Philosophy of Cognitive Science > Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence > Computation and Representation > AI without Representation?
|Summary||At least since the rise of anti-representational dynamicism (including so-called radical dynamicism, embedded and embodied cognition as well as enactivism), cognitive science and AI research has been engaged with issues concerning the need for representation in modelling and explaining intelligence. Traditionally, AI research has been based on the tenet that representation is necessary for intelligence. The anti-representational dynamicist approach rejects representation (and computation) as being key to understanding cognition and intelligence. The AI without Representation category centers on the proposal that AI can do without the central ingredient of representing the world.|
|Key works||Given the strong interrelation between this category and other leaf categories, the interested reader is referred to related works in sibling categories, such as Symbols and Symbol Systems, Implicit/Explicit Rules and Representations as well as Computation and Representation, Misc. More specific classical works on the present topic include the following ones. Varela et al 1991 offer an early introduction to embodied cognition without representation. Bearing a similar name to this category is Rodney Brooks' famous work based on his mobots in Brooks 1991. Bearing the same name is Hubert L. Dreyfus' analysis of Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation in Dreyfus 2002. Clark & Toribio 1994 offer an early critique of the anti-representationalist approach to modelling and understanding intelligence. Shimon Edelman ms offers a nice comparative analysis of the anti-representational approach, on the one hand, and those who defend the need for representation Markman & Dietrich 2000, on the other hand. Garzon 2008 outlines a general account of cognition without the need of positing representational resources.|
|Introductions||Bickhard 1993 Müller 2007 Wallis 2004|
- Symbols and Symbol Systems (269)
- Computational Semantics (80)
- Implicit/Explicit Rules and Representations (61)
- Representation in Connectionism (103)
- Subsymbolic Computation (32)
- Computation and Representation, Misc (116)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
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