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  1. Science, Epistemological Relativism and Truth: Some Comments on Roy Bhaskar's Transcendental Realism.C. Allan - 1998 - South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):37-49.
    This paper sets out to assess the internal coherence of Roy Bhaskar's transcendental realist account of science. Whilst fully supporting his transcendental derivation of a stratified ontology of structures and generative mechanisms from the scientific practice of experimentation, I argue that Bhaskar's adoption of the stance of epistemic relativism results in his inability to defend the generalizability of this ontology. My argument against his epistemic stance turns on the fact that it rests on a false dichotomy between epistemic relativism and (...)
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  2. Ferré, Frederick. Being and Value: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Metaphysics. [REVIEW]George Allan - 1997 - Review of Metaphysics 50 (3):656-658.
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  3. Science: Process and History.Hanne Andersen - 2004 - In Michel Weber (ed.), After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics. Ontos Verlag. pp. 1--197.
    (1) Rescher's processual account of science depicts scientific inquiry as an epitome of the processual nature of knowledge. On this view, science is not seen as a body of theories, but as a process, as an ongoing venture in inquiry whose products are ever changing. (2) Traditionally within philosophy of science, discussions of the development of science are closely connected to discussions of scientific realism. Realists assume that there exists some fixed realm of theory-independent entities, and argue that the aim (...)
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  4. A Modest Defense of Manifestationalism.Jamin Asay & S. Seth Bordner - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):147-161.
    As the debate between realists and empiricists in the philosophy of science drags on, one point of consensus has emerged: no one wants to be a manifestationalist. The manifestationalist is a kind of radical empiricist who argues that science provides theories that aim neither at a true picture of the entire world, nor even an empirically adequate picture that captures the world in all its observable respects. For manifestationalists, science aims only at providing theories that are true to the observed (...)
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  5. Continental and Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science.Babette E. Babich, Debra B. Bergoffen & Simon Glynn (eds.) - 1995 - Avebury.
  6. The Empiricist Position.A. Bain - 1889 - Mind 14 (55):369-392.
  7. Empiricism and/or Instrumentalism?Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Gordon Brittan & Ken A. Aho - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S5):1019-1041.
    Elliott Sober is both an empiricist and an instrumentalist. His empiricism rests on a principle called actualism, whereas his instrumentalism violates this. This violation generates a tension in his work. We argue that Sober is committed to a conflicting methodological imperative because of this tension. Our argument illuminates the contemporary debate between realism and empiricism which is increasingly focused on the application of scientific inference to testing scientific theories. Sober’s position illustrates how the principle of actualism drives a wedge between (...)
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  8. An Empiricist Criterion of Meaning.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):95-108.
    The meaning of scientific propositions is not always expressible in terms of observable phenomena. Such propositions involve generalizations, and also terms that are theoretical constructs. I study here how to assess the meaning of scientific propositions, that is, the specific import of theoretical terms. Empiricists have expressed a concern that scientific propositions, and theoretical terms, should always be, to some degree, related to observable consequences. We can see that the former empiricist criterion of meaning only implies for theoretical terms not (...)
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  9. Anti-Realism and Aesthetic Cognition.Ruben Berrios - unknown
    Ruben Berrios Queen’s University Belfast Anti-realism and Aesthetic Cognition Abstract At the core of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is the question of the relation between scientific theory and the world. The realist possesses a mimetic conception of the relation between theory and reality. For the realist, scientific theories represent reality. The anti-realist, in contrast, seeks to understand the relations between theory and world in non-mimetic terms. We will examine Cartwright’s simulacrum account of explanation in order to illuminate (...)
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  10. What is a Philosophical Stance? Paradigms, Policies and Perspectives.Sandy C. Boucher - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2315-2332.
    Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In (...)
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  11. Models and Perspectives on Stage: Remarks on Giere's Scientific Perspectivism.Matthew J. Brown - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):213-220.
    Ron Giere's recent book Scientific Perspectivism sets out an account of science that attempts to forge a via media between two popular extremes: absolutist, objectivist realism on the one hand, and social constructivism or skeptical anti-realism on the other. The key for Giere is to treat both scientific observation and scientific theories as perspectives, which are limited, partial, contingent, context-, agent- and purpose-dependent, and pluralism-friendly, while nonetheless world-oriented and modestly realist. Giere's perspectivism bears significant similarly to early writings by Paul (...)
