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  1. added 2018-12-24
    Putnam and The Notion of" Reality".Celeste Cancela Silva - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):9-16.
    The main aim of this brief paper is to present in which sense both Putnam's internal realism and his natural realism are realist. In order to do that I will take into consideration the notion of "reality" that Putnam uses in his defense of his internalist perspective as well in his present natural realism. Although there exist significant differences between Putnam's two different realist stances, the notion of "reality" present in each of them remains the same. In this paper I (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-24
    Some Sources of Putnam's Pragmatism.Russell B. Goodman - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):125-140.
    This paper considers some sources, mostly within the pragmatist tradition, for the full-fledged pragmatism that Putnam set out in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in The Many Faces of Realism and Realism with a Human Face. In considering Putnam's views about metaphysics, I pay particular attention to his pluralism , which I trace back through Nelson Goodman to William James. In considering Putnam's idea that facts and values are intertwined, I discuss both John Dewey and that neglected middle-generation pragmatist, C. (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-10
    Review of The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism by Juha Saatsi (Ed.). [REVIEW]Jan Arreman - forthcoming - Philosophy in Review.
    Review of The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism by Juha Saatsi (ed.).
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  4. added 2018-08-29
    No-Miracles argumentet utan vetenskaplig realism.Richard Dawid - 2018 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 2018 (3).
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  5. added 2018-08-20
    L'empirisme modal.Quentin Ruyant - 2017 - Dissertation, Université Rennes 1
    The aim of this thesis dissertation is to propose a novel position in the debate on scientific realism, modal empiricism, and to show its fruitfulness when it comes to interpreting the cognitive content of scientific theories. Modal empiricism is an empiricist position, according to which the aim of science is to produce empirically adequate theories rather than true theories. However, it suggests adopting a broader comprehension of experience than traditional versions of empiricism, through a commitment to natural modalities. Following modal (...)
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  6. added 2018-07-29
    Resisting Scientific Realism.Brad Wray - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this book K. Brad Wray provides a comprehensive survey of the arguments against scientific realism. In addition to presenting logical considerations that undermine the realists' inferences to the likely truth or approximate truth of our theories, he provides a thorough assessment of the evidence from the history of science. He also examines grounds for a defence of anti-realism, including an anti-realist explanation for the success of our current theories, an account of why false theories can be empirically successful, and (...)
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  7. added 2018-04-03
    The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (3):1-6.
    In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own (...)
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  8. added 2018-02-23
    From Zymes to Germs: Discarding the Realist/Anti-Realist Framework.Dana Tulodziecki - 2016 - In R. Scholl & T. Sauer (eds.), The Philosophy of Historical Case-Studies. Springer. pp. 265--284.
    I argue that neither realist nor anti-realist accounts of theory-change can account for the transition from zymotic views of disease to germ views. The trouble with realism is its focus on stable and continuous elements that get retained in the transition from one theory to the next; the trouble with anti-realism is its focus on the radical discontinuity between theories and their successors. I show that neither of these approaches works for the transition from zymes to germs: there is neither (...)
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  9. added 2018-02-17
    Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2008 - Oxford University Press UK.
  10. added 2018-02-17
    Stance Relativism: Empiricism Versus Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Anjan Chakravartty - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):173-184.
    In The empirical stance, Bas van Fraassen argues for a reconceptualization of empiricism, and a rejection of its traditional rival, speculative metaphysics, as part of a larger and provocative study in epistemology. Central to his account is the notion of voluntarism in epistemology, and a concomitant understanding of the nature of rationality. In this paper I give a critical assessment of these ideas, with the ultimate goal of clarifying the nature of debate between metaphysicians and empiricists, and more specifically, between (...)
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  11. added 2017-10-24
    Critiques of Minimal Realism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Problemos 92:102-114.
    Saatsi’s minimal realism holds that science makes theoretical progress. It is designed to get around the pessimistic induction, to fall between scientific realism and instrumentalism, and to explain the success of scientific theories. I raise the following two objections to it. First, it is not clear whether minimal realism lies between realism and instrumentalism, given that minimal realism does not entail instrumentalism. Second, it is not clear whether minimal realism can explain the success of scientific theories, given that it is (...)
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  12. added 2017-07-14
    Introduction: Scientific Realism and Commonsense.Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons - 2002 - In Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense. Dordrecht: Springer.
  13. added 2017-07-12
    Nature, Knowledge, and Scientific Theories in G. C. Lichtenberg’s Reflections on Physics.Steven Tester - 2016 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (2):185-211.
    Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–99) is perhaps best known for his aphoristic writings collected in his Sudelbücher (Waste Books) and his critique of the substantial view of the self in which he argues that we should say “it thinks,” that is, “thinking is happening” rather than “I think.” However, Lichtenberg also reflects in the Waste Books and his lectures on physics on a wide range of issues in epistemology and metaphysics concerning realism and idealism that inform his thoughts on the natural (...)
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  14. added 2017-07-12
    Scientific Perspectivism: A Philosopher of Science's Response to the Challenge of Big Data Biology.Werner Callebaut - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):69-80.
    Big data biology—bioinformatics, computational biology, systems biology (including ‘omics’), and synthetic biology—raises a number of issues for the philosophy of science. This article deals with several such: Is data-intensive biology a new kind of science, presumably post-reductionistic? To what extent is big data biology data-driven? Can data ‘speak for themselves?’ I discuss these issues by way of a reflection on Carl Woese’s worry that “a society that permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows that science to slip into (...)
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  15. added 2017-07-12
    Science: Process and History.Hanne Andersen - 2004 - In Michel Weber (ed.), After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics. Ontos Verlag. pp. 1--197.
    (1) Rescher's processual account of science depicts scientific inquiry as an epitome of the processual nature of knowledge. On this view, science is not seen as a body of theories, but as a process, as an ongoing venture in inquiry whose products are ever changing. (2) Traditionally within philosophy of science, discussions of the development of science are closely connected to discussions of scientific realism. Realists assume that there exists some fixed realm of theory-independent entities, and argue that the aim (...)
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  16. added 2017-07-03
    Philosophers Against “Truth”: The Cases of Harr and Laudan.A. Paya - 1995 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (3):255 – 284.
    The criticisms levelled at the notion of truth by an anti‐realist (Larry Laudan) and an entity‐realist (Rom Harré) are critically examined. The upshot of the discussion will be that whilst neither of the two anti‐truth philosophers have succeeded in establishing their cases against truth, for entity‐realists to reject the notion of truth is to throw out the baby with the bath water: entity‐realism without the notion of correspondence truth will degenerate into anti‐realism.
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  17. added 2017-06-29
    How (Not) to Write the History of Pragmatist Philosophy of Science?Sami Pihlström - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (1):26-69.
    This survey article discusses the pragmatist tradition in twentieth century philosophy of science. Pragmatism, originating with Charles Peirce's writings on the pragmatic maxim in the 1870s, is a background both for scientific realism and, via the views of William James and John Dewey, for the relativist and/or constructivist forms of neopragmatism that have often been seen as challenging the very ideas of scientific rationality and objectivity. The paper shows how the issue of realism arises in pragmatist philosophy of science and (...)
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  18. added 2017-06-19
    Realism and Antirealism in Social Science.Mario Bunge - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (3):207-235.
    Up until recently social scientists took it for granted that their task was to account for the social world as objectively as possible: they were realists in practice if not always in their methodological sermons. This situation started to change in the 1960s, when a number of antirealist philosophies made inroads into social studies. -/- This paper examines critically the following kinds of antirealism: subjectivism, conventionalism, fictionism, social constructivism, relativism, and hermeneutics. An attempt is made to show that these philosophies (...)
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  19. added 2017-06-05
    Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate.Derek Turner - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Scientists often make surprising claims about things that no one can observe. In physics, chemistry, and molecular biology, scientists can at least experiment on those unobservable entities, but what about researchers in fields such as paleobiology and geology who study prehistory, where no such experimentation is possible? Do scientists discover facts about the distant past or do they, in some sense, make prehistory? In this book Derek Turner argues that this problem has surprising and important consequences for the scientific realism (...)
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  20. added 2017-06-03
    The Dynamical Theory of Knowledge in Duhem: A Middle Way Between the Classical Conception of Science and the Conventionalist/Pragmatist Conception.J. R. N. Chiappin - 2014 - Trans/Form/Ação 37 (2):57-90.
    O objetivo é propor uma reconstrução racional da concepção da ciência de Duhem, por meio do recurso da metodologia da teoria da ciência, como uma teoria normativa da dinâmica do conhecimento. Essa reconstrução ajuda a estabelecer que Duhem não pode ser classificado como um convencionalista/pragmatista, como sugere a interpretação-padrão, e, além disso, que Duhem almeja construir uma concepção que seja um termo médio entre a concepção metafísica clássica e a concepção do convencionalismo/pragmatismo. A estratégia metodológica para construir esse termo médio (...)
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  21. added 2017-06-03
    Scientific Realism: The New Debates.Edward MacKinnon - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (4):501-532.
