About this topic
Summary The topic of Animal Cognition is a broad interdisciplinary area with contributions by philosophers, psychologists, behavioral biologists, and neuroscientists. Because the definition of "cognition" is itself contested, the exact range of capacities attributable to animals and capable of empirical investigation is also contested, but these capacities include general reasoning, reasoning in specific domains such as causal inference or social hierarchies, tool use, problem solving, communicative and proto-linguistic abilities, episodic and semantic memory, spatial navigation (including cognitive maps), metacognition, self-recognition and self-awareness, and so-called "mind reading" or "theory of mind".  Questions about the existence, distribution and forms of animal consciousness are also raised in the context of animal cognition.
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  1. Animal Psychology and Ethology in Britain and the Emergence of Professional Concern for the Concept of Ethical Cost [Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 33c/2 (2002), 235-261]. [REVIEW]H. A. - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 34 (1):201-201.
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  2. Animal Psychology and Ethology in Britain and the Emergence of Professional Concern for the Concept of Ethical Cost.H. A. - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 33 (2):235-262.
    It has been argued that if an animal is psychologically like us, there may be more scientific reason to experiment upon it, but less moral justification to do so. Some scientists deny the existence of this dilemma, claiming that although there are scientifically valuable similarities between humans and animals that make experimentation worthwhile, humans are at the same time unique and fundamentally different. This latter response is, ironically, typical of pre-Darwinian beliefs in the relationship between human and non-human animals. Another (...)
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  3. Cross-Modal Representations in Primates and Dogs A New Framework of Recognition of Social Objects.Ikuma Adachi - 2009 - Interaction Studies 10 (2):225-251.
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  4. Defense Motivational System: Issues of Emotion, Reinforcement, and Neural Structure.David Adams - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):675.
  5. Motivational Systems: Fear or Defense? Pain or Recuperation?David B. Adams - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (2):301.
  6. Waiting by Mistake: Symbolic Representation of Rewards Modulates Intertemporal Choice in Capuchin Monkeys, Preschool Children and Adult Humans.Elsa Addessi, Francesca Bellagamba, Alexia Delfino, Francesca De Petrillo, Valentina Focaroli, Luigi Macchitella, Valentina Maggiorelli, Beatrice Pace, Giulia Pecora, Sabrina Rossi, Agnese Sbaffi, Maria Isabella Tasselli & Fabio Paglieri - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):428-441.
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  7. The Ecological Rationality of Delay Tolerance: Insights From Capuchin Monkeys.Elsa Addessi, Fabio Paglieri & Valentina Focaroli - 2011 - Cognition 119 (1):142-147.
  8. Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory.Pieter R. Adriaens & Andreas de Block (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Maladapting Minds discusses a number of reasons why philosophers of psychiatry should take an interest in evolutionary explanations of mental disorders and, more generally, in evolutionary thinking. First of all, there is the nascent field of evolutionary psychiatry. Unlike other psychiatrists, evolutionary psychiatrists engage with ultimate, rather than proximate, questions about mental illnesses. Being a young and youthful new discipline, evolutionary psychiatry allows for a nice case study in the philosophy of science. Secondly, philosophers of psychiatry have engaged with evolutionary (...)
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  9. Anthropomorphism in Science.Joseph Agassi - manuscript
    ANTHROPOMORPHISM is an inveterate tendency to project human qualities into natural phenomena—consciously or not. The standard and most important variant of anthropomorphism is animism which sees a soul in everything in nature. Before entering into the role of anthropomorphism in the history of science, let us consider a few important and usually neglected logical aspects of the idea.
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  10. Animales sin lenguaje en el espacio de los conceptos.Aguilera Mariela - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):25-38.
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  11. Is Anyone a Cognitive Ethologist?Colin Allen - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):589-607.
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  12. A Skeptic's Progress.Colin Allen - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):695-702.
