African Philosophy: Ethics

Scholars have compared the transitional justice processes of Colombia and South Africa in some respects, but there has yet to be a systematic moral-philosophical evaluation of them and specifically regarding the way they have sought to allocate economic goods. In this essay, I appraise the ways that South Africa and of Colombia have responded to their respective historical conflicts in respect of the distribution of property, especially land and money, and opportunities such as access to education and job training. I (...) do so in the light of a certain conception of national reconciliation that is informed by an ethic of harmonious relationship, a value salient in the worldviews of many indigenous peoples in both sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. By this conception, national reconciliation of an attractive sort is largely a matter of cooperative participation in projects expected to benefit formerly conflicting parties in combination with the disavowal of respects in which parties had flouted the value of harmony in the past. I argue that, given this plausible account of reconciliation, one of Colombia’s major proposed ways of allocating property and opportunities, whereby offenders would labour for the sake of victims, would be much better than what South Africa has done, even if Colombia has yet to put its economic policy systematically into practice. (shrink)

The contributions elsewhere in this volume from us, Nathalia Bautista and Thaddeus Metz, address the proper way to respond to gross human rights violations, given a Global South context. Specifically, considering the histories of Colombia and South Africa and some of the values indigenous to those locales, respectively, we advance non-individualist and non-retributive approaches to the social conflicts that had taken place there. Broadly speaking, we both advocate relational and constructive forms of transitional justice that make victim compensation central. According (...) to Bautista, it is important not to rely merely on legal strategies, but also to draw on the values and more generally the cultures of local peoples, in order to resolve conflict. She highlights respects in which those from three different Colombian societies believe in communitarian ways of “restoring the normative bond” between former enemies, approaches that the state ought to consider when making reparations. Metz appeals to communal values frequently associated with the South African philosophy of ubuntu to construct an account of reconciliation, and he brings out what reconciliation entails for how to make economic restitution in a post-conflict society. In this chapter we consider how Metz’s ubuntu-based reconciliatory approach to reparations might be relevant to Colombia in ways he did not consider, after which we reflect on how the kinds of communitarian practices advanced by Bautista might apply to South Africa. We conclude that these cross-applications are revealing, pointing out how economic compensation in Colombia should plausibly be influenced by cultural factors, and how considerations of culture in South Africa call for compensation beyond economic factors. (shrink)

This book offers a unique comparative study of ubuntu, a dominant ethical theory in African philosophy, and western monotheism. It is the first book to bring ubuntu to bear on the axiology of theism debate in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. -/- A large motivating force behind this book is to explore the extent to which there is intersubjective ethical agreement and disagreement between ubuntu and Western worldviews like monotheism and naturalism. First, the author assesses the various arguments for anti-theism (...) and pro-theism on the assumption that ubuntu is true. Ubuntu’s communitarian focus might be so different from the Western tradition that it completely changes how we evaluate theism and atheism. Second, the author assesses the advantages and disadvantages of the truth of ubuntu for the world. -/- Ubuntu and Western Monotheism will be of interest to scholars and advanced students specializing in philosophy of religion, African religion and philosophy, and religious ethics. (shrink)

Mildly modified reprint of a chapter originally appearing in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics (2012).

After expounding the conceptions of harmony that are central to Confucianism and the sub-Saharan ethic of ubuntu, I apply them to three major topics pertaining to age, namely, virtue, the value of life, and care. Roughly speaking, indigenous East Asian and African values of harmony both entail that only the elderly can be truly virtuous, that the elderly have a strong claim to life-saving resources, and that they are entitled to care from their children, views that I show are not (...) characteristic of moral thinking in the contemporary West, neither for prominent philosophies nor the cultures out of which they grew. I suggest that many Anglophone moral philosophers should be given pause by the existence of different perspectives on the part of at least two long-standing philosophies, and conclude by briefly proposing some ways that cross-cultural debate might be undertaken in the future. (shrink)

This chapter expounds relational values characteristic of indigenous Africa and considers how they might usefully be adopted when contemporary societies interact with each other. Specifically, it notes respects in which genuinely human or communal relationship has been missing in the two contexts of globalization and international relations, and suggests what a greater appreciation of this good by the rest of the world would mean for them.