    In place of earlier instrumentalist and phenomenalist interpretations of science both Quine and Sellars have developed highly influential realist positions centering around the doctrine that accepting a theory as explanatory and irreducible rationally entails accepting the entities posited by the theory. A growing reaction against this realism is partially based on perceived inadequacies in the doctrines of Quine and Sellars, but even more on reconstructions of scientific explanations which do not involve such ontic commitments. Three types of anti-realistic positions are (...)
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  22. added 2017-05-30
    Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid: Scientific Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Cord Friebe - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2):387-391.
    Scientific Metaphysics is a collection of essays in which prominent philosophers of science explore how metaphysics looks like that is judged by scientific standards. Common to all chapters is the requirement that scientific results and methods should be applied to metaphysical puzzle solving and, hence, the skepticism about philosophical reasoning that is based on the analysis of common-sense concepts and appeals to intuitions and a priori knowledge. It is, however, controversial what exactly naturalistic metaphysics might be, since at present there (...)
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  23. added 2017-05-30
    Boskovic's Unobservables.Zvonimir Čuljak - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):211 – 224.
    Boskovic treated unobservables in two different ways. During his earlier period (1741-48) the difference between observables and unobservables was a significant element of his specific semantic instrumentalism. The sentences of unobservables (such as absolute space, time and motions) were treated only as convenient tools conceived to provide for the empirical success of a theory. Later, especially in his Theory of Natural Philosophy (1763), Boskovic relativized this distinction by positing absolute properties (continuity and impenetrability), which are common to both observables and (...)
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  24. added 2017-05-08
    Analyzing the Scientific Realism Debate from the Contextualist's Point of View.Yukinori Onishi - 2011 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (2):2_65-2_81.
    The debate over scientific realism is one of the traditional topics in philosophy of science. Today there are various types of realism and anti-realism, including entity realism, (epistemic/ontic/moderate) structural realism, semirealism, eclectic realism, and constructive empiricism. However, the main point of the dispute, which is the validity of inference from observable evidence to unobservable events, seems to have been set aside in the recent debate. To improve this situation, I propose a new approach to the scientific realism issue that utilizes (...)
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  25. added 2017-05-08
    Science, Epistemological Relativism and Truth: Some Comments on Roy Bhaskar's Transcendental Realism.C. Allan - 1998 - South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):37-49.
    This paper sets out to assess the internal coherence of Roy Bhaskar's transcendental realist account of science. Whilst fully supporting his transcendental derivation of a stratified ontology of structures and generative mechanisms from the scientific practice of experimentation, I argue that Bhaskar's adoption of the stance of epistemic relativism results in his inability to defend the generalizability of this ontology. My argument against his epistemic stance turns on the fact that it rests on a false dichotomy between epistemic relativism and (...)
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  26. added 2017-02-14
    Ronald N. Giere (Ed.): Cognitive Models of Science. [REVIEW]Jeffrey E. Foss - 1993 - Philosophy in Review 13 (6):311-315.
  27. added 2017-02-01
    Defense of Epistemic Reciprocalism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Filosofija. Sociologija 28 (1):56-64.
    Scientific realists and antirealists believe that a successful scientific theory is true and merely empirically adequate, respectively. In contrast, epistemic reciprocalists believe that realists’ positive theories are true, and that antirealists’ positive theories are merely empirically adequate, treating their target agents as their target agents treat other epistemic agents. Antirealists cannot convince reciprocalists that their positive theories are true, no matter how confident they might be that they are true. In addition, reciprocalists criticize antirealists’ positive theories exactly in the way (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-02
    Natural Kinds as Scientific Models.Luiz Henrique Dutra - 2011 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 290:141-150.
    The concept of natural kind is center stage in the debates about scientific realism. Champions of scientific realism such as Richard Boyd hold that our most developed scientific theories allow us to “cut the world at its joints” (Boyd, 1981, 1984, 1991). In the long run we can disclose natural kinds as nature made them, though as science progresses improvements in theory allow us to revise the extension of natural kind terms.
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  29. added 2017-01-02
    Epistemic Groundings of Abstraction and Their Cognitive Dimension.Sergio F. Martínez & Xiang Huang - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (3):490-511.
    In the philosophy of science, abstraction has usually been analyzed in terms of the interface between our experience and the design of our concepts. The often implicit assumption here is that such interface has a definite identifiable and universalizable structure, determining the epistemic correctness of any abstraction. Our claim is that, on the contrary, the epistemic grounding of abstraction should not be reduced to the structural norms of such interface but is also related to the constraints on the cognitive processes (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-02
    Towards a Radical Constructivist Understanding of Science.Alexander Riegler - 2001 - Foundations of Science 6 (1-3):1-30.
