African/Africana Philosophy

This article recognizes that linguistic prejudice (with its associated cultural biases) is a reality in any multilingual country, including South Africa. Prejudice is inherently human and the article suggests that it can be both positive and negative. In the case of the Senzo Meyiwa murder trial the article suggests that the linguistic prejudice experienced by witnesses and legal practitioners was largely negative. Even though the South African Constitution suggests an empowering multilingual environment where there are now twelve official languages, in (...) contrast to this, the article takes as a point of departure the monolingual language of record policy that has been in place in the South African legal system since 2017. This is contrary to the constitutional imperatives. It is argued that this policy negatively impacts witnesses and legal practitioners and that the Meyiwa trial is a case in point. It is found that in this trial there is linguistic prejudice (practiced by the presiding judge) where there are linguistic or cultural voids related to communicative inequality and where the speaker does not have sufficient English vocabulary to proceed. It is concluded that the interpretation process also has its challenges and that ideally the use of African languages as languages of record in courts could only aid the delivery of social justice and the implementation of language rights in a multilingual and multicultural country such as South Africa. (shrink)

This article pays homage to Drucilla Cornell through examining her writings on ubuntu not only as a jurisprudential concept, but also as a philosophical and ethical concept. Cornell’s incisive ability to synthesize Kant’s idealism of the realm of ends and the African philosophy of ubuntu, combined with her revolutionary spirit, deepened understanding of the South African constitutional values and principles. Exploring the interpretation of ubuntu by the South African Constitutional Court, it shows how Cornell advanced an ubuntu-inspired ethical ideal that (...) informs and shapes dignity as the Grundnorm of the South African Constitution. For Cornell, as a transformative ethic, ubuntu imposes obligations upon us to live up to ideals in our relationships with each other and to ideals of the new democracy. Cornell championed the idea of a substantive revolution brought about by the Constitution and argued for a reading of the South African Constitution against these aspirational ideals. (shrink)

Ethical Theory in Global Perspective provides an easy-to-teach introduction to ethical theory from a uniquely global perspective. In addition to key Western ethical theories—such as virtue ethics, consequentialism, various deontological theories, and care ethics—moral theories from a range of East Asian, South Asian, and African philosophical traditions and schools are also discussed, including Akan philosophy, Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and both orthodox and heterodox schools of classical Indian philosophy. In short, this book is a key resource for educators who want to (...) diversify their ethical theory curricula but are not sure how, as well as those currently teaching comparative ethics looking for a single textbook that covers a range of philosophical traditions in a clear, approachable way. (shrink)

This memoriam essay begins with a reflection on the author’s relationship to Drucilla Cornell, the famed activist, revolutionary legal theorist, social and political philosopher, playwright, and biographer. It then proceeds to examine her contributions to Africana existential revolutionary thought and the Caribbean-inspired project of shifting the geography of reason.

The thesis of this essay is that equal opportunity (EO) "strictly dominates" (in the game-theoretic sense) reparations. That is, (1) all the ways reparations would make our world more just would also be achieved under EO; (2) EO would make our world more just in ways reparations cannot; and (3) reparations would create injustices which EO would avoid. Further, (4) EO has important practical advantages over reparations. These include economic efficiency, feasibility, and long-term impact. Supporters of reparations should abandon that (...) ideal to support equal opportunity instead. (shrink)

With the contemporary global resurgence of interest in Marxism, including its Marxist‑Leninist form(s), as a theoretical framework that can orient contemporary struggles against capitalism and its attendant depredations, it has become even more urgent to address some of the key criticisms that were leveled at Marx, Engels, and Lenin when they came to be treated as “dead dogs” toward the end of the twentieth century. One key criticism was the charge that alleged that Marxism, including its Marxist‑Leninist form(s), was and (...) is irredeemably Eurocentric in character. While there have been attempts to counter such charges by excavating and reframing Marx’s writings on the “non‑Western world,” this essay proposes to take another approach toward the charge of Eurocentrism in relation to Marxism (and Marxism‑Leninism in particular). This essay proposes to contribute to responses to the charge of Eurocentrism, by taking seriously the theoretical contributions of two African Marxists to the development of Marxism‑Leninism. This essay shows the specific ways in which two prominent East African Marxists, namely Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu (1924–1996) and Dani Wadada Nabudere (1932–2011) were both deeply influenced by Lenin and made important contributions to Marxism‑Leninism. (shrink)

