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  1. The Discourse of the Birds.David Abram - 2010 - Biosemiotics 3 (3):263-275.
    Modern humans spend much of their time deploying a very rarefied form of intelligence, manipulating abstract symbols while their muscled body is mostly inert. Other animals, in a constant and largely unmediated relation with their earthly surroundings, think with the whole of their bodies. This kind of distributed sentience, this intelligence in the limbs, is especially keen in the case of birds of flight. Unlike most creatures of the ground, who must traverse an opaque surface of only two-plus dimensions as (...)
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  2. Pensamientos de primer orden.Mariela Aguilera - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):55-81.
    Uno de los argumentos en favor de la dependencia entre lenguaje y conceptos descansa en la premisa de que la posesión de conceptos involucra pensamientos de segundo orden y éstos, a su vez, requieren lenguaje. Este trabajo se centra en una variante de este argumento formulada por José Luis Bermúdez. Sostendré que aun cuando el pensamiento de segundo orden suponga competencia lingüística, no es necesario aceptar esa premisa. Propondré, en cambio, dos condiciones alternativas para la posesión de conceptos, la identificación (...)
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  3. The Chimpanzee's Tool.Barry Allen - 1997 - Common Knowledge 6:34-51.
  4. Conditioned Anti-Anthropomorphism.Colin Allen - unknown
    How should scientists react to anthropomorphism (defined for the purposes of this paper as the attribution of mental states or properties to nonhuman animals)? Many thoughtful scientists have attempted to accommodate some measure of anthropomorphism in their approaches to animal behavior. But Wynne will have none of it. We reject his argument against anthropomorphism and argue that he does not pay sufficient attention to the historical facts or to the details of alternative approaches.
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  5. Umwelt or Umwelten? How Should Shared Representation Be Understood Given Such Diversity?Colin Allen - 2014 - Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique 2014 (198):137-158.
    It is a truism among ethologists that one must not forget that animals perceive and represent the world differently from humans. Sometimes this caution is phrased in terms of von Uexküll’s Umwelt concept. Yet it seems possible (perhaps even unavoidable) to adopt a common ontological framework when comparing different species of mind. For some purposes it seems sufficient to ­anchor comparative cognition in common-sense categories; bats echolocate insects (or a subset of them) after all. But for other purposes it seems (...)
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  6. Transitive Inference in Animals: Reasoning or Conditioned Associations?Colin Allen - 2006 - In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
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  7. Animal Cognition and Animal Minds.Colin Allen - 1997 - In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
    Psychology, according to a standard dictionary definition, is the science of mind and behavior. For a major part of the twentieth century, (nonhuman) animal psychology was on a behavioristic track that explicitly denied the possibility of a science of animal mind. While many comparative psychologists remain wedded to behavioristic methods, they have more recently adopted a cognitive, information-processing approach that does not adhere to the strictures of stimulus-response explanations of animal behavior. Cognitive ethologists are typically willing to go much further (...)
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  8. Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1997 - MIT Press.
    The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition.
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  9. Cognitive Ethology and the Intentionality of Animal Behavior.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):313-328.
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  10. Battlefish Contention.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2017 - Animal Sentience 2 (13):3.
  11. Assessment of Covariation by Humans and Animals: The Joint Influence of Prior Expectations and Current Situational Information.Lauren B. Alloy & Naomi Tabachnik - 1984 - Psychological Review 91 (1):112-149.
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  12. Cognitive Explanations and Cognitive Ethology.Rita E. Anderson - 1986 - In William Bechtel (ed.), Integrating Scientific Disciplines. pp. 323--336.
  13. Animal Cognition.Andrews Kristin - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Entry for the Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy.
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  14. Chimpanzee Mind Reading: Don't Stop Believing.Kristin Andrews - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (1).
    Since the question “Do chimpanzees have a theory of mind?” was raised in 1978, scientists have attempted to answer it, and philosophers have attempted to clarify what the question means and whether it has been, or could be, answered. Mindreading or theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. Some versions of the question focus on whether chimpanzees engage in belief reasoning or can think about false belief, and chimpanzees have been given nonverbal versions (...)
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  15. Snipping or Editing? Parsimony in the Chimpanzee Mind-Reading Debate.Kristin Andrews - 2016 - Metascience 25 (3):377-386.
    on ). -/- Advice about how to move forward on the mindreading debate, particularly when it comes to overcoming the logical problem, is much needed in comparative psychology. In chapter 4 of his book Ockham’s Razors, Elliott Sober takes on the task by suggesting how we might uncover the mechanism that mediates between the environmental stimuli that is visible to all, and chimpanzee social behavior. I argue that Sober's proposed method for deciding between the behaivor-reading and mindreading hypotheses fails given (...)