I critically discuss respects in which conceptions of community have featured in African moral-political philosophy over the past 40 years or so. Some of the discussion is in the vein of intellectual history, recounting key theoretical moves for those unfamiliar with the field. However, my discussion is also opinionated, noting prima facie weaknesses with certain positions and presenting others as more promising, particularly relative to prominent Western competitors. There are a variety of forms that African communitarianism has taken and could (...) take in respect of moral status, good character, and just policy, and my aims include arguing that some are more plausible than others and should give more individualist thinkers in Euro-American traditions pause. (shrink)

Shortened version of an article that first appeared in Philosophical Papers (2017).

A large swathe of the indigenous African ethical tradition is frequently encapsulated in the maxim, “A person is a person through other persons.” This phrasing is an overly literal translation of some sayings that are prominent in the southern and central regions of Africa, but that resonate with most indigenous sub-Saharan cultures. This chapter articulates and motivates a philosophical interpretation of the maxim for an international readership interested in virtue. According to the initial formulation, one should strive to become a (...) real person, which one can do insofar as one prizes other persons’ capacity to relate harmoniously, where harmony consists of identifying with and exhibiting solidarity toward them. The chapter also explores ways of revising this theory to respond to some powerful criticisms, such as that virtue is not purely relational, but also includes some self-regarding dispositions, and that virtue can be manifested by relating to parts of the natural world, particularly to some non-human animals. (shrink)

Unlike the Chinese, Indian, and Western ethical traditions, the African one had not been text-based until as recently as the 1960s. Since a very large majority of indigenous sub-Saharan societies had oral cultures, there are no classic texts in the field of African ethics and hence also no Big Names; there's nothing comparable to, say, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics or Confucius’ Analects. However, some names and texts have been more influential than others in shaping ethical reflection, particularly over the past 30 (...) years or so with the development of a decent cohort of Africans lecturing in universities. In my contribution, I engage with those contemporary African philosophers whose writings have made some of the most difference to field, favouring those whose views are particularly distinct from salient western approaches to ethics and should be taken seriously as rivals to them. (shrink)

French translation of 'What Africa Can Contribute to the World', a commissioned chapter for UNESCO'S General History of Africa project.

_A Relational Moral Theory_ provides a new answer to the long-standing question of what all morally right actions might have in common as distinct from wrong ones, by drawing on neglected resources from the Global South and especially the African philosophical tradition. The book points out that the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy, the two rivals that have dominated western moral theory for about two centuries, share an individualist premise. Once that common assumption is replaced by a (...) relational perspective that has been salient in African ethical thought, a different comprehensive principle focused on harmony or friendliness emerges, one that is shown to correct the blind spots of the western principles and to have implications for a wide array of applied controversies that an international audience of moral philosophers, professional ethicists, and similar thinkers will find attractive. (shrink)

A collection of several articles on African moral and political philosophy by Thaddeus Metz, translated into French by Emmanuel Fopa, and edited and introduced by Pius Mosima of the University of Bamenda, Cameroon.

A collection of several previously published articles by Thaddeus Metz translated into Igbo, with an introduction by Prof L. O. Ugwuanyi of the University of Abuja.

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought significant challenges to healthcare systems worldwide, and in Africa, given the lack of resources, they are likely to be even more acute. The usefulness of Traditional African Healers in helping to mitigate the effects of pandemic has been neglected. We argue from an ethical perspective that these healers can and should have an important role in informing and guiding local communities in Africa on how to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Particularly, we argue not only (...) that much of the philosophy underlying Traditional African Medicine is adequate and compatible with preventive measures for COVID-19, but also that Traditional African Healers have some unique cultural capital for influencing and enforcing such preventive measures. The paper therefore suggests that not only given the cultural context of Africa where Traditional African Healers have a special role, but also because of the normative strength of the Afro-communitarian philosophy that informs it, there are good ethical reasons to endorse policies that involve Traditional Healers in the fight against COVID-19. We also maintain that concerns about Traditional African Healers objectionably violating patient confidentiality or being paternalistic are much weaker in the face of COVID-19. (shrink)

Moderately updated version of this encyclopaedia entry.