This philosophical investigation interrogates the relationship between G.W.F. Hegel’s concept of the master-slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit and the critique and reformulation of it by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks. As a means of contextualization and expansion of Hegel’s original textual account, I consider Susan Buck-Morss’ seminal defense through grounding the dialectic in Hegel’s possible historical knowledge of the Haitian Revolution. I maintain that despite a compelling picture, Buck-Morss’ insights are unable to fully vindicate Hegel from (...) the rebukes of Fanon, and as a result, Hegel’s phenomenology necessitates a concrete analysis of the actual conscious experiences of the racialized and colonized subject in order to realize its aims. In pursuit of this critical methodology, I develop the upshot and positive movement of Fanon’s critique through what I describe as a “phenomenology of flesh” in conversation with Maurice Merleau Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible. (shrink)

In African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought (2023), Bruce B. Janz introduces what he calls an enactivist African philosophy. The book makes a significant contribution to African philosophy as no other work has yet made the connection between African philosophy and enactivism. This article’s aim is to give a critical response to the book. It starts with some background by connecting Enactivist Cognition with Janz’s earlier Philosophy in an African Place (2009). This is followed by a brief (...) discussion of his introduction to enactivist African philosophy and its connection to texts in African philosophy. The article closes with a discussion of some issues that Enactivist Cognition raises. (shrink)

This response to Bruce Janz’s African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition (2023) uses the work of Martin Heidegger and Stanley Cavell to understand the relationship among philosophy, thinking, and place and, most crucially, Africa as a place from which philosophy might be thought, that is, might be proposed as native to philosophy. Invoking the late Heidegger, for whom thinking presents itself as the question, and Cavell’s use of Ralph Waldo Emerson as a thinker native to America, the difficulty is raised as (...) to how these relations manifest themselves in Janz’s Enactivist Cognition. (shrink)

This article is a response to the new book by Bruce Janz, African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought, published in 2023 in the Bloomsbury Studies in World Philosophies series. Enactivist Cognition opens up a new space of conversation in the field of African philosophy—and world philosophies more broadly—through an innovative approach that applies insights from the cognitive sciences to the humanities in order to highlight the relationship between thought and context, between theorization and experience. Through the interpretive (...) lens of enactivism, Janz ventures into new readings of well-known themes and personalities in African philosophy and also introduces interesting new themes and personalities to the African philosophical conversation. Janz also intentionally bridges African and Africana thought. While this article contests the application of enactivism to all the philosophers treated in Enactivist Cognition, it applauds Janz’s search for new, creative, and productive spaces for and of philosophy. (shrink)

The author of African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought responds to four critiques of his book. After giving some context and history of the book, he addresses points raised by each of the readers.

This article addresses Bruce Janz’s “enactivist” reading of African philosophy from two perspectives. The space in which African philosophy finds itself remains problematic, and, thus, this article attempts to unpack this issue. Janz argues that African philosophy allows for only a few or no possibilities for radical thought. However, his own reading of the Nigerian philosopher Sophie Oluwole serves to debunk this claim. Oluwole’s thought highlights the challenges of building a modern African philosophy within the context of postcoloniality, in which (...) problems of untranslatability are encountered when utilizing a metropolitan language, which, in her case, is English. But, beyond the problem of untranslatability, she is able to delineate a holistic cosmology that, in multiple ways, incorporates, complicates, and extends the borders of philosophy. (shrink)

To liberate African philosophy from the remnants of the colonial style of thought, Kwesi Wiredu promotes the idea of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy. He argues that, to accomplish this project, African philosophers must theorize in African vernaculars. This article attempts to show that the project of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy by recourse to theorizing in African vernaculars is challenging. It examines a particular strategy that Wiredu deploys in “Conceptual Decolonization as an Imperative in Contemporary African Philosophy,” (...) in which he hopes to demonstrate that the Akan conception of mind is superior to the Cartesian conception of mind. It demonstrates that Wiredu’s attempt to show the superiority of the Akan conception of mind is unsuccessful and that his project of conceptual decolonization fails. Nevertheless, it concludes that Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization project still shows promise even in light of our criticisms. (shrink)

This is a book review of Melvin L. Rogers's The Darkened Light of Faith: Race, Democracy, and Freedom in African American Political Thought.

