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Constructive Empiricism
  1. What is Religious Empiricism?Babak Abbasi - 2011 - Philosophical Investigations 7 (19):59-86.
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  2. Scienza E Senso Comune.Luciano Albanese, Eugenio De Pisi & Mauro Fraioli (eds.) - 1987 - Rome: Bulzoni.
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  3. Desgabets: Rationalist or Cartesian Empiricist?Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2008 - In Jon Miller (ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind (Springer).
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  4. Constructive Empiricism Revisited.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2012 - Metascience 21 (1):187-191.
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  5. Constructive Empiricism and Epistemic Modesty: Response to van Fraassen and Monton. [REVIEW]Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):371-379.
    Bas van Fraassen claims that constructive empiricism strikes a balance between the empiricist’s commitments to epistemic modesty – that one’s opinion should extend no further beyond the deliverances of experience than is necessary – and to the rationality of science. In “Should the Empiricist be a Constructive Empiricist?” I argued that if the constructive empiricist follows through on her commitment to epistemic modesty she will find herself adopting a much more extreme position than van Fraassen suggests. Van Fraassen and Bradley (...)
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  6. Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience. [REVIEW]Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2004 - Synthese 140 (3):331-353.
    Van Fraassen maintains that the information that we canglean from experience is limited to those entities and processes that are detectable bymeans of our unaided senses. His challenge to the realist, I suggest, is that the attemptto inferentially transcend those limits amounts to a reversion to rationalism. Under pressurefrom such examples as microscopic observation, he has recently widened the scope of thephenomena to include object-like experiences without empirical objects of experience.With this change in mind, I argue that van Fraassen needs (...)
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  7. The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307 - 322.
  8. Should the Empiricist Be a Constructive Empiricist?Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (4):413-431.
    Van Fraassen does not argue that everyone should be a constructive empiricist. He claims only that constructive empiricism (CE) is a coherent post-positivist alternative to realism, notwithstanding the realist's charge that CE is arbitrary and irrational. He does argue, however, that the empiricist is obliged to limit belief as CE prescribes. Criticism of CE has been largely directed at van Fraassen's claim that CE is a coherent option. Far less attention has been directed at his claim that empiricists should be (...)
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  9. Naive Empiricism and the Treatment of Evidence: Epistemological Conflict in Grounded Theory.D. Ambrose - unknown
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  10. Reply to Van Fraassen.D. M. Armstrong - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):224 – 229.
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  11. Discussion: Reply to Van Fraassen.David M. Armstrong - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:224-229.
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  12. Metaphysics and British Empiricism.Robert L. Armstrong - 1970 - Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press.
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  13. Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth.Jamin Asay - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (4):423-443.
    Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth (...)
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  14. Truth in Constructive Empiricism.Jamin Asay - 2007 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    Constructive empiricism, the scientific anti-realism championed by Bas van Fraassen, claims to offer an adequate reconstruction of the aim and practice of scientific inquiry without adopting the inflationary metaphysical excesses of scientific realism. In articulating the positions of the realist and the empiricist, van Fraassen freely makes use of the concept of truth. Theories of truth come in a variety of flavors, some more metaphysically stark than others. Deflationary theories of truth, for instance, boast of the ability to offer a (...)
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  15. A Modest Defense of Manifestationalism.Jamin Asay & S. Seth Bordner - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):147-161.
    As the debate between realists and empiricists in the philosophy of science drags on, one point of consensus has emerged: no one wants to be a manifestationalist. The manifestationalist is a kind of radical empiricist who argues that science provides theories that aim neither at a true picture of the entire world, nor even an empirically adequate picture that captures the world in all its observable respects. For manifestationalists, science aims only at providing theories that are true to the observed (...)
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  16. The Paradox of Empiricism.Bruce Aune - 1970 - Metaphilosophy 1 (2):128–138.
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  17. Can There Be a New Empiricism?Michael Ayers - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 7:111-127.
    ‘Empiricism’ has become for many a dirty word, and many writers have in mind the kind of neo-Humean Positivism that is the target of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, or Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie de la perception. But examination of the Empiricist tradition before Hume uncovers views that do not involve anything like the much-abused “Myth of the Given” or twentieth-century sensedatum theory. This paper identifiesthe particular line of seventeenth-century thought that eventually gave rise to sense-datum theory, and (...)
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  18. The Empiricist Strikes Back.Michael Ayers - 1999 - The Philosophers' Magazine 5 (5):54-55.
  19. The Scientific Image. [REVIEW]R. J. B. - 1982 - Review of Metaphysics 35 (3):636-638.
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  20. The Empiricist Position.A. Bain - 1889 - Mind 14 (55):369-392.