    Constructivism is the idea that we construct our own world rather than it being determined by an outside reality. Its most consistent form, Radical Constructivism (RC), claims that we cannot transcend our experiences. Thus it doesn't make sense to say that our constructions gradually approach the structure of an external reality. The mind is necessarily an epistemological solipsist, in contrast to being an ontological solipsist who maintains that this is all there is, namely a single mind within which the only (...)
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  31. added 2017-01-02
    How Untidy is God's Mind? A Note on the Dynamical Implications of Nancy Cartwright's Metaphysics.Harmke Kamminga & Reza Tavakol - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):549-553.
    One of the points of principle made by Cartwright is that the fundamental laws do not describe reality because they are always employed together with ceteris paribus clauses, the implication being that ceteris paribus assumptions always have dire consequences. We here wish to offer a dynamical interpretation of ceteris paribus laws in terms of their stability or fragility. On this interpretation, the consequences of ceteris paribus assumptions become concretely dependent on the nature of the laws under consideration and cannot be (...)
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  32. added 2016-12-12
    To Believe in Belief.Herman C. D. G. De Regt - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):21-39.
    Take the following version of scientific realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell us something specific about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper, the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientific realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. Popper did not believe (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-08
    Dos Escepticismos Y Desafío Escéptico En the Advancement of Science, de Philip Kitcher (Two Skepticism and Skeptic Challenge in Philip Kitcher's the Advancement of Science).Pochon Daniel Attala - 1997 - Theoria 12 (2):317-335.
    En este artículo me propongo analizar el punto de partida epistemológico de un reciente libro de Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) a través de su discusión con las concepciónes ‘escépticas’. Podemos distinguir entre dos tipos de escepticismo en Ia trama deI libro de Kitcher: uno débil y otro radical. Intentamos difinir el tipo de realismo que Kitcher defiende, para finalmente mostrar que tal tipo de realismo es posible para Kitcher en Ia medida que no toma en cuenta el escepticismo (...)
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  34. added 2016-10-16
    Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem.Karen Merikangas Darling - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
    This paper addresses a central interpretive problem in understanding Pierre Duhem's philosophy of science. The problem arises because there is textual support for both realist and antirealist readings of his work. I argue that his realist and antirealist claims are different. For Duhem, scientific reasoning leads straight to antirealism. But intuition (reasons of the heart) motivates, without justifying, a kind of realism. I develop this idea to suggest a motivational realist interpretation of Duhem's philosophy.
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  35. added 2016-10-16
    Laudan's Pragmatic Alternative to Positivist and Historicist Theories of Science.Gerald Doppelt - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):253 – 271.
  36. added 2016-09-21
    Repositioning Realism.Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem - 2015 - Philosophia Scientae 19:85-98.
    Naturalised realism’ is presented as a version of realism which is more compatible with the history of science than convergent or explanationist forms of realism. The account is unpacked according to four theses: 1) Whether realism is warranted with regards to a particular theory depends on the kind and quality of evidence available for that theory; 2) Reference is about causal interaction with the world; 3) Most of science happens somewhere in between instrumentalism and scientific realism on a continuum of (...)
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  37. added 2016-06-07
    Extensional Scientific Realism Vs. Intensional Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:46-52.
    Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional (...)
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  38. added 2016-03-04
    Discarded Theories: The Role of Changing Interests.K. Brad Wray - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    I take another look at the history of science and offer some fresh insights into why the history of science is filled with discarded theories. I argue that the history of science is just as we should expect it to be, given the following two facts about science: theories are always only partial representations of the world, and almost inevitably scientists will be led to investigate phenomena that the accepted theory is not fit to account for. Together these facts suggest (...)
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  39. added 2016-02-29
    Reconstructed Empiricism.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):95-113.
    According to Bas van Fraassen, scientific realists and anti-realists disagree about whether accepting a scientific theory involves believing that the theory is true. On van Fraassen’s own anti-realist empiricist position, accepting a theory involves believing only that the theory is correct in its claims about observable aspects of the world. However, a number of philosophers have argued that acceptance and belief cannot be distinguished and thus that the debate is either confused or trivially settled in favor of the realist. In (...)
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  40. added 2015-12-28
    What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?Harald A. Wiltsche - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):105-130.
    Abstract Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary literature. While some commentators criticize Husserl for his alleged scientific anti-realism, others argue that Husserl's position is much more realist than the first impression indicates. It is against this background that I want to argue for the following theses: a) The basic outlook of Husserl's (...)
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  41. added 2015-12-28
    Is Realism Dead?Ronald N. Giere - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):287-304.