Du Bois regarded social reform as a legitimate object for the scientist. He gave a place to non-epistemic values in scientific reasoning and, to counter the effects of scientific racism, he constructed his approach around the belief that scientists must adopt an assumption or scientific hypothesis that African Americans are human. His engagement in scientific research was a way to reform the society in which he lived, which in turn, led him to defend the faithfulness to fact as his conception (...) of scientific objectivity. This essay examines his sophisticated theory of facts, account of the difference between the natural and human sciences, and unique pragmatist theory of truth. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, a relatively new field in practical philosophy, offers to potentially edify the layperson’s everyday life with the help of philosophy. This lofty ideal is upheld by philosophical practitioners introducing various contemporary philosophies to its growing literature. However, many philosophical traditions beyond contemporary philosophy still somewhat suffer from an unwarranted neglect. Presently, African philosophy faces an almost complete absence in the philosophical counselling literature. It is thus a given that a prevalent lack of inquiry exists regarding its use in (...) philosophical counselling. Despite this silence, fertile grounds exist for innovative contributions to further advance the development of African philosophy in philosophical counselling. -/- In this talk, I will introduce a novel reading of African philosophy to the literature of philosophical counselling. This understanding of African philosophy is greatly inspired and influenced by the work of Tsenay Serequeberhan and Jonathan Chimakonam. More specifically, the notion of African philosophy gathered from these philosophers seek to advance the critical interpretation/hermeneutic actualised from a specific philosophical place or lifeworld through the method of conversationalism. Furthermore, the very rootedness of this notion of philosophy, stemming from a concrete lifeworld, actively problematises philosophies that reproduce a supposed and untenable value neutrality. -/- Developing this understanding of African philosophy in a philosophical counselling context, I offer an initial critique of uncritical applications of philosophies originating from distinct philosophical places under the guise of a value neutrality. In maintaining this unwarranted silence on different philosophical traditions, philosophical counsellors might promote the use of philosophies as if universally applicable. And secondly, I propose that following from this understanding of African philosophy, philosophical counselling as such can begin to foster an environment in which new concepts can be co-created. Consequently, and in conjunction with conversationalism, radically new ways of being/becoming can be explored which might hold greater contextual significance. (shrink)

Assuming that effort is made to locate the meaning of dignity in the African thought scheme, what does it mean, and what are the ways this notion could be said to defend the idea of a distinctively African worldview? What are the key values that would define and direct this meaning? How does this notion provide a normative basis for the concept of dignity that is capable of conceiving dignity from a fresh but valuable perspective? This work sets out to (...) address these questions. Applying the Igbo thought scheme as an illustration of the African thought scheme, the work seeks to provide an account of an African concept of dignity. To do this, it translates the concept of dignity in Igbo thought to greatness, nobility and honour. It demonstrates how these concepts underlie the Igbo notion of dignity and explains how the norms and values implied by these concepts inform the idea of dignity in an African thought scheme. It articulates the basis and grounds through which these concepts are upheld and the values they defend, and it shows how they illustrate the notion of dignity in an African thought scheme. To do this, I map out a number of Igbo proverbs on greatness, nobility and honour and provide an interpretation of them, of the underlying assumptions they represent, and of how they illustrate the concept of dignity in the Igbo (African) thought. I will then locate the key principles that can be read in these proverbs and how they suggest an idea of dignity. The outcome of my study suggests that the virtues of greatness, nobility and honour are implicated in the notion of dignity, as it can be ascribed to a person in Igbo thought. (shrink)

The desire for dignity informs an individual’s daily activities. Human beings, driven by a universal desire to be recognised and to be seen as dignified people within a society, conduct their actions according to values that are considered dignified. Society informs our disposition toward the dignity of one another. This evokes the question of the true nature of dignity: what is dignity? This chapter seeks to explore and engage with the question of the nature of dignity in African society, drawing (...) on African philosophers’ conceptions of human dignity in personhood within moderate and strict communitarian positions. Is dignity an intrinsic or an instrumental value? Can dignity be both an instrumental and an intrinsic value? These distinctions are very important in moral theory. Is dignity value in itself (an end in itself) or instrumental value (means to an end) or both? Responses to these questions shed light on African conceptions of dignity. (shrink)

I argue in this chapter against a common Kantian-inspired misconception of human dignity that has prevailed in African philosophical discussions of the concept of late. This approach substitutes the normative ground of dignity in our inherent capacity for individual rational autonomy for our inherent capacity for communal relationality. Although this African communitarian correction to Kantian individualism rightly picks up on the relational character of human dignity in African ethics and political thought, it repeats the mistake of attributing dignity to single, (...) individual persons. This misses the value of the social ontology of human dignity, which may be attributed to a typically African relational approach. In contrast, I offer an interpretation that locates dignity in mutual recognition. (shrink)

