Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy: Rhetoric

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Although Gaius Julius Victor has attracted scholarly attention due to his inclusion of letter-writing in his fourth-century rhetorical manual, his peculiar notion of sermocinatio or “impersonation” has gone largely unnoticed. Set against the backdrop of earlier accounts of sermocinatio as a technique of the grand style—including accounts in Quintilian and Cicero—Julius Victor presents impersonation as a method of subtle eloquence most germane to plain-style rubrics. Given Julius Victor’s coupling of sermocinatio and letter-writing, too, his manual suggests that the ascending importance (...) of writing tracks this stylistic reorientation, anticipating our own era’s evolving media and techniques for impersonating others. (shrink)

Cicero’s first speeches as consul, de lege agraria I and II, delivered to the senate and the people respectively, are virtually identical in outline and broad argument. That allows the rhetorical technique of individual sections to be compared closely. This article uses such comparisons to probe the tactics and ideology of the speeches. In both Cicero’s choice of word and phrase might suggest that he is simply addressing his audiences as suits their stations. But a consideration of the circumstances of (...) the speeches reveals instead that Cicero is directing his audiences to alternate ways of imagining their social and political positions; in effect, Cicero propounds distinct, principled, and communalist definitions of dignitas and libertas, core values of each audience – though sometimes at the price of distorting the intent of the bill. (shrink)

The question of Plutarch’s attitude towards rhetoric has occupied several scholars since the 19th century. The traditional view is that it is rather negative. Although Plutarch acknowledges some value in rhetoric as a means of persuasion in politics, he nevertheless attributes the dominant role to ethos. As it will be shown below, however, this picture is only partially justified after a closer examination of the relevant texts in their historical-cultural context. In the present study, Plutarch’s remarks on rhetoric are considered (...) against the background of the traditional conflict between rhetoric and philosophy, and analyzed in relation to three thematically significant oppositions, namely that between teaching and persuading, between speech and ethos, and between the philosophers and the sophists. The result is that the secondary, supporting role that rhetoric assumes in certain passages as a means of persuasion is to be relativized rather than emphasized. It can be explained in each case on the basis of its argumentative function. In other cases in Plutarch’s work, where rhetoric is discussed without the usual opposition between speech and ethos playing a role at the same time the attitude expressed is in principle positive. (shrink)

Attic orators skillfully deployed reference to ancestral cults, sacred laws, traditional rites and other types of religious actions to construct religious identity as a means of persuasion. The present chapter explores the use of a variety of forms of religious argumentation and addresses issues of religious identity in public cases of eisangelia. Emphasis is placed on the question of how orators reconstruct ideal forms of religious identity in their arguments; particularly, the main interest of this chapter lies in the techniques (...) by which orators use their religious argumentation to construct pictures of religious identity, both collective and individual, as well as their own identity. (shrink)

Although modern Republicanism, which highly values the right of freedom of speech, finds its inspiration in the historical reality of the Roman Republic, it seems that in the course of the Republican period citizens shared a recognised ability to speak freely in public, but did not enjoy equal status with one another in the domain of speech as protected by law. Of course, Republican Rome knew laws regulating free speech and perhaps even later provisions had been passed concerning iniuria. However, (...) in these cases, as later on under Augustus, these measures acted as means of restraint and inhibition and did not directly address the right of the individual to speak freely. The fundamental question this paper addresses is why, in the course of the Republic, the right to speak freely was not protected by law and never came to be recognised as a formalised subjective right in Republican Rome. The answer, I argue, lies in the fact that in Rome speaking freely was conceived as the positive moral quality that characterised a natural ability of human beings, and thereby it could not have provided a field of legislation. It follows that the Roman Republic would not have passed the ‘straight talk test’ that modern Republicanism requires for the establishment of a free and just society. However, Republican Rome invites us to think about liberty of speech as belonging to the realm of ethics: as a moral quality sustained by contemporary social norms, not subject to legislation, which inevitably ends up protecting the interests of a group or groups and their specific speech regimes. (shrink)

Democritus of Abdera, best known as a cosmologist and the founder of atomism, wrote more on ethics than anyone before Plato. His work Peri euthumiês (On Contentment) was extremely influential on the later development of teleological and intellectualist ethics, eudaimonism, hedonism, therapeutic ethics, and positive psychology. The loss of his works, however, and the transmission of his fragments in collections of maxims (gnomai), has obscured the extent his contribution to the history of systematic ethics and influence on later philosophy, especially (...) in the Hellenistic age. In this essay I review the evidence basis for Democritus’ ethics, discuss the rhetorical and logical aspects of his maxims, attempt to synthesize the fragments into an overall interpretation, and offer a summary some of the more influential aspects of his ethics. (shrink)