  21. An Architectonic for Science the Structuralist Program.Wolfgang Balzer, Carles Ulises Moulines & Joseph D. Sneed - 1987
  22. On an Inconsistency in Constructive Empiricism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (3):511-514.
    I show that van Fraassen's empiricism leads to mutually incompatible claims with regard to empirical theories. He is committed to the claim that reasons for accepting a theory and believing it are always identical, insofar as the theory in question is an empirical theory. He also makes a general claim that reasons for accepting a theory are not always reasons for believing it irrespective of whether the theory is an empirical theory.
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  23. Constructive Empiricism: From a Theory of Empirical Adequacy to a Theory of Acceptance.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 1995 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    I begin chapter I by discussing two key distinctions that constitute the core of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism: a distinction between observables and unobservables and a distinction between acceptance and belief with regard to a theory. To support constructive empiricism, van Fraassen also deploys two epistemological principles: only actual observations are to be taken as evidence and possible evidence is all that can be rationally inferred from the actual evidence. I reject both principle and van Fraassen's construal of observation. As (...)
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  24. Review of Bas C. Van Fraassen: Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective[REVIEW]Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11).
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  25. Counting Marbles: Reply to Clifton and Monton.Angelo Bassi & GianCarlo Ghirardi - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):125-130.
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  26. Empiricism and the Myth of Fundamental Measurement.Vadim Batitsky - 1998 - Synthese 116 (1):51 - 73.
  27. Empiricism, Stances, and the Problem of Voluntarism.Peter Baumann - 2010 - Synthese 178 (1):27-36.
    Classical empiricism leads to notorious problems having to do with the (at least prima facie) lack of an acceptable empiricist justification of empiricism itself. Bas van Fraassen claims that his idea of the “empirical stance” can deal with such problems. I argue, however, that this view entails a very problematic form of voluntarism which comes with the threat of latent irrationality and normative inadequacy. However, there is also a certain element of truth in such a voluntarism. The main difficulty consists (...)
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  28. An Empiricist Criterion of Meaning.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):95-108.
    The meaning of scientific propositions is not always expressible in terms of observable phenomena. Such propositions involve generalizations, and also terms that are theoretical constructs. I study here how to assess the meaning of scientific propositions, that is, the specific import of theoretical terms. Empiricists have expressed a concern that scientific propositions, and theoretical terms, should always be, to some degree, related to observable consequences. We can see that the former empiricist criterion of meaning only implies for theoretical terms not (...)
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  29. Types of Empiricism.A. Cornelius Benjamin - 1942 - Philosophical Review 51 (5):497-502.
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  30. Empiricism About Meanings.Jonathan Bennett - 2002 - In Peter Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry. Clarendon Press.
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  31. Two Cornerstones of Empiricism.Gustav Bergmann - 1949 - Synthese 8 (1):435 - 452.
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  32. Can an Empiricist Talk About The World?C. Bhattacharya - 1982 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):265.
    It is often held that an empiricist because of the peculiarity of his initial beliefs cannot significantly talk about the world. However, the question whether an empiricist can significantly talk about the world is not a closed chapter. This question can be most interestingly discussed with reference to the Indian philosophers who are said to be rigorously committed to empiricism (in its modern terminology) and yet to have propounded certain philosophical conclusions about the world. I specially have in mind Nyaya-Vaisesika's (...)
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  33. On Constructive Legal Science Then and Now.Uta Bindreiter - 2011 - Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 97 (1):78-106.
    The article purports, firstly, to shed some light on the meaning of the verb “to construct”, used by the German jurists Gerber and Jhering in connection with their juristic technique; and, secondly, to establish whether or not three more modern types of jurisprudence, suggested by Swedish legal scholars, can legitimately be called constructive. Not intending to criticize the theories which these suggestions are based upon, the author contents herself with focussing on the verb “to construct” and its derivatives and on (...)
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  34. A-Priorism and Empiricism.John J. Birch - 1924 - The Monist 34 (1):131-149.
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  35. Underdetermination and Evidence.Alexander Bird - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.
    I present an argument that encapsulates the view that theory is underdetermined by evidence. I show that if we accept Williamson's equation of evidence and knowledge, then this argument is question-begging. I examine ways of defenders of underdetermination may avoid this criticism. I also relate this argument and my critique to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism.
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  36. Kuhn, Nominalism, and Empiricism.Alexander Bird - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):690-719.
    In this paper I draw a connection between Kuhn and the empiricist legacy, specifically between his thesis of incommensurability, in particular in its later taxonomic form, and van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. I show that if it is the case the empirically equivalent but genuinely distinct theories do exist, then we can expect such theories to be taxonomically incommensurable. I link this to Hacking's claim that Kuhn was a nominalist. I also argue that Kuhn and van Fraassen do not differ as (...)
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  37. Materialism, Stances, and Open-Mindedness.Michel Bitbol - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.
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  38. 'Saving the Phenomena' and Saving the Phenomena.Jim Bogen - 2011 - Synthese 182 (1):7-22.