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  16. Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals.Kristin Andrews - 2011 - In Tom Beauchamp & R. G. Frey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics,. Oxford University Press. pp. 469-494.
    In the context of animal cognitive research, anthropomorphism is defined as the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to animals. Those who worry about anthropomorphism in research, however, are immediately confronted with the question of which properties are uniquely human. One might think that researchers must first hypothesize the existence of a feature in an animal before they can, with warrant, claim that the property is uniquely human. But all too often, this isn't the approach. Rather, there is an a (...)
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  17. Politics or Metaphysics? On Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (1):51-63.
    Biology and Philosophy, forthcoming. Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are unable (...)
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  18. Interpreting the Baboon. [REVIEW]Kristin Andrews - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):5-6.
  19. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds.Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    While philosophers have been interested in animals since ancient times, in the last few decades the subject of animal minds has emerged as a major topic in philosophy. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising nearly fifty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into eight parts: -/- • Mental representation (...)
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  20. Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity.Kristin Andrews & Ljiljana Radenovic - 2012 - In Todd Shackelford & Jennifer Vonk (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-60.
    According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species. Materialism of mind coupled with Darwin’s evolutionary theory leads directly to such claims and even today arguments for animal mental properties are often presented with the MCC as a premise. However, the MCC has been often challenged among contemporary scholars. It is usually argued that (...)
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  21. Chimps as Secret Agents.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2129-2158.
    We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more full-blown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimpanzee agency does not possess all the features of typical adult human agency, chimpanzee agency is evolutionarily responsive to their environment and overlaps considerably with our own. As such, it is an evolved set of capacities (...)
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  22. Visual Cognition in Social Insects.A. Avarguès-Weber, N. Deisig & M. Giurfa - 2011 - Annu. Rev. Entomol 56:423-443.
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  23. The Current State of the “Question of the Animal”. [REVIEW]Fareed Awan - 2004 - Janus Head 7 (2).
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  24. Steps Toward a Zoology of Mind.Elizabeth Baeten - 2014 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28 (2):107-129.
    Much of twentieth- and twenty-first-century theorizing about cognitive processes, whether in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, cognitive psychology, or related disciplines, spins accounts of cognition totally devoid of any consideration of cognition as an attribute of animals making a living (or not) in various habitats. A significant shift in discussions of mind and cognition follows if we take seriously the fact that humans are animals, products of evolutionary processes and situated squarely within suites of ecosystems. Ignoring evolutionary history is an (...)
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  25. Origins of Meaning: Must We 'Go Gricean'?Dorit Bar-on - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):342-375.
    The task of explaining language evolution is often presented by leading theorists in explicitly Gricean terms. After a critical evaluation, I present an alternative, non-Gricean conceptualization of the task. I argue that, while it may be true that nonhuman animals, in contrast to language users, lack the ‘motive to share information’ understood à la Grice, nonhuman animals nevertheless do express states of mind through complex nonlinguistic behavior. On a proper, non-Gricean construal of expressive communication, this means that they show to (...)
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  26. Objectivity and the Language-Dependence of Thought: A Transcendental Defence of Universal Lingualism.Christian Barth - 2010 - Routledge.
    Does thought depend on language? Primarily as a consequence of the cognitive turn in empirical disciplines like psychology and ethology, many current empirical researchers and empirically minded philosophers tend to answer this question in the negative. This book rejects this mainstream view and develops a philosophical argument in favor of a universal dependence of language on thought. In doing so, it comprises insights of two primary representatives of 20 th century and contemporary philosophy, namely Donald Davidson and Robert Brandom. Barth (...)
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  27. Why We Can't Say What Animals Think.Jacob Beck - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):520–546.
    Realists about animal cognition confront a puzzle. If animals have real, contentful cognitive states, why can’t anyone say precisely what the contents of those states are? I consider several possible resolutions to this puzzle that are open to realists, and argue that the best of these is likely to appeal to differences in the format of animal cognition and human language.
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  28. Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought?Jacob Beck - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):218-229.
    This paper surveys and evaluates the answers that philosophers and animal researchers have given to two questions. Do animals have thoughts? If so, are their thoughts conceptual? Along the way, special attention is paid to distinguish debates of substance from mere battles over terminology, and to isolate fruitful areas for future research.
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  29. Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson, Eds., Readings in Animal Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, XV + 379 Pp., $30.00 (Paper), ISBN 0-262-52208-X. [REVIEW]Colin G. Beer - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (1):156-160.
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  30. Expressions of Mind in Animal Behavior.R. Beers - 1997 - In R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.), Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Suny Press. pp. 198--209.
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  31. Readings in Animal Cognition.Marc Bekoff & Dale W. Jamieson (eds.) - 1996 - MIT Press.
    This collection of 24 readings is the first comprehensive treatment of important topics by leading figures in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of...
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  32. An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  33. 2 Life and Cognition.Margaret Boden - 2001 - In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 11.