I articulate a plausible African view of ‘moral dignity’, which is founded on the normative conception of ‘personhood’ and the idea of communalism. The status of ‘personhood’ is attained when one is recognized for internalizing communal norms, performing requisite duties, and participating in relevant functions. This engenders the appellation of ‘moral dignity’, which implies ‘being worthy of respect’ and consequent respect by others. I examine the implication of the ideas of ‘moral dignity’, ‘personhood’, and ‘communalism’ for a plausible conception and (...) practice of punishment. I argue that the plausible communal goal of punishment is not retributive but reformatory, reconciliatory, rehabilitative, and reintegrative. A person who exhibits bad behaviour, violates rules or norms, and commits crimes diminishes his ‘moral dignity’, ‘personhood’, and creates disharmony in, and is ‘estranged’ from, the community. This involves a denial of ‘personhood’ and ‘moral dignity’, which involves disapprobation and, in some cases, requires punishment. Such a person is thus in need of rehabilitation to improve or restore his ‘moral dignity’ and ‘personhood’. By engaging in redemptive behaviours, one is able to restore the moral dignity or personhood one has lost or diminished so that one can be in harmony and reconciled with the people and community one is estranged from, has harmed or offended. (shrink)

The introductory chapter gives the reader an overall sense of the book. The book focuses on human dignity in an African context. The chapter aims to convey a sense of the scope of African conceptions of human dignity, their contested nature, and their importance for the broader literature on human dignity. It also motivates and justifies our focus in the book on perspectives and voices from an African context in relation to the subject of human dignity. Finally, it gives the (...) reader a sense of the contributions made by various theorists in this volume on African conceptions of human dignity. (shrink)

Inherent and universal human dignity was an entirely novel legal concept when it was promulgated by the Universal Declaration of Rights in 1948. Prior to its judicialisation, human dignity had a twofold connotation in anthropology, religion and philosophy, denoting a relationship of contingent status in human relations and relying heavily on duties, rather than rights, as a requirement to achieve dignity. In contrast, the post-WWII paradigm dictates that dignity is equal, universal and unacquired, premised on a right to have one’s (...) inherent dignity respected and protected. The Afrocentric idea of human dignity is also contingent since dignity must be achieved through good deeds towards one’s community, meaning that an individual’s dignity is subordinate to the dignity of one’s community. It has been argued that inherent and universal human dignity is a Western concept, considering that it is rooted in individual rights rather than duties, and therefore takes an approach to human relations that is antithetical to Africa’s communitarian worldview based on duties. Therefore, this chapter explores whether inherent dignity is universal to such an extent that it can accommodate African communitarianism and whether judicialised dignity in all instances should trump the competing rights of a community over individual liberalism and autonomy. (shrink)

This contribution reads the current debate on African personhood and human dignity against the backdrop of South African women’s struggle for dignity in the face of persistent and pervasive interpersonal violence perpetrated against them by South African men. The point of departure is Menkiti’s classic description of normative personhood in African “traditional thought”, as translated into “the idiom of modern philosophy”. This starting point exposes two fault lines that run through all African philosophical endeavours: the first is the tension between (...) normative and descriptive emphases, and the second fault line is the tension contained in the very task of ‘translation’—in the need for illuminating the distinctiveness of African notions, while simultaneously rendering them understandable in, and productive for, a modern (universal) philosophical idiom. For Menkiti, what is distinctive about African personhood is that the community takes both ontological and epistemological precedence over the individual. Feminist and other criticisms (Imafidon) show how this notion of personhood becomes discriminatory. In response to these criticisms, Molefe’s nuanced understanding of the internal relationship between the intrinsic and extrinsic worth of persons is linked with the work of Gobodo-Madikizela on forgiveness and the capacity for sympathy. The contribution concludes with the insight that human dignity and personhood (and Ubuntu) in African philosophy should be reconnected with the concrete struggles of the powerless to be recognised and treated as fully human—a tradition with a long and rich history in our part of the world. Only then will we have a critical and incisive enough version of personhood and Ubuntu to tackle the crisis of violence against women and children. (shrink)

