This chapter offers a discussion of Leonard Harris’ insurrectionist philosophy, paying special attention to those places where Harris attenuates the capability and scope of human reasoning. The chapter critically engages: claims to divine reasoning, conceptual approaches to racism that rely upon totalizing accounts, the prominent conception of modernity, the notion that human apperception is unaffected by the episteme (i.e., intervening background assumptions that pervade the present epoch), and the notion that Harris’ philosophy precludes us from establishing moral imperatives and value (...) ultimates. The author argues that one must take into account the cognitive and rational limitations—the corporeality and fallibilism—of human beings to understand Harris’ proffered conception of efficacious reasoning in moral contexts. Only then will we understand the ongoing creation and transvaluation of our norms and values, and what we could be outside the Asylum walls. (shrink)
This chapter aims to articulate the motivation behind an insurrectionist philosophy. On this account, insurrectionist philosophy is about rejecting a world (and its norms and intervening background assumptions) and creating the possibility for transvaluation or a radical revolution of values. To shed light on this, McBride offers an account of Leonard Harris’s idiosyncratic philosophy born of strife and struggle, clarifying the role of Alain Locke’s critical pragmatism and the insurrectionist spirit needed to disavow the conventional norms and the intervening background (...) assumptions that lurk tacitly behind the dominant order of things. (shrink)
This article aims to investigate Alain Locke and Richard Rorty’s accounts of cultural pluralism. First, I argue that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and Locke’s critique of absolutes are similar with respect to the nature of value. I then explain their respective conceptions of culture and cultural pluralism. Finally, I argue that their fundamental differences with each other in regards to culture and cultural pluralism lie in their differing theories of value. Whereas Rorty’s nominalist understanding of value only finds the relativity and contingency (...) of culture and value, Locke’s functionalist theory of value allows for the objectivity and universality of culture and value. To make these differences explicit, I introduce a distinction between value content and value process. If my reading of Locke and Rorty’s accounts of cultural pluralism is convincing, then we can find a more robust view of tolerance in Locke’s version of cultural pluralism than in Rorty’s. -/- . (shrink)
This chapter draws questions of race into food ethics. Appropriating a conception of race articulated by Alain Locke (1885‒1954), it is suggested that racial imperialism and the attending drive to claim proprietary ownership of racialized cultural products is responsible for much of the intercultural strife and race-based injustice in the modern world. Foods and foodways, understood as cultural products, are then discussed against the backdrop of racial partisanship in the exchange and consumption of foods and cuisine. Notions of authenticity and (...) cultural appropriation are discussed in this light. It is argued that there is a place for race in the discussion of food ethics and that racial imperialism and racial partisanship in the exchange and consumption of foods should be repudiated. (shrink)
Drawing on contexts of critical theory offered by Simone de Beauvoir, Herbert Marcuse, and Angela Davis, this article argues that Alain Locke’s theory of valuation should be of interest to theorists who apprehend struggle as a process of desire. Locke’s value theory with its classification of “form-feelings” may be used to develop appreciation for value’s genealogical dependence on desire. This has consequences for theorizing the challenges faced by liberation from oppressive structures. A case study is provided from popular film.