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  1. Counting Subjects.Joseph Gottlieb & Bob Fischer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    We normally assume that there’s just one conscious individual per animal. Some question this, suggesting that there may be nonhuman taxonomic groups whose normal, adult members house more than one conscious subject. Call this the multitudes view (“MV)”. Our aim is methodological: we hope to understand how we might assess whether MV is true. To that end, we distinguish two strategies for counting conscious subjects: the duplication strategy and the mind-first strategy. We use human split-brain patients and octopuses to illustrate (...)
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  2. Playing Possum: How Animals Understand Death.Susana Monsó - forthcoming - Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
    When the opossum feels threatened, she becomes paralyzed. Her body temperature plummets, her breathing and heart rates drop to a minimum, and her glands simulate the smell of a putrefying corpse. Playing Possum explores what the opossum and other creatures can teach us about how we and other species understand mortality, and demonstrates that the concept of death, far from being a uniquely human attribute, is widespread in the animal kingdom. -/- With humor and empathy, Susana Monsó tells the stories (...)
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  3. Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on Animal Cognition and Immortality.Peter Adamson & Bethany Somma - 2024 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 106 (1):23-52.
    This paper is devoted to a fascinating passage in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), in which he argues that non-human animals have rational souls. It is found in his Mulaḫḫaṣ fī l-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma (Epitome on Philosophy and Logic). Following a discussion of the afterlife, Faḫr al-Dīn suggests that animals should, like humans, be capable of grasping universals, and that they are aware of their own identity over time. Furthermore, animal behavior shows that they are capable of rational planning and problem-solving. (...)
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  4. Rethinking core affect: the role of dominance in animal behaviour and welfare research.Víctor Carranza-Pinedo - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-23.
    This paper critically examines the philosophical underpinnings of current experimental investigation into animal affect-related decision-making. Animals’ affective states are standardly operationalised by linking positively valenced states with “approach” behaviours and negatively valenced states with “avoidance” behaviours. While this operationalisation has provided a helpful starting point to investigate the ecological role of animals’ internal states, there is extensive evidence that valenced and motivational states do not always neatly align, namely, instances where “liking” does not entail “wanting” (and vice versa). To address (...)
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  5. Letting Animals Off the Hook.Nicolas Delon - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 28 (1).
    A growing literature argues that animals can act for moral reasons without being responsible. I argue that the literature often fails to maintain a clear distinction between moral behavior and moral agency, and I formulate a dilemma: either animals are less moral or they are more responsible than the literature suggests. If animals can respond to moral reasons, they are responsible according to an influential view of moral responsibility—Quality of Will. But if they are responsible, as some argue, costly implications (...)
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  6. Extended animal cognition.Marco Facchin & Giulia Leonetti - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-22.
    According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we (...)
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  7. Nonhuman Animals and Epistemic Injustice.Andrew Lopez - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (1).
    In this paper, I argue that nonhuman animals can be subject to epistemic injustice. I consider Miranda Fricker’s (2007) account of the nature of the harm of epistemic injustice and highlight that it requires that a knower be invested in being recognized as a knower. I argue that a focus on know-how, rather than testimony or concepts for self-understanding and communication, can serve to highlight how nonhuman animals can suffer epistemic injustice without an investment in recognition, by focusing on distributive (...)
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  8. Textos Selecionados de Filosofia da Cognição.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2022 - Pelotas: NEPFIL online.
    Coletânea de traduções de verbetes da SEP na área de Filosofia da Cognição organizada por Eros Carvalho (UFRGS). A obra contém os seguintes verbetes: "Ciência cognitiva", "A teoria computacional da mente", "Teorias teleológicas do conteúdo mental", "Modularidade da Mente", "Cognição Corporificada", "Emoção", e "Cognição Animal".
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  9. Replication, uncertainty and progress in comparative cognition.Alexandria Boyle - 2021 - Animal Behaviour and Cognition 8 (2):296-304.
    Replications are often taken to play both epistemic and demarcating roles in science: they provide evidence about the reliability of fields’ methods and, by extension, about which fields “count” as scientific. I argue that, in a field characterized by a high degree of theoretical openness and uncertainty, like comparative cognition, replications do not sit well in these roles. Like other experiments conducted under conditions of uncertainty, replications are often equivocal and open to interpretation. As a result, they are poorly placed (...)
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  10. The Psychological Speciesism of Humanism.Carrie Figdor - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:1545-1569.
    Humanists argue for assigning the highest moral status to all humans over any non-humans directly or indirectly on the basis of uniquely superior human cognitive abilities. They may also claim that humanism is the strongest position from which to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of within-species discrimination. I argue that changing conceptual foundations in comparative research and discoveries of advanced cognition in many non-human species reveal humanism’s psychological speciesism and its similarity with common justifications of within-species discrimination.