    Seven chimpanzees in twenty-seven experiments run over the course of five years at his University of Louisiana laboratory in New Iberia, Louisiana, are at the heart of Daniel Povinelli’s case that chimpanzee thinking about the physical world is not at all like that of humans. Chimps, according to Povinelli and his coauthors James Reaux, Laura Theall, and Steve Giambrone, are phenomenally quick at learning to associate visible features of tools with specific uses of those tools, but they appear to lack (...)
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  13. Animal Concepts.Colin Allen - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):66-66.
    Millikan's account of concepts is applicable to questions about concepts in nonhuman animals. I raise three questions in this context: (1) Does classical conditioning entail the possession of simple concepts? (2) Are movement property concepts more basic than substance concepts? (3) What is the empirical content of claiming that concept meanings do not necessarily change as dispositions change?
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  14. Comparative Cognitive Studies, Not Folk Phylogeny, Please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122.
  15. Monkeys Mind.Colin Allen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):147.
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  16. Readings in Animal Cognition.Colin Allen & D. Jamison (eds.) - 1996 - MIT Press.
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  17. Encountering Anthropomorphism.Richard Allen & S. May - unknown
    On Anthropomorphism concerns itself with performances and artworks that explore the complex of interesting and mutually contradictory ideas located under the umbrella term, ‘anthropomorphism’. On the one hand, it is used to refer to something that resembles a human, and on the other hand it refers to our natural tendency to read human characteristics in the non-human object or animal. Moreover, an interrogation of the concept of anthropomorphism, especially as it is found in contemporary performance, suggests that there is not (...)
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  18. Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds.Sean Allen-Hermanson - forthcoming - Routledge.
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  19. Decentering Anthropocentrisms: A Functional Approach to Animal Minds.Matthew C. Altman - 2015 - Between the Species 18 (1).
    Anthropocentric biases manifest themselves in two different ways in research on animal cognition. Some researchers claim that only humans have the capacity for reasoning, beliefs, and interests; and others attribute mental concepts to nonhuman animals on the basis of behavioral evidence, and they conceive of animal cognition in more or less human terms. Both approaches overlook the fact that language-use deeply informs mental states, such that comparing human mental states to the mental states of nonlinguistic animals is misguided. In order (...)
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  20. Chimpanzees and Capuchin Monkeys: Comparative Cognition.James R. Anderson - 1996 - In A. Russon, Kim A. Bard & S. Parkers (eds.), Reaching Into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23--56.
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  21. Making the Best Use of Primate Tool Use?James R. Anderson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):551-552.
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  22. On the Contents of Capuchins' Cognitive Toolkit.James R. Anderson - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):588.
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  23. Is Human Cognition Adaptive?John R. Anderson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):471-485.
  24. Prelinguistic Agents Will Form Only Egocentric Representations.Michael L. Anderson & Tim Oates - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):284-285.
    The representations formed by the ventral and dorsal streams of a prelinguistic agent will tend to be too qualitatively similar to support the distinct roles required by PREDICATE(x) structure. We suggest that the attachment of qualities to objects is not a product of the combination of these separate processing streams, but is instead a part of the processing required in each. In addition, we suggest that the formation of objective predicates is inextricably bound up with the emergence of language itself, (...)
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  25. Behavioural Constraints on Social Communication Are Not Likely to Prevent the Evolution of Large Social Groups in Nonhuman Primates.R. J. Andrew - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):694.
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  26. Questions About the Evolution of Bird Song.R. J. Andrew - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):100-100.
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  27. Avian Data on Aggression.R. J. Andrew - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):213-214.
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  28. Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals.Kristin Andrews - 2011 - In Tom L. Beauchamp R. G. Frey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 469--494.
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  29. Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 191--209.
  30. Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?Kristin Andrews - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.
    I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s theoretical commitments should lead them to accept (...)
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  31. Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null Hypothesis.Kristin Andrews & Brian Huss - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (5):711-729.
    We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing “anthropomorphic” properties to animals . This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while in practice there is sometimes bias, either in the formulation of the null hypothesis or in the preference of Type-II errors over Type-I (...)
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  32. Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior.Alejandro Arango - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):403-422.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  33. Protosign and Protospeech: An Expanding Spiral.Michael A. Arbib - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):209-210.