This chapter considers the status of metaphysical capacities in the debates on personhood and value theory in African philosophy. Specifically, it considers whether metaphysical capacities are morally neutral, instrumentally good or intrinsically good. The inquiry into the status of metaphysical capacities arises because it is important for the concept of human dignity in African thought. This question emerges because there are scholars that reject capacity-based theories of value and personhood (the minimalist view of personhood) for the performance/merit-based theories of value (...) and personhood (the maximalist view of personhood), which debate has implications for the concept of human dignity in African philosophy. This chapter presents Ikuenobe’s personhood/merit-based theory of human dignity, and it further provides three reasons why we should prefer the metaphysical capacity-based theory of human dignity. The capacity-based theory of value has the theoretical advantages of being more useful in bioethical debates, animal ethics and political theory. The chapter argues that there are good moral-political reasons to attach intrinsic value to the metaphysical capacities of our nature, where intrinsic dignity (minimalist personhood) is primary and achievement dignity (maximalist personhood) is secondary in African moral thought. (shrink)

This paper will reflect on the possibility of epistemic decolonization, particularly in terms of curriculum, as a transformative educational process in the context of the South African university, and with respect to my own positionality. The argument will centre around two difficult interdependent positions. On the one hand I will argue for the university’s task as transformational, even offering, via Cornel West, the ‘salvific’ possibility that knowledge offers those who seek it. To develop this claim, I will draw on and (...) develop the notion of paideia though the work of Plato and Heidegger.On the other hand, within the postcolonial African university, the question of decolonization in the tertiary space cannot be elided, particularly since the 2015 #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements. The university is a powerful colonial relic, and it can be used to reinforce and perpetuate epistemic violence through unreflective or unconscious pedagogical and curriculum decisions. Here I draw on decolonial thinkers such as Santos, Mignolo, Maldonado-Torres and Mbembe: I argue for a reckoning with the forces of coloniality, and advocate for epistemic justice and criticality, as part of the decolonizing project. In conclusion, working with ideas from Cornel West, I argue to reconcile paideia, as the ‘turning of the soul’, with the decolonizing African university. (shrink)

Recent research into contemporary African social and political philosophy has emphasized African folk and indigenous heritage, as well as the legacies of eminent African leaders and precolonial African societies. Such research has also attended to theoretical debates and discussions and clarifications of concepts employed in the political and social spheres. The core themes and issues driving this subject area relate to African people’s daily lives, the search for better modes of political and social organization, and the challenges that African people (...) must face. In accordance with this contemporary definition, African social and political philosophy draws on African people themselves and considers them to be actively engaged in philosophical theorization work while tackling the challenges that reality poses to their lives. Democracy is one of the main challenges for Africa. In particular, on the continent, democracy is increasingly following an alternative trajectory toward anocratic forms of government. Anocracy is examined to describe the path to democratization that various African countries are following. The analysis of acts of civil disobedience carried out in an anocratic regime, such as that of Sudan, provides additional evidence of the role that African people are playing in dealing with injustices and democratizing their countries from below. Through these processes, African people are philosophizing from below, and it is on this process that African social and political philosophy should concentrate to further develop as a field of study. (shrink)

The chapter explores African epistemology by taking a historical approach to examining its nature and character. By doing so, it seeks to explain some distinctive features of African epistemology, such as the focus on cultural beliefs and practices in the attempt to describe the nature of African epistemology and the need to debate the question of method in African epistemology. To be sure, while the former is traced to attempts to respond to colonial subjugation of the African’s capacity for rational (...) deliberation, the latter arises from the task of authentically construing what passes as ‘African’ in relation to epistemology. Aside from its explanatory engagement, the chapter elucidates pertinent future concerns for scholars of the discipline. Worthy of note is the task of construing African epistemology in the light of philosophy (and by extension, epistemology) as a normative discipline. The chapter, therefore, notes that epistemic normativity is a key challenge if African epistemology is to take its place in the global discourse of knowledge in epistemology. (shrink)

African philosophy has, in recent decades, emerged from the academic margins to assume occupation of its rightful place in the scholarly mainstream, having garnered long-overdue acknowledgement and recognition. Within African philosophy, the question of the animal, which has for a long time been ignored or deemed comparatively unimportant, is now beginning to get the kind of attention it deserves, acknowledgement that has, similarly, been long overdue. This chapter examines the status of “the animal” in African ontology and metaphysics; epistemology; social, (...) political, and moral philosophy; aesthetics; and philosophy of education. The argument is that while African philosophical treatment of other-than-human animals has tended to be anthropocentric, or human-centered, African philosophy is equipped with the requisite conceptual resources for the systematic development of a comprehensive non-anthropocentric stance. What this requires on the part of African philosophers, however, is nothing less than intellectual, ethical, and practical honesty and consistency. (shrink)