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  11. Observing Primates: Gender, Power, and Knowledge in Primatology.Maria Botero - 2020 - In Kristen Intemann & Sharon Crasnow (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Philosophy of Science. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Using examples of observations of primates in the wild, I will focus in this chapter on the ways in which some of the main feminist critiques are applicable to the observation of non-human animals. In particular, I will focus on the relationship between primatology and various conceptions of human nature and on the fact that primatology has often been described as a “feminist science.” I argue that in primatology there is an openness to a diversity of approaches and to feminist (...)
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  12. Remembering events and representing time.Alexandria Boyle - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2505-2524.
    Episodic memory—memory for personally experienced past events—seems to afford a distinctive kind of cognitive contact with the past. This makes it natural to think that episodic memory is centrally involved in our understanding of what it is for something to be in the past, or to be located in time—that it is either necessary or sufficient for such understanding. If this were the case, it would suggest certain straightforward evidential connections between temporal cognition and episodic memory in nonhuman animals. In (...)
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  13. The Ontology of Organismic Agency: A Kantian Approach.Hugh Desmond & Philippe Huneman - 2020 - In Andrea Altobrando & Pierfrancesco Biasetti (eds.), Natural Born Monads: On the Metaphysics of Organisms and Human Individuals. De Gruyter. pp. 33-64.
    Biologists explain organisms’ behavior not only as having been programmed by genes and shaped by natural selection, but also as the result of an organism’s agency: the capacity to react to environmental changes in goal-driven ways. The use of such ‘agential explanations’ reopens old questions about how justified it is to ascribe agency to entities like bacteria or plants that obviously lack rationality and even a nervous system. Is organismic agency genuinely ‘real’ or is it just a useful fiction? In (...)
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  14. Beyond the human standard in the cognitive domain: a reply to Rodriguez' “Cognition beyond the human domain”.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1204-1208.
    In "Cognition Beyond the Human Domain", Angel Garcia Rodriguez provides critical commentary on Pieces of Mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates (Oxford UP, 2018). In this reply, I argue that his alternative "No-Core" semantic proposal is not an alternative to the Literalist view I defend, but rather one way of elaborating that position.
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  15. Relationship between Cognition and Moral Status Needs Overhaul.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (3):1-2.
    I commend Mikhalevich & Powell for extending the discussion of cognition and its relation to moral status with their well researched and argued target article on invertebrate cognition. I have two small criticisms: that the scala naturae still retains its appeal to some in biology as well as psychology, and that drawing the line at invertebrates requires a bit more defense given the larger comparative cognitive-scientific context.
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  16. Avoiding anthropocentrism in evolutionarily inclusive ethics.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2020 - Animal Sentience 5 (29).
    Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma” that invertebrates are unworthy of ethical concern. However, developing an evolutionarily inclusive ethics requires facing some of the more radical implications of rejecting hierarchical scala naturae and human-centered conceptions of the biological world. In particular, we need to question the anthropocentric assumptions that still linger in discussions like these.
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  17. Against the mind package view of minds: Comments on Carrie Figdor's Pieces of mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (5):671-676.
    Carrie Figdor's Pieces of mind lays the groundwork for critiquing the mind package view of minds. According to the mind package view, psychological properties travel in groups, such that an entity either has the whole mind package or lacks mentality altogether. Implicit commitment to the mind package view makes it seem absurd to attribute some psychological properties (e.g., preferences) to entities that lack other psychological properties (e.g., feelings). Contra the mind package view, we are psychologically continuous with plants, worms, and (...)
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  18. Learning from the Past: Epistemic Generativity and the Function of Episodic Memory.A. Boyle - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):242-251.
    I argue that the function of episodic memory is to store information about the past, against the orthodox view that it is to support imagining the future. I show that episodic memory is epistemically generative, allowing organisms to learn from past events retroactively. This confers adaptive benefits in three domains: reasoning about the world, skill, and social interaction. Given the role of evolutionary perspectives in comparative research, this argument necessitates a radical shift in the study of episodic memory in nonhumans.
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  19. The impure phenomenology of episodic memory.Alexandria Boyle - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (5):641-660.
    Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology: it involves “mentally reliving” a past event. It has been suggested that characterising episodic memory in terms of this phenomenology makes it impossible to test for in animals, because “purely phenomenological features” cannot be detected in animal behaviour. Against this, I argue that episodic memory's phenomenological features are impure, having both subjective and objective aspects, and so can be behaviourally detected. Insisting on a phenomenological characterisation of episodic memory consequently does nothing to damage the (...)