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  12. Realism and Antirealism in Social Science.Mario Bunge - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (3):207-235.
    Up until recently social scientists took it for granted that their task was to account for the social world as objectively as possible: they were realists in practice if not always in their methodological sermons. This situation started to change in the 1960s, when a number of antirealist philosophies made inroads into social studies. -/- This paper examines critically the following kinds of antirealism: subjectivism, conventionalism, fictionism, social constructivism, relativism, and hermeneutics. An attempt is made to show that these philosophies (...)
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  13. Scientific Perspectivism: A Philosopher of Science's Response to the Challenge of Big Data Biology.Werner Callebaut - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):69-80.
    Big data biology—bioinformatics, computational biology, systems biology (including ‘omics’), and synthetic biology—raises a number of issues for the philosophy of science. This article deals with several such: Is data-intensive biology a new kind of science, presumably post-reductionistic? To what extent is big data biology data-driven? Can data ‘speak for themselves?’ I discuss these issues by way of a reflection on Carl Woese’s worry that “a society that permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows that science to slip into (...)
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  14. Essay Review:Scientific Pluralism* Stephen H. Kellert , Helen E. Longino , and C. Kenneth Waters , Eds., Scientific Pluralism . Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 19. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (2006), Xxix+248 Pp., $50.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Jordi Cat - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (2):317-325.
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  15. Stance Relativism: Empiricism Versus Metaphysics.Anjan Chakravartty - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):173-184.
    In The empirical stance, Bas van Fraassen argues for a reconceptualization of empiricism, and a rejection of its traditional rival, speculative metaphysics, as part of a larger and provocative study in epistemology. Central to his account is the notion of voluntarism in epistemology, and a concomitant understanding of the nature of rationality. In this paper I give a critical assessment of these ideas, with the ultimate goal of clarifying the nature of debate between metaphysicians and empiricists, and more specifically, between (...)
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  16. The Dynamical Theory of Knowledge in Duhem: A Middle Way Between the Classical Conception of Science and the Conventionalist/Pragmatist Conception.J. R. N. Chiappin - 2014 - Trans/Form/Ação 37 (2):57-90.
    O objetivo é propor uma reconstrução racional da concepção da ciência de Duhem, por meio do recurso da metodologia da teoria da ciência, como uma teoria normativa da dinâmica do conhecimento. Essa reconstrução ajuda a estabelecer que Duhem não pode ser classificado como um convencionalista/pragmatista, como sugere a interpretação-padrão, e, além disso, que Duhem almeja construir uma concepção que seja um termo médio entre a concepção metafísica clássica e a concepção do convencionalismo/pragmatismo. A estratégia metodológica para construir esse termo médio (...)
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  17. Introduction: Scientific Realism and Commonsense.Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons - 2002 - In Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense. Dordrecht: Springer.
  18. Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense.Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.) - 2002 - Dordrecht: Springer.
  19. Empiricist Structuralism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Bridging Problem.Gabriele Contessa - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):514-524.
    [This paper is part of a book symposium on Bas van Fraassen's Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (OUP, 2010)].
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  20. Review of Bas C. Van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective[REVIEW]Gabriele Contessa - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
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  21. How Natural Can Ontology Be?Sharon L. Crasnow - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.
    Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of "natural" in NOA is "nonphilosophical," but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical (...)
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  22. Taking Theories Seriously.Richard Creath - 1985 - Synthese 62 (3):317 - 345.
    This paper defends scientific realism, the doctrine that we should interpret theories as being just as ontologically committing as beliefs at the observational level. I examine the character of observation to show that the difference in interpretation suggested by anti-realists is unwarranted. Second, I discuss Wilfrid Sellars'' approach to the issue. Finally, I provide a detailed study of recent work by Bas van Fraassen. While van Fraassen''s work is the focus of the paper, the conclusions are far broader: That a (...)
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  23. Boskovic's Unobservables.Zvonimir Čuljak - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):211 – 224.