This chapter introduces this handbook. It begins with an examination of the meaning of African philosophy and analyses some of the key challenges that emerge from the definition of African philosophy as philosophy in an African place. The key challenges examined are the extent to which the “philosophy” in African philosophy can be genuinely said to be African, and the problem of defining which place is exactly represented by “African” in African philosophy without unduly essentializing the discourse and overgeneralizing theory. (...) The chapter then proceeds to examine the importance, rich contents, and limitations of the handbook by highlighting the different parts and chapters. This introductory chapter thus provides an entry point for a robust engagement with the handbook. (shrink)

The question of life’s meaning is a universal question that not only cuts across various cultures but also resides at the back of the mind of almost every individual that has ever existed. The very desire to continue striving in this world suggests that there is something about life that makes it worth living. Even in the throes of despair and suicide, there is something that drives the existential angst that awakens such despair. Both striving and despair in life stand (...) as subtle and benign answers to questions about whether one considers his/her life meaningful. In African philosophy today, answer to the question of life’s meaning from an African perspective is receiving more attention now than it has in the last few decades. This chapter is a summary of some of the dominant views in the current literature on African conceptions of meaning. Specifically, it explores traditional conceptions of meaning such as the love view, the God’s purpose view (destiny and divine law view), the vital force view, the communal view, and the (Yoruba) Cluster view, as well as the more contemporary views such as living a religious life and the contemporary cluster view. (shrink)

Over 60 years of political development, most postcolonial African nations appear to be condemned to live perpetually in conditions of unmitigated underdevelopment. In these nations, the realization of meaningful development has remained elusive and illusory. The quest for development, understood as a search for a positive change or an improvement in the status of things, has given rise to several development theories, plans, and strategies, all designed to facilitate an improved quality of life in postcolonial African nations. Prominent among these (...) theories are Modernization theory; Dependency theory; Cultural theory; and Reconstructionist theory of development. This chapter critically examines the quest for meaningful development in postcolonial African nations in light of these dominant theories of development and argues that they failed to bring about desired development because the theories lack a strong and clearly developed philosophical foundation that pays attention to the ontological, epistemological, and ethical systems of African peoples. The chapter, therefore, argues for a philosophy of development for Africa, which prioritizes the building of communities over industrialization, capitalization, and competitiveness among African nation-states. (shrink)

Education in South Africa has always been a contentious matter since the inception of colonization and coloniality, which is rooted in two competing conceptions of education. The first being colonial missionary education, framed as uplifting the Black/Indigenous “savage” from the pits of backward, retarded, and gradual life as detailed by Mudimbe in The Invention of Africa. The second being Indigenous modes of education (along with their role and function) as explicated by Gqoba in his Ingxoxo Enkulu Ngemfundo (A Great Debate (...) on Education). These two competing conceptions continue to define the higher education landscape in the country, as decolonial agitation was substantiated by the student movements of #MustFall.The chapter begins by analyzing Gqoba’s treatment of education. This treatment contextualizes the contestation that defines a philosophy of education as articulated from a South African vantage-point. In the second move, it analyzes AC Jordan’s The Wrath of the Ancestors. Jordan’s novel reveals a textured and layered interplay between western conceptions of education – as they necessarily contend and compete with traditional/Indigenous ideas of education. The main objective is to discern (the aims of education), i.e., what a South African philosophy of education might entail in a context defined by colonial violence, contestation, and erasure. (shrink)

Masters Degree. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg.

The claim that is examined in this chapter is that, as is bivalent logic, trivalent logic occupies a place in the field of logic. A trivalent logic is a three-value logical system, and a bivalent logic is a two-value logical system. As part of advancing this claim, the chapter uses the examples of trivalent logic in Charles Sanders Peirce’s thought, the trivalent logic of Janus, the Aymará trivalent logical system, and African trivalent logic. Using the example of ancestorhood, where characteristically (...) an ancestor, as a living dead, is both a spiritual and physical entity or is considered neither a spiritual nor physical being, the overarching view or thesis that is defended and advanced is that African trivalent logic mirrors a trivalent African metaphysics or ontology. (shrink)