    Empiricists claim that in accepting a scientific theory one should not commit oneself to claims about things that are not observable in the sense of registering on human perceptual systems (according to Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism) or experimental equipment (according to what I call liberal empiricism ). They also claim scientific theories should be accepted or rejected on the basis of how well they save the phenomena in the sense delivering unified descriptions of natural regularities among things that meet their (...)
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  39. What is a Philosophical Stance? Paradigms, Policies and Perspectives.Sandy C. Boucher - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2315-2332.
    Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In (...)
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  40. On Rejecting Foss's Image of Van Fraassen.Warren Bourgeois - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (2):303-308.
    Foss's critique of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is shown to be completely wide of the mark (Foss 1984, van Fraassen 1980). Foss misunderstands van Fraassen's use of the terms 'observable', 'phenomena', 'empirical adequacy', and 'epistemic community'. He misconstrues constructive empiricism as making knowledge, and perhaps existence, dependent on the observer. On the basis of this error, he attempts to reduce constructive empiricism to skepticism. None of his criticisms are to the point.
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  41. Lex Orandi Ast Lex Credendi.Richard N. Boyd - 1985 - In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. University of Chicago Press.
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  42. The Critique of Equilibrium Theory in Economic Methodology: A Constructive Empiricist Perspective.Thomas A. Boylan & Pascal F. O'Gorman - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (2):131 – 142.
    Abstract Kaldor, one of the leading figures of the post?war ?Cambridge School?, has produced a large volume of methodological writings since the mid?1960s, which we will argue represents one of the major critiques of orthodox equilibrium economic theory produced this century. While Kaldor's position represents a fundamental and radical rejection of the methodological basis of equilibrium economics, he did not provide a systematically formulated alternative methodology for economics. Recent attempts at providing such a reconstruction has argued that scientific realism provides (...)
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  43. Constructive Truth in Practice.Douglas Bridges - 1998 - In H. G. Dales & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), Truth in Mathematics. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 53--69.
    In this chapter, which has evolved over the last ten years to what I hope will be its perfect Platonic form, I shall first discuss those features of constructive mathematics that distinguish it from its traditional, or classical, counterpart, and then illustrate the practice of that distinction in aspects of complex analysis whose classical treatment ought to be familiar to a beginning graduate student of pure mathematics.
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  44. Apartness, Topology, and Uniformity: A Constructive View.Douglas Bridges, Peter Schuste & Luminiţa Vîţă - 2002 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 48 (4):16-28.
    The theory of apartness spaces, and their relation to topological spaces (in the point–set case) and uniform spaces (in the set–set case), is sketched. New notions of local decomposability and regularity are investigated, and the latter is used to produce an example of a classically metrisable apartness on R that cannot be induced constructively by a uniform structure.
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  45. The Pragmatics of Empirical Adequacy.Bryson Brown - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):242 – 264.
    Empirical adequacy is a central notion in van Fraassen's empiricist view of science. I argue that van Fraassen's account of empirical adequacy in terms of a partial isomorphism between certain structures in some model(s) of the theory and certain actual structures (the observables) in the world, is untenable. The empirical adequacy of a theory can only be tested in the context of an accepted practice of observation. But because the theory itself does not determine the correct practice of observation, its (...)
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  46. Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism.F. A. I. Buekens & F. A. Muller - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):91-100.
    By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.
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  47. Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach.O. Bueno - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):585-610.
    Based on da Costa's and French's notions of partial structures and pragmatic truth, this paper examines two possible characterizations of the concept of empirical adequacy, one depending on the notion of partial isomorphism, the other on the hierarchy of partial models of phenomena, and both compatible with an empiricist view. These formulations can then be employed to illuminate certain aspects of scientific practice.
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  48. Scientific Representation and Nominalism: An Empiricist View.Otávio Bueno - 2008 - Principia 12 (2):177-192.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n2p177 Can a constructive empiricist make sense of scientific representation? Usually, a scientific model is an abstract entity (e.g., formulated in set theory), and scientific representation is conceptualized as an intentional relation between scientific models and certain aspects of the world. On this conception, since both the models and the representation relation are abstract, a constructive empiricist, who is not committed to the existence of abstract entities, would be unable to invoke these notions to make sense of scientific representation. In (...)
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  49. Scientific Representation and Nominalism: An Empiricist View.Otávio Bueno - 2008 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (2).
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  50. Empiricism, Conservativeness, and Quasi-Truth.Otávio Bueno - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):485.
    A first step is taken towards articulating a constructive empiricist philosophy of mathematics, thus extending van Fraassen's account to this domain. In order to do so, I adapt Field's nominalization program, making it compatible with an empiricist stance. Two changes are introduced: (a) Instead of taking conservativeness as the norm of mathematics, the empiricist countenances the weaker notion of quasi-truth (as formulated by da Costa and French), from which the formal properties of conservativeness are derived; (b) Instead of quantifying over (...)
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