In this piece, I propose a reading of Plato’s Gorgias that pays special attention to the role that the fictional audience plays in the unfolding of the dialogue. To this end, I use some of the insights that Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts–Tyteca conveyed in their seminal work, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation in order to argue that thinking about the way in which Socrates’ arguments are shaped by the different audiences that Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles aim to (...) address and represent provides us with a new hermeneutical understanding of what is at stake in each of the different interactions Socrates engages in throughout the dialogue. In unpacking the way in which Socrates appropriates Gorgias’ particular audience, transforms Polus’ universal audience, and challenges Callicles’ elite audience, I provide an outline of the difficulties that Plato’s Socrates has to overcome in order to achieve the ‘community of minds’ that Perelman and Olbrechts–Tyteca identify as the bedrock of fruitful argumentation. Having done this, in the last section I turn to Plato’s Phaedrus, for the purpose of making evident that thinking about Plato’s deployment of rhetorical audiences is a crucial step in the effort to expose the implicit continuity that links the discussion of rhetoric delivered by the Gorgias to that of the Phaedrus. (shrink)

The present chapter addresses a passage from Plutarch’s Praecepta gerendae reipublicae that can be found where the section referring to the need for the statesman’s ethical development intersects with the section concerning rhetoric. In this passage, Plutarch remarks that even though he had earlier ascribed everything to virtue, he shall now consent that rhetoric, too, has a role to play in politics. Though not defined as the “craftsman” of persuasion but just as a “factor helping for persuasion,” rhetoric is still (...) regarded as necessary for the good statesman to exercise his power on the irrational and aggressive impulses of the mass. Despite the fact that the passage has strongly attracted the attention of scholars, there is still room for analysis of this ‘secondary place’ that Plutarch has reserved for rhetoric. My intention here is to explore the extent to which taking a closer look both at the literary/rhetorical aspect of this passage and in the way and the conditions under which pre-textual presence occurs in it could yield a deeper understanding of the attitude expressed by Plutarch towards a subject as loaded as rhetoric during that period. (shrink)

Este artículo explora el potencial persuasivo de los imperativos y las preguntas en los discursos de Esquines y Demóstenes. Los imperativos tienen una fuerza directiva volitiva en que invitan a la audiencia a tomar medidas, ya sea bloqueando al adversario del orador para que no haga una declaración o votando en contra de él. El uso de una alta concentración de preguntas retóricas en momentos específicos en los discursos se convierte en una herramienta poderosa: tanto al articular un ataque implacable (...) contra el oponente, como al no dar al público un respiro en el cual considere defectos en la posición del hablante. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

In the past two decades scholars such as Robert Dodaro, Kathy Eden, and Michael Cameron have called attention to the influence that Augustine’s rhetorical education had on his scriptural hermeneutic. Recently, M. Cameron has argued that Augustine began to incorporate the rhetorical concept of oeconomia into his scriptural hermeneutic during his time in Milan. This article expands on Cameron’s work by establishing that Augustine had in fact incorporated rhetorical oeconomia into his scriptural hermeneutic by 387 / 8 C.E. through a (...) focused reading of two texts from De moribus ecclesiae. This reading demonstrates that the terminology and logic that Augustine employs to argue for the unity of the Christian scriptures in mor. 1.17.30 and 1.28.56 mirror the terminology and logic of the Latin rhetorical tradition, revealing that Augustine uses the phrases mirifica dispositio and admirabilis ordo to represent the same concept that Quintilian had referred to with the phrase oeconomica dispositio. (shrink)

Los discursos de oradores como Isócrates, Gorgias, Antifonte, Lisias, entre otros, e igualmente, los dos tratados de retórica que conservamos de la segunda mitad del siglo IV a. C no solo pueden considerarse como piezas literarias construidas con gran habilidad o como manuales con recetas para aplicar sino como fuente de conceptos de interés para la filosofía. En este artículo analizaremos uno de esos conceptos, τὸ εἰκός. Traducido normalmente como “probable” o “verosímil”, los eikóta son recursos argumentativos utilizados desde los (...) orígenes de la práctica de arte retórico, sobre todo en espacios judiciales y, particularmente, fueron usados en aquellos litigios en donde la falta de testigos o testimonios hacía difícil inclinar favorablemente al juez. Pero también los eikóta ocuparon el centro de la crítica platónica al ser definidos como opuestos a la verdad. (shrink)

This article uses the evidence of the early Christian martyr acts to argue for the existence of a broader, provincial discourse on the importance of legal procedure in criminal trials in the Roman Empire. By focusing on moments of criminal confrontations, these texts not only attempted to explain and glorify the deaths of martyrs, but also sought to make sense of a process that was designed by the Roman state to be arbitrary and terrifying. In the course of their narratives, (...) the martyr acts articulate a distinctly provincial understanding of imperial judicial procedures. They politicize this understanding in ways consequential for current scholarly models of the relations between the imperial government and provincial society more broadly. (shrink)