In post-apartheid South Africa, a foregrounding of democratic citizenship education through broadened and inclusive participation is especially evident in a decentralised school-based leadership, management, and governance system. Policy-wise, the involvement of parents in School Governing Body (SGB) structures is seen as an enactment of representative and collective consultation, key to the democratisation of schooling and education. In practice, however, the wide-sweeping authority of SGBs, has allowed several schools to continue a historical narrative of exclusion and inequality, effectively widening the gaps (...) between historically advantaged and disadvantaged schools, and putting into effect renewed tensions of inequality and inequity. Key questions arise: has the state erred in its trust of SGBs to enact democratisation? Or are there limits to what democratisation can achieve? In considering these questions, the article explores re-considerations of governance so that interpretations of democratisation of schools are not used in the subversion of education as a public good. (shrink)

The starting point of this chapter is that there is a basic distinction between indigenous African societies and Western societies. It is argued that while the former are largely communal, the latter are predominantly individualistic. The communal emphasis in indigenous African societies is demonstrated on the basis of Mbiti’s adage of “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am,” while the individualistic attention in Western societies is exemplified on the basis of Descartes’ dictum of “cogito ergo (...) sum (I think, therefore I am).” It is further argued that in order to understand and appreciate some of the different attitudes and behaviors found in indigenous African societies and Western societies, one must comprehend this communal/individual distinction; this is the distinction that underlies several other differences in the two societies. Differently stated, several other differences that punctuate the two societies are explainable in terms of this distinction. The chapter goes on to illustrate some of these differences whilst showing how they are derived from the basic communal/individual distinction. In making the comparison, the interest is to assist in comprehension of some of the notions and practices in indigenous African societies. The chapter is not judgmental. (shrink)

This chapter interrogates the conceptualizations of the nonhuman in African thought. To do this, it draws on a Swahili Sufi poem entitled Al-Inkishafi, by Sayyid Abdallah bin Ali Bin Nassir (1720–1820). The poem presents a distinct notion of the nonhuman as “the world,” constructed in opposition to the human understood as fundamentally antagonistic to humanity. The world is characterized as worthless, impermanent, deceptive, and destructive. Such a view of the world is not isolated in African cultures, but is indeed ubiquitous (...) in regions with a strong influence of Sufi Islam, and even beyond these regions. Based on the philosophical assertion about “the world” in Al-Inkishafi, the chapter then traces the developments of this notion of “the world” in two postcolonial African texts: a Swahili novel by Euphrase Kezilahabi, Dunia Uwanja wa Fujo (1975), and a Wolof novel by Boubacar Boris Diop, Doomi Golo (2003). It suggests that reading these novels against the background of Al-Inkishafi’s conceptualization of “the world” dramatically changes their interpretation. In the case of Dunia Uwanja wa Fujo, an intellectual continuity between Sufism, existentialism, and socialism makes it possible to attribute the failures of socialism in Tanzania to the very nature of the world. Doomi Golo presents a world where the ephemeral nature of human existence is taken as a point of departure and where deception belongs to the basic setup of all reality. (shrink)

This chapter examines themes and issues in two phases of African Existentialism, the first in premodern Africa and the second in modern Africa. By premodern Africa, I mean here African cultural experiences prior to contact with foreign cultures, and by modern I mean the exact opposite, African cultural experiences after her contact with foreign cultures as we experience today. In the first phase, I show that primary concern and theme in Africa Existentialism is the question of the meaning of life. (...) According to African traditional thought, the life of an African is meaningful if he or she lives in a community-accepted life. I also explore the issue that arises from this theme, such as individual autonomy in a living community-accepted life. In the second phase, I show that the concern shifted primarily to the question of African identity and authenticity of life in the face of Western influence. In this case, I explore the works of African existentialist such as Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire. I concluded that African existentialism is an essential part of the African philosophy curriculum for understanding the identity and meaningfulness of life of the African person. (shrink)

The chapter critically examines the fundamental and all-embracing philosophy of sub-Saharan African peoples, Afro-communitarianism or African communitarian philosophy. The chapter shows that recent theoretical scholarship on African communitarian philosophy is often removed from the concrete and lived experiences of African peoples in terms of how community and communing are understood. This results in a theory-praxis gap or dichotomy that needs to be bridged to ensure that this philosophy remains relevant for African peoples. The chapter analyses this gap and ways to (...) bridge them by examining four challenges of African communitarian philosophy: the exclusion challenge in relation to an existentially narrow conception of community, the difference challenge in relation to a normative ontology of being in sub-Saharan African communities, the participatory challenge in relation to hierarchies in African communities, and the autonomy challenge in relation to the understanding of relationality. The chapter concludes that the theorization of African communitarian philosophy can only overcome a crisis of relevance and avoid the tendency of serving only the West if it bridges the theory-praxis gap and pay closer attention to the lived experience of African peoples. (shrink)

