African Philosophy: Ethics

Reply to contributors to a special issue of _Social Theory and Practice_ devoted to _A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent_.

Discussion of sexuality in African cultures has a long history, but since the 1990s ethical reflections on homosexuality on the continent have often degenerated into furors and provoked a spate of...

This paper offers an African perspective on moral status grounded on an understanding of personhood. These concepts are key to understanding the differences in emphasis and the values at play when global ethical issues are analysed within the African context. Drawing from African philosophical reflections on the descriptive and normative concepts of personhood, I propose a dual notion of subject and object moral status. I explain how object moral status, duties owed to persons, is differently grounded with respect to subject (...) moral status, which refers to communally directed agency. This distinction influences the African way of conceptualising and addressing ethical issues, where, without ignoring rights of persons, moral consideration about the agency of right bearers is often factored into ethical deliberation. As a practical example, I look at the debate surrounding legal access to safe abortion on the African continent. I suggest a Gadamerian approach to diffuse the tensions that sometimes arise between universalist advocates of rights and cultural decolonisationists. (shrink)

This book aims to enhance understanding of the meaning of wellbeing in an African context.

Bernard Matolino has recently argued that African communitarianism is an ethics grounded in emotion aligned with reason. If he is correct, questions arise about what emotions have value within African communitarianism, especially as emotions like anger or resentment could stand in tension with important communitarian values, such as social harmony. While little critical attention has so far been paid to such emotions within an African communitarian framework, a wider philosophical literature examining the moral value of disruptive emotions could be drawn (...) on to develop analyses of emotion within African communitarianism. In this paper, I explore how such an analysis could proceed. I argue that drawing on the wider emotion literature, and especially the concept of reactive attitudes introduced by P. F. Strawson, provides an initial case for even disruptive emotions to have value. Even so, we must question whether an analysis of emotion plausibly based on individualistic commitments is compatible with relational communitarian commitments. I nevertheless defend the compatibility and argue that, not only can disruptive emotions have instrumental value through their epistemic and motivational roles in the promotion of community but, importantly, they are partially constitutive of the interpersonal relationships within which we are embedded and that form community. (shrink)

In this contribution, we will analyse the inquiry (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), written by Ethiopian scholar, Zera Yaqob, ዘርአ፡ያዕቆብ, Seed of Jacob (Sumner, 1976: 4, I). His philosophy resists a division into the basic disciplines customary in Western philosophy, his arguments, as we wish to propose with caution, combine metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology in a way that is almost impossible to separate. We will thus not be able to identify purely epistemological principles in his philosophy. However, since Zera Yaqob is deeply concerned (...) about truth, we still find profound philosophical insights about knowledge and being and their relationship to one another. We will finish our reconstruction of some of the main ideas of the inquiry, (ሐተታ, ḥāteta), with some rather critical notes on some of the hidden premises and their seemingly superioristic implications. (shrink)

International Indigenous rights coalitions increasingly involve Indigenous and non-Indigenous civil society organizations with diverse backgrounds and interests. As these organizations more frequently interact and partner with one another, what issues are being emphasized in their advocacy efforts? This study utilizes content analysis of 60 Indigenous rights organizations’ websites, as well as interviews of several leaders and staff, to explore whether African Indigenous organizations emphasize different aspects of Indigenous rights in their messaging and advocacy than their other Indigenous and non-Indigenous coalition (...) partners, We find that African Indigenous CSOs discuss issues of unequal treatment more frequently, and issues of self-determination and assimilation less frequently, than their coalition partners. The messaging of Indigenous organizations outside of Africa contained similar themes as that of non-Indigenous CSOs. This raises questions regarding why these messages differ: do African Indigenous groups have distinct concerns and/or are there other reasons for the variance in messaging across international Indigenous rights coalitions. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of African worldviews in biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. African worldviews recognise the interdependence and interconnectedness of human beings, animals, plants and the natural world. Although it is not always the case that what one does depends on what one thinks and believes, indigenous African people’s ideas and beliefs about the human–nature relationship have influenced what they have done in and to nature. In African worldviews, the present generation has moral obligations to the ancestors and (...) future generations. It ought to preserve the environment, which is rich in biodiversity, for posterity. This paper insists that it is extremely urgent that every effort be made to document the knowledge of peasant farmers and indigenous people in general. This paper further stresses that indigenous environmental knowledge makes a big difference to sustaining diverse environments, and it is imperative to preserve such knowledge before it dies out. (shrink)

I critically discuss respects in which conceptions of community have featured in African moral-political philosophy over the past 40 years or so. Some of the discussion is in the vein of intellectual history, recounting key theoretical moves for those unfamiliar with the field. However, my discussion is also opinionated, noting prima facie weaknesses with certain positions and presenting others as more promising, particularly relative to prominent Western competitors. There are a variety of forms that African communitarianism has taken and could (...) take in respect of moral status, good character, and just policy, and my aims include arguing that some are more plausible than others and should give more individualist thinkers in Euro-American traditions pause. (shrink)

Reprint of a chapter first appearing in African Values, Ethics, and Technology: Questions, Issues, and Approaches (2021).

