafting of the UNESCO guidelines on AI. Different value systems may lead to different choices in programming and application of AI. Programming languages may acerbate existing biases as a people’s worldview is captured (...) in its language. What are the implications for AI when seen from a collective ontology? Ubuntu (I am a person through other persons) starts from collective morals rather than individual ethics. Design/methodology/approach Literature overview on the African philosophy of Ubuntu as applied to artificial intelligence. Application of it to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) debates on establishing guidelines to the ethics of artificial intelligence. Findings Metaphysically, Ubuntu and its conception of social personhood (attained during one’s life) largely rejects transhumanism. When confronted with economic choices, Ubuntu favors sharing above competition and thus an anticapitalist logic of equitable distribution of AI benefits, humaneness and nonexploitation. When confronted with issues of privacy, Ubuntu emphasizes transparency to group members, rather than individual privacy, yet it calls for stronger (group privacy) protection. In democratic terms, it promotes consensus decision-making over representative democracy. Certain applications of AI may be more controversial in Africa than in other parts of the world, like care for the elderly, that deserve the utmost respect and attention, and which builds moral personhood. At the same time, AI may be helpful, as care from the home and community is encouraged from an Ubuntu perspective. The report on AI and ethics of the UNESCO World COMEST formulated principles as input, which are analyzed from the African ontological point of view. COMEST departs from “universal” concepts of individual human rights, sustainability and good governance which are not necessarily fully compatible with relatedness, including future and past generations. Next to rules based approaches, which may hamper diversity, bottom-up approaches are needed with intercultural deep learning algorithms. Research limitations/implications There is very few existing literature on AI and Ubuntu. Therefore, this paper is of an explorative nature. Practical implications The ethics of Ubuntu offers unique vantage points in looking at the organization of society and economics today, which are also relevant for development of AI, especially in its tenet of relatedness rather than individuality (and practical use of AI for individuals), taking responsibility for society as a whole (such as analyzing the benefit of AI for all strata of society), and embodying true inclusiveness. Whether looking at top-down guidelines for the development and implementation of AI or the bottom-up ethical learning process of AI (deep learning), ethics of the Global South can have an important role to play to combat global individualist tendencies and inequity, likely reinforced by AI. This warrants far more research. Social implications Applications of AI in Africa are not contextualized, do not address the most pressing needs of the African continent, lead to cybersecurity issues and also do not incorporate African ethics. UNESCO’s work in this regard is important but expert inputs are largely centered around Western “universal” principles and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and EU precedence. African ethics have, so far, a small role to play in global ethics and philosophy and therefore risk to be overlooked in the discussion on AI and ethics. This is why the consultation process of UNESCO on ethics of AI was of paramount importance. However, it does not automatically lead to consultation of African philosophers or sages, as many are educated in Western (ized) education systems. See further details under practical implications. Originality/value This is a new area of research in which little work has been done so far. This paper offers the opportunity to widen the debate on AI and ethics beyond the conventional discourse, involving multiple worldviews, of which Ubuntu is just one. (shrink)

Ethics applied to Artificial Intelligence (AI), improperly called AI ethics, is mainly addressed through a Western perspective focusing on continental philosophy. As a result, discussions on ethics applied to AI are shaped by the West.

From the Greek word “ethos”, which means custom, habit or character, the word ethics can mean and has been defined in many different ways by ethics and morality theorists.

Hunhu/Ubuntu in the Traditional Thought of Southern Africa The term Ubuntu/Botho/Hunhu is a Zulu/Xhosa/Ndebele/Sesotho/Shona word referring to the moral attribute of a person, who is known in the Bantu languages as Munhu (Among the Shona of Zimbabwe), Umuntu (Among the Ndebele of Zimbabwe and the Zulu/Xhosa of South Africa) and Muthu (Among the Tswana of … Continue reading Hunhu/Ubuntu in Traditional Southern African Thought →.

A useful concept that can be invoked to resolve complex bioethical issues is that of moral status (or, human dignity). In this article, we apply this concept to dead human bodies in order to support our view that research on such bodies is permissible. Instead of drawing from salient Western theories of human dignity that account for it by appeals to autonomy or rationality, we will base our investigation on emerging conceptions in African theories of moral status as articulated by (...) Thaddeus Metz and Munamato Chemhuru. Our conclusion is that neither of these theories of moral status, one secular, and the other religious, can accommodate the intuition that we have direct duties of respect towards such bodies because, in relation to Metz's conception, they lack the capacity to enter into social relationships while on Chemhuru's conception, dead bodies appear not to have any meaningful purpose within the hierarchy that captures the ontological systems that determine such status. Consequently, we argue that our analysis provides support for the use of unclaimed cadavers in training and research in medical institutions. (shrink)

A useful concept that can be invoked to resolve complex bioethical issues is that of moral status (or, human dignity). In this article, we apply this concept to dead human bodies in order to support our view that research on such bodies is permissible. Instead of drawing from salient Western theories of human dignity that account for it by appeals to autonomy or rationality, we will base our investigation on emerging conceptions in African theories of moral status as articulated by (...) Thaddeus Metz and Munamato Chemhuru. Our conclusion is that neither of these theories of moral status, one secular, and the other religious, can accommodate the intuition that we have direct duties of respect towards such bodies because, in relation to Metz's conception, they lack the capacity to enter into social relationships while on Chemhuru's conception, dead bodies appear not to have any meaningful purpose within the hierarchy that captures the ontological systems that determine such status. Consequently, we argue that our analysis provides support for the use of unclaimed cadavers in training and research in medical institutions. (shrink)

A useful concept that can be invoked to resolve complex bioethical issues is that of moral status (or, human dignity). In this article, we apply this concept to dead human bodies in order to support our view that research on such bodies is permissible. Instead of drawing from salient Western theories of human dignity that account for it by appeals to autonomy or rationality, we will base our investigation on emerging conceptions in African theories of moral status as articulated by (...) Thaddeus Metz and Munamato Chemhuru. Our conclusion is that neither of these theories of moral status, one secular, and the other religious, can accommodate the intuition that we have direct duties of respect towards such bodies because, in relation to Metz's conception, they lack the capacity to enter into social relationships while on Chemhuru's conception, dead bodies appear not to have any meaningful purpose within the hierarchy that captures the ontological systems that determine such status. Consequently, we argue that our analysis provides support for the use of unclaimed cadavers in training and research in medical institutions. (shrink)