This chapter will explore two major themes in the African epistemology: the question of epistemic injustice and the question of the epistemology of ignorance. By epistemic injustice in an African context, I mean the moral wrong or injustice that has been done to the African knower by denying him of, or downplaying on his or her capacity to know. And by epistemology of ignorance in the African thought, I am referring to the role deliberate and non-deliberate ignorance has played and (...) continues to play in the African knowledge experience and production process. Concerning the former, this chapter shows that a great injustice has been done to the African indigenous knowledge production and processing systems, one that needs to be remedied. Concerning the latter, I argue as well that ignorance is often ignored in the discourse of epistemology, and it has continued to play important roles in the altering of African epistemic traditions and structures. Thus, there is need to remedy this situation. This chapter concludes by holding that the African epistemology has important functions to play in liberating the African knowledge systems from attempts to undermine it. (shrink)

African philosophy has used the concept of the future in a wide range of ways, but these ways have not been surveyed. This chapter does that by considering five broad types of questions. The first is to ask about what African philosophy has said about the future. This will take us into a discussion of African theories of time, as well as into thinking about the places where African philosophy has contributed something to the question of Africa’s future, particularly in (...) early postindependence in various countries. The second question is about the concepts which necessitate some understanding of the future in African philosophy. These include divination, destiny, immortality, and the environment. The third question has to do with philosophy’s part in some proposals for Africa to move into the future. These include a brief look at Afropessimism, Afrofuturism and Africanfuturism, African Renaissance, and Ubuntu, inasmuch as they assume or advocate for a future. The fourth question has to do with proposals that philosophers have made for African philosophy’s own future as a discipline and as an intellectual component to African life. And finally, the fifth question has to do with how we might think of futurity as an integral component of philosophy itself, as part of “becoming-African.” How might the doing of philosophy be seen as facing the future, and how would that change the way it is engaged? (shrink)

Aribiah Attoe took issue with the materialist and the non-materialist African conceptions of death by arguing that the reality of death puts pressure on the human conception of life’s meaning. He admits the reality of an afterlife experience through a causal principle that sees events in the world as the product of interactions between predetermined past events. It is an afterlife where a decomposing body continues interacting with other things in the world, not an afterlife involving consciousness. While conscious meaning-making (...) ends in the death of the body in Attoe’s materialist view, thereby affirming the conclusion that human existence is meaningless and the universe is purposeless, the conviction about life’s meaninglessness is also reinforced by the possibility of a second death, that is, the death of the transcendent consciousness in the traditional African view. In this article, I will mount two objections to Attoe’s submission. First, I argue that Attoe’s refutation of life’s meaning may be faulted by a world view devoid of the ideas of the afterlife and immortality. Life’s meaninglessness for him should have been limited to the facts of human existence in the world, not the human inability to continue meaning after death. Second, Attoe’s conception of death as finality questions his principle of causality that suggests the reality of an endless afterlife. Attoe’s overarching submission on life’s meaninglessness gives the impression that theories of life’s meaning must be anchored on the thought of an afterlife and immortality. (shrink)

In late eighteenth-century West Africa, cycles of increasing violence and slave raiding sparked a desire for new modes of political organization. In the Sahel a.

Phenomenology is an emerging field within the broader domain of African and Africana philosophy. The phenomenological method, with its various approaches to studying the meaning of lived experience, is at the core of the thought of African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji, Dismas A. Masolo, Achille Mbembe, Mabogo More, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Noel Chabani Manganyi, and proponents of Africana Philosophy such as WEB Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Lucius Outlaw, Lewis Gordon, George Yancy, and Linda Martin Alcoff. Technically, the term “African phenomenology” (...) is not used as widely, or introduced as systematically, as Africana phenomenology. The aim of this chapter is to introduce some of the central issues and theorists of the field of African phenomenology. As the subtitle of this chapter indicates, its scope is limited to what one may call introductory perspectives in African phenomenology. The idea is to outline for further investigation some thematically related contributions to African phenomenology with specific reference to the grounding work of Paulin Hountondji as related to works of Kwasi Wiredu and Dismas A. Masolo. Hountondji’s critical adoption of Husserl’s classic phenomenological approach offers a broad, foundational scope, which makes it particularly suitable for a basic introduction to African phenomenology. (shrink)