Reprint of an article that first appeared in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics (2017).

French translation of 'What Africa Can Contribute to the World', a commissioned chapter for UNESCO'S General History of Africa project.

This chapter expounds relational values characteristic of indigenous Africa and considers how they might usefully be adopted when contemporary societies interact with each other. Specifically, it notes respects in which genuinely human or communal relationship has been missing in the two contexts of globalization and international relations, and suggests what a greater appreciation of this good by the rest of the world would mean for them.

Mildly revised edition of an entry that first appeared in Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research, 1st edn (2014).

Unlike the Chinese, Indian, and Western ethical traditions, the African one had not been text-based until as recently as the 1960s. Since a very large majority of indigenous sub-Saharan societies had oral cultures, there are no classic texts in the field of African ethics and hence also no Big Names; there's nothing comparable to, say, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics or Confucius’ Analects. However, some names and texts have been more influential than others in shaping ethical reflection, particularly over the past 30 (...) years or so with the development of a decent cohort of Africans lecturing in universities. In my contribution, I engage with those contemporary African philosophers whose writings have made some of the most difference to field, favouring those whose views are particularly distinct from salient Western approaches to ethics and should be taken seriously as rivals to them. The main figures critically discussed are I. Menkiti and D. Tutu regarding good character and B. Bujo and K. Gyekye in respect of right action. (shrink)

Scholars have compared the transitional justice processes of Colombia and South Africa in some respects, but there has yet to be a systematic moral-philosophical evaluation of them and specifically regarding the way they have sought to allocate economic goods. In this essay, I appraise the ways that South Africa and of Colombia have responded to their respective historical conflicts in respect of the distribution of property, especially land and money, and opportunities such as access to education and job training. I (...) do so in the light of a certain conception of national reconciliation that is informed by an ethic of harmonious relationship, a value salient in the worldviews of many indigenous peoples in both sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. By this conception, national reconciliation of an attractive sort is largely a matter of cooperative participation in projects expected to benefit formerly conflicting parties in combination with the disavowal of respects in which parties had flouted the value of harmony in the past. I argue that, given this plausible account of reconciliation, one of Colombia’s major proposed ways of allocating property and opportunities, whereby offenders would labour for the sake of victims, would be much better than what South Africa has done, even if Colombia has yet to put its economic policy systematically into practice. (shrink)

In this chapter I critically discuss ideas from the under-explored indigenous African tradition of philosophy of religion. Salient in African thought are four major beliefs that on the face of it make good sense of the view that it is appropriate to be grateful and act gratefully to God for being alive. First, there is a theological belief in a personal God as the creator of all concrete objects in the universe, a globally under-recognized form of monotheism alongside the Abrahamic (...) faiths. Second, there is a force rather than object ontology, with a common view being that everything that exists is imbued with a certain quantity and quality of life-force or vital energy that has come from God. Third, there is a vitalist axiology, such that the greater the life-force, the more final value something has. Fourth, there is the claim that, of what is perceptible on Earth, human persons were given the greatest life-force, one that confers on them a dignity lacking in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. It naturally follows from these claims that human persons have reason to be grateful to God for having been created with a superlative, non-instrumental worth. I expound this position for a global audience and defend it from several ways of objecting to the idea that being given a dignity can provide reason to be thankful. (shrink)