    The intriguing observation that left-cerebral dominance for vocalization is ancient, occurring in frogs, birds, and mammals, grounds Corballis's argument that the predominance of right-handedness may result from an association between manual gestures and vocalization in the evolution of language. This commentary supports the general thesis that language evolved “From hand to mouth” (Corballis 2002), while offering alternatives for some of Corballis's supporting arguments.
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  34. The Significance of Seeking the Animal's Perspective.Arnold Arluke - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):13-14.
  35. The Origins and Rise of Ethology: The Science of the Natural Behaviour of Animals. [REVIEW]Pamela Asquith - 1980 - British Journal for the History of Science 13 (3):273-274.
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  36. Reflecting on Animal Consciousness.Laure Assayag - 2016 - Questions: Philosophy for Young People 16:5-6.
  37. Perhaps Sisyphus is the Relevant Model for Animal-Language Researchers.Donald M. Baer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):642.
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  38. Anthropomorphism and Truth.J. B. Baillie - 1917 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 18:185 - 223.
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  39. Toward an Understanding of the Differences in the Responses of Humans and Other Animals to Density.Reuben M. Baron & Stephen P. Needel - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (3):320-326.
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  40. Why Not Ask “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Soul?”.William M. Baum - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):116-116.
    The question, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” is logically identical to the question, “Does the chimpanzee have a soul?” It is a peculiarity of our culture that we talk about anyone having a mind, and such talk is unhelpful for a science of behavior. The label “killjoy hypothesis” is an ad hominem attack.
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  41. Do Animals Need a Theory of Mind?Michael Bavidge & ian Ground - 2009 - In I. Leudar & A. Costall (eds.), Against Theory of Mind‎. Palgrave. pp. 167--188.
    This book brings together disparate strands of ToM research, lays out historical roots of the idea, and indicates better alternatives.
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  42. Social Cognition: Exchanging and Sharing Information on the Run. [REVIEW]Marc Bekoff - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):617-632.
    In this essay I consider various aspects of the rapidly growing field of cognitive ethology, concentrating mainly on evolutionary and comparative discussion of the notion of intentionality. I am not concerned with consciousness, per se, for a concentration on consciousness deflects attention from other, and in many cases more interesting, problems in the study of animal cognition. I consider how, when, where, and (attempt to discuss) why individuals from different taxa exchange social information concerning their beliefs, desires, and goals. My (...)
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  43. Cognitive Ethology: Slayers, Skeptics, and Proponents.Marc Bekoff & Colin Allen - 1997 - In R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.), Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Suny Press. pp. 313--334.
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  44. Readings in Animal Cognition.Marc Bekoff & Dale W. Jamieson (eds.) - 1996 - MIT Press.
    This collection of 24 readings is the first comprehensive treatment of important topics by leading figures in the rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of...
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  45. The Dangers of Analogy in Human Ethology.Burton Benedict - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (1):27.
  46. Cognitive Ethology: Theory or Poetry?Jonathan Bennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):356.
  47. The Force-Field Puzzle and Mindreading in Non-Human Primates.José Luis Bermúdez - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):397-410.
    What is the relation between philosophical theorizing and experimental data? A modest set of naturalistic assumptions leads to what I term the force-field puzzle. The assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science, as captured in Quine’s force-field metaphor, seems to push us simultaneously towards thinking that there have to be conceptual constraints upon how we interpret experimental data and towards thinking that there cannot be such conceptual constraints, because all theorizing must be accountable to data and observation. The key (...)
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  48. Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom.José Luis Bermúdez - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press.
    ven a cursory look at the extensive literature on mindreading in nonhuman animals reveals considerable variation both in what mindreading abilities are taken to be, and in what is taken as evidence for them. Claims that seem to contradict each other are often not inconsistent with each other when examined more closely. And sometimes theorists who seem to be on the same side are actually talking at cross-purposes. The first aim of this paper is to tackle some important framework questions (...)
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  49. Animal Reasoning and Proto-Logic.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2006 - In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
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  50. Ascribing Thoughts to Non-Linguistic Creatures.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5 (2):313-34.
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