    Boskovic treated unobservables in two different ways. During his earlier period (1741-48) the difference between observables and unobservables was a significant element of his specific semantic instrumentalism. The sentences of unobservables (such as absolute space, time and motions) were treated only as convenient tools conceived to provide for the empirical success of a theory. Later, especially in his Theory of Natural Philosophy (1763), Boskovic relativized this distinction by positing absolute properties (continuity and impenetrability), which are common to both observables and (...)
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  24. Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem.Karen Merikangas Darling - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
    This paper addresses a central interpretive problem in understanding Pierre Duhem's philosophy of science. The problem arises because there is textual support for both realist and antirealist readings of his work. I argue that his realist and antirealist claims are different. For Duhem, scientific reasoning leads straight to antirealism. But intuition (reasons of the heart) motivates, without justifying, a kind of realism. I develop this idea to suggest a motivational realist interpretation of Duhem's philosophy.
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  25. An Empirical Critique of Empiricism.Richard De Brasi & Joseph R. Laracy - 2013 - Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 16 (4):124-163.
    [A] thorough definition of empiricism is no simple task. In this article, we will instead attempt an overarching exposition of two overlapping but divergent paradigms of empiricism: (a) strict empiricism, representing most of the British empiricists and ancient skeptics and (b) mitigated, or metaphysical,1 empiricism represented by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Sense experience is the unifying departure point for both, but while (b) says that human knowledge begins with sense experience, (a) tends to ultimately reduce knowledge to sense experience. (...)
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  26. Basic Propositions, Empiricism and Science.C. F. Delaney - 1978 - In Joseph Pitt (ed.), The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions. D. Reidel. pp. 41--55.
    In this paper I would like to explore Sellars' answers to these general epistemological questions in order to get clear about the sense in which he can be said to be in the empiricist tradition broadly construed and to ascertain what resources he has available to demarcate science from other (rationally acceptable or unacceptable) forms of inquiry. My contention will be that to the degree that one moves away from the notion of basic empirical proposition in the strong sense it (...)
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  27. Reconstructed Empiricism.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):95-113.
    According to Bas van Fraassen, scientific realists and anti-realists disagree about whether accepting a scientific theory involves believing that the theory is true. On van Fraassen’s own anti-realist empiricist position, accepting a theory involves believing only that the theory is correct in its claims about observable aspects of the world. However, a number of philosophers have argued that acceptance and belief cannot be distinguished and thus that the debate is either confused or trivially settled in favor of the realist. In (...)
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  28. Laudan's Pragmatic Alternative to Positivist and Historicist Theories of Science.Gerald Doppelt - 1981 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):253 – 271.
  29. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - 1954 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    This classic work in the philosophy of physical science is an incisive and readable account of the scientific method. Pierre Duhem was one of the great figures in French science, a devoted teacher, and a distinguished scholar of the history and philosophy of science. This book represents his most mature thought on a wide range of topics.
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  30. Keeping Things in Perspective. [REVIEW]Catherine Z. Elgin - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):439 - 447.
    Scientific realism holds that scientific representations are utterly objective. They describe the way the world is, independent of any point of view. In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen argues otherwise. If science is to afford an understanding of nature, it must be grounded in evidence. Since evidence is perspectivai, science cannot vindicate its claims using only utterly objective representations. For science to do its epistemic job, it must involve perspectivai representations. I explicate this argument and show its power.
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  31. P. Kyle Stanford Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Patrick Enfield - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):881-895.
  32. Critique of Intuition According to Scientific Empiricism.Herbert Feigl - 1958 - Philosophy East and West 8 (1/2):1-16.
  33. Realism, Rationalism, and Scientific Method.Paul Feyerabend - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
    Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume (...)
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  34. REVIEW: Bas van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. [REVIEW]Curtis Forbes - 2009 - Spontaneous Generations 3 (1):236-238.
  35. Ronald N. Giere (Ed.): Cognitive Models of Science. [REVIEW]Jeffrey E. Foss - 1993 - Philosophy in Review 13 (6):311-315.
  36. Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid: Scientific Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Cord Friebe - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2):387-391.
    Scientific Metaphysics is a collection of essays in which prominent philosophers of science explore how metaphysics looks like that is judged by scientific standards. Common to all chapters is the requirement that scientific results and methods should be applied to metaphysical puzzle solving and, hence, the skepticism about philosophical reasoning that is based on the analysis of common-sense concepts and appeals to intuitions and a priori knowledge. It is, however, controversial what exactly naturalistic metaphysics might be, since at present there (...)