The most prominent strand of moral thought in the African philosophical tradition is relational and cohesive, roughly demanding that we enter into community with each other. Familiar is the view that being a real person means sharing a way of life with others, perhaps even in their fate. What does such a communal ethic prescribe for the coronavirus pandemic? Might it forbid one from social distancing, at least away from intimates? Or would it entail that social distancing is wrong to (...) some degree, although morally permissible on balance? Or could it mean that social distancing is not wrong to any degree and could, under certain circumstances, be the right way to commune? In this article, I defend the latter view. I argue that, given an independently attractive understanding of how to value communal relationship, distancing oneself from others when necessary to protect them from serious incapacitation or harm can come at no cost to right action. However, I also discuss cases in which social distancing would evince a lack of good character, despite being the right thing to do. (shrink)

In this article I aim to make progress towards the philosophical goal of ascertaining what, if anything, all mental illnesses have in common, attempting to unify a large sub-set of them that have a relational or interpersonal dimension. One major claim is that, if we want a promising theory of mental illness, we must go beyond the dominant western accounts of mental illness/health, which focus on traits intrinsic to a person such as pain/pleasure, lethargy/liveliness, fragmentation/integration, and falsehood/authenticity. A second major (...) claim is that the relational facets of mental illness are plausibly understood theoretically in terms of a person’s inability to identify with others or to exhibit solidarity with them, relational values that are salient in the African philosophical tradition. I show that these two extrinsic properties well explain several intuitive instances of mental illness, including, amongst several others, being abusive, psychopathic, narcissistic, histrionic, paranoid, and phobic. (shrink)

When reflecting on human need as a moral-political category, it is natural to include some intersubjective conditions. Surely, children need to be socialized, adults need to be recognized, and the poor need to be given certain resources. I point out that there are two different respects in which such intersubjective factors could be considered needs. On the one hand, they might be needed roughly for their own sake, that is, for exemplifying relational values such as caring for others and sharing (...) a way of life with them. On the other hand, those intersubjective conditions might be needed for the realization of intrinsic values distinct from them, such as autonomy, biological health, or the absence of pain. After spelling out this intrinsic/relational way of valuing intersubjectivity, I provide reason to take seriously the characteristically African idea that we need others in our lives largely because certain ways of relating are valuable as ends and not merely as means to intrinsic goods. I also argue that acknowledging that we need others for such relational considerations would affect public policy in revealing and plausible ways, specifically with respect to poverty, employment, education, and the fourth industrial revolution. (shrink)

While there is a budding literature on media ethics in the light of characteristic sub-Saharan moral values, there is virtually nothing on wartime reporting more specifically. Furthermore, the literature insofar as it has a bearing on wartime reporting suggests that embedded journalism and patriotic journalism are ethically justified during war. In this essay, I sketch a prima facie attractive African moral theory, grounded on a certain interpretation of the value of communal relationship, and bring out what it entails for the (...) ways journalists should report on war. My aims are the normative ones of showing how this Afro-communal ethic can provide a unitary foundation for a wide array of plausible conclusions about reporting on war, and, in particular, can avoid objectionable implications such as support for embedded and patriotic journalism. (shrink)

Insofar as artificial intelligence is to be used to guide automated systems in their interactions with humans, the dominant view is probably that it would be appropriate to programme them to maximize (expected) utility. According to utilitarianism, which is a characteristically western conception of moral reason, machines should be programmed to do whatever they could in a given circumstance to produce in the long run the highest net balance of what is good for human beings minus what is bad for (...) them. In this essay, I appeal to values that are characteristically African––but that will resonate with those from a variety of moral-philosophical traditions, particularly in the Global South––to cast doubt on a utilitarian approach. Drawing on norms salient in sub-Saharan ethics, I provide four reasons for thinking it would be immoral for automated systems governed by artificial intelligence to maximize utility. In catchphrases, I argue that utilitarianism cannot make adequate sense of the ways that human dignity, group rights, family first, and (surprisingly) self-sacrifice should determine the behaviour of smart machines. (shrink)