  34. What Does Fido Believe?Lisa Bortolotti - 2008 - Think 7 (19):7-15.
    Lisa Bortolotti introduces the arguments about whether dogs can have beliefs.
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  35. A Comparative Approach to Understanding Human Numerical Cognition.Kerry E. Jordan & Brannon & M. Elizabeth - 2009 - In Bruce M. Hood & Laurie R. Santos (eds.), The Origins of Object Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  36. The Role of Abstract Reference in Mead's Account of Human Origins.Tom Burke - 2005 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (3):567-601.
    This paper addresses issues regarding human origins, drawing particularly on George Herbert Mead 's account of the emergence of self consciousness as a product of social and physical evolution. Some of John Dewey's ideas on the nature of thought and language are added to that account. The so called "great leap" in human evolution that occurred some 50,000 years ago is attributed not just to the emergence of symbols or language but to the development of fully recursive languages suited for (...)
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  37. Living Together: People, Animals, Environment--A Personal Historical Perspective.L. K. Bustad - 1988 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 31 (2):171.
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  38. Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison.Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem - 2005 - Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness-brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both (...)
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  39. Primate Cognition: Evidence for the Ethical Treatment of Primates.Richard W. Byrne - 1999 - In Francine L. Dolins (ed.), Attitudes to Animals: Views in Animal Welfare. Cambridge University Press. pp. 114--125.
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  40. On the Cognitive Architecture of Insects and Other Information-Processing Systems.Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):13-33.
    According to Carruthers ants and bees have minds. This claim is to be understood realistically. We do not interpret the overt behaviour of ants and bees by ascribing to them beliefs and desires in an instrumental manner. They rather possess minds in the relevant cognitive sense. In this paper, I propose to pave the way for a reductio against such a polemic view. In particular, I shall argue that if ants and bees have minds, by the same token, plants do (...)
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  41. Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind.Martin Carrier & Peter Machamer (eds.) - 1997 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Leading scholars in the fields of philosophy and the sciences of the mind have contributed to this newest volume in the prestigious Pittsburgh-Konstanz series. Among the problem areas discussed are folk psychology, meanings as conceptual structures, functional and qualitative properties of colors, the role of conscious mental states, representation and mental content, the impact of connectionism on the philosophy of the mind, and supervenience, emergence, and realization. Most of the essays are followed by commentaries that reflect ongoing debates in the (...)
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  42. Vacancy Chains: A Process of Mobility to New Resources in Humans and Other Animals.I. D. Chase & T. H. DeWitt - 1988 - Social Science Information 27 (1):83-98.
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  43. `The Complete Biography of Every Animal': Ants, Bees, and Humanity in Nineteenth-Century England.J. F. M. Clark - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 29 (2):249-267.
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  44. The Logical Problem and the Theoretician's Dilemma.Hayley Clatterbuck - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1).
    The theory-theory of human uniqueness posits that the capacity to theorize, in a way strongly analogous to theorizing in scientific practice, was a key innovation in the hominid lineage and was responsible for many of our unique cognitive traits. One of the central arguments that its proponents have used to support the claim that animals are not theorists, the logical problem, bears strong similarities to Hempel's theoretician's dilemma, which purports to show that theories are unnecessary. This similarity threatens to undermine (...)
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  45. Comparative Behavior in Solving a Series of Maze Problems of Varying Difficulty.C. M. Cox - 1928 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 11 (3):202.
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  46. Pushmi-Pullyu Representations and Mindreading in Chimpanzees.Laura Danón - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):208-236.
    Lurz and Krachun propose a new experimental protocol designed to discriminate genuine mindreading animals from mere behavior-readers and to give evidence in favor of the claim that chimpanzees are capable of attributing internal goals to others. They suggest that chimpanzees' variety of "internal goal attribution" consists in attributing to others basic intentional representations, baptized by Millikan as "pushmi-pullyu representations". Now, Millikan distinguishes what I propose to call 'pure' PPs from more complex varieties of PPs, which allow their owners to respond (...)
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  47. Kinds of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Basic Books.
  48. Against Morgan's Canon.Simon Fitzpatrick - forthcoming - In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge.
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  49. The Primate Mindreading Controversy : A Case Study in Simplicity and Methodology in Animal Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. pp. 224--246.
  50. Doing Away with Morgan’s Canon.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (2):224–246.
    Morgan’s Canon is a very widely endorsed methodological principle in animal psychology, believed to be vital for a rigorous, scientific approach to the study of animal cognition. In contrast I argue that Morgan’s Canon is unjustified, pernicious and unnecessary. I identify two main versions of the Canon and show that they both suffer from very serious problems. I then suggest an alternative methodological principle that captures all of the genuine methodological benefits that Morgan’s Canon can bring but suffers from none (...)
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