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  37. Putting the 'Empiricism' in 'Logical Empiricism': The Director's Cut. [REVIEW]Greg Frost-Arnold - 2011 - Metascience 20 (2):373-376.
    Putting the ‘empiricism’ in ‘logical empiricism’: the director’s cut Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9444-x Authors Greg Frost-Arnold, Department of Philosophy, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY 14456, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  38. Bas van Fraassen's Scientific Representation.Carlo Gabbani & Marc Lange - 2010 - Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 2 (3):245-256.
  39. Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective di Bas van Fraassen. [REVIEW]Carlo Gabbani & Marc Lange - 2009 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 22 (3):707-720.
  40. Fraassen, B. C. van: Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. [REVIEW]Lucia Galovičová - 2011 - Filozofia 66:386-390.
  41. Representing and Measuring: Discussing van Fraassen’s Views.Michel Ghins - 2015 - Metascience 24 (1):31-35.
    Representation and models have been the focus of considerable interest in philosophy of science for several decades. But the publication in 2008 of Bas van Fraassen’s important book Scientific representation: Paradoxes of perspective gave a novel and strong impetus to the study of their role in the dynamic of scientific knowledge, as attested by the growing quantity of papers and conferences related to representation. In science, knowing necessarily involves representing—phenomena at least and perhaps more for the scientific realist—by means of (...)
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  42. Models, Truth and Realism: Assessing Bas van Fraassen's Views on Scientific Representation.Michel Ghins - 2011 - Manuscrito 34 (1):207-232.
    This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen’s views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called “semantic” or “model-theoretic” construal of theories does not give proper due to the (...)
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  43. Perspectival Pluralism.Ronald Giere - 2006 - In ¸ Itekellersetal:Sp. pp. 26--41.
    In this paper I explore the extent to which a perspectival understanding of scientific knowledge supports forms of “scientific pluralism.” I will not initially attempt to formulate a general characterization of either perspectivism or scientific pluralism. I assume only that both are opposed to two extreme views. The one extreme is a (monistic) metaphysical realism according to which there is in principle one true and complete theory of everything. The other extreme is a constructivist relativism according to which scientific claims (...)
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  44. Bas C. Van Fraassen: Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective,. [REVIEW]Ronald N. Giere - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1).
  45. Scientific Perspectivism.Ronald N. Giere - 2006 - University of Chicago Press.
    Many people assume that the claims of scientists are objective truths. But historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have long argued that scientific claims reflect the particular historical, cultural, and social context in which those claims were made. The nature of scientific knowledge is not absolute because it is influenced by the practice and perspective of human agents. Scientific Perspectivism argues that the acts of observing and theorizing are both perspectival, and this nature makes scientific knowledge contingent, as Thomas Kuhn (...)
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  46. Is Realism Dead?Ronald N. Giere - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):287-304.
    I appreciate Norton Wise’s comparison of my project in Explaining Science (1988) with that of Enlightenment scientists and philosophers. When rejecting one’s immediate philosophical predecessors, it is comforting to be able to portray oneself not as a heretic who has abandoned philosophy, but as a reformer who would return philosophy to the correct path from which his predecessors had strayed. -/- But we cannot simply return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. Some doctrines that were fundamental to the Enlightenment picture (...)
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  47. Theories: An Examination of the Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science.Clark Noren Glymour - 1969 - Dissertation, Indiana University
  48. Empiricism and Necessary Truth.Fred Ivan Goldberg - 1969 - Dissertation, Brandeis University
  49. Reduction and elimination in philosophy and the sciences : papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium.Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.) - 2008 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  50. Hermeneutical Realism and Scientific Observation.Patrick A. Heelan - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:77 - 87.
    Using the methods of hermeneutic phenomenology, and against the background of the principle that the real is what is or can be given in a public way in perception as a state of the World, and of the thesis established elsewhere that acts of perception are always epistemic, contextual, and hermeneutical, the writer proposes that objects of scientific observation are perceptual objects, states of the World described by theoretical scientific terms and, therefore, real. This thesis of Hermeneutical Realism is proved (...)
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