The nature and extent of Africa’s leadership challenge has been explored from multi-theoretical perspectives finding that amongst other issues, it is ethical in nature. This study therefore aimed to investigate and present a model of virtuous leadership within an indigenous African firm’s context drawing from the African virtue ethics of Afro-communitarianism. Using a qualitative case study design, it explored a model of virtuous leadership within a leading Nigerian pharmaceutical brand. Data was collected from multiple primary sources including semi-structured interviews and (...) informal conversations as well as secondary sources. This study found a virtuous leadership model underpinned by four African primary virtues—Truthfulness, Courage, Humility and Humanity within a context of communitarianism. It also found that the nature and practice of these four virtues by the leaders within the context positively shaped employees’ moral characters through visible modelling but not without its flaws. It concluded that virtuous leadership models are essential within the African leadership context to rise above existing status quo to build communities of practices that are not business as usual but seeking the ultimate end of facilitating the flourishing of immediate and wider communities alike. (shrink)

There is arguably no region of the world that has been the object of more intellectual contempt, intellectual derision, and intellectual disregard than Africa. Scholars have long documented the dark, dreary, pernicious, and primitive “Africanism” some argue has been a defining pillar of philosophizing, literature, criticism, and historiography in the North Atlantic for a long time. Emerging along with intentionally misconstrued yet ubiquitous constructions of blackness as other than human—negative ideas about the continent of Africa and its supposed intellectual vacuity (...) are part of a widely circulating discourse that Kurtis Keim dubbed “mistaking Africa.” In the United States, what Toni Morrison called... (shrink)

There is increasing research on the inclusion and exclusion of people with disabilities in African spaces, which are perpetuated by religious and cultural fear. Decision to shun or embrace people is defined by the politics of the body and influenced by the religion and culture of fear. In politics of the body, women are discriminated against because their bodies are often controlled and put under surveillance. Women with disabilities experience this discrimination more than their able-bodied counterparts and men with disabilities. (...) Written from the perspective of the ethic of ubuntu, this article examines the fear of disability among the Ndebele of Matetsi in Zimbabwe, as well as how the politics of the body are used by women with disabilities to denounce this fear. These women described how they used and and still use their bodies to call for inclusion in their communities. The article employs findings from the politics of the body emerging from the narratives of women with disabilities to propose an African women’s theology of disability.Contribution: The article problematises fear of disability as a cause of discrimination and exclusion of differently abled people particularly women with. It therefore proposes an African women’s theology of disability that is informed by the interdisciplinary approach of Ubuntu promoting the inclusion of all people including women with disabilities into the web of life. (shrink)

This study adopts a heuristic technique to argue the thesis that a set of norms rooted in the African philosophy of Ubuntu can usefully supplement current research guidelines for dealing with incidental findings discovered in genomic research. The consensus regarding incidental findings is that there is an ethical obligation to return individual genetic incidental findings that meet the threshold of analytic and clinical validity, have clinical utility, and are actionable, provided that research contributors have not opted out from receiving such (...) information. This study outlines the hurdles that may hinder the integration of this consensus in mainstream clinical practice, and shows how an ethical theory from the global south may be used to address the same. This will advance the field of ethical, legal and social issues of personalized medicine by providing exposure to the under-represented African perspective on the ethical, legal, and social issues of genomics. (shrink)