The contributions elsewhere in this volume from us, Nathalia Bautista and Thaddeus Metz, address the proper way to respond to gross human rights violations, given a Global South context. Specifically, considering the histories of Colombia and South Africa and some of the values indigenous to those locales, respectively, we advance non-individualist and non-retributive approaches to the social conflicts that had taken place there. Broadly speaking, we both advocate relational and constructive forms of transitional justice that make victim compensation central. According (...) to Bautista, it is important not to rely merely on legal strategies, but also to draw on the values and more generally the cultures of local peoples, in order to resolve conflict. She highlights respects in which those from three different Colombian societies believe in communitarian ways of “restoring the normative bond” between former enemies, approaches that the state ought to consider when making reparations. Metz appeals to communal values frequently associated with the South African philosophy of ubuntu to construct an account of reconciliation, and he brings out what reconciliation entails for how to make economic restitution in a post-conflict society. In this chapter we consider how Metz’s ubuntu-based reconciliatory approach to reparations might be relevant to Colombia in ways he did not consider, after which we reflect on how the kinds of communitarian practices advanced by Bautista might apply to South Africa. We conclude that these cross-applications are revealing, pointing out how economic compensation in Colombia should plausibly be influenced by cultural factors, and how considerations of culture in South Africa call for compensation beyond economic factors. (shrink)

A collection of several articles on African moral and political philosophy by Thaddeus Metz, translated into French by Emmanuel Fopa, and edited and introduced by Pius Mosima of the University of Bamenda, Cameroon.

A collection of several previously published articles by Thaddeus Metz translated into Igbo, with an introduction by Prof L. O. Ugwuanyi of the University of Abuja.

The first case of COVID-19 infection in Africa was recorded in Egypt on 14 February 2020. Following this, several projections of the possible devastating effect that the virus can have on the population of African countries were made in the Western media. This paper presents evidence for Africa’s successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and under-reporting or misrepresentation of these successes in Western media. It proceeds to argue for accounting for these successes in terms of Africa’s communitarian way of life (...) and conceptions of self, duty, and rights; and that a particular orientation in theorizing on global justice can highlight the injustices inherent in the misrepresentation of these successes and contribute shared perspectives to formulating a framework of values and concepts that would facilitate the implementation of global policy goals for justice. The paper is thus grounded in a rejection of the insular tenets of theorizing prevalent in the global justice debate and to persistent inclinations in Western scholarship to the thinking that theorizing in the African context that draws inspiration from the cultural past has little to contribute to the quest for justice globally. On the contrary, it argues that reflexive critique of cultural history is a necessary source of normative ideals that can foster tolerant coexistence and a cooperative endeavour toward shared conceptions of justice in the contemporary world. (shrink)

This essay argues that the inherent value of Indigenous African Religions, which ensures that the belief in different gods does not eclipse the fact of common humanity might be of importance to contemporary Africa plagued by ceaseless conflicts. The IAR ideology contrasts, for example, with that of Christianity which views the Christian God as the one true God and regards those who worship a different God as pagans and gentiles. It also contrasts with the ideology of Islam, which views Allah (...) as the one true God and regards those who worship different God as infidels. The essay claims that social orientation in contemporary Africa is mostly influenced by the divisive ideologies of these two foreign religions that have come to dominate. These divisive ideologies are to a large extent, indirectly responsible for some of the violent conflicts on the continent. This divisive religious orientation bifurcates humanity into in and out-groups that are extended to the social sphere where people from different religious, ethnic and linguistic groups are treated as outsiders and are made targets for attacks like in South Africa and Nigeria today. Further, if we interpret such violent conflicts as evil and consider its source in light of the perennial problem of evil, what would be our response? Using the conversational method, the essay argues that both good and evil are part of the universe, and that if we want more good, then a change from a divisive to a complementary orientation based on the relational values of the IARs is imperative. (shrink)

In this chapter, I begin the first attempt at mapping out what I consider to be the one concept of African ethics and some of its many accounts. I take the one concept of African ethics to be the general idea or notion of African morality and the many accounts to be narrations or versions that try to flesh out this concept. Regarding the one concept of African ethics, I suggest that constitutive of it or characteristic of it is communal (...) flourishing. Taking Ubuntu, Ujamaa, and Ukama as representatives of the many accounts of African ethics, I highlight the sense in which they constitute developments or narrations of the general notion of communal flourishing. (shrink)