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  20. Let's call a memory a memory, but what kind?Nazim Keven - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Hoerl & McCormack argue that animals cannot represent past situations and subsume animals’ memory-like representations within a model of the world. I suggest calling these memory-like representations as what they are without beating around the bush. I refer to them as event memories and explain how they are different from episodic memory and how they can guide action in animal cognition.
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  21. Carving event and episodic memory at their joints.Nazim Keven - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
    Mahr & Csibra (M&C) argue that event and episodic memories share the same scenario construction process. I think this way of carving up the distinction throws the baby out with the bathwater. If there is a substantive difference between event and episodic memory, it is based on a difference in the construction process and how they are organized, respectively.
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  22. Deleting the Human Clause: A Review of Ashley Shew’s Animal Constructions and Technological Knowledge[REVIEW]Damien P. Williams - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (2):42-44.
    _Animal Constructions and Technological Knowledge_ is Ashley Shew’s debut monograph and in it she argues that we need to reassess and possibly even drastically change the way in which we think about and classify the categories of technology, tool use, and construction behavior. Drawing from the fields of anthropology, animal studies, and philosophy of technology and engineering, Shew demonstrates that there are several assumptions made by researchers in all of these fields—assumptions about intelligence, intentionality, creativity and the capacity for novel (...)
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  23. Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification.Alexandria Boyle - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):284-303.
    That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self-aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self-awareness in question is psychological or bodily self-awareness. This paper argues that whilst self-recognition does not require psychological self-awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self-awareness would leave something out. That is that self-recognition requires ‘objective self-awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self-identification and so are (...)
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  24. Instrumental Reasoning in Nonhuman Animals.Elisabeth Camp & Eli Shupe - 2017 - In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge. pp. 100-118.
  25. Ethics for Fish.Eliot Michaelson & Andrew Reisner - 2017 - In Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 189-208.
    In this chapter we discuss some of the central ethical issues specific to eating and harvesting fish. We survey recent research on fish intelligence and cognition and discuss possible considerations that are distinctive to questions about the ethics of eating fish as opposed to terrestrial and avian mammals. We conclude that those features that are distinctive to the harvesting and consumption of fish, including means of capture and the central role that fishing plays in many communities, do not suggest that (...)
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  26. Anthropomorphism, anthropectomy, and the null hypothesis.Kristin Andrews & Brian Huss - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (5):711-729.
    We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing “anthropomorphic” properties to animals . This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while in practice there is sometimes bias, either in the formulation of the null hypothesis or in the preference of Type-II errors over Type-I (...)
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  27. Human and Animal Minds: Against the Discontinuity Thesis.Caroline Meline - 2014 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 21 (2):39-51.
    Are animals and humans different in kind or only different in degree when it comes to the mental springs of behavior? The source of this question is Charles Darwin's 1871 The Descent of Man, in which he argued for a difference in degree between animals and humans in mental abilities, rather than a difference in kind. Darwin's opponents in the ensuing debate were theologians and scientific traditionalists who insisted upon human specialness when it came to the mind,even if evolution held (...)
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  28. Cephalopod Cognition in an Evolutionary Context: Implications for Ethology. [REVIEW]Joseph J. Vitti - 2013 - Biosemiotics 6 (3):393-401.
    What is the distribution of cognitive ability within the animal kingdom? It would be egalitarian to assume that variation in intelligence is everywhere clinal, but examining trends among major phylogenetic groups, it becomes easy to distinguish high-performing ‘generalists’ – whose behavior exhibits domain-flexibility – from ‘specialists’ whose range of behavior is limited and ecologically specific. These generalists include mammals, birds, and, intriguingly, cephalopods. The apparent intelligence of coleoid cephalopods (squids, octopuses, and cuttlefish) is surprising – and philosophically relevant – because (...)
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  29. Synthetic ethology: a new tool for investigating animal cognition.Bruce MacLennan - 2002 - In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 151--156.
  30. Animal Cognition in Nature, edited by Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg and Alan C. Kamil.Richard W. Byrne - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):73-73.
  31. Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys: comparative cognition.James R. Anderson - 1996 - In A. Russon, Kim A. Bard & S. Parkers (eds.), Reaching Into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23--56.
  32. „Do Animals Choose Habitats?".Michael L. Rosenzweig - 1996 - In Marc Bekoff & Dale Jamieson (eds.), Readings in Animal Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 185.
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  33. Review of CR Gallistel (Ed.) Animal Cognition. [REVIEW]Christopher Gauker - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7:515-515.
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  34. Animal learning.J. Proust - 1992 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 46 (183):418-434.
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  35. Animal Learning.Donald A. Dewsbury - 1991 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (1):57-58.
  36. A communicative approach to animal cognition: A study of conceptual abilities of an African grey parrot.I. Pepperberg - 1991 - In Carolyn A. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 153--186.