    I appreciate Norton Wise’s comparison of my project in Explaining Science (1988) with that of Enlightenment scientists and philosophers. When rejecting one’s immediate philosophical predecessors, it is comforting to be able to portray oneself not as a heretic who has abandoned philosophy, but as a reformer who would return philosophy to the correct path from which his predecessors had strayed. -/- But we cannot simply return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. Some doctrines that were fundamental to the Enlightenment picture (...)
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  42. added 2015-07-10
    Accepting Our Best Scientific Theories.Seungbae Park - 2015 - Filosofija. Sociologija 26 (3):218-227.
    Dawes (2013) claims that we ought not to believe but to accept our best scientific theories. To accept them means to employ them as premises in our reasoning with the goal of attaining knowledge about unobservables. I reply that if we do not believe our best scientific theories, we cannot gain knowledge about unobservables, our opponents might dismiss the predictions derived from them, and we cannot use them to explain phenomena. We commit an unethical speech act when we explain a (...)
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  43. added 2015-06-02
    Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense.Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.) - 2002 - Dordrecht: Springer.
  44. added 2015-06-02
    Hermeneutical Realism and Scientific Observation.Patrick A. Heelan - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:77 - 87.
    Using the methods of hermeneutic phenomenology, and against the background of the principle that the real is what is or can be given in a public way in perception as a state of the World, and of the thesis established elsewhere that acts of perception are always epistemic, contextual, and hermeneutical, the writer proposes that objects of scientific observation are perceptual objects, states of the World described by theoretical scientific terms and, therefore, real. This thesis of Hermeneutical Realism is proved (...)
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  45. added 2015-05-28
    Explanatory Failures of Relative Realism.Seungbae Park - 2015 - Epistemologia 38 (1):16-28.
    Scientific realism (Putnam 1975; Psillos 1999) and relative realism (Mizrahi 2013) claim that successful scientific theories are approximately true and comparatively true, respectively. A theory is approximately true if and only if it is close to the truth. A theory is comparatively true if and only if it is closer to the truth than its competitors are. I argue that relative realism is more skeptical about the claims of science than it initially appears to be and that it can explain (...)
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  46. added 2015-05-25
    Realism Versus Surrealism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Foundations of Science 21 (4):603-614.
    Realism and surrealism claim, respectively, that a scientific theory is successful because it is true, and because the world operates as if it is true. Lyons :891–901, 2003) criticizes realism and argues that surrealism is superior to realism. I reply that Lyons’s criticisms against realism fail. I also attempt to establish the following two claims: Realism and surrealism lead to a useful prescription and a useless prescription, respectively, on how to make an unsuccessful theory successful. Realism and surrealism give the (...)
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  47. added 2015-04-06
    Representing and Measuring: Discussing van Fraassen’s Views.Michel Ghins - 2015 - Metascience 24 (1):31-35.
    Representation and models have been the focus of considerable interest in philosophy of science for several decades. But the publication in 2008 of Bas van Fraassen’s important book Scientific representation: Paradoxes of perspective gave a novel and strong impetus to the study of their role in the dynamic of scientific knowledge, as attested by the growing quantity of papers and conferences related to representation. In science, knowing necessarily involves representing—phenomena at least and perhaps more for the scientific realist—by means of (...)
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  48. added 2015-04-06
    What is a Philosophical Stance? Paradigms, Policies and Perspectives.Sandy C. Boucher - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2315-2332.
    Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In (...)
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  49. added 2015-04-06
    Empiricism and/or Instrumentalism?Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Gordon Brittan & Ken A. Aho - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S5):1019-1041.
    Elliott Sober is both an empiricist and an instrumentalist. His empiricism rests on a principle called actualism, whereas his instrumentalism violates this. This violation generates a tension in his work. We argue that Sober is committed to a conflicting methodological imperative because of this tension. Our argument illuminates the contemporary debate between realism and empiricism which is increasingly focused on the application of scientific inference to testing scientific theories. Sober’s position illustrates how the principle of actualism drives a wedge between (...)
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  50. added 2015-04-06
    An Empirical Critique of Empiricism.Richard De Brasi & Joseph R. Laracy - 2013 - Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 16 (4):124-163.
    [A] thorough definition of empiricism is no simple task. In this article, we will instead attempt an overarching exposition of two overlapping but divergent paradigms of empiricism: (a) strict empiricism, representing most of the British empiricists and ancient skeptics and (b) mitigated, or metaphysical,1 empiricism represented by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Sense experience is the unifying departure point for both, but while (b) says that human knowledge begins with sense experience, (a) tends to ultimately reduce knowledge to sense experience. (...)
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