Ageing as a natural process leads one gradually to a life’s stage where one becomes frail and elderly. In this life’s stage, due primarily to the wearing out of the body system, a number of health-related challenges arise. Such may include weakening of the bones which would affect body physique and structure, partial loss of memory, and poor vision. It is thus expected that the frail and elderly would be in need of more care and would become more dependent on (...) the young and energetic class of the society who has the duty and moral responsibility to care. In this essay, we examine a disturbing cultural representation or ideology common in many sub-Saharan African societies, an ideology that is counterproductive to the health and well-being of the frail and elderly and causes stigma, discrimination and harm to such persons. It is the worldview that the frail and elderly are in some way and in some respect harmful to the class of younger persons and they remain alive by, through the practice of witchcraft, taking the lives of younger persons in the family, kin or community. This disturbing belief becomes a source of stigma, discrimination and harm against the frail and elderly, especially in situations where younger persons in a community, kin or family die before the frail and elderly person. In this essay, with reference to specific scenarios and examples where such cultural representations have resulted in the harming of frail and elderly persons, we analyse the extent to which such beliefs hinder our duty to care for the elderly in contemporary African societies. We begin by conceptualising the nature of ageing and the aged or old, paying specific attention to how biological understanding of these concepts and stages of life for human beings may be quite different from cultural and social representations and understanding of such as human history shows. We then proceed to examine the nature and basis of cultural representations of the elderly in specific African communities using specific examples and examining the paradox between African respect for community elders and seeming cases of disrespect for the very frail and elderly. We further discuss the moral duty and responsibility to care for the elderly by the younger persons in the community. We then show how this disturbing trend is perpetuated both by traditional beliefs and representations and modern religious beliefs such as those in Pentecostalism. We conclude by showing why the pursuit of enlightenment is needed to curb this growing and disturbing treatment of the frail and elderly in sub-Saharan African societies. (shrink)

This book advances Oruka's argument that the right to a human minimum is the most basic and necessary means to ensuring human dignity, a precondition to functioning as a moral agent. It also defends and promotes an understanding of justice as ensuring both egalitarian and ecological fairness at the global level.

Shortened version of an article that first appeared in Philosophical Papers (2017).

Mildly modified reprint of a chapter originally appearing in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics (2012).

_A Relational Moral Theory_ draws on neglected resources from the Global South and especially the African philosophical tradition to provide a new answer to a perennial philosophical question: what do all morally right actions have in common as distinct from wrong ones? Metz points out that the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy, the two rivals that have dominated western moral theory for the last two centuries, share an individualist premise. Once that common assumption is replaced by a (...) relational perspective given prominence in African ethical thought, a different comprehensive principle, one focused on harmony or friendliness, emerges. Metz argues that this principle corrects the blind spots of the western moral principles, and has implications for a wide array of controversies in applied ethics that an international audience of moral philosophers, professional ethicists, and similar thinkers will find compelling. (shrink)

After expounding the conceptions of harmony that are central to Confucianism and the sub-Saharan ethic of ubuntu, I apply them to three major topics pertaining to age, namely, virtue, the value of life, and care. Roughly speaking, indigenous East Asian and African values of harmony both entail that only the elderly can be truly virtuous, that the elderly have a strong claim to life-saving resources, and that they are entitled to care from their children, views that I show are not (...) characteristic of moral thinking in the contemporary West, neither for prominent philosophies nor the cultures out of which they grew. I suggest that many Anglophone moral philosophers should be given pause by the existence of different perspectives on the part of at least two long-standing philosophies, and conclude by briefly proposing some ways that cross-cultural debate might be undertaken in the future. (shrink)

A large swathe of the indigenous African ethical tradition is frequently encapsulated in the maxim, “A person is a person through other persons.” This phrasing is an overly literal translation of some sayings that are prominent in the southern and central regions of Africa, but that resonate with most indigenous sub-Saharan cultures. This chapter articulates and motivates a philosophical interpretation of the maxim for an international readership interested in virtue. According to the initial formulation, one should strive to become a (...) real person, which one can do insofar as one prizes other persons’ capacity to relate harmoniously, where harmony consists of identifying with and exhibiting solidarity toward them. The chapter also explores ways of revising this theory to respond to some powerful criticisms, such as that virtue is not purely relational, but also includes some self-regarding dispositions, and that virtue can be manifested by relating to parts of the natural world, particularly to some non-human animals. (shrink)

This chapter explores the place of agent-centred duties in African philosophy. To do so, I investigate influential moral theories in the literature, namely: Kwasi Wiredu’s ‘sympathetic impartiality’, Kwame Gyekye’s ‘moderate communitarianism’ and Thad Metz’s ‘friendship’ principle. This chapter ultimately demonstrates that these moral theories fail to imagine a place for agent-centred duties in their moral frame. The problem, I suggest, is the tendency to construe morality entirely in other-regarding terms, which is not surprising in a moral culture that tends to (...) prize the community over the individual. This chapter is one way to challenge the literature to re-think the importance of collective goods in light of imagining some place for agent-centred duties. (shrink)