This article investigates the concept of Ubuntu/botho as a possible foundation for an African moral theory. It departs from an analysis of the idea of “human personhood” as a basis for moral agency, which is controversially debated within African philosophy. This notion of personhood relies on an understanding of the mutual interdependence of human beings. As a next step, the author critically assesses the discursive function of Ubuntu/botho in African societies and its misuse by political elites as ideological cover for (...) exclusionary and violent practices. By way of conclusion, the article stresses restoration as a key value associated with African humanism based on Ubuntu/botho. (shrink)

Is normative theory grounded in ontology and if so, how? Taking a debate between Kwame Gyekye and Thaddeus Metz as my point of departure, my aim in this article is to show that something normative does indeed follow from ontological views: The social ontological, I maintain, circumscribes the normative without, however, fully determining its content. My argument proceeds in two steps: First, I argue that our social ontological position constrains what kind of normative theory we may plausibly defend. A relational (...) ontology as defended by Gyekye entails a relational normative theory, whereas an atomist ontology calls for an individualist normative approach and a collectivist ontology for a strong communitarian one. Second, this link between the ontological and the normative has substantive implications for how to interpret the normative content of a theory; it entails interpreting normative values in light of the appropriate kind of normative thought. I illustrate the importance of this implication by showing that it suggests a decidedly relational reading of the core value of well-being in Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, that resolves the alleged tension between communal and individual values in his account. (shrink)

This book examines issues relating to Menkiti’s “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought,” which articulates an African notion of personhood. Contributors not only show that personhood is normative but also explore the implications this notion of personhood and citizenship holds for the nation-state in Africa.

An avowed communitarian, Gyekye follows the lead of such African communitarians as Menkiti who believe that the community is ontologically prior to the individual. However, unlike Menkiti and other...

This article begins with a brief outline of current African and Western contexts, and the moral predicaments in which leaders in South Africa find themselves. The research problem addressed is how the spiritual maturity and moral excellence of Christian leaders can be advanced. The methodology employed draws on African and Western cultural and Christian traditions of moral formation. Whilst some common means of moral formation are discussed, particular attention is given to the role of spiritual disciplines. The article aims to (...) address the following question: ‘how do leaders become the kind of people who will make good and right decisions, live moral lives, contribute to the life and work of the church, care for others and the environment, and pursue social justice?’ Three clusters of moral deficiencies are discussed, including pride, vainglory and greed, together with the spiritual disciplines that can counteract them. The central argument is that spiritually mature and morally excellent leaders can address more effectively the moral challenges facing the church and South African society.Contribution: This transdisciplinary article contributes to the HTS’s theological research by combining the academic disciplines of Christian Spirituality and Theological Ethics with particular reference to leadership formation. It further contributes to academic contextual discourse by evaluating African and Western traditions of moral formation and advancing practical means of addressing leadership deficiencies. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the concept of African communitarianism and reflect on its potential value for ecojustice education as a localised response to the wider ecological crises that i...

Partial reprint of an article first appearing in the Journal of Philosophy of Education (2009).

Recent work by comparative philosophers, global ethicists, and cross-cultural value theorists indicates that, unlike most Western thinkers, those in many other parts of the globe, such as indigenous Africa, East Asia, and Latin America, tend to prize relationality. These relational values include enjoying a sense of togetherness, participating cooperatively, creating something new together, engaging in mutual aid, and being compassionate. Global economic practices and internationally influential theories pertaining to justice, development, and normative economics over the past 50 years have been (...) principally informed by characteristically Western and individualist values such as utility, autonomy, and capability. In this article I consider what economic appropriation, production, distribution, and consumption would look like if they were more influenced by relational values typical of non-Western worldviews, and especially the sub-Saharan ethic of ubuntu. (shrink)

In this article I critically discuss some recent English language books in African philosophy. Specifically, I expound and evaluate key claims from books published by sub-Saharan thinkers since 2017 that address epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory and that do so in ways of interest to an audience of at least Anglo-American-Australasian analytic philosophers. My aim is not to establish a definitive conclusion about these claims, but rather to facilitate cross-cultural engagement by highlighting their relevance particularly to many western philosophers and (...) by presenting challenges to these claims that such philosophers would be likely to mount. (shrink)